From 4b25ec27719d341e0b83ca38b7126ec56982785f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 04:18:43 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 01/21] feat(pam): Oracle database support via proxied-auth gateway Adds Oracle DB as the 8th PAM handler. Gateway accepts client connections with a placeholder password, proxies pre-auth bytes verbatim to upstream, intercepts at O5Logon to swap client-supplied placeholder-keyed material for real-password-keyed material, and byte-relays post-auth. Credential injection works end-to-end for JDBC thin clients (sqlcl, SQL Developer, DBeaver) and go-ora; user never sees real Oracle credentials. Handler lives in packages/pam/handlers/oracle/. Ports crypto primitives (PBKDF2+SHA512, AES-CBC session-key encryption, PKCS5 padding) and TTC codec (compressed ints, CLR byte strings, KVP encoding) from MIT-licensed sijms/go-ora. See ATTRIBUTION.md and ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md for architecture notes and handoff. Known dead code remains in this commit from the earlier full- impersonation attempt (ano.go, nego.go, nego_templates.go, parts of o5logon*.go, upstream.go, handshake_test.go). Kept intact to preserve history of the approach; cleanup follows as a separate commit. --- ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md | 512 ++++++++++++ go.mod | 3 +- go.sum | 6 +- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md | 33 + packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ano.go | 198 +++++ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go | 9 + .../pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go | 186 +++++ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go | 425 ++++++++++ .../pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go | 207 +++++ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go | 290 +++++++ .../pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go | 624 ++++++++++++++ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go | 344 ++++++++ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go | 780 ++++++++++++++++++ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go | 290 +++++++ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go | 304 +++++++ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go | 339 ++++++++ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/upstream.go | 401 +++++++++ packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go | 21 + packages/pam/pam-proxy.go | 22 + packages/pam/session/uploader.go | 3 +- 20 files changed, 4993 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ano.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go create mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/upstream.go diff --git a/ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md b/ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..da8eadce --- /dev/null +++ b/ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md @@ -0,0 +1,512 @@ +# Oracle PAM — Research & Implementation Notes + +Handoff document for anyone forking this branch and continuing Oracle PAM work. Contains: +- What we're building and why it's different from other databases +- What we tried, how far we got, what broke +- Research into how the major PAM vendors solve this +- The two viable paths forward, with concrete technical detail +- References, file map, and how to reproduce the current test setup + +--- + +## 1. Context + +Oracle is the 8th database type being added to Infisical PAM. For the seven existing databases (Postgres, MySQL, MSSQL, MongoDB, Redis, plus SSH/Kubernetes), the gateway acts as a credential-injecting middleman: the user types a placeholder password, the gateway rewrites authentication on the fly with real credentials stored in Infisical, and forwards traffic. The user never sees real credentials, every query is session-recorded. + +Oracle breaks this pattern because: + +- The **TNS/TTC wire protocol is proprietary and poorly documented**. No published spec. Different reference behaviors per Oracle client (sqlplus/OCI vs. JDBC thin vs. python-oracledb vs. go-ora). +- **O5Logon authentication is cryptographic** — the server must generate a challenge derived from the password; client derives response from the same password; simple password substitution like Postgres/MySQL doesn't work. +- **Pre-authentication handshake has 4–5 negotiation phases** where each response must be byte-correct for the specific client profile. + +## 2. Constraints (product-level) + +Decided by product: + +1. **No credential exposure to user** — not even ephemeral credentials. User must never see, store, or be able to exfiltrate an Oracle password. +2. **Must work with the mainstream Oracle clients** actual DBAs use: sqlplus, SQL Developer, DBeaver, Toad, JDBC applications. +3. **Complete support** — not a partial ship that only covers a subset of clients. +4. **Time/effort not a constraint.** +5. **Ongoing maintenance acceptable.** + +## 3. All approaches evaluated + +| Approach | Used by | Ruled in/out | Why | +|----------|---------|-------------|-----| +| Full protocol impersonation | StrongDM, our attempt | **IN (THE MASK)** | Meets all constraints | +| Cert-based auth (mTLS + `IDENTIFIED EXTERNALLY` users) | Teleport | **IN (THE PASS)** | Meets all constraints | +| Ephemeral Oracle users (`CREATE USER temp_x; DROP USER` per session) | CyberArk SIA | OUT | User sees ephemeral password | +| Jump-host with RDP video recording | CyberArk PSM | OUT | Wrong shape for a network gateway; heavy Windows infra | +| Vaulted credential checkout | Delinea, BeyondTrust, HashiCorp Boundary | OUT | User sees real password | + +## 4. The two viable paths + +### THE MASK — full protocol impersonation + +Gateway pretends to be an Oracle server to the client, holds real credentials, authenticates upstream to the real Oracle, relays bytes. Zero Oracle-side configuration required by the customer. + +**What StrongDM ships in production.** Confirmed by release-note analysis (see §9). + +### THE PASS — cert-based auth + +Infisical issues per-session client certificates. Oracle is configured with TCPS + users created as `IDENTIFIED EXTERNALLY AS 'CN=user'`. Gateway terminates client TLS, re-establishes TLS upstream with a signed cert. No passwords anywhere. + +**What Teleport ships in production.** Specified in their [RFD 0115](https://github.com/gravitational/teleport/blob/master/rfd/0115-oracle-db-access-integration.md). + +### Trade-off + +One-axis choice: + +- **MASK** = zero customer-side setup, permanent protocol maintenance +- **PASS** = one-time customer DBA setup per Oracle DB, minimal ongoing maintenance + +## 5. Current state of THE MASK implementation + +Branch: `oracle-db`. Handler: `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/`. + +### File map (~2,750 LOC) + +| File | Purpose | +|------|---------| +| `proxy.go` | `OracleProxy` struct, `HandleConnection` orchestration | +| `upstream.go` | Upstream dial via go-ora with TLS-in-dial trick; captures authenticated `net.Conn` | +| `tns.go` | TNS packet codec (CONNECT/ACCEPT/DATA/MARKER/REFUSE); ported from go-ora | +| `o5logon.go` + `o5logon_server.go` | Server-side O5Logon crypto + auth phase 1/2 builders | +| `nego.go` | `RunPreAuthExchange` pre-auth dispatcher; handles ANO/TCPNego/DataTypeNego | +| `nego_templates.go` | Captured RDS responses (currently used as static replies) | +| `ano.go` | ANO request parser + refusal response | +| `ttc.go` | TTC codec helpers (`TTCBuilder`, `TTCReader`) | +| `query_logger.go` | Passive TTC tap for session recording | +| `handshake_test.go` | Standalone test: runs server-side handshake, points go-ora at it | +| `constants.go` | `ProxyPasswordPlaceholder = "infisical-pam-proxy"` | +| `ATTRIBUTION.md` | MIT notice for ported go-ora code | + +### Protocol flow and status + +``` +Client Gateway Upstream Oracle + │ │ │ + │── CONNECT ──────────────────────▶ │ │ + │ │── CONNECT ───────────────────────▶ │ [go-ora] + │ │◀── ACCEPT + nego + O5Logon ────── │ [go-ora] + │ │ (upstream authenticated) │ + │◀─ ACCEPT ──────────────────────── │ │ + │ │ │ + │── connect-data supplement ──────▶ │ ← NEW 16-bit framed DATA │ + │ (go-ora only — sqlplus skips) │ │ + │ │ │ + │── ANO request ──────────────────▶ │ │ + │◀─ ANO refusal ──────────────────── │ │ + │ │ │ + │── TCPNego request ──────────────▶ │ │ + │◀─ TCPNego response ────────────── │ │ + │ │ │ + │── DataTypeNego request ─────────▶ │ │ + │◀─ DataTypeNego response ───────── │ │ + │ │ │ + │── O5Logon phase 1 ──────────────▶ │ │ + │◀─ phase 1 response ───────────── │ │ + │── O5Logon phase 2 ──────────────▶ │ │ + │◀─ phase 2 response ────────────── │ │ + │ │ │ + │── post-auth byte relay ◀────────────┼──────────── byte relay ────────── │ +``` + +### Per-stage status against each client + +| Stage | go-ora | sqlcl (JDBC thin) | sqlplus (OCI) | +|-------|--------|-------------------|---------------| +| CONNECT / ACCEPT | ✅ | ✅ | untested | +| Connect-data supplement drain | ✅ | N/A | N/A | +| ANO refusal | ✅ | ✅ | untested | +| TCPNego | ✅ | ✅ | untested | +| DataTypeNego | ✅ (dynamic echo generator) | ✅ | untested | +| O5Logon phase 1 | ✅ | ✅ (fixed JDBC thin username encoding) | untested | +| O5Logon phase 2 + password verify | ✅ | ✅ | untested | +| Phase 2 response with trailing summary | ✅ | ✅ | untested | +| Post-auth byte relay | not tested E2E | ⚠ stalls — state mismatch between upstream (go-ora caps) and client (sqlcl caps) | untested | + +**As of 2026-04-21 session, both go-ora and sqlcl (JDBC thin) complete the full handshake + O5Logon auth successfully.** sqlcl sends an OALL8 query through the relay, but upstream Oracle responds with a MARKER (protocol reset signal) + ORA-error instead of query results — because the upstream session was negotiated with go-ora's TTC caps at startup, and sqlcl's post-auth bytes don't match the state the upstream is in. + +## 6. What broke (and what's fixable) + +### Failure 1: sqlcl / JDBC thin — DataTypeNego + +- **Symptom:** `ORA-17401: Protocol violation` +- **Root cause:** we replay a DataTypeNego response captured from `go-ora ↔ RDS` back to JDBC thin. JDBC's offered type list differs from go-ora's, so JDBC sees types it never advertised and aborts. +- **Fix shape:** build a dynamic generator (see §8 for the reference material found). + +### Failure 2: go-ora — TCPNego response rejected + +- **Symptom:** `server compile time caps length less than 8` +- **Likely cause:** either a content issue in our captured `rdsTCPNegoResponse` template or state-dependent parsing in go-ora tied to prior ANO/nego steps. +- **Fix shape:** debug the specific byte that go-ora trips on. Probably ~hours of work with packet-level diffing. + +### Failure 3 (FIXED TODAY): go-ora — post-ACCEPT framing + +- **Symptom:** `TNS packet too large: 16056320` +- **Root cause:** after ACCEPT, go-ora sends a **16-bit-framed DATA packet** containing `(DESCRIPTION=...)` as a connect-data supplement, BEFORE switching to 32-bit framing. Our code assumed 32-bit framing immediately after ACCEPT. +- **Fix shipped:** added `detectConnectDataSupplement` in `proxy.go` and drain logic in both `proxy.go` and `handshake_test.go`. When we detect a 16-bit-framed DATA packet with the signature pattern (length in `[0:2]`, zero checksum in `[2:4]`, DATA opcode `0x06` in `[4]`), we consume it and continue. +- **This unblocks 2 of 4 pre-auth stages for go-ora.** + +## 7. Research: how the major PAM vendors solve Oracle + +### StrongDM — confirmed via release-note analysis + +Their Oracle integration is a protocol-level proxy written in Go (same as us). Release-note evidence proves they wrote their own TNS/TTC parser: + +- 2025-10-16: "shorter username would cause ORA-03146: invalid buffer length for TTC field" — only happens if you wrote the TTC encoder yourself +- 2025-10-09: "JDBC-based Oracle clients (DBeaver, SQL Developer) could fail with a decoding error during authentication" — separate JDBC-specific decode path +- 2025-09-26: "warning messages are now correctly decoded if present during the Oracle authentication handshake" +- 2025-11-20: "corrects an issue with connecting to Oracle resources using server or client character sets other than AL32UTF8" + +They ship separate "Oracle" and "Oracle (NNE)" resource types. NNE is the Native Network Encryption variant — they support both, with selectable AES/DES/RC4 + SHA algorithms. That means they implement full NNE termination (decrypt + re-encrypt), not refusal. + +8+ Oracle-specific bug fixes in Sep–Nov 2025 alone. Confirms the maintenance burden is real and permanent — this is a team of 2–4 engineers actively hardening the protocol. + +No public source code. We have to implement from scratch using go-ora and python-oracledb as references. + +### Teleport — confirmed via public RFD and docs + +Oracle Access Proxy. Terminates incoming TLS, re-establishes TLS to Oracle with a Teleport-signed client cert. Cert-based auth end-to-end. + +Hard requirements on Oracle side: +- TCPS listener on port 2484 +- `SSL_CLIENT_AUTHENTICATION = TRUE` +- `SQLNET.AUTHENTICATION_SERVICES = (TCPS)` in `sqlnet.ora` +- Teleport wallet installed on Oracle server +- Users created as `IDENTIFIED EXTERNALLY AS 'CN=user'` + +Oracle 18c/19c/21c supported. 12c explicitly incompatible (dropped due to incompatibilities). + +`tctl auth sign --format=oracle` generates the Oracle wallet for the server to trust. Turnkey DBA setup. + +### CyberArk SIA — ruled out (would expose ephemeral creds) + +Ephemeral Oracle users created per-session via bootstrap admin (`ALTER USER`, `CREATE USER`, `DROP USER`, `GRANT ANY ROLE`). Customer must also enable TCPS and disable NNE. + +### CyberArk PSM — ruled out (wrong arch for gateway) + +SQL Developer installed on PSM host itself. User RDPs to PSM, PSM launches SQL Developer with injected credentials via templated `ConnectionsTemplate.json`. Session recorded as RDP video. + +### HashiCorp Boundary — **no native Oracle support** + +Generic TCP tunneling + Vault credential brokering. Users still see Oracle passwords. No Oracle wire protocol handling. Confirmed via docs + source tree (no `oracle.go` in `internal/cmd/commands/connect`). Not a fourth architectural pattern. + +### Delinea / BeyondTrust — ruled out (vaulted creds) + +Secret Server templates / Password Safe. User checks out credential, sees the password. + +## 8. Dynamic DataType Negotiation — the key technical finding + +**The single most important finding for THE MASK path.** + +### It's filter-and-echo, not set-intersection + +Previous assumption: "server must compute intersection of client's offered types and server's supported types." That framing made the problem look like multi-week reverse engineering. + +Correct behavior (from python-oracledb source): + +> For each type the client offered, the server echoes back the same `(data_type, conv_data_type, representation)` entry **if the server supports it**; otherwise returns the type with `conv_data_type=0` (a "bare" marker meaning unsupported). + +The server maintains its own fixed supported set (Oracle 19c's type catalog). For each offered type T, emit either echo-with-rep or `(T, 0)`. Representation echoed back may be the server's preferred rep, not the client's. + +### Wire format (synthesized from go-ora + python-oracledb) + +**Request (client → server), opcode 0x02:** +``` +byte 0x02 # TNS_MSG_TYPE_DATA_TYPES +u16LE client_in_charset +u16LE client_out_charset +byte flags # TNS_ENCODING_MULTI_BYTE | TNS_ENCODING_CONV_LENGTH +byte len + compile_time_caps[] # ~45 bytes for 19c +byte len + runtime_caps[] # ~7 bytes + +u16LE client_ncharset # go-ora sends this; JDBC may not +loop: # type-rep tuples (repeated) + u16BE data_type + u16BE conv_data_type + u16BE representation + u16BE 0 # per-entry terminator +u16BE 0 # final terminator +``` + +When `compile_time_caps[27] == 0`, each field is a single byte instead of u16BE — legacy mode. + +**Response (server → client), opcode 0x02:** +``` +byte 0x02 + +loop: + u16BE data_type # 0 terminates + u16BE conv_data_type # 0 = bare entry, stop reading this entry + +``` + +### Reference materials + +| Reference | URL | What's in it | +|-----------|-----|--------------| +| `oracle/python-oracledb` | https://github.com/oracle/python-oracledb/blob/main/src/oracledb/impl/thin/messages/data_types.pyx | **Oracle-authored.** 320-entry `DATA_TYPES` array as `(data_type, conv_data_type, representation)` tuples. `_write_message` (request builder) and `_process_message` (response parser). This is the Rosetta Stone — port this table. | +| `sijms/go-ora` | https://github.com/sijms/go-ora/blob/master/v2/data_type_nego.go | Full `buildTypeNego()` with ~270 `addTypeRep()` calls. Type range 1–640. Three reps: `NATIVE=0`, `UNIVERSAL=1`, `ORACLE=10`. Go-native cross-check. | +| `SpiderLabs/net-tns` | https://github.com/SpiderLabs/net-tns/blob/master/lib/net/tti/messages/data_type_negotiation_request.rb | Ruby request builder. Confirms `compile_time_caps[27]` 1-byte vs 2-byte encoding toggle. | +| Wireshark `packet-tns.c` | https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/blob/master/epan/dissectors/packet-tns.c | Falls through to generic data dissector for DTY. **Not useful** for content parsing but confirms the TNS framing. | +| `T4CTTIdty.java` (Oracle JDBC) | not public | We couldn't find a decompilation. Would be the third reference. Using python-oracledb + go-ora is sufficient since the Oracle-blessed reference covers 320 types. | + +### Open questions (for the implementer) + +- **Do go-ora's offered types differ from JDBC thin's?** Unknown without a JDBC capture. Likely JDBC offers a superset (XDB/XML, AQ, streams). The server's supported set should be derived from 19c, NOT from any specific client. +- **How to handle `compile_time_caps[27] == 0` legacy clients?** Match `go-ora`'s write/read logic — it already handles both modes. +- **Time zone block representation** — `runtime_caps[1] & 1` flag. Mirror what client advertises. + +Research agent's confidence: tractable, 1–2 weeks of focused work. + +## 9. StrongDM research — detailed findings + +Full transcript of the research (what we could verify, what we couldn't): + +**Verified facts:** +- Gateway is Go (job postings, HN threads, careers page) +- Hand-rolled TNS/TTC parser (release-note bugs prove it — `ORA-03146` invalid buffer length, character set conversion bugs, warning decode bugs) +- Separate decode paths per client (JDBC decode bugs distinct from OCI bugs in release notes) +- Oracle handling lives in main gateway binary (release notes ship as CLI version bumps, not sidecar) +- Full NNE termination (not refusal) — separate resource type with selectable algorithms, stacks with TLS +- Character-set conversion done themselves (AL32UTF8-specific bugs) +- Active team of 2–4 engineers hardening the protocol (8+ bug fixes Sep–Nov 2025) + +**Not found (confirmed absent):** +- No public StrongDM source code for Oracle +- No fork of sijms/go-ora or godror on their GitHub org +- No patent, blog post, conference talk, or ex-employee writeup describing the Oracle internals +- No description of their DataType Negotiation strategy specifically + +**Bottom line:** what we're building is what StrongDM ships. Their release-note patterns confirm the maintenance burden is ongoing but bounded — not an infinite commitment. + +## 10. Code changes made in this session + +### `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go` + +Added `detectConnectDataSupplement` (new function, ~20 LOC) that identifies a 16-bit-framed DATA packet post-ACCEPT by signature: `bytes[0:2]` = plausible length (8..64K), `bytes[2:4]` = 0 (checksum zero), `bytes[4]` = 0x06 (DATA opcode). + +Added supplement-drain logic to `HandleConnection`: after ACCEPT peek, if a supplement is detected, consume it (either from the peek buffer alone or by reading additional bytes from the conn) before creating the `prependedConn` for `RunPreAuthExchange`. + +### `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go` (new file) + +Standalone test that runs the client-facing handshake on a local TCP listener (skipping upstream Oracle dial) and points go-ora at it with `ProxyPasswordPlaceholder` as the password. Mirrors the proxy.go handshake logic in a test harness. + +Gated by env var: `ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST=1 go test -run TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra ./packages/pam/handlers/oracle/...` + +Skipped by default. Useful for iterating on protocol fixes without needing a live Oracle or the full PAM/gateway stack. + +### `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go` + +Removed a stray `0x00` byte at offset 180 of `rdsTCPNegoResponse` that was causing go-ora to read `compile_caps_length = 0` ("server compile time caps length less than 8"). The original capture had a one-byte surplus. Template now parses cleanly through go-ora's client-side `newTCPNego`. + +### `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go` + +**Full rewrite of DataType Nego parser and response builder.** Previously we parsed a minimal header and replayed a static captured RDS response. Now: + +- `ClientDataTypeNegoRequest` struct holds the parsed request including TZ preamble, `ClientTZVersion`, `ServernCharset`, and a list of `DataTypeTuple` entries (full or bare). +- `parseClientDataTypeNego` parses the full wire format, including the optional TZ/version preamble (conditional on `runtime_caps[1]&1` and `compile_caps[37]&2`), the mandatory `ServernCharset`, and tuple-by-tuple type entries. Supports both 2-byte and 1-byte field modes (legacy `compile_caps[27]==0`). +- `buildServerDataTypeNego` now echoes the client's offered type list dynamically. For each tuple the client sent, we reply with an identical tuple ("supported"). The TZ preamble is mirrored from the client's request. Terminator is `u16BE 0` (or `u8 0` in legacy mode). + +**Strategy note:** we mirror everything the client offered rather than maintaining a server-side supported-type set. This works because our gateway byte-relays data from upstream Oracle (which did its own type negotiation with go-ora); we just need the client to accept the handshake. + +### `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go` + +Fixed `VerifyClientPassword` to decrypt with `padding=true` instead of `padding=false`. Client calls `encryptPassword(pw, key, padding=true)` which returns the full PKCS5-padded ciphertext; decrypting with `padding=false` left the trailing pad bytes in place, causing `decoded[16:] != ProxyPasswordPlaceholder`. + +### Handshake test now PASSES end-to-end + +``` +$ ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST=1 go test -count=1 -run TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra \ + ./packages/pam/handlers/oracle/... -v +... + handshake_test.go:173: password verified — client proved knowledge of placeholder + handshake_test.go:182: phase-2 response sent — handshake complete from server side + handshake_test.go:79: PASS: go-ora client completed the handshake against our impersonation +--- PASS: TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra (3.01s) +``` + +The go-ora client connects, authenticates with `ProxyPasswordPlaceholder`, and our server-side O5Logon successfully verifies its password. This proves the protocol impersonation approach works end-to-end for at least one major client profile. + +## 11. What we exhausted and what's definitively needed for THE MASK + +### Completed in this session +- ✅ Dynamic DataType Nego parser + echo generator +- ✅ TCPNego captured-template off-by-one fix +- ✅ Connect-data supplement drain +- ✅ O5Logon password verification padding fix +- ✅ JDBC thin username encoding (raw bytes, no CLR prefix) in phase 1 + phase 2 parsers +- ✅ Phase 2 response trailing summary packet +- ✅ End-to-end handshake against sqlcl (JDBC thin): full auth completes successfully +- ✅ Extracted upstream's real phase-2 KVPs (47 entries including `AUTH_SESSION_ID`, `AUTH_SERIAL_NUM`, all NLS params) via a custom byte-level parser; mirrored them in our downstream phase-2 response + +### The architectural blocker (verified, not speculation) + +**Post-auth byte relay fails even with full session-metadata mirroring.** When sqlcl sends its first query post-auth (an OALL8 execute, 469 bytes), upstream Oracle responds with MARKER packets (0x0C, Oracle's protocol-reset signal) followed by an ORA-error summary. Same behavior regardless of whether we mirror session IDs, serial numbers, NLS params, DB info, or any combination thereof. + +Root cause: the upstream Oracle session was negotiated by **go-ora**, not by us. go-ora's session holds state we cannot access or influence from outside the library: +- **Sequence numbers** (per-session monotonic, incremented by every round-trip) +- **`UseBigClrChunks` / `ClrChunkSize`** framing flags +- **Compile-time capability bits** that influence downstream packet parsing (`ServerCompileTimeCaps[4]`, `[15]`, `[16]`, `[27]`, `[37]` all gate behaviors) +- **Runtime capability bits** (`RuntimeCap[1]` gates TZ handling) +- **Character-set conversion state** +- **Negotiated ANO service levels** (even though we refused ANO to the client, go-ora may have negotiated supervisor-level ANO with upstream) + +The client (sqlcl) sends its post-auth RPCs per **its** negotiated state with us. When we relay those bytes to upstream, upstream interprets them per **go-ora's** state. Any mismatch in any of the above fields produces a protocol violation — which is exactly what we see. + +### What would actually fix this + +**Replace go-ora's upstream dial with our own client-side TNS/TTC/O5Logon implementation**, so we control every bit of the upstream session state and can match it to the client's negotiated state. + +Scope (realistic): +- Port go-ora's client-side handshake logic into our own `upstream.go` +- Interleave client and upstream negotiation: read client's CONNECT → forward to upstream → forward ACCEPT back → etc. +- Intercept O5Logon specifically: decrypt client's AUTH_SESSKEY (with placeholder key), re-encrypt with real-password-derived key, forward to upstream; same for phase 2 AUTH_PASSWORD +- After auth, both sides are in matching state because we forwarded the same negotiation bytes to both +- Relay post-auth bytes transparently + +This is substantial work. Estimate: **1–2 weeks of focused engineering**, plus ongoing maintenance for every new Oracle version and client-driver release (see StrongDM's release-note cadence as reference). + +### Exhaustion checklist + +Things we tried or thoroughly considered: +- ✅ Fix every pre-auth protocol bug we could find (done — auth succeeds for both go-ora and sqlcl) +- ✅ Mirror upstream's session metadata (all 47 phase-2 KVPs: AUTH_SESSION_ID, AUTH_SERIAL_NUM, NLS params, DB identity) to the client's phase-2 response (done — no effect on relay) +- ✅ Tested whether session ID/serial mismatch alone was the issue (no — fixing them didn't help) +- ✅ Tested whether ANO negotiation was wrapping packets asymmetrically (no — disabling ANO levels changed nothing) +- ✅ Researched all major PAM vendors' Oracle approaches (CyberArk SIA/PSM, StrongDM, Teleport, Delinea, BeyondTrust, HashiCorp Boundary — no fourth architecture exists) +- ✅ Searched for open-source Oracle proxies, honeypots, protocol analyzers we could reference (found ODAT, SpiderLabs net-tns, redwood spec, britus Wireshark dissector — none implement upstream re-auth with downstream impersonation; Teleport is the closest peer and it sidesteps the problem via cert auth) +- ✅ Checked go-ora's public API for ways to manipulate session state externally (only `Connection.SessionProperties` is exposed; sequence numbers, compile-time caps, UseBigClrChunks, ClrChunkSize are all private) + +No cheap win remains. The state-mismatch is a fundamental consequence of using an existing client library for upstream. Every piece of go-ora's internal session state we'd need to match is either private or set during negotiation and not adjustable after the fact. + +### Why this is a reasonable stopping point for THE MASK (if we stop) + +- The handshake-plus-auth surface is proven viable (our `handshake_test.go` passes end-to-end for go-ora; sqlcl reaches and completes auth against the real gateway). +- The architectural blocker is understood and reproducible. +- The fix is well-defined but expensive (1–2+ weeks). +- The research confirms no external shortcut exists — even StrongDM had to build this themselves and maintain it with a dedicated team. +- **PASS (cert-based auth, Teleport's approach) is the pragmatic alternative** — it sidesteps this entire class of problems by avoiding upstream re-auth. It requires one-time customer DBA setup per Oracle DB but has vastly lower ongoing complexity. + +### Medium priority +1. **Per-client profile detection** — different clients send slightly different request shapes (sqlcl sends 23-byte TCPNego with protocol list `05 04 03 02 01 00` before banner; go-ora sends 18-byte TCPNego without). Current static TCPNego response works for both so far, but may need splitting if we see future divergences. +2. **OCI (sqlplus/Toad) support** — untested. OCI uses a different client library than JDBC thin. The dynamic DataType Nego should adapt automatically but there may be other protocol-shape differences. +3. **Auth phase 1 response hardening** — currently sends a byte-for-byte RDS-captured trailing summary with a fixed sequence number `0x1A98`. Works for both go-ora and sqlcl so far but may need dynamic derivation for some clients. + +### Medium priority +4. **OCI (sqlplus/Toad) support** — untested. OCI uses a different client library than JDBC thin. The dynamic DataType Nego should adapt automatically but there may be other protocol-shape differences. +5. **Auth phase 1 response hardening** — the captured trailing summary bytes are byte-for-byte correct for go-ora. JDBC and OCI may parse it differently; verify against each. +6. **Character set conversion** — we pass `AL32UTF8` only. Non-UTF-8 targets will break (StrongDM hit this in Nov 2025). + +### Lower priority (but eventually needed) +7. **NNE termination** — StrongDM ships this as a separate resource type. When a customer requires `SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_CLIENT=REQUIRED`, the gateway must decrypt/re-encrypt rather than refuse. ~1000 LOC of crypto + state machine. +8. **Oracle RAC via SCAN** — single-host only in v1. RAC customers must use a specific VIP. +9. **Query logging hardening** — current `query_logger.go` handles OALL8/OFETCH/OCOMMIT; add OROLLBACK, OLOBOPS, bundled RPC calls. + +## 12. Remaining work for THE PASS + +Different shape of work — less protocol engineering, more infrastructure. + +### High priority +1. **Oracle CA infrastructure** — new CA per org, scoped to Oracle targets. May be able to reuse existing Infisical cert-signing infrastructure if there is one. +2. **Per-session cert issuance** — on `pam db access`, CLI receives a short-lived cert signed by the Oracle CA with CN set to the Infisical user. +3. **CLI wallet generator** — CLI writes `cwallet.sso` + `tnsnames.ora` into a session-scoped temp dir. Prints `export TNS_ADMIN=` for the user. +4. **TCPS proxy** — gateway terminates incoming TLS from CLI, re-establishes TLS upstream with the session cert. Byte-relays post-TLS-auth. + +### Medium priority +5. **DBA setup script / docs** — one-time per Oracle DB. Teleport's pattern: `tctl auth sign --format=oracle` generates the server wallet. We'd ship equivalent: an Infisical command that emits an Oracle wallet containing our CA + setup instructions for `listener.ora`, `sqlnet.ora`, and creating users as `IDENTIFIED EXTERNALLY AS 'CN='`. +6. **Autonomous DB / RDS support** — these have their own wallet-config paths. Document the specifics. + +### What we'd delete +- All protocol impersonation code (TNS codec, O5Logon, nego handlers, DataType Nego) — ~2,000 LOC of current work. +- `nego_templates.go` +- The `handshake_test.go` test harness + +### What we'd keep +- Backend resource/account schema (~70% reusable, need to swap password fields for cert config) +- Frontend resource form (~70% reusable) +- CLI subcommand structure +- Upstream dial via go-ora (used for initial connection validation; may or may not be retained post-redesign) +- Session recording tap (can parse TTC read-only, same as Teleport does, for audit logging) + +## 13. How to run the current tests + +### Handshake test (current state, demonstrates 2/4 stages working for go-ora) + +```bash +cd /path/to/cli.oracle-db +ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST=1 go test -count=1 -run TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra \ + ./packages/pam/handlers/oracle/... -v -timeout 30s +``` + +Expected output: test reaches TCPNego response, go-ora rejects with `server compile time caps length less than 8`. This confirms: +- CONNECT/ACCEPT works +- Connect-data supplement drain works +- ANO refusal works +- TCPNego request parsing works +- (Blocked on TCPNego response content bug) + +### Full gateway + CLI end-to-end (against real Oracle) + +Requires existing PAM resource `aws-oracledb` with account `admin` in backend. From prior work — may have been cleaned up. + +```bash +# Terminal 1 — gateway +go run main.go gateway start local-pat-g2-1 \ + --enroll-method=token --token=gwe_... \ + --target-relay-name=local-pat-1 \ + --domain=https://oracle-db.test \ + --pam-session-recording-path=./sessionrecordings + +# Terminal 2 — CLI proxy +go run main.go pam db access --resource aws-oracledb --account admin \ + --project-id --duration 4h --domain https://oracle-db.test + +# Terminal 3 — client +sql admin/infisical-pam-proxy@localhost:/DATABASE +``` + +## 14. Recommended path for the fork + +If committing to **THE MASK**: + +1. Start with dynamic DataType Nego. Port python-oracledb's `DATA_TYPES` table. This is the concrete, well-scoped piece of work that gets us past the current blocker for JDBC. +2. Debug the go-ora TCPNego template issue. Should be hours, not days. +3. Verify end-to-end against go-ora (easiest because we captured templates from go-ora). +4. Extend to JDBC thin (sqlcl / SQL Developer / DBeaver). Expect per-client response shaping. +5. Extend to OCI (sqlplus / Toad). Separate test profile. +6. Hardening: char sets, NNE, more query logger coverage. + +If committing to **THE PASS**: + +1. Delete `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/{tns.go, ttc.go, nego.go, nego_templates.go, o5logon*.go, ano.go, handshake_test.go}`. +2. Keep `proxy.go` skeleton, `upstream.go`, `query_logger.go`, `constants.go`. +3. Build Oracle CA infrastructure in `backend/`. +4. Add per-session cert issuance on `/api/v1/pam/accounts/access`. +5. Add CLI wallet generator to `packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go`. +6. Replace upstream dial path with TCPS-with-cert instead of password auth. +7. Draft DBA setup script. + +## 15. References + +### Primary +- [python-oracledb data_types.pyx](https://github.com/oracle/python-oracledb/blob/main/src/oracledb/impl/thin/messages/data_types.pyx) — Oracle-authored type table +- [sijms/go-ora](https://github.com/sijms/go-ora) — pure-Go Oracle driver, client-side reference for TNS/TTC/O5Logon +- [Teleport RFD 0115](https://github.com/gravitational/teleport/blob/master/rfd/0115-oracle-db-access-integration.md) — cert-based Oracle proxy architecture + +### Secondary +- [StrongDM Oracle docs](https://docs.strongdm.com/admin/resources/datasources/oracle) — what production protocol-injection Oracle looks like (surface only) +- [StrongDM release notes](https://docs.strongdm.com/changelog/release-notes) — indirect evidence of implementation decisions via bug fixes +- [CyberArk SIA Oracle ZSP](https://docs.cyberark.com/ispss-access/latest/en/content/db/dpa-database-manage-zsp.htm) — ephemeral-user approach details +- [SpiderLabs/net-tns](https://github.com/SpiderLabs/net-tns) — Ruby Oracle client library, DTY request builder +- [Wireshark packet-tns.c](https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/blob/master/epan/dissectors/packet-tns.c) — TNS framing dissector + +### Background +- [Passive Capture and Analysis of Oracle Network Traffic (NYOUG 2008)](https://www.nyoug.org/Presentations/2008/Sep/Harris_Listening%20In.pdf) — general TNS protocol overview +- [Oracle error index](https://docs.oracle.com/error-help/) — for decoding ORA-* errors seen during debugging + +--- + +*Document generated 2026-04-21 after ~2 weeks of implementation attempts and research. Forks should update as findings evolve.* diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index 795ea4a9..9a6a018c 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ require ( github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.54.1 github.com/rs/cors v1.11.0 github.com/rs/zerolog v1.26.1 + github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2 v2.9.0 github.com/smallnest/resp3 v0.0.0-20251228151914-4f2fa7427e69 github.com/spf13/cobra v1.6.1 github.com/spf13/viper v1.8.1 @@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ require ( github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.0 // indirect github.com/dvsekhvalnov/jose2go v1.7.0 // indirect github.com/emicklei/go-restful/v3 v3.11.0 // indirect - github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.12.0 // indirect + github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.18.1 // indirect github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.0.4 // indirect github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.4.9 // indirect github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2 v2.7.0 // indirect diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index a76256b5..413e6d1e 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -165,8 +165,8 @@ github.com/dvsekhvalnov/jose2go v1.7.0 h1:bnQc8+GMnidJZA8zc6lLEAb4xNrIqHwO+9Tzqv github.com/dvsekhvalnov/jose2go v1.7.0/go.mod h1:QsHjhyTlD/lAVqn/NSbVZmSCGeDehTB/mPZadG+mhXU= github.com/emicklei/go-restful/v3 v3.11.0 h1:rAQeMHw1c7zTmncogyy8VvRZwtkmkZ4FxERmMY4rD+g= github.com/emicklei/go-restful/v3 v3.11.0/go.mod h1:6n3XBCmQQb25CM2LCACGz8ukIrRry+4bhvbpWn3mrbc= -github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.12.0 h1:QAUIPSaCu4G+POclxeqb3F+WPpdKqFGlw36+yOzGlrg= -github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.12.0/go.mod h1:YfzfFFoVP/catgzJb4IKIqXjX78Ha8FMSDh3ymbK86o= +github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.18.1 h1:FXtiHYKDGKCW2KzwZKx0iC0PQmdlorYgdFG9jPXJ1Bc= +github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.18.1/go.mod h1:8tpGGwCnJ5H4r6BWwaV6OrWmMoPhUl5jm/FMNAnJvWQ= github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane v0.9.0/go.mod h1:YTl/9mNaCwkRvm6d1a2C3ymFceY/DCBVvsKhRF0iEA4= github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane v0.9.1-0.20191026205805-5f8ba28d4473/go.mod h1:YTl/9mNaCwkRvm6d1a2C3ymFceY/DCBVvsKhRF0iEA4= github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane v0.9.4/go.mod h1:6rpuAdCZL397s3pYoYcLgu1mIlRU8Am5FuJP05cCM98= @@ -531,6 +531,8 @@ github.com/sean-/seed v0.0.0-20170313163322-e2103e2c3529/go.mod h1:DxrIzT+xaE7yg github.com/shopspring/decimal v1.4.0 h1:bxl37RwXBklmTi0C79JfXCEBD1cqqHt0bbgBAGFp81k= github.com/shopspring/decimal v1.4.0/go.mod h1:gawqmDU56v4yIKSwfBSFip1HdCCXN8/+DMd9qYNcwME= github.com/shurcooL/sanitized_anchor_name v1.0.0/go.mod h1:1NzhyTcUVG4SuEtjjoZeVRXNmyL/1OwPU0+IJeTBvfc= +github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2 v2.9.0 h1:+iQbUeTeCOFMb5BsOMgUhV8KWyrv9yjKpcK4x7+MFrg= +github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2 v2.9.0/go.mod h1:QgFInVi3ZWyqAiJwzBQA+nbKYKH77tdp1PYoCqhR2dU= github.com/smallnest/resp3 v0.0.0-20251228151914-4f2fa7427e69 h1:AkDv2coi+ZsMlEp/6V21FWxdswSIEzqflgJ6snIQG+U= github.com/smallnest/resp3 v0.0.0-20251228151914-4f2fa7427e69/go.mod h1:cmfXTZVXEA7xFOYcGnpKp2VeFf6FUHmxdKQHVNE6BXY= github.com/smartystreets/assertions v0.0.0-20180927180507-b2de0cb4f26d h1:zE9ykElWQ6/NYmHa3jpm/yHnI4xSofP+UP6SpjHcSeM= diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ae43ff47 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +# Third-party code attribution + +This package contains code adapted from [sijms/go-ora](https://github.com/sijms/go-ora), +licensed under the MIT License. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. + +Ported / adapted portions: + +- `tns.go` adapts `go-ora/v2/network/{packets,connect_packet,accept_packet,data_packet,marker_packet,refuse_packet}.go` +- `o5logon.go` adapts crypto primitives from `go-ora/v2/auth_object.go` +- `nego.go` adapts `go-ora/v2/{tcp_protocol_nego,data_type_nego}.go` +- `ttc.go` adapts the TTC buffer codec from `go-ora/v2/network/session.go` + +## MIT License + +Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan + +Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal +in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights +to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell +copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + +The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all +copies or substantial portions of the Software. + +THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER +LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, +OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE +SOFTWARE. diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ano.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ano.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3574f692 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ano.go @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +package oracle + +import ( + "fmt" + "net" + + "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" +) + +// Advanced Negotiation (ANO) handling. Our gateway is configured to REFUSE +// authentication, encryption and data-integrity services on the client-facing leg, +// because the mTLS tunnel between the CLI and the gateway already provides +// confidentiality and integrity. The Supervisor service is accepted with a trivial CID. +// +// On-wire structure (see go-ora/v2/advanced_nego/comm.go): +// +// outer: magic(4) | length(2) | version(4) | servCount(2) | flags(1) +// per service: serviceType(2) | numSubPackets(2) | errNum(4) | {sub-packets} +// sub-packet: length(2) | type(2) | body(length) +// types: 0=string, 1=bytes, 2=UB1, 3=UB2, 4=UB4, 5=version, 6=status, 7=? + +const anoMagic uint32 = 0xDEADBEEF + +// Service-type IDs. +const ( + anoServiceAuth = 1 + anoServiceEncrypt = 2 + anoServiceIntegrity = 3 + anoServiceSupervisor = 4 +) + +// ANO sub-packet types (from comm.go validatePacketHeader). +const ( + anoTypeString = 0 + anoTypeBytes = 1 + anoTypeUB1 = 2 + anoTypeUB2 = 3 + anoTypeUB4 = 4 + anoTypeVersion = 5 + anoTypeStatus = 6 +) + +const ( + // anoStatusSupervisorOK is what the Supervisor service must respond with. + anoStatusSupervisorOK uint16 = 31 + // anoStatusAuthRefused is the "I heard you, but I'm declining this service" code. + anoStatusAuthRefused uint16 = 0xFBFF +) + +// ANO version numbers observed in a real RDS Oracle 19c listener's response. +// The outer header version is 0; per-service version sub-packets carry Oracle's own +// version encoding (high byte = major version; bits 12-15 of the second half indicate +// a "modern" service). We mirror these exactly — go-ora's internal constant +// 0xB200200 is client-side and servers don't use it. +const ( + anoOuterVersion = 0 + anoServiceVersion_Super = 0x13000000 // supervisor emits this + anoServiceVersion_Modern = 0x13001000 // auth/encrypt/integrity emit this +) + +// handleANOPayload parses an ANO request payload (magic already confirmed at [0:4]) — +// we only skim it to confirm well-formedness — then writes our refusal response. +func handleANOPayload(payload []byte, conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool) error { + r := NewTTCReader(payload) + // Skip outer header: magic(4) + length(2) + version(4) + servCount(2) + flags(1) = 13 bytes + if _, err := r.GetBytes(13); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ANO header: %w", err) + } + // We intentionally don't walk every sub-packet. The response is what matters, + // and detecting =REQUIRED would require parsing config state the client also + // doesn't transmit on the wire. If the client insists on ENCRYPTION_CLIENT=REQUIRED + // it will validate our refusal response and close itself with ORA-12660. + return writeANOResponse(conn, use32BitLen) +} + +// writeANOResponse sends our refusal: supervisor accepted (status=31) with an empty +// servArray, authentication/encryption/integrity all replied with status/algoID 0 or +// the "not activated" code. +func writeANOResponse(conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool) error { + // Build each service body first so we can sum the total length. + supervisorBody := buildSupervisorService() + authBody := buildAuthRefusalService() + encryptBody := buildEncryptRefusalService() + integrityBody := buildIntegrityRefusalService() + + totalServiceLen := len(supervisorBody) + len(authBody) + len(encryptBody) + len(integrityBody) + headerLen := 13 + totalLen := headerLen + totalServiceLen + + b := NewTTCBuilder() + // Outer header + b.PutUint(uint64(anoMagic), 4, true, false) + b.PutInt(int64(totalLen), 2, true, false) + b.PutInt(int64(anoOuterVersion), 4, true, false) + b.PutInt(4, 2, true, false) // service count = 4 + b.PutBytes(0) // flags + + // Order matches go-ora's AdvNego.Write(): supervisor, auth, encrypt, integrity + b.PutBytes(supervisorBody...) + b.PutBytes(authBody...) + b.PutBytes(encryptBody...) + b.PutBytes(integrityBody...) + + resp := b.Bytes() + log.Info(). + Int("anoRespLen", len(resp)). + Int("declaredTotalLen", totalLen). + Str("anoRespHex", fmt.Sprintf("% X", resp)). + Msg("Oracle ANO response built") + + return writeDataPayload(conn, resp, use32BitLen) +} + +// buildSupervisorService returns the supervisor service body: header + version + status(31) + +// UB2Array (CID magic + array of supported service types). +func buildSupervisorService() []byte { + b := NewTTCBuilder() + // Service header + b.PutInt(anoServiceSupervisor, 2, true, false) + b.PutInt(3, 2, true, false) // 3 sub-packets + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, false) // errNum + // Sub 1: version (supervisor uses the _Super variant, observed from RDS) + writeAnoVersion(b, anoServiceVersion_Super) + // Sub 2: status = 31 (supervisor OK) + writeAnoStatus(b, anoStatusSupervisorOK) + // Sub 3: UB2Array — RDS sends [4, 1] for its 19c listener; mirror that. + writeAnoUB2Array(b, []int{4, 1}) + return b.Bytes() +} + +// buildAuthRefusalService returns the auth service body indicating we refuse auth. +func buildAuthRefusalService() []byte { + b := NewTTCBuilder() + b.PutInt(anoServiceAuth, 2, true, false) + b.PutInt(2, 2, true, false) // 2 sub-packets + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, false) + writeAnoVersion(b, anoServiceVersion_Modern) + writeAnoStatus(b, anoStatusAuthRefused) + return b.Bytes() +} + +// buildEncryptRefusalService returns the encrypt service body indicating no encryption. +// Mirrors go-ora encryptService.readServiceData(): version + UB1(algoID=0). +func buildEncryptRefusalService() []byte { + b := NewTTCBuilder() + b.PutInt(anoServiceEncrypt, 2, true, false) + b.PutInt(2, 2, true, false) + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, false) + writeAnoVersion(b, anoServiceVersion_Modern) + writeAnoUB1(b, 0) // algoID 0 = no encryption + return b.Bytes() +} + +// buildIntegrityRefusalService mirrors encrypt but for data integrity. +func buildIntegrityRefusalService() []byte { + b := NewTTCBuilder() + b.PutInt(anoServiceIntegrity, 2, true, false) + b.PutInt(2, 2, true, false) + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, false) + writeAnoVersion(b, anoServiceVersion_Modern) + writeAnoUB1(b, 0) // algoID 0 = no integrity + return b.Bytes() +} + +// writeAnoVersion emits a version sub-packet: length=4, type=5, body=uint32 BE. +func writeAnoVersion(b *TTCBuilder, version uint32) { + b.PutInt(4, 2, true, false) // length + b.PutInt(anoTypeVersion, 2, true, false) + b.PutUint(uint64(version), 4, true, false) +} + +// writeAnoStatus emits a status sub-packet: length=2, type=6, body=uint16 BE. +func writeAnoStatus(b *TTCBuilder, status uint16) { + b.PutInt(2, 2, true, false) + b.PutInt(anoTypeStatus, 2, true, false) + b.PutUint(uint64(status), 2, true, false) +} + +// writeAnoUB1 emits a UB1 sub-packet: length=1, type=2, body=byte. +func writeAnoUB1(b *TTCBuilder, v uint8) { + b.PutInt(1, 2, true, false) + b.PutInt(anoTypeUB1, 2, true, false) + b.PutBytes(v) +} + +// writeAnoUB2Array emits the supervisor service's UB2Array sub-packet, which has a +// non-standard body framed with the 0xDEADBEEF magic (see comm.go writeUB2Array). +func writeAnoUB2Array(b *TTCBuilder, input []int) { + b.PutInt(int64(10+len(input)*2), 2, true, false) // length field + b.PutInt(anoTypeBytes, 2, true, false) // type = 1 (bytes) + // Body + b.PutUint(uint64(anoMagic), 4, true, false) + b.PutInt(3, 2, true, false) // constant + b.PutInt(int64(len(input)), 4, true, false) + for _, v := range input { + b.PutInt(int64(v), 2, true, false) + } +} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..729216fb --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +package oracle + +// ProxyPasswordPlaceholder is the fixed password string clients must present to the +// gateway's client-facing O5Logon. Real authentication happens upstream with the real +// credentials injected by the gateway. The placeholder is not a secret — security is +// enforced by the mTLS tunnel between CLI, backend and gateway, and by session-scoped +// client certs. Oracle's O5Logon cannot be bypassed the way MySQL/Postgres auth can, +// so the gateway and the client must agree on some shared string; this is it. +const ProxyPasswordPlaceholder = "infisical-pam-proxy" diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..53d0defc --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +package oracle + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "os" + "testing" + "time" + + _ "github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2" +) + + +// TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra spins up just the client-facing Oracle handshake on a +// local TCP listener (no real upstream Oracle target) and checks whether a go-ora +// client connecting with ProxyPasswordPlaceholder completes the handshake cleanly. +// +// Skipped unless ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST=1 because it binds a TCP port. +func TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra(t *testing.T) { + if os.Getenv("ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST") == "" { + t.Skip("set ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST=1 to run") + } + + ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer ln.Close() + port := ln.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port + t.Logf("Listening on 127.0.0.1:%d", port) + + serverDone := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + conn, err := ln.Accept() + if err != nil { + serverDone <- fmt.Errorf("accept: %w", err) + return + } + defer conn.Close() + serverDone <- runHandshakeOnly(conn, t) + }() + + dsn := fmt.Sprintf("oracle://ADMIN:%s@127.0.0.1:%d/TESTDB", ProxyPasswordPlaceholder, port) + t.Logf("go-ora DSN: %s", dsn) + + db, err := sql.Open("oracle", dsn) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal("sql.Open:", err) + } + defer db.Close() + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second) + defer cancel() + + pingErr := db.PingContext(ctx) + + var serverErr error + select { + case serverErr = <-serverDone: + case <-time.After(20 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("server goroutine timed out") + } + + t.Logf("SERVER handshake result: %v", serverErr) + t.Logf("CLIENT go-ora ping result: %v", pingErr) + + if serverErr != nil { + t.Fatalf("server-side handshake failed: %v", serverErr) + } + t.Log("PASS: go-ora client completed the handshake against our impersonation") +} + +// runHandshakeOnly mirrors the client-facing portion of HandleConnection (lines +// 106-220) without dialling an upstream Oracle. It returns nil if our server +// successfully writes the phase-2 auth response without the client closing the +// connection underneath us. +func runHandshakeOnly(clientConn net.Conn, t *testing.T) error { + connectRaw, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read CONNECT: %w", err) + } + if PacketTypeOf(connectRaw) == PacketTypeResend { + connectRaw, err = ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("re-read CONNECT: %w", err) + } + } + if PacketTypeOf(connectRaw) != PacketTypeConnect { + return fmt.Errorf("expected CONNECT, got type=%d", connectRaw[4]) + } + connectPkt, err := ParseConnectPacket(connectRaw) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("parse CONNECT: %w", err) + } + t.Logf("CONNECT received: clientVersion=%d", connectPkt.Version) + + accept := AcceptFromConnect(connectPkt) + t.Logf("connect parsed: sdu=%d tdu=%d version=%d loVer=%d acfl0=0x%02X acfl1=0x%02X options=0x%04X", + connectPkt.SessionDataUnit, connectPkt.TransportDataUnit, connectPkt.Version, connectPkt.LoVersion, + connectPkt.ACFL0, connectPkt.ACFL1, connectPkt.Options) + t.Logf("accept built: sdu=%d tdu=%d version=%d histone=%d acfl0=0x%02X acfl1=0x%02X", + accept.SessionDataUnit, accept.TransportDataUnit, accept.Version, accept.Histone, accept.ACFL0, accept.ACFL1) + acceptBytes := accept.Bytes() + if _, err := clientConn.Write(acceptBytes); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write ACCEPT: %w", err) + } + use32Bit := accept.Version >= 315 + t.Logf("ACCEPT sent: version=%d use32Bit=%v acceptHex=% X", accept.Version, use32Bit, acceptBytes) + + peekBuf := make([]byte, 512) + _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)) + n, _ := clientConn.Read(peekBuf) + _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) + t.Logf("POST-ACCEPT peek: n=%d first16=% X", n, peekBuf[:min(16, n)]) + peeked := append([]byte(nil), peekBuf[:n]...) + + if slen := detectConnectDataSupplement(peeked); slen > 0 { + t.Logf("draining connect-data supplement (16-bit framed DATA, %d bytes)", slen) + if slen > len(peeked) { + rest := make([]byte, slen-len(peeked)) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(clientConn, rest); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read supplement tail: %w", err) + } + peeked = nil + } else { + peeked = peeked[slen:] + } + } + + wrapped := &prependedConn{Conn: clientConn, buf: peeked} + + p1Payload, err := RunPreAuthExchange(wrapped, use32Bit) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("pre-auth exchange: %w", err) + } + t.Logf("pre-auth exchange complete, received phase-1 payload (%d bytes)", len(p1Payload)) + + if _, err := ParseAuthPhaseOne(p1Payload); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("parse auth phase 1: %w", err) + } + state, err := NewO5LogonServerState() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("init O5Logon state: %w", err) + } + if err := writeDataPayload(wrapped, BuildAuthPhaseOneResponse(state), use32Bit); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write phase 1 response: %w", err) + } + t.Logf("phase-1 response sent") + + p2Payload, err := readDataPayload(wrapped, use32Bit) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read phase 2: %w", err) + } + p2, err := ParseAuthPhaseTwo(p2Payload) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("parse phase 2: %w", err) + } + t.Logf("phase-2 received, verifying password...") + + _, encKey, verr := state.VerifyClientPassword(p2.EClientSessKey, p2.EPassword) + if verr != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("verify password: %w", verr) + } + t.Logf("password verified — client proved knowledge of placeholder") + + svr, err := BuildSvrResponse(encKey) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("build SVR response: %w", err) + } + if err := writeDataPayload(wrapped, BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse(svr, 0xC0DE, 0x42), use32Bit); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write phase 2 response: %w", err) + } + t.Logf("phase-2 response sent — handshake complete from server side") + + // Try to read a follow-up from the client. If the client sends anything, + // it accepted our handshake. If it closes immediately, it rejected it. + _ = wrapped.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)) + buf := make([]byte, 32) + m, rerr := wrapped.Read(buf) + t.Logf("post-handshake client read: n=%d err=%v firstBytes=%x", m, rerr, buf[:m]) + + return nil +} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b942e782 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go @@ -0,0 +1,425 @@ +// Portions of this file are adapted from github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2, +// licensed under MIT. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. +// Original: tcp_protocol_nego.go (newTCPNego) and data_type_nego.go (buildTypeNego, +// DataTypeNego.read/write, TZBytes). +// Modifications for server-side use: inverted roles — the gateway reads the client's +// ProtocolNego TTC message and responds with a fixed server profile matching 19c. + +package oracle + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/binary" + "fmt" + "net" + "time" + + "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" +) + +// Server-side protocol negotiation. The flow after the ACCEPT packet is: +// 1. Client sends a TCPNego TTC message (opcode 1): [0x01 0x00 "client_name\x00"] +// 2. Server responds with its own TCPNego: [0x01 0x06 0x00 ...] +// 3. Client sends a DataTypeNego message (opcode 2) with client caps and type list. +// 4. Server responds with a matching DataTypeNego. +// +// We advertise a 19c-class server profile, which is the most broadly compatible choice +// across supported Oracle client drivers. + +// Hard-coded server capabilities for a 19c-class server. These match go-ora's default +// CompileTimeCaps (modified for server role) and RuntimeCap. +var serverCompileTimeCaps = []byte{ + 6, 1, 0, 0, 106, 1, 1, 11, + 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 41, + 144, 3, 7, 3, 0, 1, 0, 235, + 1, 0, 5, 1, 0, 0, 0, 24, + 0, 0, 7, 32, 2, 58, 0, 0, + 5, 0, 0, 0, 8, +} + +var serverRuntimeCaps = []byte{2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} + +// tzBytes returns the server's time zone — go-ora's TZBytes in reverse. +func tzBytes() []byte { + _, offset := time.Now().Zone() + hours := int8(offset / 3600) + minutes := int8((offset / 60) % 60) + seconds := int8(offset % 60) + return []byte{128, 0, 0, 0, uint8(hours + 60), uint8(minutes + 60), uint8(seconds + 60), 128, 0, 0, 0} +} + +// RunPreAuthExchange is a thin wrapper that calls RunPreAuthExchangeWithUpstream with no +// upstream overrides; responses are constructed from local templates (TCPNego) and +// dynamic echoes (DataTypeNego). +func RunPreAuthExchange(conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool) (authPhase1Payload []byte, err error) { + return RunPreAuthExchangeWithUpstream(conn, use32BitLen, nil, nil) +} + +// RunPreAuthExchangeWithUpstream reads the client's pre-authentication DATA payloads and +// dispatches each based on content (ANO magic, TCPNego opcode, DataTypeNego opcode, auth +// opcode). If upstreamTCPNego and/or upstreamDataTypeNego are non-nil, those exact bytes +// are forwarded to the client as responses — aligning client-negotiated caps with what +// upstream actually negotiated. When nil, falls back to locally-built responses. +func RunPreAuthExchangeWithUpstream(conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool, upstreamTCPNego, upstreamDataTypeNego []byte) (authPhase1Payload []byte, err error) { + seenTCPNego := false + seenDataTypeNego := false + iteration := 0 + for { + iteration++ + // Apply a generous per-step deadline so a client that stops sending surfaces + // as a diagnosable timeout rather than blocking the handler forever. + if tc, ok := conn.(interface{ SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error }); ok { + _ = tc.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(15 * time.Second)) + } + payload, rerr := readDataPayload(conn, use32BitLen) + if tc, ok := conn.(interface{ SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error }); ok { + _ = tc.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) + } + if rerr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("read pre-auth payload (iter %d): %w", iteration, rerr) + } + if len(payload) == 0 { + // Some clients send an empty DATA packet as a flush/ack between steps. + // Skip it and read the next payload. + log.Info().Int("iter", iteration).Msg("empty pre-auth payload (ignored)") + continue + } + log.Info(). + Int("iter", iteration). + Int("payloadLen", len(payload)). + Str("firstBytes", fmt.Sprintf("% X", payload[:min(32, len(payload))])). + Msg("Pre-auth payload received") + + // ANO request: DATA payload begins with 0xDEADBEEF magic (4-byte BE uint32). + if len(payload) >= 4 && binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[:4]) == anoMagic { + if werr := handleANOPayload(payload, conn, use32BitLen); werr != nil { + return nil, werr + } + continue + } + + switch payload[0] { + case 1: // TCPNego + if err := parseClientTCPNego(payload); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse client TCPNego: %w", err) + } + var resp []byte + if upstreamTCPNego != nil { + resp = upstreamTCPNego + log.Info().Int("respLen", len(resp)).Msg("Server TCPNego response (from upstream)") + } else { + resp = buildServerTCPNego() + log.Info().Int("respLen", len(resp)).Msg("Server TCPNego response (local)") + } + if err := writeDataPayload(conn, resp, use32BitLen); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("write server TCPNego: %w", err) + } + seenTCPNego = true + case 2: // DataTypeNego + req, err := parseClientDataTypeNego(payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse client DataTypeNego: %w", err) + } + var resp []byte + if upstreamDataTypeNego != nil { + resp = upstreamDataTypeNego + log.Info().Int("respLen", len(resp)).Msg("Server DataTypeNego response (from upstream)") + } else { + resp = buildServerDataTypeNego(req) + log.Info(). + Int("clientTypes", len(req.Types)). + Int("respLen", len(resp)). + Msg("Server DataTypeNego response (echoed)") + } + if err := writeDataPayload(conn, resp, use32BitLen); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("write server DataTypeNego: %w", err) + } + seenDataTypeNego = true + case TTCMsgAuthRequest: // 0x03 — auth phase 1 begins + if !seenTCPNego || !seenDataTypeNego { + // Permissive: some clients may skip nego steps; we still progress to auth. + } + return payload, nil + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected pre-auth payload opcode 0x%02X", payload[0]) + } + } +} + +func parseClientTCPNego(payload []byte) error { + r := NewTTCReader(payload) + op, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return err + } + if op != 1 { + return fmt.Errorf("expected TCPNego opcode 1, got 0x%02X", op) + } + // client version byte + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return err + } + // null-terminated client name + if _, err := r.GetNullTermString(); err != nil { + return err + } + return nil +} + +// buildServerTCPNego returns the server's TCPNego response. We use RDS's exact bytes +// (captured from a real Oracle 19c listener) because JDBC thin uses the negotiated +// compile-time caps downstream for summary-object parsing — and any deviation from +// the real Oracle caps causes ORA-17401 during auth. +func buildServerTCPNego() []byte { + // Return a copy so callers can't mutate the template. + out := make([]byte, len(rdsTCPNegoResponse)) + copy(out, rdsTCPNegoResponse) + return out +} + +// DataTypeTuple is one entry in the client's offered type-representation list. +// Wire format is u16BE per field, with a trailing u16BE 0 between entries. +type DataTypeTuple struct { + DataType uint16 + ConvDataType uint16 + Representation uint16 +} + +// ClientDataTypeNegoRequest holds everything we parsed from the client's DataType Nego +// request. We keep the offered tuple list so we can echo it back in the response +// (mirror strategy — we claim to support whatever the client offered; the actual type +// handling happens upstream where go-ora already negotiated with real Oracle). +type ClientDataTypeNegoRequest struct { + InCharset uint16 + OutCharset uint16 + Flags byte + CompileCaps []byte + RuntimeCaps []byte + TZBlock []byte // 11 bytes if runtimeCaps[1]&1 else nil + ClientTZVersion uint32 // present if TZBlock present AND compileCaps[37]&2 + HasTZVersion bool + ServernCharset uint16 + Types []DataTypeTuple +} + +// parseClientDataTypeNego parses the client's DataType Nego payload into a struct the +// response builder can echo back from. +// +// Request wire format (ported from go-ora's DataTypeNego.write): +// u8 opcode 0x02 +// u16LE client_in_charset +// u16LE client_out_charset +// u8 server_flags +// u8 compile_caps_len +// [] compile_caps +// u8 runtime_caps_len +// [] runtime_caps +// [if runtime_caps[1]&1 == 1: +// [11]byte tz_block +// [if compile_caps[37]&2 == 2: +// u32BE client_tz_version]] +// u16LE server_ncharset +// (tuples loop — each entry is either full [8B] or bare [4B]: +// u16BE data_type +// u16BE conv_data_type +// [if conv_data_type != 0: +// u16BE rep +// u16BE 0 (separator)]) +// u16BE 0 // terminator +// +// Full entries carry a (dty, conv, rep) triple; bare entries are (dty, 0) used to signal +// types offered without a specific representation. Terminator is u16BE 0. +func parseClientDataTypeNego(payload []byte) (*ClientDataTypeNegoRequest, error) { + r := NewTTCReader(payload) + op, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if op != 2 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected DataTypeNego opcode 2, got 0x%02X", op) + } + req := &ClientDataTypeNegoRequest{} + + inBytes, err := r.GetBytes(2) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("in_charset: %w", err) + } + req.InCharset = binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(inBytes) + + outBytes, err := r.GetBytes(2) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("out_charset: %w", err) + } + req.OutCharset = binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(outBytes) + + req.Flags, err = r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("flags: %w", err) + } + + ccLen, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("compile_caps_len: %w", err) + } + req.CompileCaps, err = r.GetBytes(int(ccLen)) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("compile_caps: %w", err) + } + + rcLen, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("runtime_caps_len: %w", err) + } + req.RuntimeCaps, err = r.GetBytes(int(rcLen)) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("runtime_caps: %w", err) + } + + // Optional TZ preamble: 11 bytes if runtime_caps[1]&1 == 1, plus 4 more for + // clientTZVersion if compile_caps[37]&2 == 2. Mirrored exactly in our response. + if len(req.RuntimeCaps) >= 2 && req.RuntimeCaps[1]&1 == 1 { + req.TZBlock, err = r.GetBytes(11) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tz_block: %w", err) + } + if len(req.CompileCaps) > 37 && req.CompileCaps[37]&2 == 2 { + vBytes, err := r.GetBytes(4) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("client_tz_version: %w", err) + } + req.ClientTZVersion = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(vBytes) + req.HasTZVersion = true + } + } + + // ServernCharset (2 bytes LE) — always present. + ncBytes, err := r.GetBytes(2) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("server_ncharset: %w", err) + } + req.ServernCharset = binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(ncBytes) + + // Tuple loop. Full entry = 8 bytes (dty, conv, rep, 0). Bare = 4 bytes (dty, 0). + // 2-byte fields are u16BE. CompileCaps[27]==0 would switch to 1-byte fields + // (legacy mode); every mainstream modern client uses 2-byte. + use1ByteFields := len(req.CompileCaps) > 27 && req.CompileCaps[27] == 0 + readField := func() (uint16, error) { + if use1ByteFields { + b, err := r.GetByte() + return uint16(b), err + } + bs, err := r.GetBytes(2) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(bs), nil + } + + for { + dt, err := readField() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tuple %d data_type: %w", len(req.Types), err) + } + if dt == 0 { + break + } + conv, err := readField() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tuple %d conv_data_type: %w", len(req.Types), err) + } + t := DataTypeTuple{DataType: dt, ConvDataType: conv} + if conv != 0 { + rep, err := readField() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tuple %d rep: %w", len(req.Types), err) + } + sep, err := readField() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tuple %d separator: %w", len(req.Types), err) + } + if sep != 0 { + log.Debug(). + Int("tuple", len(req.Types)). + Uint16("separator", sep). + Msg("DataTypeNego: unexpected non-zero tuple separator") + } + t.Representation = rep + } + req.Types = append(req.Types, t) + } + + log.Info(). + Int("types", len(req.Types)). + Int("compileCapsLen", len(req.CompileCaps)). + Int("runtimeCapsLen", len(req.RuntimeCaps)). + Bool("tzBlock", req.TZBlock != nil). + Bool("tzVersion", req.HasTZVersion). + Uint16("ncharset", req.ServernCharset). + Msg("DataTypeNego request parsed") + return req, nil +} + +// buildServerDataTypeNego returns the server's DataTypeNego response that echoes back +// the client's offered type list as "all supported". +// +// Response wire format (per go-ora's DataTypeNego.read): +// u8 opcode 0x02 +// [if client_runtime_caps[1]&1 == 1: +// [11]byte tz_block +// [if client_compile_caps[37]&2 == 2: +// u32BE server_tz_version]] +// (tuples loop echoing client's offer — full entry 8B or bare 4B): +// u16BE data_type +// u16BE conv_data_type +// [if conv != 0: u16BE rep, u16BE 0] +// u16BE 0 // terminator +// +// Strategy: "mirror everything." We don't maintain a server-side supported-type set +// because actual type handling happens upstream (go-ora → real Oracle negotiates for +// real). We just need the client to accept the handshake and move on to auth. +func buildServerDataTypeNego(req *ClientDataTypeNegoRequest) []byte { + var out bytes.Buffer + out.WriteByte(0x02) // opcode + + // Mirror the TZ preamble the client sent us. If the client included a TZ block, + // the response must include one too; mismatches cause protocol violations. + if req.TZBlock != nil { + out.Write(tzBytes()) + if req.HasTZVersion { + var vbuf [4]byte + // Use a stable 19c-era serverTZVersion. Exact value doesn't matter — client + // just validates structure and records it. + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(vbuf[:], 44) + out.Write(vbuf[:]) + } + } + + use1ByteFields := len(req.CompileCaps) > 27 && req.CompileCaps[27] == 0 + writeField := func(v uint16) { + if use1ByteFields { + out.WriteByte(byte(v)) + return + } + var b [2]byte + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(b[:], v) + out.Write(b[:]) + } + + // Echo each client-offered tuple. If client sent a full entry, we reply with a + // full entry (supported). If client sent a bare entry (conv == 0), we reply with + // a bare entry (also conv == 0) to mirror the structure. + for _, t := range req.Types { + writeField(t.DataType) + writeField(t.ConvDataType) + if t.ConvDataType != 0 { + writeField(t.Representation) + writeField(0) // separator + } + } + // Final terminator: u16BE 0 (or u8 0 in legacy mode) + writeField(0) + return out.Bytes() +} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..08d63a1c --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +package oracle + +// Hardcoded TCPNego and DataTypeNego response payloads captured from a real Oracle +// 19c RDS listener. These set the TTC caps (TTCVersion, HasEOSCapability, etc.) that +// the client uses later to parse the auth response summary object. +// +// Captured from upstream taplog during a working go-ora connection to the same user's +// RDS instance. Byte-for-byte verbatim — modifying any byte is likely to trigger +// ORA-17401 (protocol violation) because the client treats the trailing summary bytes +// based on these negotiated caps. + +// rdsTCPNegoResponse is the payload of the DATA packet RDS sends in response to a +// client TCPNego request (231 bytes, starts with opcode 0x01). +var rdsTCPNegoResponse = []byte{ + 0x01, 0x06, 0x00, 0x78, 0x38, 0x36, 0x5F, 0x36, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x75, 0x78, 0x20, + 0x32, 0x2E, 0x34, 0x2E, 0x78, 0x78, 0x00, 0x69, 0x03, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x66, 0x03, 0x40, 0x03, + 0x01, 0x40, 0x03, 0x66, 0x03, 0x01, 0x66, 0x03, 0x48, 0x03, 0x01, 0x48, 0x03, 0x66, 0x03, 0x01, + 0x66, 0x03, 0x52, 0x03, 0x01, 0x52, 0x03, 0x66, 0x03, 0x01, 0x66, 0x03, 0x61, 0x03, 0x01, 0x61, + 0x03, 0x66, 0x03, 0x01, 0x66, 0x03, 0x1F, 0x03, 0x08, 0x1F, 0x03, 0x66, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x64, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x60, 0x01, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x03, 0x0C, 0x0C, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, + 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x07, 0x08, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, + 0x0A, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x08, 0x23, 0x47, 0x23, 0x47, + 0x08, 0x11, 0x23, 0x08, 0x11, 0x41, 0xB0, 0x47, 0x00, 0x83, 0x03, 0x69, 0x07, 0xD0, 0x03, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x6F, 0x07, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x01, 0x01, + 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0x03, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xFF, 0x01, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x01, 0x01, 0xFF, 0x01, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xE2, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x05, 0x0F, 0x0F, 0x0D, + 0x07, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x18, 0x00, 0x77, +} + +// rdsDataTypeNegoResponse is the payload of the DATA packet RDS sends in response to +// a client DataTypeNego request (2714 bytes, starts with opcode 0x02). The client +// uses the compile-time caps inside this response to determine TTCVersion and +// downstream parsing behavior. +var rdsDataTypeNegoResponse = []byte{ + 0x02, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3C, 0x3C, 0x3C, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2C, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x17, 0x00, 0x17, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x19, 0x00, 0x19, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x1B, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1C, 0x00, 0x1C, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1E, 0x00, 0x1E, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x21, 0x00, 0x21, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 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b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +// Portions of this file are adapted from github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2, +// licensed under MIT. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. +// Original: auth_object.go (generateSpeedyKey, getKeyFromUserNameAndPassword, +// decryptSessionKey, encryptSessionKey, encryptPassword, generatePasswordEncKey) and +// network/security/general.go (PKCS5Padding). +// Modifications for server-side use by Infisical: the roles are inverted — the gateway +// acts as the Oracle server verifying the client's O5Logon using the placeholder password. + +package oracle + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/md5" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha512" + "encoding/hex" + "errors" + "fmt" + "strconv" +) + +// O5Logon verifier types. Only 18453 (12c+ PBKDF2+SHA512) is supported in v1. +const ( + VerifierType10g = 2361 + VerifierType11g = 6949 + VerifierType12c = 18453 +) + +// Oracle error codes we return on the client-facing leg. +const ( + ORA1017InvalidCredentials = 1017 + ORA12660EncryptionRequired = 12660 +) + +// PKCS5Padding appends PKCS#5 padding. +func PKCS5Padding(cipherText []byte, blockSize int) []byte { + padding := blockSize - len(cipherText)%blockSize + padtext := bytes.Repeat([]byte{byte(padding)}, padding) + return append(cipherText, padtext...) +} + +// generateSpeedyKey is HMAC-SHA512 iterative XOR, used for PBKDF2-like derivation. +func generateSpeedyKey(buffer, key []byte, turns int) []byte { + mac := hmac.New(sha512.New, key) + mac.Write(append(buffer, 0, 0, 0, 1)) + firstHash := mac.Sum(nil) + tempHash := make([]byte, len(firstHash)) + copy(tempHash, firstHash) + for index1 := 2; index1 <= turns; index1++ { + mac.Reset() + mac.Write(tempHash) + tempHash = mac.Sum(nil) + for index2 := 0; index2 < 64; index2++ { + firstHash[index2] = firstHash[index2] ^ tempHash[index2] + } + } + return firstHash +} + +// decryptSessionKey AES-CBC-decrypts a hex-encoded session key using a null IV. +func decryptSessionKey(padding bool, encKey []byte, sessionKeyHex string) ([]byte, error) { + result, err := hex.DecodeString(sessionKeyHex) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + blk, err := aes.NewCipher(encKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + dec := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(blk, make([]byte, 16)) + output := make([]byte, len(result)) + dec.CryptBlocks(output, result) + cutLen := 0 + if padding { + num := int(output[len(output)-1]) + if num < dec.BlockSize() { + apply := true + for x := len(output) - num; x < len(output); x++ { + if output[x] != uint8(num) { + apply = false + break + } + } + if apply { + cutLen = int(output[len(output)-1]) + } + } + } + return output[:len(output)-cutLen], nil +} + +// encryptSessionKey AES-CBC-encrypts a byte slice and returns hex. Mirrors go-ora. +func encryptSessionKey(padding bool, encKey []byte, sessionKey []byte) (string, error) { + blk, err := aes.NewCipher(encKey) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + enc := cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(blk, make([]byte, 16)) + originalLen := len(sessionKey) + sessionKey = PKCS5Padding(sessionKey, blk.BlockSize()) + output := make([]byte, len(sessionKey)) + enc.CryptBlocks(output, sessionKey) + if !padding { + return fmt.Sprintf("%X", output[:originalLen]), nil + } + return fmt.Sprintf("%X", output), nil +} + +// encryptPassword prepends 16 random bytes to `password`, then encrypts. +func encryptPassword(password, key []byte, padding bool) (string, error) { + buff1 := make([]byte, 0x10) + if _, err := rand.Read(buff1); err != nil { + return "", err + } + buffer := append(buff1, password...) + return encryptSessionKey(padding, key, buffer) +} + +// O5LogonServerState is the per-session state the gateway maintains across O5Logon's +// two message phases. All crypto runs against ProxyPasswordPlaceholder. +type O5LogonServerState struct { + // ServerSessKey is the raw (not-yet-encrypted) server session key we sent to the client. + ServerSessKey []byte + // Salt is the AUTH_VFR_DATA we sent (10 raw bytes; hex-encoded on the wire). + Salt []byte + // Pbkdf2CSKSalt is AUTH_PBKDF2_CSK_SALT — EXACTLY 32 hex characters (16 raw bytes). ORA-28041 otherwise. + Pbkdf2CSKSalt string + Pbkdf2VGenCount int + Pbkdf2SDerCount int + + // EServerSessKey is the hex-encoded encrypted server session key we sent (for round-trip checks). + EServerSessKey string + + // speedyKey derived from the placeholder + salt; cached so phase 2 doesn't recompute. + speedyKey []byte + // key is the per-session encryption key derived from placeholder password and pbkdf2 params. + key []byte +} + +// NewO5LogonServerState generates the server-side challenge material using the placeholder password. +// Sizes match a real Oracle 19c listener's output: server session key = 32 raw bytes +// (64 hex chars on the wire), salt = 16 raw bytes (32 hex chars), PBKDF2 CSK salt = 16 raw. +func NewO5LogonServerState() (*O5LogonServerState, error) { + s := &O5LogonServerState{ + Pbkdf2VGenCount: 4096, + Pbkdf2SDerCount: 3, + } + + s.ServerSessKey = make([]byte, 32) + if _, err := rand.Read(s.ServerSessKey); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + s.Salt = make([]byte, 16) + if _, err := rand.Read(s.Salt); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // AUTH_PBKDF2_CSK_SALT must be exactly 32 hex chars on the wire (16 raw bytes). + csk := make([]byte, 16) + if _, err := rand.Read(csk); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + s.Pbkdf2CSKSalt = fmt.Sprintf("%X", csk) + + key, speedy, err := deriveServerKey(ProxyPasswordPlaceholder, s.Salt, s.Pbkdf2VGenCount) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + s.key = key + s.speedyKey = speedy + + eServerSessKey, err := encryptSessionKey(false, key, s.ServerSessKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + s.EServerSessKey = eServerSessKey + + return s, nil +} + +// deriveServerKey computes the 32-byte AES-256 key used to encrypt AUTH_SESSKEY for +// verifier type 18453 (12c+ PBKDF2+SHA512), same as go-ora's client-side derivation. +func deriveServerKey(password string, salt []byte, vGenCount int) (key []byte, speedy []byte, err error) { + message := append([]byte(nil), salt...) + message = append(message, []byte("AUTH_PBKDF2_SPEEDY_KEY")...) + speedy = generateSpeedyKey(message, []byte(password), vGenCount) + + buffer := append([]byte(nil), speedy...) + buffer = append(buffer, salt...) + h := sha512.New() + h.Write(buffer) + key = h.Sum(nil)[:32] + return +} + +// VerifyClientPassword runs the server side of the phase-2 handshake: decrypt the +// client's AUTH_SESSKEY + AUTH_PASSWORD and confirm the plaintext password matches the +// placeholder. Returns the clientSessKey (needed for the SVR response) plus the password +// encryption key. +func (s *O5LogonServerState) VerifyClientPassword(eClientSessKey, ePassword string) (clientSessKey, encKey []byte, err error) { + clientSessKey, err = decryptSessionKey(false, s.key, eClientSessKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt client session key: %w", err) + } + if len(clientSessKey) != len(s.ServerSessKey) { + // For verifier 18453, len should be 48. Mismatch → bad protocol or key mismatch. + return nil, nil, errors.New("client session key length mismatch") + } + + // Derive password encryption key: generateSpeedyKey(pbkdf2ChkSalt_raw, + // hex(clientSessKey || serverSessKey), pbkdf2SderCount)[:32] for verifier 18453. + buffer := append([]byte(nil), clientSessKey...) + buffer = append(buffer, s.ServerSessKey...) + keyBuffer := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%X", buffer)) + df2key, err := hex.DecodeString(s.Pbkdf2CSKSalt) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("decode pbkdf2 salt: %w", err) + } + encKey = generateSpeedyKey(df2key, keyBuffer, s.Pbkdf2SDerCount)[:32] + + // Client calls encryptPassword(password, key, padding=true), which PKCS5-pads the + // (random16 || password) buffer to a 16-byte boundary and returns the full padded + // ciphertext. We decrypt with padding=true so decryptSessionKey strips the PKCS5 + // pad, leaving (random16 || password). + decoded, err := decryptSessionKey(true, encKey, ePassword) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt password: %w", err) + } + // encryptPassword prepended 16 random bytes before encryption. + if len(decoded) <= 16 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("decoded password too short") + } + plain := decoded[16:] + if string(plain) != ProxyPasswordPlaceholder { + return nil, nil, errors.New("password mismatch") + } + return clientSessKey, encKey, nil +} + +// BuildSvrResponse produces AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE: AES-CBC(rand(16) || "SERVER_TO_CLIENT", encKey). +// The client decrypts it and verifies bytes [16:32] == "SERVER_TO_CLIENT" (verified from +// auth_object.go:526-537 — the commented-out VerifyResponse in go-ora). +func BuildSvrResponse(encKey []byte) (string, error) { + head := make([]byte, 16) + if _, err := rand.Read(head); err != nil { + return "", err + } + body := append(head, []byte("SERVER_TO_CLIENT")...) + return encryptSessionKey(true, encKey, body) +} + +// Legacy 11g (verifier 6949) key derivation, kept for reference — v1 does not use it. +// nolint: unused +func deriveKey11g(password, saltHex string) ([]byte, error) { + salt, err := hex.DecodeString(saltHex) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + buffer := append([]byte(password), salt...) + h := sha1.New() + if _, err := h.Write(buffer); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + key := h.Sum(nil) + key = append(key, 0, 0, 0, 0) + return key, nil +} + +// md5Hash is a small helper so callers don't have to import md5 directly. +// nolint: unused +func md5Hash(data []byte) []byte { + sum := md5.Sum(data) + out := make([]byte, 16) + copy(out, sum[:]) + return out +} + +// parseIntVal is a small utility for parsing the integer-encoded TTC values +// (VGEN_COUNT / SDER_COUNT) we read out of AUTH_* key-values. +func parseIntVal(v []byte) (int, error) { + if len(v) == 0 { + return 0, nil + } + return strconv.Atoi(string(v)) +} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..992bb210 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go @@ -0,0 +1,624 @@ +package oracle + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/binary" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "strconv" +) + +// Server-role O5Logon implementation. The gateway acts as an Oracle server and drives +// the two-phase O5Logon challenge/response with the client, verifying that the client +// sends the placeholder password. Real upstream auth is handled separately (see +// upstream.go) with the injected real credentials. +// +// NOTE: This is new code (not ported from go-ora). The formats match what go-ora's +// client-side code expects; see auth_object.go newAuthObject / AuthObject.Write. + +// TTC function-call opcodes we touch during auth. +const ( + TTCMsgAuthRequest = 0x03 // generic "pre-auth" message + TTCMsgAuthResponse = 0x08 // server's response carrying KVP dict + TTCMsgError = 0x04 // server's error summary packet + TTCMsgBreak = 0x0B // reserved +) + +// AuthSubOp values — bundled inside a TTCMsgAuthRequest. +const ( + AuthSubOpPhaseOne = 0x76 + AuthSubOpPhaseTwo = 0x73 +) + +// LogonMode flags (subset). Sent by the client inside phase-2 so we know what kind of +// auth is requested. +const ( + LogonModeUserAndPass = 0x100 + LogonModeNoNewPass = 0x2000 +) + +// AuthPhaseOne carries the parsed client request that begins auth. +type AuthPhaseOne struct { + Username string + LogonMode uint32 + KeyValuePairs map[string]string +} + +// AuthPhaseTwo carries the parsed client request that completes auth. +type AuthPhaseTwo struct { + EClientSessKey string + EPassword string + ESpeedyKey string + ClientInfo map[string]string + AlterSession string + LogonMode uint32 +} + +// readDataPayload reads a single DATA packet from the client and returns its TTC payload +// (the bytes after the 2-byte dataFlag). +func readDataPayload(conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool) ([]byte, error) { + raw, err := ReadFullPacket(conn, use32BitLen) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if PacketTypeOf(raw) == PacketTypeMarker { + // Discard break/marker and try again + return readDataPayload(conn, use32BitLen) + } + if PacketTypeOf(raw) != PacketTypeData { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected DATA packet, got type=%d", raw[4]) + } + pkt, err := ParseDataPacket(raw, use32BitLen) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return pkt.Payload, nil +} + +// writeDataPayload wraps a TTC payload in a single DATA packet and writes it. +func writeDataPayload(conn net.Conn, payload []byte, use32BitLen bool) error { + d := &DataPacket{Payload: payload} + _, err := conn.Write(d.Bytes(use32BitLen)) + return err +} + +// ParseAuthPhaseOne decodes the first auth-request TTC payload from the client. +// Layout: opcode(0x03) subop(0x76) 0x00, then username length-prefix + username, +// then mode(uint32 compressed), marker byte, KVP count, then pairs. +// The structure mirrors AuthObject.Write (inverted as reader). +func ParseAuthPhaseOne(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseOne, error) { + r := NewTTCReader(payload) + op, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("phase1 opcode: %w", err) + } + if op != TTCMsgAuthRequest { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("phase1 unexpected opcode 0x%02X", op) + } + sub, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if sub != AuthSubOpPhaseOne { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("phase1 unexpected sub-op 0x%02X", sub) + } + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + out := &AuthPhaseOne{KeyValuePairs: map[string]string{}} + + // username presence byte + length + hasUser, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var userLen int + if hasUser == 1 { + userLen, err = r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } else { + // skip the second length byte (go-ora writes two zeros when no username) + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + + mode, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + out.LogonMode = uint32(mode) + + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + index, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // two marker bytes (1, 1) + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if hasUser == 1 && userLen > 0 { + // Username encoding varies per client: + // - go-ora: CLR-prefixed — one byte length (== userLen) followed by userLen bytes. + // - JDBC thin (sqlcl / SQL Developer / DBeaver): raw userLen bytes, no prefix. + // Disambiguate by peeking: if the next byte equals userLen AND is in the control + // range (< 0x20), it's a length prefix. Otherwise treat as raw string data. + peek, perr := r.PeekByte() + if perr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("peek username: %w", perr) + } + if int(peek) == userLen && peek < 0x20 { + // Consume CLR length and use GetClr-style read. + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("consume username length prefix: %w", err) + } + } + u, err := r.GetBytes(userLen) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("read username bytes: %w", err) + } + out.Username = string(u) + } + + for i := 0; i < index; i++ { + k, v, _, err := r.GetKeyVal() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("phase1 KVP #%d: %w", i, err) + } + out.KeyValuePairs[string(k)] = string(v) + } + return out, nil +} + +// BuildAuthPhaseOneResponse builds the server's phase-1 response payload carrying the +// challenge material the client needs to continue. Layout (mirrors a real Oracle 19c +// listener byte-for-byte): +// +// opcode(0x08) +// dictLen(compressed) = 6 +// AUTH_SESSKEY num=0 value = 64 hex chars (32 raw bytes, AES-CBC encrypted) +// AUTH_VFR_DATA num=18453 value = 32 hex chars (16 raw bytes salt) +// AUTH_PBKDF2_CSK_SALT num=0 value = 32 hex chars +// AUTH_PBKDF2_VGEN_COUNT num=0 value = "4096" +// AUTH_PBKDF2_SDER_COUNT num=0 value = "3" +// AUTH_GLOBALLY_UNIQUE_DBID num=0 value = 32 hex chars (fake DBID is fine) +// then summary: +// opcode(0x04) + retCode + zeros (ends the response — without it JDBC thin ORA-17401) +func BuildAuthPhaseOneResponse(state *O5LogonServerState) []byte { + b := NewTTCBuilder() + b.PutBytes(TTCMsgAuthResponse) + kvs := []struct { + key string + value string + flag uint32 + }{ + {"AUTH_SESSKEY", state.EServerSessKey, 0}, + // AUTH_VFR_DATA: value = hex-encoded salt; flag = VerifierType. + {"AUTH_VFR_DATA", fmt.Sprintf("%X", state.Salt), VerifierType12c}, + {"AUTH_PBKDF2_CSK_SALT", state.Pbkdf2CSKSalt, 0}, + {"AUTH_PBKDF2_VGEN_COUNT", strconv.Itoa(state.Pbkdf2VGenCount), 0}, + {"AUTH_PBKDF2_SDER_COUNT", strconv.Itoa(state.Pbkdf2SDerCount), 0}, + // AUTH_GLOBALLY_UNIQUE_DBID — a fixed 32-hex-char fake DBID. Real Oracle uses + // the instance's actual DBID; JDBC thin just validates its presence and format. + // Key ends with an embedded NULL to exactly match the 26-byte length RDS sends. + {"AUTH_GLOBALLY_UNIQUE_DBID\x00", "11A7D223DECC14322F8777F2BACBEE84", 0}, + } + b.PutUint(uint64(len(kvs)), 4, true, true) + for _, kv := range kvs { + b.PutKeyValString(kv.key, kv.value, kv.flag) + } + + // Trailing summary packet (message code 0x04) — marks end of the auth response so + // JDBC thin's reader loop terminates. Format observed from RDS (34 bytes total): + // 04 01 01 02 1A 98 <28 zero bytes> + // Two compressed ints: first = 1 (call status), second = 2-byte sequence number. + b.PutBytes(TTCMsgError) // opcode 4 + b.PutInt(1, 4, true, true) // 01 01 + b.PutInt(0x1A98, 4, true, true) // 02 1A 98 + // padding — 28 zero bytes matches RDS's 34-byte summary trailer + for i := 0; i < 28; i++ { + b.PutBytes(0) + } + return b.Bytes() +} + +// ParseAuthPhaseTwo decodes the second auth-request TTC payload from the client. +func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { + r := NewTTCReader(payload) + op, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if op != TTCMsgAuthRequest { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("phase2 unexpected opcode 0x%02X", op) + } + sub, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if sub != AuthSubOpPhaseTwo { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("phase2 unexpected sub-op 0x%02X", sub) + } + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + out := &AuthPhaseTwo{ClientInfo: map[string]string{}} + + hasUser, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var userLen int + if hasUser == 1 { + userLen, err = r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } else { + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + + mode, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + out.LogonMode = uint32(mode) + + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + count, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if hasUser == 1 && userLen > 0 { + // Same client-specific branch as ParseAuthPhaseOne: go-ora prefixes with a + // CLR length byte; JDBC thin sends raw. Peek to disambiguate. + peek, perr := r.PeekByte() + if perr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("peek phase2 username: %w", perr) + } + if int(peek) == userLen && peek < 0x20 { + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("consume phase2 username length prefix: %w", err) + } + } + if _, err := r.GetBytes(userLen); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("read phase2 username bytes: %w", err) + } + } + + for i := 0; i < count; i++ { + k, v, _, err := r.GetKeyVal() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("phase2 KVP #%d: %w", i, err) + } + switch string(k) { + case "AUTH_SESSKEY": + out.EClientSessKey = string(v) + case "AUTH_PASSWORD": + out.EPassword = string(v) + case "AUTH_PBKDF2_SPEEDY_KEY": + out.ESpeedyKey = string(v) + case "AUTH_ALTER_SESSION": + out.AlterSession = string(v) + default: + out.ClientInfo[string(k)] = string(v) + } + } + return out, nil +} + +// BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponseFromUpstream produces the phase-2 response using the actual +// KVPs upstream Oracle returned to go-ora during our upstream auth. We substitute +// AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE with our placeholder-derived value (so the client can verify the +// server proves knowledge of its placeholder password) and keep everything else intact. +// +// If upstreamKVPs is empty (e.g. TLS path where we can't tap), we fall back to the +// synthesised minimal response via BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse. +func BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponseFromUpstream(svrResponse string, upstreamKVPs map[string]string) []byte { + if len(upstreamKVPs) == 0 { + return BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse(svrResponse, 0xC0DE, 0x42) + } + + b := NewTTCBuilder() + b.PutBytes(TTCMsgAuthResponse) + + // Build KVP list preserving a canonical insertion order. We mirror the order Oracle + // 19c uses: version info first, then DB identity, then session identity, then server + // host scoping, then NLS params, then AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE, then misc limits. Clients + // don't appear to require a specific order but matching reality is safest. + order := []string{ + "AUTH_VERSION_STRING", + "AUTH_VERSION_SQL", + "AUTH_XACTION_TRAITS", + "AUTH_VERSION_NO", + "AUTH_VERSION_STATUS", + "AUTH_CAPABILITY_TABLE", + "AUTH_LAST_LOGIN", + "AUTH_DBNAME", + "AUTH_DB_MOUNT_ID", + "AUTH_DB_ID", + "AUTH_USER_ID", + "AUTH_SESSION_ID", + "AUTH_SERIAL_NUM", + "AUTH_INSTANCE_NO", + "AUTH_FAILOVER_ID", + "AUTH_SERVER_PID", + "AUTH_SC_SERVER_HOST", + "AUTH_SC_DBUNIQUE_NAME", + "AUTH_SC_INSTANCE_NAME", + "AUTH_SC_INSTANCE_ID", + "AUTH_SC_INSTANCE_START_TIME", + "AUTH_SC_DB_DOMAIN", + "AUTH_SC_SERVICE_NAME", + "AUTH_ONS_RLB_SUBSCR_PATTERN", + "AUTH_ONS_HA_SUBSCR_PATTERN", + "AUTH_INSTANCENAME", + "AUTH_NLS_LXLAN", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCTERRITORY", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCCURRENCY", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCISOCURR", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCNUMERICS", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCDATEFM", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCDATELANG", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCSORT", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCCALENDAR", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCUNIONCUR", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCTIMEFM", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCSTMPFM", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCTTZNFM", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCSTZNFM", + "AUTH_NLS_LXLENSEMANTICS", + "AUTH_NLS_LXNCHARCONVEXCP", + "AUTH_NLS_LXCOMP", + "AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE", // substituted below + "AUTH_TSTZ_ERROR_CHECK", + "AUTH_MAX_OPEN_CURSORS", + "AUTH_MAX_IDEN_LENGTH", + } + + // Build the final KVP list — only include keys that appear either in the order + // list (from upstream) or are AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE (always included). + type kvEntry struct { + key string + value string + } + var kvs []kvEntry + seen := map[string]bool{} + for _, k := range order { + if k == "AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE" { + kvs = append(kvs, kvEntry{k, svrResponse}) + seen[k] = true + continue + } + if v, ok := upstreamKVPs[k]; ok { + kvs = append(kvs, kvEntry{k, v}) + seen[k] = true + } + } + // Append any upstream keys we didn't explicitly order (e.g. keys Oracle added in a + // newer version that aren't in our list). This keeps us forward-compatible. + for k, v := range upstreamKVPs { + if !seen[k] && k != "AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE" { + kvs = append(kvs, kvEntry{k, v}) + } + } + + b.PutUint(uint64(len(kvs)), 4, true, true) + for _, kv := range kvs { + b.PutKeyValString(kv.key, kv.value, 0) + } + + // Trailing summary packet — same shape as the non-upstream variant. + b.PutBytes(TTCMsgError) + b.PutInt(1, 4, true, true) + b.PutInt(0x1A98, 4, true, true) + for i := 0; i < 28; i++ { + b.PutBytes(0) + } + return b.Bytes() +} + +// BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse produces the final server response that tells the client +// auth succeeded. It includes session IDs, NLS params and AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE. +func BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse(svrResponse string, sessionID, serialNum uint32) []byte { + b := NewTTCBuilder() + b.PutBytes(TTCMsgAuthResponse) + kvs := []struct { + key string + value string + flag uint32 + }{ + {"AUTH_VERSION_NO", "352321536", 0}, + {"AUTH_SESSION_ID", strconv.FormatUint(uint64(sessionID), 10), 0}, + {"AUTH_SERIAL_NUM", strconv.FormatUint(uint64(serialNum), 10), 0}, + {"AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE", svrResponse, 0}, + {"AUTH_VERSION_STRING", "Oracle Database 19c Enterprise Edition Release 19.0.0.0.0 - Production", 0}, + {"AUTH_VERSION_SQL", "1", 0}, + {"AUTH_XACTION_TRAITS", "3", 0}, + {"AUTH_INSTANCENAME", "orcl", 0}, + {"AUTH_FLAGS", "16777344", 0}, + // NLS params + {"AUTH_SC_DBUNIQUE_NAME", "orcl", 0}, + {"AUTH_SC_SERVICE_NAME", "orcl", 0}, + {"AUTH_SC_INSTANCE_NAME", "orcl", 0}, + {"AUTH_SC_DB_DOMAIN", "", 0}, + {"AUTH_SC_INSTANCE_START_TIME", "", 0}, + } + b.PutUint(uint64(len(kvs)), 4, true, true) + for _, kv := range kvs { + b.PutKeyValString(kv.key, kv.value, kv.flag) + } + // Trailing summary packet (opcode 0x04) — terminates the auth response so the + // client's TTC reader loop exits. Same shape as the phase-1 trailer. + // Format (34 bytes total): 04 01 01 02 <2-byte seq> <28 zero bytes> + b.PutBytes(TTCMsgError) + b.PutInt(1, 4, true, true) // 01 01 + b.PutInt(0x1A98, 4, true, true) // 02 1A 98 + for i := 0; i < 28; i++ { + b.PutBytes(0) + } + return b.Bytes() +} + +// BuildErrorPacket constructs an Oracle error summary packet (opcode 0x04). The Oracle +// client checks `Session.HasError()` after each response, which reads this summary. +// Minimal fields: opcode, retCode (the ORA error number), retCol, errorPos, SQL state, +// flags, rpc message (empty), and finally the error message. +func BuildErrorPacket(oraCode int, message string) []byte { + b := NewTTCBuilder() + b.PutBytes(TTCMsgError) + + // length: sum of number-compressed fields. go-ora summary_object.go shows: + // endOfCallStatus (4 bytes compressed) + // endToEndECIDSequence (2 bytes) + // currentRowNumber (4) + // returnCode (4) ← our oraCode goes here + // arrayElemErrorsCount (2) + // arrayElemError count again + // current cursor id (2) + // error position (2) + // sql type (1) + // oer_fatal (1) + // flags (1) + // user cursor opts (1) + // uol (1) + // sid (4) + // serial num (4) + // rba ts (2) + // rba sqn (4) + // rba blk (4) + // rba byte (4) + // some flags, then CLR of the message + // Most fields can be zero; the code is what matters. + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) // endOfCallStatus + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) // endToEndECID + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) // currentRow + b.PutInt(int64(oraCode), 4, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 1, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 1, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 1, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 1, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 1, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) // flags + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) + b.PutString(message) + // trailing warning count + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) + return b.Bytes() +} + +// WriteErrorToClient writes an Oracle-format error summary packet to the client. +func WriteErrorToClient(conn net.Conn, oraCode int, message string, use32BitLen bool) error { + return writeDataPayload(conn, BuildErrorPacket(oraCode, message), use32BitLen) +} + +// RunServerO5Logon drives the two-phase O5Logon handshake with the client. On success +// returns nil; on failure it has already written an ORA-error packet to the client. +func RunServerO5Logon(conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool) error { + // Phase 1: read client's initial auth request. + p1Payload, err := readDataPayload(conn, use32BitLen) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read phase1 DATA: %w", err) + } + if _, err := ParseAuthPhaseOne(p1Payload); err != nil { + _ = WriteErrorToClient(conn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32BitLen) + return fmt.Errorf("parse phase1: %w", err) + } + + state, err := NewO5LogonServerState() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("init O5Logon state: %w", err) + } + + // Phase 1 response: send challenge material. + if err := writeDataPayload(conn, BuildAuthPhaseOneResponse(state), use32BitLen); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write phase1 response: %w", err) + } + + // Phase 2: read client's password response. + p2Payload, err := readDataPayload(conn, use32BitLen) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read phase2 DATA: %w", err) + } + p2, err := ParseAuthPhaseTwo(p2Payload) + if err != nil { + _ = WriteErrorToClient(conn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32BitLen) + return fmt.Errorf("parse phase2: %w", err) + } + + _, encKey, err := state.VerifyClientPassword(p2.EClientSessKey, p2.EPassword) + if err != nil { + _ = WriteErrorToClient(conn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32BitLen) + return fmt.Errorf("verify password: %w", err) + } + + svrResponse, err := BuildSvrResponse(encKey) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("build svr response: %w", err) + } + + // Phase 2 response: auth OK + if err := writeDataPayload(conn, BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse(svrResponse, 0xC0DE, 0x42), use32BitLen); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write phase2 response: %w", err) + } + return nil +} + +// dumpBytes is a tiny hex helper used in log messages when something goes sideways. +// nolint: unused +func dumpBytes(b []byte, max int) string { + if len(b) > max { + b = b[:max] + } + var buf bytes.Buffer + for i, v := range b { + if i > 0 { + buf.WriteByte(' ') + } + fmt.Fprintf(&buf, "%02X", v) + } + return buf.String() +} + +// readUint32 is a tiny helper used in tests. Kept here to avoid a separate utility file. +// nolint: unused +func readUint32(r io.Reader) (uint32, error) { + var v [4]byte + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, v[:]); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(v[:]), nil +} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..504e5e0f --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +package oracle + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/tls" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "time" + + "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/session" + "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" +) + +// prependedConn lets us push bytes we've already read back "in front" of a net.Conn's +// read stream, so downstream code can read them normally. +type prependedConn struct { + net.Conn + buf []byte +} + +func (p *prependedConn) Read(b []byte) (int, error) { + if len(p.buf) > 0 { + n := copy(b, p.buf) + p.buf = p.buf[n:] + return n, nil + } + return p.Conn.Read(b) +} + +// SetReadDeadline forwards to the wrapped conn; our prepended buf reads are synchronous +// so no deadline is needed for them. +func (p *prependedConn) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error { + type withDeadline interface{ SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error } + if d, ok := p.Conn.(withDeadline); ok { + return d.SetReadDeadline(t) + } + return nil +} + +// OracleProxyConfig mirrors the shape used by other PAM database handlers so the +// dispatch in pam-proxy.go stays templatized. Oracle-specific extras (the upstream +// TLS pinning fields) sit on top of the common eight. +type OracleProxyConfig struct { + TargetAddr string // "host:port" + InjectUsername string + InjectPassword string + InjectDatabase string + EnableTLS bool + TLSConfig *tls.Config // provided by dispatcher but not used on the upstream leg + SessionID string + SessionLogger session.SessionLogger + + SSLRejectUnauthorized bool + SSLCertificate string +} + +type OracleProxy struct { + config OracleProxyConfig +} + +func NewOracleProxy(config OracleProxyConfig) *OracleProxy { + return &OracleProxy{config: config} +} + +// HandleConnection runs one end-to-end PAM session for a connecting Oracle client. +// Flow: +// 1. Dial+auth upstream with real credentials so we fail cleanly if the backend is down. +// 2. Read the client's CONNECT, send an ACCEPT. +// 3. Drive server-side TCPNego + DataTypeNego. +// 4. Handle (and refuse) ANO if the client sent it. +// 5. Run server-side O5Logon verifying ProxyPasswordPlaceholder. +// 6. Relay raw bytes both directions with a passive TTC tap for query logging. +func (p *OracleProxy) HandleConnection(ctx context.Context, clientConn net.Conn) error { + // New proxied-auth flow: forward client pre-auth bytes verbatim to upstream, intercept + // only at O5Logon boundary. This keeps client and upstream in matching cap state, so + // post-auth byte relay works for clients whose caps differ from go-ora's (notably JDBC + // thin — sqlcl, SQL Developer, DBeaver). + return p.handleConnectionProxied(ctx, clientConn) +} + +// handleConnectionLegacy is the original impersonation flow (go-ora upstream dial + +// server-side handshake). Kept for reference; not currently routed. +func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionLegacy(ctx context.Context, clientConn net.Conn) error { + defer clientConn.Close() + defer func() { + if err := p.config.SessionLogger.Close(); err != nil { + log.Error().Err(err).Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Failed to close session logger") + } + }() + + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Str("target", p.config.TargetAddr).Msg("Oracle PAM session started") + + host, port, err := splitHostPort(p.config.TargetAddr) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid target addr: %w", err) + } + + upstream, err := DialUpstream(ctx, UpstreamCredentials{ + Host: host, + Port: port, + Service: p.config.InjectDatabase, + Username: p.config.InjectUsername, + Password: p.config.InjectPassword, + SSLEnabled: p.config.EnableTLS, + SSLRejectUnauthorized: p.config.SSLRejectUnauthorized, + SSLCertificate: p.config.SSLCertificate, + }) + if err != nil { + log.Error().Err(err).Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Failed to authenticate to Oracle upstream") + _ = WriteRefuseToClient(clientConn, "(DESCRIPTION=(ERR=12564)(VSNNUM=0)(ERROR_STACK=(ERROR=(CODE=12564)(EMFI=4))))") + return fmt.Errorf("upstream auth failed: %w", err) + } + defer upstream.Close() + + // Read client CONNECT (16-bit length framing until ACCEPT completes + v315 negotiation). + connectRaw, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read client CONNECT: %w", err) + } + if PacketTypeOf(connectRaw) == PacketTypeResend { + // Rare fall-back: client may re-send; accept and read again. + connectRaw, err = ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("re-read CONNECT: %w", err) + } + } + if PacketTypeOf(connectRaw) != PacketTypeConnect { + return fmt.Errorf("expected CONNECT, got type=%d", connectRaw[4]) + } + connectPkt, err := ParseConnectPacket(connectRaw) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("parse CONNECT: %w", err) + } + + log.Info(). + Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID). + Uint16("clientVersion", connectPkt.Version). + Uint16("clientLoVersion", connectPkt.LoVersion). + Uint32("clientSDU", connectPkt.SessionDataUnit). + Uint32("clientTDU", connectPkt.TransportDataUnit). + Uint16("clientOptions", connectPkt.Options). + Uint8("clientFlag", connectPkt.Flag). + Uint8("clientACFL0", connectPkt.ACFL0). + Uint8("clientACFL1", connectPkt.ACFL1). + Int("connectDataLen", len(connectPkt.ConnectData)). + Str("connectRawHex", fmt.Sprintf("% X", connectRaw[:min(80, len(connectRaw))])). + Msg("Oracle CONNECT received") + + accept := AcceptFromConnect(connectPkt) + acceptBytes := accept.Bytes() + if _, err := clientConn.Write(acceptBytes); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write ACCEPT: %w", err) + } + // From ACCEPT onward, use 32-bit length framing if negotiated >= 315. + use32Bit := accept.Version >= 315 + log.Info(). + Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID). + Uint16("acceptVersion", accept.Version). + Bool("use32BitLen", use32Bit). + Int("acceptLen", len(acceptBytes)). + Str("acceptHex", fmt.Sprintf("% X", acceptBytes)). + Msg("Oracle ACCEPT sent") + + // Peek what the client sends next: if it's an empty read/EOF, the client rejected + // our ACCEPT and closed the socket. Otherwise feed the bytes back into nego. + peekBuf := make([]byte, 256) + _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)) + n, peekErr := clientConn.Read(peekBuf) + _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) + log.Info(). + Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID). + Int("peekBytes", n). + Err(peekErr). + Str("peekHex", fmt.Sprintf("% X", peekBuf[:n])). + Msg("Post-ACCEPT peek") + if peekErr != nil && n == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("client closed after ACCEPT without sending nego: %w", peekErr) + } + + peeked := append([]byte(nil), peekBuf[:n]...) + + // Connect-data supplement: some clients (notably go-ora) send the DESCRIPTION string + // as a follow-up 16-bit-framed DATA packet right after the ACCEPT, before any nego + // traffic. We recognise it by the 16-bit framing pattern (length high byte in [0], + // length low byte in [1], bytes [2:4] zero, bytes[4] == 0x06 for DATA) and drain it. + // Only after this supplement is consumed does the client switch to 32-bit framing. + if supplementLen := detectConnectDataSupplement(peeked); supplementLen > 0 { + log.Info(). + Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID). + Int("supplementLen", supplementLen). + Msg("Draining connect-data supplement (16-bit framed DATA)") + if supplementLen > len(peeked) { + // Supplement extends past what we peeked — read the rest. + remaining := make([]byte, supplementLen-len(peeked)) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(clientConn, remaining); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read connect-data supplement tail: %w", err) + } + peeked = nil + } else { + peeked = peeked[supplementLen:] + } + } + + clientConn = &prependedConn{Conn: clientConn, buf: peeked} + + // Pre-auth: client may send ANO / TCPNego / DataTypeNego in various orders. + // RunPreAuthExchange dispatches per-payload and returns once it sees the auth-request + // opcode (0x03), returning that payload so we can feed it to O5Logon phase 1. + p1Payload, err := RunPreAuthExchange(clientConn, use32Bit) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("pre-auth exchange: %w", err) + } + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Oracle pre-auth exchange complete") + + if _, err := ParseAuthPhaseOne(p1Payload); err != nil { + _ = WriteErrorToClient(clientConn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32Bit) + return fmt.Errorf("parse auth phase 1: %w", err) + } + state, err := NewO5LogonServerState() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("init O5Logon state: %w", err) + } + p1Resp := BuildAuthPhaseOneResponse(state) + log.Info(). + Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID). + Int("p1RespLen", len(p1Resp)). + Str("p1RespHex", fmt.Sprintf("% X", p1Resp)). + Msg("Auth phase 1 response") + if err := writeDataPayload(clientConn, p1Resp, use32Bit); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write auth phase 1 response: %w", err) + } + + p2Payload, err := readDataPayload(clientConn, use32Bit) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read auth phase 2: %w", err) + } + p2, err := ParseAuthPhaseTwo(p2Payload) + if err != nil { + _ = WriteErrorToClient(clientConn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32Bit) + return fmt.Errorf("parse auth phase 2: %w", err) + } + if _, encKey, verr := state.VerifyClientPassword(p2.EClientSessKey, p2.EPassword); verr != nil { + _ = WriteErrorToClient(clientConn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32Bit) + return fmt.Errorf("verify client password: %w", verr) + } else { + svr, err := BuildSvrResponse(encKey) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("build SVR response: %w", err) + } + // Mirror upstream's phase-2 KVPs (session IDs, NLS, db info etc.) so the client's + // view of the session matches what upstream actually issued — otherwise subsequent + // RPCs reference IDs upstream will reject. + p2Resp := BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponseFromUpstream(svr, upstream.Phase2KVPs) + if err := writeDataPayload(clientConn, p2Resp, use32Bit); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write auth phase 2 response: %w", err) + } + } + + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Client authenticated; starting relay") + + c2u, u2c := NewQueryExtractorPair(p.config.SessionLogger, p.config.SessionID, use32Bit) + defer c2u.Stop() + defer u2c.Stop() + + errCh := make(chan error, 2) + go relayWithTap(clientConn, upstream.Conn, c2u, errCh) + go relayWithTap(upstream.Conn, clientConn, u2c, errCh) + + select { + case rerr := <-errCh: + if rerr != nil && rerr != io.EOF { + log.Debug().Err(rerr).Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Oracle relay ended") + } + case <-ctx.Done(): + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Oracle session cancelled by context") + } + + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Oracle PAM session ended") + return nil +} + +// detectConnectDataSupplement returns the length of a 16-bit-framed DATA packet at the +// start of buf, or 0 if buf doesn't look like one. Pattern: bytes[0:2] = length (16-bit +// BE, plausible 8..64K), bytes[2:4] = 0 (packet checksum), bytes[4] = 0x06 (DATA type). +func detectConnectDataSupplement(buf []byte) int { + if len(buf) < 8 { + return 0 + } + length := int(buf[0])<<8 | int(buf[1]) + if length < 8 || length > 64*1024 { + return 0 + } + // Reject if the length field LOOKS like the high bytes of a 32-bit length + // (i.e. bytes[2:4] are non-zero would imply a 32-bit length). A 16-bit framed + // packet MUST have bytes[2:4] zero because that's the checksum field. + if buf[2] != 0 || buf[3] != 0 { + return 0 + } + if buf[4] != 0x06 { + return 0 + } + return length +} + +// relayWithTap copies src → dst byte-for-byte, Feed()'ing a copy of each read into the +// tap extractor. This is the hot path — it must not parse or log per-packet. +func relayWithTap(src, dst net.Conn, tap *QueryExtractor, errCh chan<- error) { + buf := make([]byte, 32*1024) + for { + n, err := src.Read(buf) + if n > 0 { + if _, werr := dst.Write(buf[:n]); werr != nil { + errCh <- werr + return + } + tap.Feed(buf[:n]) + } + if err != nil { + errCh <- err + return + } + } +} + +func min(a, b int) int { + if a < b { + return a + } + return b +} + +func splitHostPort(addr string) (string, int, error) { + host, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) + if err != nil { + return "", 0, err + } + var port int + _, err = fmt.Sscanf(portStr, "%d", &port) + if err != nil { + return "", 0, fmt.Errorf("bad port %q: %w", portStr, err) + } + return host, port, nil +} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..37b2adeb --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go @@ -0,0 +1,780 @@ +package oracle + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "crypto/tls" + "encoding/binary" + "encoding/hex" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "strconv" + "time" + + "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" +) + +// handleConnectionProxied is the cap-aligned implementation of the Oracle PAM handler. +// Instead of dialling upstream via go-ora (which negotiates upstream state with go-ora's +// own caps), we open a raw TCP connection to upstream and forward the client's CONNECT / +// ANO / TCPNego / DataTypeNego bytes verbatim. Upstream therefore negotiates with the +// CLIENT's caps — making post-auth byte relay possible. +// +// The only interception happens at the O5Logon boundary: we decrypt the client's key +// material with the placeholder password, re-encrypt with the real password before +// forwarding to upstream; and we substitute upstream's password-derived fields with +// placeholder-derived equivalents when forwarding to the client. +func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn net.Conn) error { + defer clientConn.Close() + defer func() { + if err := p.config.SessionLogger.Close(); err != nil { + log.Error().Err(err).Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Failed to close session logger") + } + }() + + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Str("target", p.config.TargetAddr).Msg("Oracle PAM session started (proxied auth)") + + // 1. Raw TCP dial to upstream. + upstreamConn, err := dialUpstreamRaw(ctx, p.config) + if err != nil { + log.Error().Err(err).Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Failed to dial Oracle upstream") + _ = WriteRefuseToClient(clientConn, "(DESCRIPTION=(ERR=12564)(VSNNUM=0)(ERROR_STACK=(ERROR=(CODE=12564)(EMFI=4))))") + return fmt.Errorf("upstream dial: %w", err) + } + defer upstreamConn.Close() + + // 2. Forward client CONNECT → upstream, then upstream ACCEPT → client. + connectRaw, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read client CONNECT: %w", err) + } + if PacketTypeOf(connectRaw) != PacketTypeConnect { + return fmt.Errorf("expected CONNECT, got type=%d", connectRaw[4]) + } + if _, err := upstreamConn.Write(connectRaw); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("forward CONNECT: %w", err) + } + + // Read upstream packets until we see ACCEPT. The listener may send intermediate + // packets first — notably NSPTRS (type 0x0B, "RESEND") which tells the client to + // re-transmit its DESCRIPTION as a follow-up packet because it didn't fit inline + // in the CONNECT. We forward these intermediates to the client transparently, and + // if we see NSPTRS specifically we also read the client's follow-up packet and + // forward it back to upstream — otherwise upstream stalls waiting for it. + // + // A REFUSE / REDIRECT ends the flow with an error. + const ( + PacketTypeResendMarker PacketType = 0x0B // NSPTRS + ) + var acceptRaw []byte + for attempt := 0; acceptRaw == nil; attempt++ { + pkt, err := ReadFullPacket(upstreamConn, false) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read upstream handshake packet (attempt %d): %w", attempt, err) + } + pktType := PacketTypeOf(pkt) + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Uint8("pktType", uint8(pktType)).Int("pktLen", len(pkt)).Msg("Proxy: upstream handshake packet") + if _, werr := clientConn.Write(pkt); werr != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("forward upstream handshake packet: %w", werr) + } + switch pktType { + case PacketTypeAccept: + acceptRaw = pkt + case PacketTypeRefuse: + return fmt.Errorf("upstream REFUSE during handshake") + case PacketTypeRedirect: + return fmt.Errorf("upstream REDIRECT during handshake (not supported)") + case PacketTypeResendMarker: + // Read the client's follow-up packet (typically the DESCRIPTION supplement + // as a 16-bit-framed DATA packet) and forward to upstream. + supplement, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read client supplement after RESEND: %w", err) + } + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Int("supplementLen", len(supplement)).Uint8("supplType", uint8(PacketTypeOf(supplement))).Msg("Proxy: forwarding client supplement after RESEND") + if _, werr := upstreamConn.Write(supplement); werr != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("forward client supplement: %w", werr) + } + } + } + + // Parse ACCEPT to learn negotiated version → framing mode. + // Layout: bytes[8:10] = version (u16BE). + var acceptVersion uint16 + if len(acceptRaw) >= 10 { + acceptVersion = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(acceptRaw[8:10]) + } + use32Bit := acceptVersion >= 315 + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Uint16("acceptVersion", acceptVersion).Bool("use32Bit", use32Bit).Msg("Proxy: ACCEPT forwarded") + + // 3. Post-ACCEPT: peek for go-ora's 16-bit-framed connect-data supplement. + peekBuf := make([]byte, 256) + _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)) + n, _ := clientConn.Read(peekBuf) + _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) + peeked := append([]byte(nil), peekBuf[:n]...) + if slen := detectConnectDataSupplement(peeked); slen > 0 { + log.Info().Int("supplementLen", slen).Msg("Proxy: draining connect-data supplement, forwarding to upstream") + if slen > len(peeked) { + rest := make([]byte, slen-len(peeked)) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(clientConn, rest); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read supplement tail: %w", err) + } + // Forward full supplement to upstream. + if _, err := upstreamConn.Write(peeked); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("forward supplement head: %w", err) + } + if _, err := upstreamConn.Write(rest); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("forward supplement tail: %w", err) + } + peeked = nil + } else { + if _, err := upstreamConn.Write(peeked[:slen]); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("forward supplement: %w", err) + } + peeked = peeked[slen:] + } + } + if len(peeked) > 0 { + clientConn = &prependedConn{Conn: clientConn, buf: peeked} + } + + // 4. Pre-auth turn-taking loop: each client packet → forward to upstream → read + // upstream response → forward to client. Break when we see the auth request. + p1Payload, err := proxyUntilAuthRequest(clientConn, upstreamConn, use32Bit, p.config.SessionID) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("pre-auth proxy: %w", err) + } + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Int("p1Len", len(p1Payload)).Msg("Proxy: auth-request boundary reached") + + // 5. Forward client's phase-1 auth request to upstream verbatim. + if err := writeDataPayload(upstreamConn, p1Payload, use32Bit); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("forward phase 1 request: %w", err) + } + + // 6. Read upstream's phase-1 response. Extract fields, translate, forward to client. + p1RespUpstream, err := readDataPayload(upstreamConn, use32Bit) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read upstream phase 1 response: %w", err) + } + state, p1RespTranslated, err := translatePhase1Response(p1RespUpstream, p.config.InjectPassword) + if err != nil { + _ = WriteErrorToClient(clientConn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32Bit) + return fmt.Errorf("translate phase 1 response: %w", err) + } + if err := writeDataPayload(clientConn, p1RespTranslated, use32Bit); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write translated phase 1 response: %w", err) + } + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Proxy: phase-1 response translated and forwarded") + + // 7. Read client's phase-2 request. Decrypt with placeholder keys, re-encrypt with + // real-password keys, forward to upstream. + p2ReqClient, err := readDataPayload(clientConn, use32Bit) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read client phase 2 request: %w", err) + } + p2ReqTranslated, err := translatePhase2Request(p2ReqClient, state, p.config.InjectPassword) + if err != nil { + _ = WriteErrorToClient(clientConn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32Bit) + return fmt.Errorf("translate phase 2 request: %w", err) + } + if err := writeDataPayload(upstreamConn, p2ReqTranslated, use32Bit); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("forward phase 2 request: %w", err) + } + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Proxy: phase-2 request translated and forwarded") + + // 8. Read upstream's phase-2 response. Substitute AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE with a + // placeholder-derived one so the client verifies successfully. + p2RespUpstream, err := readDataPayload(upstreamConn, use32Bit) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read upstream phase 2 response: %w", err) + } + p2RespTranslated, err := translatePhase2Response(p2RespUpstream, state) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("translate phase 2 response: %w", err) + } + if err := writeDataPayload(clientConn, p2RespTranslated, use32Bit); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write translated phase 2 response: %w", err) + } + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Proxy: phase-2 response translated; client authenticated") + + // 9. Byte relay. + c2u, u2c := NewQueryExtractorPair(p.config.SessionLogger, p.config.SessionID, use32Bit) + defer c2u.Stop() + defer u2c.Stop() + + errCh := make(chan error, 2) + go relayWithTap(clientConn, upstreamConn, c2u, errCh) + go relayWithTap(upstreamConn, clientConn, u2c, errCh) + + select { + case rerr := <-errCh: + if rerr != nil && rerr != io.EOF { + log.Debug().Err(rerr).Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Oracle relay ended") + } + case <-ctx.Done(): + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Oracle session cancelled by context") + } + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Oracle PAM session ended") + return nil +} + +// dialUpstreamRaw opens a plain TCP (or TLS) connection to the upstream Oracle target +// without invoking go-ora. We'll drive the handshake ourselves by proxying client bytes. +func dialUpstreamRaw(ctx context.Context, cfg OracleProxyConfig) (net.Conn, error) { + host, port, err := splitHostPort(cfg.TargetAddr) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid target addr: %w", err) + } + addr := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", host, port) + d := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 15 * time.Second} + rawConn, err := d.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if !cfg.EnableTLS { + return rawConn, nil + } + tlsCfg := &tls.Config{ + ServerName: host, + InsecureSkipVerify: !cfg.SSLRejectUnauthorized, + } + if cfg.TLSConfig != nil && len(cfg.TLSConfig.RootCAs.Subjects()) > 0 { + tlsCfg.RootCAs = cfg.TLSConfig.RootCAs + } + tc := tls.Client(rawConn, tlsCfg) + if err := tc.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil { + rawConn.Close() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream TLS handshake: %w", err) + } + return tc, nil +} + +// proxyUntilAuthRequest runs a bidirectional packet-level proxy between client and +// upstream during pre-auth. Two goroutines read from each side and forward to the other, +// synchronously with no turn-taking assumption. The client-side reader inspects DATA +// packets for the phase-1 auth request (opcode 0x03 0x76); when seen, it signals the +// main routine to stop and returns the auth-request payload WITHOUT forwarding it. +// All other packets (control, marker, data) flow through transparently. +// +// The caller takes over O5Logon translation from here. +func proxyUntilAuthRequest(client, upstream net.Conn, use32Bit bool, sessionID string) ([]byte, error) { + type result struct { + payload []byte + err error + } + done := make(chan result, 2) + stop := make(chan struct{}) + + // Upstream → client: forward every packet unchanged. Exit when stop is signalled. + go func() { + for { + select { + case <-stop: + return + default: + } + pkt, err := ReadFullPacket(upstream, use32Bit) + if err != nil { + select { + case done <- result{err: fmt.Errorf("read upstream: %w", err)}: + default: + } + return + } + if _, werr := client.Write(pkt); werr != nil { + select { + case done <- result{err: fmt.Errorf("write client: %w", werr)}: + default: + } + return + } + log.Debug().Str("sessionID", sessionID).Uint8("type", uint8(PacketTypeOf(pkt))).Int("len", len(pkt)).Msg("Proxy pre-auth: upstream → client") + } + }() + + // Client → upstream: forward packets, but watch DATA packets for auth-request. + go func() { + for { + select { + case <-stop: + return + default: + } + pkt, err := ReadFullPacket(client, use32Bit) + if err != nil { + select { + case done <- result{err: fmt.Errorf("read client: %w", err)}: + default: + } + return + } + pktType := PacketTypeOf(pkt) + // Check for auth-request on DATA packets. + if pktType == PacketTypeData { + payload, perr := extractDataPayload(pkt, use32Bit) + if perr == nil && len(payload) >= 2 && + payload[0] == TTCMsgAuthRequest && payload[1] == AuthSubOpPhaseOne { + // Don't forward — caller takes over. + select { + case done <- result{payload: payload}: + default: + } + return + } + } + if _, werr := upstream.Write(pkt); werr != nil { + select { + case done <- result{err: fmt.Errorf("write upstream: %w", werr)}: + default: + } + return + } + log.Debug().Str("sessionID", sessionID).Uint8("type", uint8(pktType)).Int("len", len(pkt)).Msg("Proxy pre-auth: client → upstream") + } + }() + + res := <-done + close(stop) + // Force the other goroutine out of its blocked ReadFullPacket by setting a past + // deadline on the upstream connection. If we don't, that goroutine would steal + // the upstream's phase-1 response when we try to read it directly. + if uc, ok := upstream.(interface{ SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error }); ok { + _ = uc.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Second)) + } + // Give it a beat to exit, then reset the deadline. + time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) + if uc, ok := upstream.(interface{ SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error }); ok { + _ = uc.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) + } + if res.err != nil { + return nil, res.err + } + return res.payload, nil +} + +// extractDataPayload returns the TTC payload body of a DATA packet. Assumes caller has +// verified the packet is indeed DATA. Framing: 4-byte length + 1-byte type + 1-byte flag +// + 2-byte checksum + 2-byte data flags = 10-byte header; body starts at offset 10. +// For 16-bit framing, header is 8 bytes (2-byte length + 2-byte checksum + 1-byte type +// + 1-byte flag + 2-byte data flags). +func extractDataPayload(pkt []byte, use32Bit bool) ([]byte, error) { + headerLen := 10 + if !use32Bit { + headerLen = 10 // 2 len + 2 ch + 1 type + 1 flag + 2 data = 8 actually. But go-ora and we add dflags. + // Actually both use 10 because of the 2-byte data_flags after the 8-byte packet + // header. See readDataPayload in o5logon_server.go. + } + if len(pkt) < headerLen { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("packet too short: %d", len(pkt)) + } + return pkt[headerLen:], nil +} + +// ProxyAuthState carries session material extracted during phase-1 so phase-2 translation +// and SVR_RESPONSE regeneration have access to what they need. +type ProxyAuthState struct { + Salt []byte // raw salt (decoded from AUTH_VFR_DATA hex) + Pbkdf2CSKSalt string // hex string + Pbkdf2VGenCount int + Pbkdf2SDerCount int + RealKey []byte // AUTH_SESSKEY key derived from real password + salt + PlaceholderKey []byte // AUTH_SESSKEY key derived from placeholder password + salt + ServerSessKey []byte // raw server session key (decrypted from upstream) + placeholderEncKey []byte // password-encryption key (session-keyed; independent of password itself) +} + +// translatePhase1Response decodes upstream's phase-1 response, substitutes AUTH_SESSKEY +// so the client can decrypt it with the placeholder password (instead of the real one), +// and returns the modified payload plus state for phase-2. +func translatePhase1Response(payload []byte, realPassword string) (*ProxyAuthState, []byte, error) { + // Parse payload into an ordered list of KVPs so we can rebuild with modifications. + kvs, trailer, err := parseAuthRespKVPList(payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("parse upstream phase 1: %w", err) + } + + // Extract fields we need. + var eSessKey, vfrData, cskSalt, vGenStr, sDerStr string + for _, kv := range kvs { + switch kv.Key { + case "AUTH_SESSKEY": + eSessKey = kv.Value + case "AUTH_VFR_DATA": + vfrData = kv.Value + case "AUTH_PBKDF2_CSK_SALT": + cskSalt = kv.Value + case "AUTH_PBKDF2_VGEN_COUNT": + vGenStr = kv.Value + case "AUTH_PBKDF2_SDER_COUNT": + sDerStr = kv.Value + } + } + if eSessKey == "" || vfrData == "" { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream phase 1 missing AUTH_SESSKEY or AUTH_VFR_DATA") + } + salt, err := hex.DecodeString(vfrData) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("decode salt: %w", err) + } + vGen, _ := strconv.Atoi(vGenStr) + if vGen == 0 { + vGen = 4096 + } + sDer, _ := strconv.Atoi(sDerStr) + if sDer == 0 { + sDer = 3 + } + + // Derive both keys (real password → decrypt upstream's SESSKEY; placeholder → re-encrypt). + realKey, _, err := deriveServerKey(realPassword, salt, vGen) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("derive real key: %w", err) + } + placeholderKey, _, err := deriveServerKey(ProxyPasswordPlaceholder, salt, vGen) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("derive placeholder key: %w", err) + } + + // Decrypt upstream's server session key with real key. + serverSessKey, err := decryptSessionKey(false, realKey, eSessKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt upstream server session key: %w", err) + } + // Re-encrypt with placeholder key so client can decrypt. + newESessKey, err := encryptSessionKey(false, placeholderKey, serverSessKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("re-encrypt server session key: %w", err) + } + + // Substitute AUTH_SESSKEY in the KVP list. + for i := range kvs { + if kvs[i].Key == "AUTH_SESSKEY" { + kvs[i].Value = newESessKey + break + } + } + + // Rebuild payload. + rebuilt := rebuildAuthRespPayload(kvs, trailer) + + state := &ProxyAuthState{ + Salt: salt, + Pbkdf2CSKSalt: cskSalt, + Pbkdf2VGenCount: vGen, + Pbkdf2SDerCount: sDer, + RealKey: realKey, + PlaceholderKey: placeholderKey, + ServerSessKey: serverSessKey, + } + return state, rebuilt, nil +} + +// translatePhase2Request takes the client's phase-2 payload (where AUTH_SESSKEY and +// AUTH_PASSWORD were encrypted with the placeholder-derived keys) and substitutes them +// with values keyed for the real password, so upstream Oracle can verify. +func translatePhase2Request(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState, realPassword string) ([]byte, error) { + // Phase-2 request uses the same "PutKeyVal" layout as phase-1 response but with a + // different leading opcode frame (0x03 0x73 0 plus header fields). We parse the + // header prefix up to the KVP dictionary, modify the KVP dictionary, and rebuild. + p2, err := ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse client phase 2: %w", err) + } + + if p2.EClientSessKey == "" || p2.EPassword == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("client phase 2 missing AUTH_SESSKEY or AUTH_PASSWORD") + } + + // Decrypt client's sess key with placeholder key. + clientSessKey, err := decryptSessionKey(false, state.PlaceholderKey, p2.EClientSessKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt client session key: %w", err) + } + if len(clientSessKey) != len(state.ServerSessKey) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("client session key length mismatch: got %d want %d", len(clientSessKey), len(state.ServerSessKey)) + } + // Re-encrypt with real key for upstream. + newEClientSessKey, err := encryptSessionKey(false, state.RealKey, clientSessKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("re-encrypt client session key: %w", err) + } + + // Compute password-encryption keys: one using placeholder password, one using real. + placeholderEncKey, err := deriveProxyPasswordEncKey(clientSessKey, state.ServerSessKey, state.Pbkdf2CSKSalt, state.Pbkdf2SDerCount) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("derive placeholder enc key: %w", err) + } + realEncKey := placeholderEncKey // same computation: encKey is derived from session keys + pbkdf2 salt, NOT password + // Verify client's password equals placeholder. + decoded, err := decryptSessionKey(true, placeholderEncKey, p2.EPassword) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt client password: %w", err) + } + if len(decoded) <= 16 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoded password too short") + } + if string(decoded[16:]) != ProxyPasswordPlaceholder { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("password mismatch: got %q", string(decoded[16:])) + } + // Encrypt REAL password with the real encKey (which equals placeholderEncKey here + // because the computation uses session keys + CSK salt only, not the password). + newEPassword, err := encryptPassword([]byte(realPassword), realEncKey, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("encrypt real password: %w", err) + } + + // Remember encKey so phase-2 response translation can reuse it for SVR_RESPONSE regen. + state.ServerSessKey = state.ServerSessKey // (no-op; kept for clarity) + // Rebuild the phase-2 payload with substituted AUTH_SESSKEY and AUTH_PASSWORD. + rebuilt, err := rebuildPhase2Request(payload, newEClientSessKey, newEPassword) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("rebuild phase 2: %w", err) + } + // Also stash encKey for SVR_RESPONSE regen. + state.placeholderEncKey = placeholderEncKey + return rebuilt, nil +} + +// translatePhase2Response substitutes AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE in upstream's phase-2 response +// with one the client can verify (derived from the placeholder-keyed encKey instead of +// the real-password-keyed one). All other fields are forwarded verbatim. +func translatePhase2Response(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState) ([]byte, error) { + kvs, trailer, err := parseAuthRespKVPList(payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse upstream phase 2: %w", err) + } + // Regenerate SVR_RESPONSE so the client's placeholder-derived verification passes. + newSvr, err := BuildSvrResponse(state.placeholderEncKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("build placeholder SVR_RESPONSE: %w", err) + } + foundSvr := false + for i := range kvs { + if kvs[i].Key == "AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE" { + kvs[i].Value = newSvr + foundSvr = true + break + } + } + if !foundSvr { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream phase 2 missing AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE") + } + return rebuildAuthRespPayload(kvs, trailer), nil +} + +// deriveProxyPasswordEncKey computes the key used for AUTH_PASSWORD encryption in +// phase 2, for verifier type 18453. Formula (from go-ora's generatePasswordEncKey): +// +// keyBuffer = hex(clientSessKey || serverSessKey) +// encKey = generateSpeedyKey(pbkdf2CSKSaltRaw, keyBuffer, sderCount)[:32] +func deriveProxyPasswordEncKey(clientSessKey, serverSessKey []byte, pbkdf2CSKSaltHex string, sderCount int) ([]byte, error) { + buffer := append([]byte(nil), clientSessKey...) + buffer = append(buffer, serverSessKey...) + keyBuffer := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%X", buffer)) + cskSalt, err := hex.DecodeString(pbkdf2CSKSaltHex) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode pbkdf2 salt: %w", err) + } + full := generateSpeedyKey(cskSalt, keyBuffer, sderCount) + if len(full) < 32 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("speedy key too short: %d", len(full)) + } + return full[:32], nil +} + +// parsedKVP holds a decoded key/value/flag from a TTC auth response. We keep the key +// verbatim (including any trailing NULLs) so rebuilt packets match the wire format. +type parsedKVP struct { + Key string + Value string + Flag int +} + +// parseAuthRespKVPList decodes a TTC auth response payload (opcode 0x08) into an ordered +// KVP list plus the trailing summary bytes (opcode 0x04 onwards). Preserves the order +// and any non-standard fields so we can rebuild with minimal changes. +func parseAuthRespKVPList(payload []byte) (kvs []parsedKVP, trailer []byte, err error) { + r := NewTTCReader(payload) + op, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + if op != 0x08 { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("expected auth response opcode 0x08, got 0x%02X", op) + } + dictLen, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("dict len: %w", err) + } + for i := 0; i < dictLen; i++ { + keyLen, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("kvp %d key len: %w", i, err) + } + var keyBytes []byte + if keyLen > 0 { + keyBytes, err = r.GetClr() + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("kvp %d key: %w", i, err) + } + if len(keyBytes) > keyLen { + keyBytes = keyBytes[:keyLen] + } + } + valLen, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("kvp %d val len: %w", i, err) + } + var valBytes []byte + if valLen > 0 { + valBytes, err = r.GetClr() + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("kvp %d val: %w", i, err) + } + if len(valBytes) > valLen { + valBytes = valBytes[:valLen] + } + } + flag, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("kvp %d flag: %w", i, err) + } + kvs = append(kvs, parsedKVP{ + Key: string(bytes.TrimRight(keyBytes, "\x00")), + Value: string(valBytes), + Flag: flag, + }) + } + // Trailer: everything remaining (usually the opcode 0x04 summary). + trailer = make([]byte, r.Remaining()) + rem, _ := r.GetBytes(r.Remaining()) + copy(trailer, rem) + return kvs, trailer, nil +} + +// rebuildAuthRespPayload reconstructs a phase-1 or phase-2 auth response payload from +// the parsed KVP list plus the trailing summary bytes. +func rebuildAuthRespPayload(kvs []parsedKVP, trailer []byte) []byte { + b := NewTTCBuilder() + b.PutBytes(0x08) + b.PutUint(uint64(len(kvs)), 4, true, true) + for _, kv := range kvs { + b.PutKeyValString(kv.Key, kv.Value, uint32(kv.Flag)) + } + b.PutBytes(trailer...) + return b.Bytes() +} + +// rebuildPhase2Request replaces AUTH_SESSKEY and AUTH_PASSWORD values in a phase-2 +// request payload while preserving the opcode/header prefix and all other KVPs. +// +// Phase-2 request layout: +// +// u8 0x03, u8 0x73, u8 0,
, u8 hasUser, [user_len compressed], u32 mode +// compressed, u8 1, u32 count compressed, u8 1, u8 1, [user bytes], +// +// Rather than parse and rebuild byte-for-byte (risky — subtle header differences across +// clients), we scan for AUTH_SESSKEY and AUTH_PASSWORD keys in the payload and rewrite +// the associated CLR-encoded values in-place. +func rebuildPhase2Request(payload []byte, newESessKey, newEPassword string) ([]byte, error) { + out := make([]byte, 0, len(payload)+128) + out = append(out, payload...) + + out, err := replaceKVPValue(out, "AUTH_SESSKEY", newESessKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("replace AUTH_SESSKEY: %w", err) + } + out, err = replaceKVPValue(out, "AUTH_PASSWORD", newEPassword) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("replace AUTH_PASSWORD: %w", err) + } + return out, nil +} + +// replaceKVPValue finds a PutKeyValString-encoded KVP for `key` within `payload` and +// replaces its value with `newValue`. Assumes the key appears exactly once. +// +// Encoded KVP layout (from go-ora's PutKeyVal): +// +// key_len (compressed int) +// key_len_again (1 byte, same value, before CLR bytes) <-- this IS the CLR length +// key bytes +// val_len (compressed int) +// val_len_again (1 byte, same as CLR length) +// val bytes +// flag (compressed int) +func replaceKVPValue(payload []byte, key, newValue string) ([]byte, error) { + keyBytes := []byte(key) + // Search for the key substring; confirm the preceding bytes look like a length prefix. + idx := bytes.Index(payload, keyBytes) + if idx < 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("key %q not found", key) + } + // Find the value start: skip over key, then parse (val_len compressed, val_len byte). + pos := idx + len(keyBytes) + if pos >= len(payload) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("truncated after key") + } + // val_len is compressed int. + vSizeByte := payload[pos] + pos++ + var vLen int + if vSizeByte == 0 { + vLen = 0 + } else if int(vSizeByte) <= 8 { + for i := 0; i < int(vSizeByte); i++ { + vLen = (vLen << 8) | int(payload[pos+i]) + } + pos += int(vSizeByte) + } else { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid val_len size byte %d", vSizeByte) + } + valStart := pos + // If vLen > 0, there's a CLR length byte + vLen value bytes. + if vLen > 0 { + // CLR length byte + if pos >= len(payload) || int(payload[pos]) != vLen { + // Some encodings don't re-emit the length; handle gracefully by assuming 0 pad. + // Still, expect the CLR-length prefix to match vLen. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("CLR length byte mismatch for %q: got %d want %d", key, payload[pos], vLen) + } + pos++ + valBodyStart := pos + valBodyEnd := valBodyStart + vLen + // Build new encoded value: + newVal := []byte(newValue) + newVLen := len(newVal) + var newValSection []byte + newValSection = append(newValSection, encodeCompressedInt(uint64(newVLen))...) + newValSection = append(newValSection, byte(newVLen)) + newValSection = append(newValSection, newVal...) + // Assemble output: prefix (unchanged up to valStart) + newValSection + rest after old val + prefix := payload[:valStart-int(vSizeByte)-1] // everything up to val_len size byte (inclusive of bytes before vSizeByte) + // Actually recompute: the old section we replace is from idx+len(keyBytes) to valBodyEnd + oldStart := idx + len(keyBytes) + oldEnd := valBodyEnd + out := make([]byte, 0, len(payload)+len(newValSection)) + out = append(out, payload[:oldStart]...) + out = append(out, newValSection...) + out = append(out, payload[oldEnd:]...) + return out, nil + _ = prefix + } + return payload, fmt.Errorf("unexpected empty value for %q", key) +} + +// encodeCompressedInt emits a compressed int the same way PutInt(n, 4, true, true) does. +func encodeCompressedInt(n uint64) []byte { + if n == 0 { + return []byte{0} + } + var buf [8]byte + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], n) + trimmed := bytes.TrimLeft(buf[:], "\x00") + out := make([]byte, 1+len(trimmed)) + out[0] = byte(len(trimmed)) + copy(out[1:], trimmed) + return out +} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..38ff0cd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +package oracle + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/binary" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/session" + "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" +) + +// TTC function-call opcodes of interest for query logging. These match what a real +// Oracle server receives during a client's query lifecycle — see Oracle Net TTC +// documentation and go-ora's parameter/command.go for reference. +const ( + ttcFuncOALL8 = 0x5E // all-in-one statement execution (SQL + binds in a single call) + ttcFuncOFETCH = 0x05 // fetch more rows + ttcFuncOCOMMIT = 0x0E // commit + ttcFuncORLLBK = 0x0F // rollback + ttcFuncOCLOSE = 0x69 // close cursor + ttcFuncOSTMT = 0x04 // parse / describe + ttcFuncOLOGOFF = 0x09 // logoff + ttcMsgFunction = 0x03 // outer opcode for function calls + ttcMsgPiggyback = 0x11 // piggyback TTC +) + +// pendingQuery tracks the SQL-string that was sent client→upstream; we correlate it +// with the subsequent upstream→client response so the session log has both. +type pendingQuery struct { + sql string + timestamp time.Time +} + +// QueryExtractor runs in its own goroutine, consuming DATA packet payloads from +// either direction via Feed() and emitting SessionLogEntry records when a complete +// client call + server response pair is recognized. Feed is non-blocking; if the +// internal channel fills, packets are dropped and a warning is logged. Logging is +// best-effort, same as MSSQL. +type QueryExtractor struct { + logger session.SessionLogger + sessionID string + direction string // "client->upstream" or "upstream->client" + ch chan []byte + stopCh chan struct{} + wg sync.WaitGroup + use32Bit bool + pair *pairState // shared across both directions via Pair +} + +// pairState couples the client-side and upstream-side extractors so we can match +// requests with responses. +type pairState struct { + mu sync.Mutex + pending *pendingQuery +} + +// NewQueryExtractorPair returns two extractors, one per direction, sharing a pair state. +// They must both be started and stopped together. +func NewQueryExtractorPair(logger session.SessionLogger, sessionID string, use32Bit bool) (clientToUpstream, upstreamToClient *QueryExtractor) { + p := &pairState{} + clientToUpstream = newExtractor(logger, sessionID, "client->upstream", use32Bit, p) + upstreamToClient = newExtractor(logger, sessionID, "upstream->client", use32Bit, p) + return +} + +func newExtractor(logger session.SessionLogger, sessionID, direction string, use32Bit bool, pair *pairState) *QueryExtractor { + e := &QueryExtractor{ + logger: logger, + sessionID: sessionID, + direction: direction, + ch: make(chan []byte, 64), + stopCh: make(chan struct{}), + use32Bit: use32Bit, + pair: pair, + } + e.wg.Add(1) + go e.loop() + return e +} + +// Feed pushes a chunk of bytes into the extractor. Returns without blocking if the +// queue is full; drops on overflow. This keeps the relay hot path off the TTC parser. +func (e *QueryExtractor) Feed(data []byte) { + if len(data) == 0 { + return + } + cp := make([]byte, len(data)) + copy(cp, data) + select { + case e.ch <- cp: + default: + // drop — logging is best-effort + } +} + +func (e *QueryExtractor) Stop() { + close(e.stopCh) + e.wg.Wait() +} + +func (e *QueryExtractor) loop() { + defer e.wg.Done() + var buffer bytes.Buffer + + for { + select { + case <-e.stopCh: + return + case chunk := <-e.ch: + buffer.Write(chunk) + e.drain(&buffer) + } + } +} + +// drain consumes as many complete TNS packets as the buffer contains. +func (e *QueryExtractor) drain(buf *bytes.Buffer) { + for { + if buf.Len() < 8 { + return + } + head := buf.Bytes()[:8] + var length uint32 + if e.use32Bit { + length = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(head) + } else { + length = uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(head)) + } + if length < 8 || length > 16*1024*1024 { + // Framing is broken — reset. Shouldn't happen in normal flow. + buf.Reset() + return + } + if buf.Len() < int(length) { + return + } + packet := make([]byte, length) + if _, err := buf.Read(packet); err != nil { + return + } + e.handlePacket(packet) + } +} + +func (e *QueryExtractor) handlePacket(raw []byte) { + if PacketTypeOf(raw) != PacketTypeData { + return + } + d, err := ParseDataPacket(raw, e.use32Bit) + if err != nil { + return + } + if len(d.Payload) < 1 { + return + } + switch e.direction { + case "client->upstream": + e.handleClientRequest(d.Payload) + case "upstream->client": + e.handleServerResponse(d.Payload) + } +} + +func (e *QueryExtractor) handleClientRequest(payload []byte) { + r := NewTTCReader(payload) + op, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return + } + if op != ttcMsgFunction { + return + } + sub, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return + } + switch sub { + case ttcFuncOALL8: + sqlText := tryExtractSQL(r) + if sqlText != "" { + e.pair.mu.Lock() + e.pair.pending = &pendingQuery{sql: sqlText, timestamp: time.Now()} + e.pair.mu.Unlock() + } + case ttcFuncOFETCH: + // Fetch uses a cursor ID we don't track in v1; leave any previous pending + // query as-is so FETCH responses are attributed back to the open SELECT. + case ttcFuncOCOMMIT: + e.recordLiteral("COMMIT") + case ttcFuncORLLBK: + e.recordLiteral("ROLLBACK") + } +} + +func (e *QueryExtractor) recordLiteral(sql string) { + e.pair.mu.Lock() + e.pair.pending = &pendingQuery{sql: sql, timestamp: time.Now()} + e.pair.mu.Unlock() +} + +// tryExtractSQL does a best-effort walk of an OALL8 payload to pick out the SQL string. +// The exact OALL8 layout is: options (ub4), cursor_id (ub4), SQL text length (ub4), +// then compressed ub4's for various counts, followed by the CLR of the SQL text. +// We scan forward looking for the first CLR that decodes to printable text ≥ 4 bytes — +// the SQL statement. This is intentionally lenient: we'd rather miss a query than +// crash, and structured parsing is brittle across Oracle versions and bind variants. +func tryExtractSQL(r *TTCReader) string { + // Skip first few compressed uint4s (options, cursor_id, sql length, etc.) + for i := 0; i < 6; i++ { + if _, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true); err != nil { + return "" + } + } + data, err := r.GetClr() + if err != nil { + return "" + } + s := string(data) + if len(s) < 1 { + return "" + } + return s +} + +func (e *QueryExtractor) handleServerResponse(payload []byte) { + // If we have a pending client query, emit one log entry with a best-effort outcome + // derived from the response. Successful responses often contain an "OK" at opcode + // 0x04 with returnCode == 0; error responses contain non-zero returnCode. + e.pair.mu.Lock() + pending := e.pair.pending + e.pair.pending = nil + e.pair.mu.Unlock() + if pending == nil { + return + } + output := extractResponseOutcome(payload) + err := e.logger.LogEntry(session.SessionLogEntry{ + Timestamp: pending.timestamp, + Input: pending.sql, + Output: output, + }) + if err != nil { + log.Debug().Err(err).Str("sessionID", e.sessionID).Msg("session log entry dropped") + } +} + +// extractResponseOutcome scans the server response for either an OError packet (opcode +// 0x04) or a row-count in a status KV. Returns "OK", "ERROR: ORA-XXXX: ..." or "". +func extractResponseOutcome(payload []byte) string { + r := NewTTCReader(payload) + for r.Remaining() > 0 { + op, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + break + } + if op == 0x04 { // summary / error + // Skip a few fields; return code is the 4th compressed int. + for i := 0; i < 3; i++ { + if _, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true); err != nil { + return "OK" + } + } + code, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil || code == 0 { + return "OK" + } + return ora(code) + } + } + return "" +} + +func ora(code int) string { + switch code { + case 0: + return "OK" + case 1: + return "ERROR: ORA-00001: unique constraint violated" + case 900: + return "ERROR: ORA-00900: invalid SQL statement" + case 942: + return "ERROR: ORA-00942: table or view does not exist" + case 1017: + return "ERROR: ORA-01017: invalid username/password" + case 28000: + return "ERROR: ORA-28000: the account is locked" + } + return "ERROR" +} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..de7f7b9a --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go @@ -0,0 +1,304 @@ +// Portions of this file are adapted from github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2, +// licensed under MIT. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. +// Original sources: +// network/packets.go, network/connect_packet.go, network/accept_packet.go, +// network/data_packet.go, network/marker_packet.go, network/refuse_packet.go +// Modifications for server-side use by Infisical: field accessors exported, +// added reader/writer helpers operating directly on io.Reader / io.Writer, +// removed Session/trace/encryption coupling (handled separately by the gateway). + +package oracle + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" +) + +type PacketType uint8 + +const ( + PacketTypeConnect PacketType = 1 + PacketTypeAccept PacketType = 2 + PacketTypeAck PacketType = 3 + PacketTypeRefuse PacketType = 4 + PacketTypeRedirect PacketType = 5 + PacketTypeData PacketType = 6 + PacketTypeNull PacketType = 7 + PacketTypeAbort PacketType = 9 + PacketTypeResend PacketType = 11 + PacketTypeMarker PacketType = 12 + PacketTypeAttn PacketType = 13 + PacketTypeCtrl PacketType = 14 +) + +const ( + markerTypeReset uint8 = 2 + markerTypeInterrupt uint8 = 3 +) + +// TNS header is always 8 bytes. Length field is uint16 before handshakeComplete+v315, +// uint32 afterwards. For server-side use the simple rule is: CONNECT / ACCEPT / REFUSE / +// early MARKER use 16-bit length; post-ACCEPT (nego onwards) use 32-bit length when the +// negotiated version is >= 315. Callers pass use32BitLen explicitly so we don't carry +// hidden state. + +// ReadPacketHeader reads the 8-byte TNS header and returns the parsed fields plus the +// full raw header bytes (so the caller can dispatch on PacketType and pass the full packet +// bytes to the type-specific parser). It reads the remaining payload into the returned +// buffer whose first 8 bytes are the header. +func ReadFullPacket(r io.Reader, use32BitLen bool) ([]byte, error) { + head := make([]byte, 8) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, head); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var length uint32 + if use32BitLen { + length = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(head) + } else { + length = uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(head)) + } + if length < 8 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid TNS packet length: %d", length) + } + if length > 1<<22 { // 4MB ceiling — Oracle SDU is 16-bit, but 32-bit length can go larger post-handshake + return nil, fmt.Errorf("TNS packet too large: %d", length) + } + buf := make([]byte, length) + copy(buf, head) + if length > 8 { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[8:]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + return buf, nil +} + +func PacketTypeOf(packet []byte) PacketType { + if len(packet) < 5 { + return 0 + } + return PacketType(packet[4]) +} + +// ConnectPacket holds the parsed fields from a client CONNECT packet (or used to build a +// response). Field layout matches go-ora's ConnectPacket / newConnectPacket. +type ConnectPacket struct { + Version uint16 + LoVersion uint16 + Options uint16 + SessionDataUnit uint32 + TransportDataUnit uint32 + OurOne uint16 + Flag uint8 + ACFL0 uint8 + ACFL1 uint8 + DataOffset uint16 + ConnectData []byte // the connect-string payload ("(DESCRIPTION=...)") +} + +func ParseConnectPacket(raw []byte) (*ConnectPacket, error) { + if len(raw) < 70 { + return nil, errors.New("CONNECT packet too short") + } + if PacketType(raw[4]) != PacketTypeConnect { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("not a CONNECT packet: type=%d", raw[4]) + } + p := &ConnectPacket{ + Version: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[8:]), + LoVersion: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[10:]), + Options: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[12:]), + OurOne: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[22:]), + ACFL0: raw[32], + ACFL1: raw[33], + DataOffset: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[26:]), + Flag: raw[5], + // 16-bit SDU/TDU at offset 14/16; 32-bit at 58/62 + SessionDataUnit: binary.BigEndian.Uint32(raw[58:]), + TransportDataUnit: binary.BigEndian.Uint32(raw[62:]), + } + if p.SessionDataUnit == 0 { + p.SessionDataUnit = uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[14:])) + } + if p.TransportDataUnit == 0 { + p.TransportDataUnit = uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[16:])) + } + buffLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[24:]) + if p.DataOffset > 0 && int(p.DataOffset)+int(buffLen) <= len(raw) { + p.ConnectData = make([]byte, buffLen) + copy(p.ConnectData, raw[int(p.DataOffset):int(p.DataOffset)+int(buffLen)]) + } + return p, nil +} + +// AcceptPacket is the server response to CONNECT, plus the negotiated session parameters +// the gateway will use. We always respond with >= v315 framing to match modern clients. +type AcceptPacket struct { + Version uint16 + NegotiatedOptions uint16 + SessionDataUnit uint32 + TransportDataUnit uint32 + Histone uint16 + ACFL0 uint8 + ACFL1 uint8 + ConnectData []byte // usually empty on ACCEPT +} + +// AcceptFromConnect returns a server-role ACCEPT that mirrors what a real Oracle 19c +// listener (RDS) sends. Captured values from a real AWS RDS Oracle listener: +// +// version = 317, options = 0x0801 (2049), Histone = 256, +// dataOffset = 45 (equals total length), ACFL0 = 0x41, ACFL1 = 0x01, +// SDU = 8192, TDU = 2_097_152, 5 trailing zero bytes after the 32-bit SDU/TDU. +// +// These are the bytes JDBC thin actually validates against; downgrading version or +// shortening the packet makes it silently drop the TCP connection. +func AcceptFromConnect(c *ConnectPacket) *AcceptPacket { + sdu := c.SessionDataUnit + tdu := c.TransportDataUnit + if sdu == 0 { + sdu = 8192 + } + if tdu == 0 { + tdu = sdu + } + if sdu < 512 { + sdu = 512 + } + if tdu < sdu { + tdu = sdu + } + if sdu > 2097152 { + sdu = 2097152 + } + if tdu > 2097152 { + tdu = 2097152 + } + return &AcceptPacket{ + Version: 317, + NegotiatedOptions: 0x0801, + SessionDataUnit: sdu, + TransportDataUnit: tdu, + Histone: 256, + ACFL0: 0x41, + ACFL1: 0x01, + } +} + +// Bytes serializes the ACCEPT to wire format, mirroring a real Oracle 19c listener. +// For version < 315 we use the legacy 24-byte layout; for >= 315 the packet is 45 +// bytes (header 0-23, reserved/reconAddr 24-31, 32-bit SDU/TDU 32-39, 5 trailing +// zero bytes 40-44). dataOffset equals the total length, indicating no trailing buffer. +func (a *AcceptPacket) Bytes() []byte { + var dataOffset uint16 + if a.Version < 315 { + dataOffset = 24 + } else { + dataOffset = 45 + } + length := uint32(int(dataOffset) + len(a.ConnectData)) + out := make([]byte, length) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(length)) + out[4] = byte(PacketTypeAccept) + out[5] = 0 // flag + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[8:], a.Version) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[10:], a.NegotiatedOptions) + if a.Version < 315 { + sdu := uint16(a.SessionDataUnit) + if a.SessionDataUnit > 0xFFFF { + sdu = 0xFFFF + } + tdu := uint16(a.TransportDataUnit) + if a.TransportDataUnit > 0xFFFF { + tdu = 0xFFFF + } + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[12:], sdu) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[14:], tdu) + } else { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[32:], a.SessionDataUnit) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[36:], a.TransportDataUnit) + } + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[16:], a.Histone) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[18:], uint16(len(a.ConnectData))) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[20:], dataOffset) + out[22] = a.ACFL0 + out[23] = a.ACFL1 + copy(out[dataOffset:], a.ConnectData) + return out +} + +// DataPacket wraps a single TNS DATA frame, without any ANO encryption/hash (the gateway +// refuses ANO so we never deal with those on the client-facing leg). +type DataPacket struct { + DataFlag uint16 + Payload []byte +} + +func ParseDataPacket(raw []byte, use32BitLen bool) (*DataPacket, error) { + if len(raw) < 10 || PacketType(raw[4]) != PacketTypeData { + return nil, errors.New("not a DATA packet") + } + return &DataPacket{ + DataFlag: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[8:]), + Payload: append([]byte(nil), raw[10:]...), + }, nil +} + +// Bytes serializes a DATA packet. use32BitLen must match the negotiated version (>= 315). +func (d *DataPacket) Bytes(use32BitLen bool) []byte { + length := uint32(10 + len(d.Payload)) + out := make([]byte, length) + if use32BitLen { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out, length) + } else { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(length)) + } + out[4] = byte(PacketTypeData) + out[5] = 0 // flag + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[8:], d.DataFlag) + copy(out[10:], d.Payload) + return out +} + +// MarkerPacket fixed 11-byte frame for break / reset signals. +func MarkerPacketBytes(markerType uint8, use32BitLen bool) []byte { + if use32BitLen { + return []byte{0, 0x0, 0, 0xB, byte(PacketTypeMarker), 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, markerType} + } + return []byte{0, 0xB, 0, 0, byte(PacketTypeMarker), 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, markerType} +} + +// RefusePacket is the server's polite "no" to an incoming CONNECT (pre-ACCEPT). Used for +// upstream-failure reporting. +type RefusePacket struct { + UserReason uint8 + SystemReason uint8 + Message string +} + +func (r *RefusePacket) Bytes() []byte { + msg := []byte(r.Message) + length := uint32(12 + len(msg)) + out := make([]byte, length) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(length)) + out[4] = byte(PacketTypeRefuse) + out[5] = 0 + out[8] = r.UserReason + out[9] = r.SystemReason + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[10:], uint16(len(msg))) + copy(out[12:], msg) + return out +} + +// WriteRefuseToClient is a convenience: build and write a REFUSE packet. The message +// should look like "(ERR=...)(ERROR_STACK=...)" so clients surface it as an Oracle error. +func WriteRefuseToClient(w io.Writer, message string) error { + pkt := &RefusePacket{ + UserReason: 0, + SystemReason: 0, + Message: message, + } + _, err := w.Write(pkt.Bytes()) + return err +} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5cc0cc8a --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +// Portions of this file are adapted from github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2, +// licensed under MIT. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. +// Original: network/session.go codec helpers (PutUint/PutInt/PutClr/PutKeyVal/Get*). +// Modifications: lifted out as stateless helpers over bytes.Buffer / []byte cursor so +// the gateway can build and parse TTC payloads without owning a full go-ora Session. + +package oracle + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "io" +) + +// TTCBuilder accumulates a TTC payload to be placed inside a DATA packet body. +// The resulting bytes go through Bytes() and are then embedded in a DataPacket. +type TTCBuilder struct { + buf bytes.Buffer + // useBigClrChunks mirrors go-ora's Session.UseBigClrChunks flag. Enabled when + // ServerCompileTimeCaps[37]&32 != 0 (true for 12c+). Since we always negotiate a 19c + // profile as the server, we can leave this true. + useBigClrChunks bool + clrChunkSize int +} + +func NewTTCBuilder() *TTCBuilder { + return &TTCBuilder{useBigClrChunks: true, clrChunkSize: 0x7FFF} +} + +func (b *TTCBuilder) Bytes() []byte { return b.buf.Bytes() } + +func (b *TTCBuilder) PutBytes(data ...byte) { b.buf.Write(data) } + +func (b *TTCBuilder) PutUint(num uint64, size uint8, bigEndian, compress bool) { + if size == 1 { + b.buf.WriteByte(uint8(num)) + return + } + if compress { + temp := make([]byte, 8) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(temp, num) + temp = bytes.TrimLeft(temp, "\x00") + if size > uint8(len(temp)) { + size = uint8(len(temp)) + } + if size == 0 { + b.buf.WriteByte(0) + return + } + b.buf.WriteByte(size) + b.buf.Write(temp) + return + } + temp := make([]byte, size) + if bigEndian { + switch size { + case 2: + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(temp, uint16(num)) + case 4: + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(temp, uint32(num)) + case 8: + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(temp, num) + } + } else { + switch size { + case 2: + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint16(temp, uint16(num)) + case 4: + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(temp, uint32(num)) + case 8: + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(temp, num) + } + } + b.buf.Write(temp) +} + +func (b *TTCBuilder) PutInt(num int64, size uint8, bigEndian, compress bool) { + if compress { + temp := make([]byte, 8) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(temp, uint64(num)) + temp = bytes.TrimLeft(temp, "\x00") + if size > uint8(len(temp)) { + size = uint8(len(temp)) + } + if size == 0 { + b.buf.WriteByte(0) + return + } + b.buf.WriteByte(size) + b.buf.Write(temp[:size]) + return + } + b.PutUint(uint64(num), size, bigEndian, false) +} + +// PutClr writes a chunked variable-length byte array. 1-byte length for short, 0xFE +// prefix + multi-chunk for long, matching go-ora's Session.PutClr. +func (b *TTCBuilder) PutClr(data []byte) { + dataLen := len(data) + if dataLen == 0 { + b.buf.WriteByte(0) + return + } + if dataLen > 0xFC { + b.buf.WriteByte(0xFE) + start := 0 + for start < dataLen { + end := start + b.clrChunkSize + if end > dataLen { + end = dataLen + } + chunk := data[start:end] + if b.useBigClrChunks { + b.PutInt(int64(len(chunk)), 4, true, true) + } else { + b.buf.WriteByte(uint8(len(chunk))) + } + b.buf.Write(chunk) + start += b.clrChunkSize + } + b.buf.WriteByte(0) + return + } + b.buf.WriteByte(uint8(dataLen)) + b.buf.Write(data) +} + +func (b *TTCBuilder) PutString(s string) { b.PutClr([]byte(s)) } + +// PutKeyVal writes key + val + flag. This is the core TTC KVP format used for auth info. +func (b *TTCBuilder) PutKeyVal(key, val []byte, num uint32) { + if len(key) == 0 { + b.buf.WriteByte(0) + } else { + b.PutUint(uint64(len(key)), 4, true, true) + b.PutClr(key) + } + if len(val) == 0 { + b.buf.WriteByte(0) + } else { + b.PutUint(uint64(len(val)), 4, true, true) + b.PutClr(val) + } + b.PutInt(int64(num), 4, true, true) +} + +func (b *TTCBuilder) PutKeyValString(key, val string, num uint32) { + b.PutKeyVal([]byte(key), []byte(val), num) +} + +// TTCReader walks a TTC payload (the body of a DATA packet) and exposes the same codec +// as go-ora's Session, sans the network plumbing. +type TTCReader struct { + buf []byte + pos int + useBigClrChunks bool +} + +func NewTTCReader(payload []byte) *TTCReader { + return &TTCReader{buf: payload, useBigClrChunks: true} +} + +// SetUseBigClrChunks lets callers match negotiated capabilities. Default is true. +func (r *TTCReader) SetUseBigClrChunks(v bool) { r.useBigClrChunks = v } + +func (r *TTCReader) Remaining() int { return len(r.buf) - r.pos } + +func (r *TTCReader) read(n int) ([]byte, error) { + if r.pos+n > len(r.buf) { + return nil, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF + } + out := r.buf[r.pos : r.pos+n] + r.pos += n + return out, nil +} + +func (r *TTCReader) GetByte() (uint8, error) { + b, err := r.read(1) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + return b[0], nil +} + +// PeekByte returns the next byte without advancing the position. Returns 0 and +// io.ErrUnexpectedEOF if the reader is exhausted. Callers should only rely on +// this for format-sniffing decisions (e.g., distinguishing a length-prefixed +// string from a raw string when clients differ in encoding). +func (r *TTCReader) PeekByte() (uint8, error) { + if r.pos >= len(r.buf) { + return 0, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF + } + return r.buf[r.pos], nil +} + +func (r *TTCReader) GetBytes(n int) ([]byte, error) { + b, err := r.read(n) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + out := make([]byte, len(b)) + copy(out, b) + return out, nil +} + +func (r *TTCReader) GetInt64(size int, compress, bigEndian bool) (int64, error) { + negFlag := false + if compress { + sb, err := r.read(1) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + size = int(sb[0]) + if size&0x80 > 0 { + negFlag = true + size = size & 0x7F + } + bigEndian = true + } + if size == 0 { + return 0, nil + } + if size > 8 { + return 0, errors.New("invalid size for GetInt64") + } + rb, err := r.read(size) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + temp := make([]byte, 8) + var v int64 + if bigEndian { + copy(temp[8-size:], rb) + v = int64(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(temp)) + } else { + copy(temp[:size], rb) + v = int64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(temp)) + } + if negFlag { + v = -v + } + return v, nil +} + +func (r *TTCReader) GetInt(size int, compress, bigEndian bool) (int, error) { + v, err := r.GetInt64(size, compress, bigEndian) + return int(v), err +} + +// GetClr reads variable-length byte data. +func (r *TTCReader) GetClr() ([]byte, error) { + nb, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if nb == 0 || nb == 0xFF || nb == 0xFD { + return nil, nil + } + if nb != 0xFE { + out, err := r.read(int(nb)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ret := make([]byte, len(out)) + copy(ret, out) + return ret, nil + } + var buf bytes.Buffer + for { + var chunkSize int + if r.useBigClrChunks { + chunkSize, err = r.GetInt(4, true, true) + } else { + b, err2 := r.GetByte() + err = err2 + chunkSize = int(b) + } + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if chunkSize == 0 { + break + } + chunk, err := r.read(chunkSize) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + buf.Write(chunk) + } + return buf.Bytes(), nil +} + +// GetDlc reads a length-prefixed variable-length byte array. +func (r *TTCReader) GetDlc() ([]byte, error) { + length, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if length <= 0 { + // length prefix = 0, but we still need to consume the CLR body (single zero byte). + _, _ = r.GetClr() + return nil, nil + } + out, err := r.GetClr() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(out) > length { + out = out[:length] + } + return out, nil +} + +func (r *TTCReader) GetKeyVal() (key, val []byte, num int, err error) { + key, err = r.GetDlc() + if err != nil { + return + } + val, err = r.GetDlc() + if err != nil { + return + } + num, err = r.GetInt(4, true, true) + return +} + +func (r *TTCReader) GetNullTermString() (string, error) { + start := r.pos + for r.pos < len(r.buf) { + if r.buf[r.pos] == 0 { + s := string(r.buf[start:r.pos]) + r.pos++ + return s, nil + } + r.pos++ + } + return "", io.ErrUnexpectedEOF +} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/upstream.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/upstream.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a921f1fa --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/upstream.go @@ -0,0 +1,401 @@ +package oracle + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "crypto/tls" + "crypto/x509" + "database/sql" + "fmt" + "net" + "net/url" + "sync" + "time" + + go_ora "github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2" + "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" +) + +// taplogConn wraps a net.Conn and accumulates bytes read from it during the auth +// phase. We later parse the accumulated bytes to extract the upstream's AUTH_* KVPs +// (AUTH_SESSION_ID, AUTH_SERIAL_NUM, NLS params, etc.) so we can mirror them when +// building our own server's phase-2 response. Without this, sqlcl authenticates but +// subsequent queries use session IDs the upstream doesn't recognise. +type taplogConn struct { + net.Conn + remaining int + readIdx int + accum []byte // accumulated bytes up to 'remaining' limit + mu sync.Mutex +} + +func (t *taplogConn) Read(b []byte) (int, error) { + n, err := t.Conn.Read(b) + if n > 0 && t.remaining > 0 { + toCapture := n + if toCapture > t.remaining { + toCapture = t.remaining + } + t.readIdx++ + t.mu.Lock() + t.accum = append(t.accum, b[:toCapture]...) + t.mu.Unlock() + log.Info(). + Int("readIdx", t.readIdx). + Int("bytes", toCapture). + Msg("Upstream Oracle read (captured)") + t.remaining -= toCapture + } + return n, err +} + +func (t *taplogConn) Captured() []byte { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + out := make([]byte, len(t.accum)) + copy(out, t.accum) + return out +} + +// UpstreamCredentials holds everything the gateway needs to authenticate to the real +// Oracle target as the injected user. +type UpstreamCredentials struct { + Host string + Port int + Service string // Oracle service name (PAMCredentials.Database) + Username string + Password string + SSLEnabled bool + SSLRejectUnauthorized bool + SSLCertificate string // PEM-encoded cert for pinning (optional) +} + +// UpstreamConn wraps a captured authenticated net.Conn to the real Oracle target. +// Do NOT close the go-ora *sql.DB — that writes a logoff packet onto our captured conn +// and corrupts the relay. Close the net.Conn directly via Close(). +type UpstreamConn struct { + Conn net.Conn + sqlDB *sql.DB // Held only to prevent GC of the go-ora Connection during the session. + + // Phase2KVPs holds the AUTH_* key-value pairs we extracted from upstream Oracle's + // phase-2 response during go-ora's authentication. Contains AUTH_SESSION_ID, + // AUTH_SERIAL_NUM, AUTH_VERSION_STRING, NLS params, etc. We mirror these in our + // server-facing phase-2 response so the client sees identical session metadata to + // what upstream issued — otherwise subsequent RPCs reference IDs upstream rejects. + Phase2KVPs map[string]string + + // UpstreamTCPNegoPayload and UpstreamDataTypeNegoPayload are the raw TTC payloads + // (no TNS header) of upstream Oracle's responses during go-ora's auth. Forwarding + // these to the client instead of constructing our own makes the client negotiate + // with upstream's actual capability profile — ensuring session-state alignment + // after auth (sequence numbers, framing flags, type table all agree). + UpstreamTCPNegoPayload []byte + UpstreamDataTypeNegoPayload []byte +} + +func (u *UpstreamConn) Close() error { + if u == nil || u.Conn == nil { + return nil + } + return u.Conn.Close() +} + +// DialUpstream authenticates to the Oracle target using go-ora and returns the +// authenticated net.Conn for raw byte relay. The TLS wrap (when SSLEnabled) happens +// inside RegisterDial so session.conn is the *tls.Conn — and go-ora never calls its +// own TCPS negotiate() because we advertise Protocol=tcp in the DSN. See the plan's +// §5.2 "TLS-in-dial" note for why this is the key to capturing a usable conn. +func DialUpstream(ctx context.Context, creds UpstreamCredentials) (*UpstreamConn, error) { + dsn := fmt.Sprintf("oracle://%s:%s@%s:%d/%s", + url.QueryEscape(creds.Username), + url.QueryEscape(creds.Password), + creds.Host, + creds.Port, + creds.Service, + ) + + config, err := go_ora.ParseConfig(dsn) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("go-ora ParseConfig: %w", err) + } + + // Defensive: force "tcp" so UpdateSSL (configurations/session_info.go:48-66) leaves + // SSL=false and go-ora's own negotiate() never wraps the conn in TLS. + for i := range config.Servers { + config.Servers[i].Protocol = "tcp" + } + config.Protocol = "tcp" + + var ( + captured net.Conn + mu sync.Mutex + ) + + config.RegisterDial(func(dctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { + rawConn, derr := (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}).DialContext(dctx, network, addr) + if derr != nil { + return nil, derr + } + + if !creds.SSLEnabled { + wrapped := &taplogConn{Conn: rawConn, remaining: 8192} + mu.Lock() + captured = wrapped + mu.Unlock() + return wrapped, nil + } + + tlsCfg, terr := buildUpstreamTLSConfig(creds, addr) + if terr != nil { + rawConn.Close() + return nil, terr + } + tlsConn := tls.Client(rawConn, tlsCfg) + + // Do the handshake explicitly so failure surfaces here, not inside go-ora's + // session code on first write. + if herr := tlsConn.HandshakeContext(dctx); herr != nil { + rawConn.Close() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("TCPS handshake failed: %w", herr) + } + + mu.Lock() + captured = tlsConn + mu.Unlock() + return tlsConn, nil + }) + + go_ora.RegisterConnConfig(config) + db, err := sql.Open("oracle", "") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("sql.Open oracle: %w", err) + } + if perr := db.PingContext(ctx); perr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("Oracle upstream auth failed: %w", perr) + } + + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + if captured == nil { + _ = db.Close() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("RegisterDial was never invoked (unexpected)") + } + + // Pull the captured auth bytes (if we wrapped with taplogConn for plaintext) and + // parse out the phase-2 AUTH_* KVPs and the TCPNego/DataTypeNego response payloads. + var ( + phase2 map[string]string + tcpNegoResp []byte + dataTypeResp []byte + ) + if tap, ok := captured.(*taplogConn); ok { + raw := tap.Captured() + phase2 = extractUpstreamPhase2KVPs(raw) + tcpNegoResp = extractUpstreamDataPayload(raw, 0x01) // TCPNego response starts with 0x01 + dataTypeResp = extractUpstreamDataPayload(raw, 0x02) // DataTypeNego starts with 0x02 + log.Info(). + Int("kvpCount", len(phase2)). + Str("sessionID", phase2["AUTH_SESSION_ID"]). + Str("serialNum", phase2["AUTH_SERIAL_NUM"]). + Int("tcpNegoLen", len(tcpNegoResp)). + Int("dataTypeLen", len(dataTypeResp)). + Msg("Upstream Oracle caps extracted") + } + + return &UpstreamConn{ + Conn: captured, + sqlDB: db, + Phase2KVPs: phase2, + UpstreamTCPNegoPayload: tcpNegoResp, + UpstreamDataTypeNegoPayload: dataTypeResp, + }, nil +} + +func buildUpstreamTLSConfig(creds UpstreamCredentials, addr string) (*tls.Config, error) { + host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr) + cfg := &tls.Config{ + ServerName: host, + InsecureSkipVerify: !creds.SSLRejectUnauthorized, + } + if creds.SSLCertificate != "" { + pool := x509.NewCertPool() + if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM([]byte(creds.SSLCertificate)) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid SSLCertificate PEM") + } + cfg.RootCAs = pool + } + return cfg, nil +} + +// extractUpstreamPhase2KVPs walks the captured upstream bytes (post-ACCEPT, so 32-bit +// length framing), identifies DATA packets whose first payload byte is 0x08 (TTC auth +// response), parses the key-value pairs inside, and returns the LARGEST/LAST such set +// — which is the phase-2 response (the phase-1 response is smaller and comes first). +// +// The phase-2 response carries AUTH_SESSION_ID, AUTH_SERIAL_NUM, all AUTH_NLS_* params, +// AUTH_VERSION_STRING, etc. These values are what a real Oracle server returned to +// go-ora; mirroring them downstream keeps our fake-server metadata consistent with the +// real upstream session the client's RPCs will actually run against. +func extractUpstreamPhase2KVPs(raw []byte) map[string]string { + // Skip the initial CONNECT→ACCEPT handshake bytes, which use 16-bit framing and + // have different header layout. The transition to 32-bit framing happens after + // the ACCEPT response. We scan for the ACCEPT (packet type 0x02) and start + // walking 32-bit frames from just past it. + // In practice the captured stream starts with upstream's ACK (0x0B), ACCEPT (0x02), + // then all 32-bit-framed DATA packets. + pos := 0 + // Skip ACK (8 bytes 16-bit framed) if present. + if len(raw) >= 8 && raw[4] == 0x0B { + accL := int(raw[0])<<8 | int(raw[1]) + if accL >= 8 && accL <= 32 && pos+accL <= len(raw) { + pos += accL + } + } + // Skip ACCEPT (16-bit framed). + if pos+5 <= len(raw) && raw[pos+4] == 0x02 { + accL := int(raw[pos])<<8 | int(raw[pos+1]) + if accL >= 8 && pos+accL <= len(raw) { + pos += accL + } + } + + // Now walk 32-bit DATA packets. Find the largest auth-response (opcode 0x08) — + // that's the phase-2 response with all the session metadata we want to mirror. + var best map[string]string + var bestSize int + for pos+10 <= len(raw) { + pktLen := int(raw[pos])<<24 | int(raw[pos+1])<<16 | int(raw[pos+2])<<8 | int(raw[pos+3]) + if pktLen < 10 || pos+pktLen > len(raw) { + break + } + pktType := raw[pos+4] + if pktType != 0x06 { // not DATA — skip + pos += pktLen + continue + } + payload := raw[pos+10 : pos+pktLen] + if len(payload) >= 1 && payload[0] == 0x08 { + kvps := parseAuthResponseKVPs(payload) + if kvps != nil && len(kvps) > bestSize { + best = kvps + bestSize = len(kvps) + } + } + pos += pktLen + } + if best == nil { + best = map[string]string{} + } + return best +} + +// extractUpstreamDataPayload walks the captured upstream bytes and returns the body of +// the first 32-bit-framed DATA packet whose payload begins with the given opcode byte. +// Used to extract upstream's TCPNego (opcode 0x01) and DataTypeNego (opcode 0x02) +// responses so we can forward them verbatim to the client — aligning the client's +// negotiated caps with upstream's actual caps. +func extractUpstreamDataPayload(raw []byte, opcode byte) []byte { + pos := 0 + if len(raw) >= 8 && raw[4] == 0x0B { + accL := int(raw[0])<<8 | int(raw[1]) + if accL >= 8 && accL <= 32 && pos+accL <= len(raw) { + pos += accL + } + } + if pos+5 <= len(raw) && raw[pos+4] == 0x02 { + accL := int(raw[pos])<<8 | int(raw[pos+1]) + if accL >= 8 && pos+accL <= len(raw) { + pos += accL + } + } + for pos+10 <= len(raw) { + pktLen := int(raw[pos])<<24 | int(raw[pos+1])<<16 | int(raw[pos+2])<<8 | int(raw[pos+3]) + if pktLen < 10 || pos+pktLen > len(raw) { + break + } + if raw[pos+4] != 0x06 { // DATA + pos += pktLen + continue + } + payload := raw[pos+10 : pos+pktLen] + if len(payload) >= 1 && payload[0] == opcode { + out := make([]byte, len(payload)) + copy(out, payload) + return out + } + pos += pktLen + } + return nil +} + +// parseAuthResponseKVPs decodes a TTC auth-response payload (opcode 0x08) into a map. +// +// Wire format from a real Oracle server (observed by decoding a captured AWS RDS +// phase-2 response). The server side of PutKeyVal differs subtly from what go-ora +// writes as the client: when a value is empty, Oracle does NOT write the single-zero +// placeholder byte that go-ora's own CLR encoding inserts. go-ora's default GetDlc +// consumes that placeholder, so parsing a real server response corrupts alignment +// after the first empty-value KVP (e.g., AUTH_CAPABILITY_TABLE). Our own KVP reader +// here handles the Oracle-server variant correctly. +// +// Per-KVP layout (Oracle server variant): +// key_len (compressed int) +// if key_len > 0: CLR key bytes (1-byte length prefix + key_len bytes) +// val_len (compressed int) +// if val_len > 0: CLR val bytes (1-byte length prefix + val_len bytes) +// flag (compressed int) +func parseAuthResponseKVPs(payload []byte) map[string]string { + r := NewTTCReader(payload) + op, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil || op != 0x08 { + return nil + } + dictLen, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil || dictLen <= 0 || dictLen > 1000 { + return nil + } + out := make(map[string]string, dictLen) + for i := 0; i < dictLen; i++ { + // key + keyLen, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + log.Debug().Int("iter", i).Err(err).Msg("Upstream KVP parse: key_len error") + break + } + var keyBytes []byte + if keyLen > 0 { + keyBytes, err = r.GetClr() + if err != nil { + break + } + if len(keyBytes) > keyLen { + keyBytes = keyBytes[:keyLen] + } + } + // value + valLen, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + break + } + var valBytes []byte + if valLen > 0 { + valBytes, err = r.GetClr() + if err != nil { + break + } + if len(valBytes) > valLen { + valBytes = valBytes[:valLen] + } + } + // flag + if _, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true); err != nil { + break + } + + if len(keyBytes) > 0 { + key := string(bytes.TrimRight(keyBytes, "\x00")) + out[key] = string(valBytes) + } + } + return out +} diff --git a/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go b/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go index aa1e2450..f40e1553 100644 --- a/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go +++ b/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go @@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ import ( "net" "os" "os/signal" + "path/filepath" "syscall" "time" + "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/handlers/oracle" "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/session" "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/util" "github.com/go-resty/resty/v2" @@ -20,6 +22,7 @@ type DatabaseProxyServer struct { BaseProxyServer // Embed common functionality server net.Listener port int + oracleTNSAdmin string // per-session TNS_ADMIN dir (Oracle only; cleaned up on shutdown) } type ALPN string @@ -125,6 +128,18 @@ func StartDatabaseLocalProxy(accessToken string, accessParams PAMAccessParams, p util.PrintfStderr("sqlserver://%s@localhost:%d?database=%s&encrypt=false&trustServerCertificate=true", username, proxy.port, database) case session.ResourceTypeMongodb: util.PrintfStderr("mongodb://localhost:%d/%s?serverSelectionTimeoutMS=15000", proxy.port, database) + case session.ResourceTypeOracle: + util.PrintfStderr("oracle://%s:%s@localhost:%d/%s", username, oracle.ProxyPasswordPlaceholder, proxy.port, database) + tnsDir := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "infisical-pam-"+pamResponse.SessionId) + if err := os.MkdirAll(tnsDir, 0700); err == nil { + sqlnetPath := filepath.Join(tnsDir, "sqlnet.ora") + if werr := os.WriteFile(sqlnetPath, []byte("DISABLE_OOB=TRUE\n"), 0600); werr == nil { + proxy.oracleTNSAdmin = tnsDir + util.PrintfStderr("\n\nBefore connecting, set:\n export TNS_ADMIN=%s", tnsDir) + } + } + util.PrintfStderr("\n\nNote: the password shown is a protocol placeholder required by Oracle, not a secret.") + util.PrintfStderr("\nReal authentication is handled by the local proxy.") default: util.PrintfStderr("localhost:%d", proxy.port) } @@ -182,6 +197,12 @@ func (p *DatabaseProxyServer) gracefulShutdown() { // Wait for connections to close p.WaitForConnectionsWithTimeout(10 * time.Second) + if p.oracleTNSAdmin != "" { + if err := os.RemoveAll(p.oracleTNSAdmin); err != nil { + log.Warn().Err(err).Str("path", p.oracleTNSAdmin).Msg("Failed to remove Oracle TNS_ADMIN temp dir") + } + } + log.Info().Msg("Database proxy shutdown complete") os.Exit(0) }) diff --git a/packages/pam/pam-proxy.go b/packages/pam/pam-proxy.go index 3c44db0d..d2f55f21 100644 --- a/packages/pam/pam-proxy.go +++ b/packages/pam/pam-proxy.go @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import ( "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/handlers/mongodb" "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/handlers/mssql" "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/handlers/mysql" + "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/handlers/oracle" "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/handlers/redis" "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/handlers/ssh" "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/session" @@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ func GetSupportedResourceTypes() []string { session.ResourceTypeKubernetes, session.ResourceTypeRedis, session.ResourceTypeMongodb, + session.ResourceTypeOracle, } } @@ -380,6 +382,26 @@ func HandlePAMProxy(ctx context.Context, conn *tls.Conn, pamConfig *GatewayPAMCo Str("authMethod", credentials.AuthMethod). Msg("Starting Kubernetes PAM proxy") return proxy.HandleConnection(ctx, conn) + case session.ResourceTypeOracle: + oracleConfig := oracle.OracleProxyConfig{ + TargetAddr: fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", credentials.Host, credentials.Port), + InjectUsername: credentials.Username, + InjectPassword: credentials.Password, + InjectDatabase: credentials.Database, + EnableTLS: credentials.SSLEnabled, + TLSConfig: tlsConfig, + SessionID: pamConfig.SessionId, + SessionLogger: sessionLogger, + SSLRejectUnauthorized: credentials.SSLRejectUnauthorized, + SSLCertificate: credentials.SSLCertificate, + } + proxy := oracle.NewOracleProxy(oracleConfig) + log.Info(). + Str("sessionId", pamConfig.SessionId). + Str("target", oracleConfig.TargetAddr). + Bool("sslEnabled", credentials.SSLEnabled). + Msg("Starting Oracle PAM proxy") + return proxy.HandleConnection(ctx, conn) case session.ResourceTypeMongodb: mongoConfig := mongodb.MongoDBProxyConfig{ Host: credentials.ConnectionString, diff --git a/packages/pam/session/uploader.go b/packages/pam/session/uploader.go index e75d8b8b..3a7a41dc 100644 --- a/packages/pam/session/uploader.go +++ b/packages/pam/session/uploader.go @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ const ( ResourceTypeSSH = "ssh" ResourceTypeKubernetes = "kubernetes" ResourceTypeMongodb = "mongodb" + ResourceTypeOracle = "oracledb" ) type SessionFileInfo struct { @@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ func NewSessionUploader(httpClient *resty.Client, credentialsManager *Credential func ParseSessionFilename(filename string) (*SessionFileInfo, error) { // Try new format first: pam_session_{sessionID}_{resourceType}_expires_{timestamp}.enc // Build regex pattern using constants - resourceTypePattern := fmt.Sprintf("(%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s)", ResourceTypeSSH, ResourceTypePostgres, ResourceTypeRedis, ResourceTypeMysql, ResourceTypeMssql, ResourceTypeKubernetes, ResourceTypeMongodb) + resourceTypePattern := fmt.Sprintf("(%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s)", ResourceTypeSSH, ResourceTypePostgres, ResourceTypeRedis, ResourceTypeMysql, ResourceTypeMssql, ResourceTypeKubernetes, ResourceTypeMongodb, ResourceTypeOracle) newFormatRegex := regexp.MustCompile(fmt.Sprintf(`^pam_session_(.+)_%s_expires_(\d+)\.enc$`, resourceTypePattern)) matches := newFormatRegex.FindStringSubmatch(filename) From 3ff9cffdafa71fd86d330ecdffb2a9b9732753e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 04:31:15 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 02/21] refactor(pam-oracle): remove impersonation-era dead code MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The initial attempt used server-side Oracle impersonation (see prior commit). That design worked through authentication but hit a state-mismatch problem post-auth: upstream (via go-ora) and client negotiated different TTC capabilities, so relayed queries were rejected as protocol violations. The replacement — proxied-auth — is already in proxy_auth.go and is the flow wired to HandleConnection. This commit removes the dead files and vestigial symbols that supported the old path: Removed entirely: - ano.go, nego.go, nego_templates.go (pre-auth TNS/TTC negotiation handlers; pre-auth is now forwarded verbatim to upstream) - upstream.go (go-ora-based upstream dial + KVP extraction; replaced by dialUpstreamRaw in proxy_auth.go) - handshake_test.go (tested the impersonation path, orphaned) Pruned: - proxy.go: handleConnectionLegacy (~200 LOC) - o5logon.go: O5LogonServerState, NewO5LogonServerState, VerifyClientPassword, deriveKey11g, md5Hash, parseIntVal - o5logon_server.go: AuthPhaseOne, ParseAuthPhaseOne, BuildAuthPhaseOneResponse, BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse, BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponseFromUpstream, RunServerO5Logon, dumpBytes, readUint32 - tns.go: AcceptPacket, AcceptFromConnect, ConnectPacket, ParseConnectPacket, MarkerPacketBytes (we forward raw packet bytes rather than parse/build CONNECT or ACCEPT) Kept: crypto primitives, DATA packet codec, TTC reader/builder, query logger, prependedConn, error helpers — all live in the proxied-auth flow. Drops github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2 from go.mod — no longer imported. Adds .idea and .vscode to .gitignore. Updates ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md with a current-state header; historical sections below retained for context. Net: ~1,600 LOC removed. The handler directory goes from 12 files to 8. Build, fmt, and the Oracle SQL test matrix (SELECT, INSERT, DDL, PL/SQL, bind vars, NLS queries) still pass against sqlcl → gateway → AWS RDS Oracle 19c. --- .gitignore | 6 +- ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md | 31 +- go.mod | 1 - go.sum | 2 - packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ano.go | 198 -------- .../pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go | 186 -------- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go | 425 ------------------ .../pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go | 207 --------- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go | 143 ------ .../pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go | 385 ---------------- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go | 217 +-------- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go | 148 ------ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/upstream.go | 401 ----------------- 13 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2316 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ano.go delete mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go delete mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go delete mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go delete mode 100644 packages/pam/handlers/oracle/upstream.go diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 9574a412..f03f50fa 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -12,4 +12,8 @@ test/infisical-merge infisical -/agent-testing \ No newline at end of file +/agent-testing + +# Editor specific +.vscode/* +.idea/* diff --git a/ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md b/ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md index da8eadce..714dc248 100644 --- a/ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md +++ b/ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md @@ -1,11 +1,30 @@ # Oracle PAM — Research & Implementation Notes -Handoff document for anyone forking this branch and continuing Oracle PAM work. Contains: -- What we're building and why it's different from other databases -- What we tried, how far we got, what broke -- Research into how the major PAM vendors solve this -- The two viable paths forward, with concrete technical detail -- References, file map, and how to reproduce the current test setup +## Current state (2026-04-22) + +**Oracle PAM works end-to-end for JDBC thin clients.** Verified with sqlcl against AWS RDS Oracle 19c: SELECT, INSERT, DDL, PL/SQL, DBMS_OUTPUT, bind variables, session-metadata queries, clean disconnect. Credential injection works: user types `infisical-pam-proxy`, real Oracle password never leaves the gateway. + +**Architecture shipped (see `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go`):** the gateway opens a raw TCP connection to upstream, forwards client's `CONNECT` / ANO / TCPNego / DataTypeNego bytes verbatim in both directions, and intercepts only at the O5Logon boundary to swap placeholder-keyed material for real-password-keyed material in four specific TTC fields. After auth, byte relay is transparent. This bypasses the state-mismatch problem that blocks the simpler "impersonate Oracle entirely" approach. + +**File map (current, post-cleanup):** + +- `proxy.go` — entry, relay loop, connection glue +- `proxy_auth.go` — the proxied-auth flow (pre-auth byte proxy + O5Logon translation) +- `o5logon.go` — O5Logon crypto primitives + `BuildSvrResponse` +- `o5logon_server.go` — phase-2 request parser, error packet helpers +- `tns.go` — DATA packet codec + REFUSE helper +- `ttc.go` — TTC codec (compressed ints, CLR strings, KVP encoding) +- `query_logger.go` — TTC tap for session recording +- `constants.go` — `ProxyPasswordPlaceholder` +- `ATTRIBUTION.md` — MIT notice for code ported from sijms/go-ora + +**What still needs verification:** +- Session recording file actually contains the captured queries (tap is wired but not end-to-end tested on this path) +- Other clients: sqlplus (OCI), python-oracledb (thin), SQL Developer, DBeaver, Toad +- Oracle NNE (Native Network Encryption) customers +- Oracle RAC via SCAN listeners + +**Historical sections below** document the impersonation approach we tried first (now removed from the codebase) and the research we did along the way. Kept for context — the "what we tried" and "how vendors solve this" analysis is still accurate. --- diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index 9a6a018c..9d278b3e 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ require ( github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.54.1 github.com/rs/cors v1.11.0 github.com/rs/zerolog v1.26.1 - github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2 v2.9.0 github.com/smallnest/resp3 v0.0.0-20251228151914-4f2fa7427e69 github.com/spf13/cobra v1.6.1 github.com/spf13/viper v1.8.1 diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index 413e6d1e..14c03ec0 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -531,8 +531,6 @@ github.com/sean-/seed v0.0.0-20170313163322-e2103e2c3529/go.mod h1:DxrIzT+xaE7yg github.com/shopspring/decimal v1.4.0 h1:bxl37RwXBklmTi0C79JfXCEBD1cqqHt0bbgBAGFp81k= github.com/shopspring/decimal v1.4.0/go.mod h1:gawqmDU56v4yIKSwfBSFip1HdCCXN8/+DMd9qYNcwME= github.com/shurcooL/sanitized_anchor_name v1.0.0/go.mod h1:1NzhyTcUVG4SuEtjjoZeVRXNmyL/1OwPU0+IJeTBvfc= -github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2 v2.9.0 h1:+iQbUeTeCOFMb5BsOMgUhV8KWyrv9yjKpcK4x7+MFrg= -github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2 v2.9.0/go.mod h1:QgFInVi3ZWyqAiJwzBQA+nbKYKH77tdp1PYoCqhR2dU= github.com/smallnest/resp3 v0.0.0-20251228151914-4f2fa7427e69 h1:AkDv2coi+ZsMlEp/6V21FWxdswSIEzqflgJ6snIQG+U= github.com/smallnest/resp3 v0.0.0-20251228151914-4f2fa7427e69/go.mod h1:cmfXTZVXEA7xFOYcGnpKp2VeFf6FUHmxdKQHVNE6BXY= github.com/smartystreets/assertions v0.0.0-20180927180507-b2de0cb4f26d h1:zE9ykElWQ6/NYmHa3jpm/yHnI4xSofP+UP6SpjHcSeM= diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ano.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ano.go deleted file mode 100644 index 3574f692..00000000 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ano.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,198 +0,0 @@ -package oracle - -import ( - "fmt" - "net" - - "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" -) - -// Advanced Negotiation (ANO) handling. Our gateway is configured to REFUSE -// authentication, encryption and data-integrity services on the client-facing leg, -// because the mTLS tunnel between the CLI and the gateway already provides -// confidentiality and integrity. The Supervisor service is accepted with a trivial CID. -// -// On-wire structure (see go-ora/v2/advanced_nego/comm.go): -// -// outer: magic(4) | length(2) | version(4) | servCount(2) | flags(1) -// per service: serviceType(2) | numSubPackets(2) | errNum(4) | {sub-packets} -// sub-packet: length(2) | type(2) | body(length) -// types: 0=string, 1=bytes, 2=UB1, 3=UB2, 4=UB4, 5=version, 6=status, 7=? - -const anoMagic uint32 = 0xDEADBEEF - -// Service-type IDs. -const ( - anoServiceAuth = 1 - anoServiceEncrypt = 2 - anoServiceIntegrity = 3 - anoServiceSupervisor = 4 -) - -// ANO sub-packet types (from comm.go validatePacketHeader). -const ( - anoTypeString = 0 - anoTypeBytes = 1 - anoTypeUB1 = 2 - anoTypeUB2 = 3 - anoTypeUB4 = 4 - anoTypeVersion = 5 - anoTypeStatus = 6 -) - -const ( - // anoStatusSupervisorOK is what the Supervisor service must respond with. - anoStatusSupervisorOK uint16 = 31 - // anoStatusAuthRefused is the "I heard you, but I'm declining this service" code. - anoStatusAuthRefused uint16 = 0xFBFF -) - -// ANO version numbers observed in a real RDS Oracle 19c listener's response. -// The outer header version is 0; per-service version sub-packets carry Oracle's own -// version encoding (high byte = major version; bits 12-15 of the second half indicate -// a "modern" service). We mirror these exactly — go-ora's internal constant -// 0xB200200 is client-side and servers don't use it. -const ( - anoOuterVersion = 0 - anoServiceVersion_Super = 0x13000000 // supervisor emits this - anoServiceVersion_Modern = 0x13001000 // auth/encrypt/integrity emit this -) - -// handleANOPayload parses an ANO request payload (magic already confirmed at [0:4]) — -// we only skim it to confirm well-formedness — then writes our refusal response. -func handleANOPayload(payload []byte, conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool) error { - r := NewTTCReader(payload) - // Skip outer header: magic(4) + length(2) + version(4) + servCount(2) + flags(1) = 13 bytes - if _, err := r.GetBytes(13); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("ANO header: %w", err) - } - // We intentionally don't walk every sub-packet. The response is what matters, - // and detecting =REQUIRED would require parsing config state the client also - // doesn't transmit on the wire. If the client insists on ENCRYPTION_CLIENT=REQUIRED - // it will validate our refusal response and close itself with ORA-12660. - return writeANOResponse(conn, use32BitLen) -} - -// writeANOResponse sends our refusal: supervisor accepted (status=31) with an empty -// servArray, authentication/encryption/integrity all replied with status/algoID 0 or -// the "not activated" code. -func writeANOResponse(conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool) error { - // Build each service body first so we can sum the total length. - supervisorBody := buildSupervisorService() - authBody := buildAuthRefusalService() - encryptBody := buildEncryptRefusalService() - integrityBody := buildIntegrityRefusalService() - - totalServiceLen := len(supervisorBody) + len(authBody) + len(encryptBody) + len(integrityBody) - headerLen := 13 - totalLen := headerLen + totalServiceLen - - b := NewTTCBuilder() - // Outer header - b.PutUint(uint64(anoMagic), 4, true, false) - b.PutInt(int64(totalLen), 2, true, false) - b.PutInt(int64(anoOuterVersion), 4, true, false) - b.PutInt(4, 2, true, false) // service count = 4 - b.PutBytes(0) // flags - - // Order matches go-ora's AdvNego.Write(): supervisor, auth, encrypt, integrity - b.PutBytes(supervisorBody...) - b.PutBytes(authBody...) - b.PutBytes(encryptBody...) - b.PutBytes(integrityBody...) - - resp := b.Bytes() - log.Info(). - Int("anoRespLen", len(resp)). - Int("declaredTotalLen", totalLen). - Str("anoRespHex", fmt.Sprintf("% X", resp)). - Msg("Oracle ANO response built") - - return writeDataPayload(conn, resp, use32BitLen) -} - -// buildSupervisorService returns the supervisor service body: header + version + status(31) + -// UB2Array (CID magic + array of supported service types). -func buildSupervisorService() []byte { - b := NewTTCBuilder() - // Service header - b.PutInt(anoServiceSupervisor, 2, true, false) - b.PutInt(3, 2, true, false) // 3 sub-packets - b.PutInt(0, 4, true, false) // errNum - // Sub 1: version (supervisor uses the _Super variant, observed from RDS) - writeAnoVersion(b, anoServiceVersion_Super) - // Sub 2: status = 31 (supervisor OK) - writeAnoStatus(b, anoStatusSupervisorOK) - // Sub 3: UB2Array — RDS sends [4, 1] for its 19c listener; mirror that. - writeAnoUB2Array(b, []int{4, 1}) - return b.Bytes() -} - -// buildAuthRefusalService returns the auth service body indicating we refuse auth. -func buildAuthRefusalService() []byte { - b := NewTTCBuilder() - b.PutInt(anoServiceAuth, 2, true, false) - b.PutInt(2, 2, true, false) // 2 sub-packets - b.PutInt(0, 4, true, false) - writeAnoVersion(b, anoServiceVersion_Modern) - writeAnoStatus(b, anoStatusAuthRefused) - return b.Bytes() -} - -// buildEncryptRefusalService returns the encrypt service body indicating no encryption. -// Mirrors go-ora encryptService.readServiceData(): version + UB1(algoID=0). -func buildEncryptRefusalService() []byte { - b := NewTTCBuilder() - b.PutInt(anoServiceEncrypt, 2, true, false) - b.PutInt(2, 2, true, false) - b.PutInt(0, 4, true, false) - writeAnoVersion(b, anoServiceVersion_Modern) - writeAnoUB1(b, 0) // algoID 0 = no encryption - return b.Bytes() -} - -// buildIntegrityRefusalService mirrors encrypt but for data integrity. -func buildIntegrityRefusalService() []byte { - b := NewTTCBuilder() - b.PutInt(anoServiceIntegrity, 2, true, false) - b.PutInt(2, 2, true, false) - b.PutInt(0, 4, true, false) - writeAnoVersion(b, anoServiceVersion_Modern) - writeAnoUB1(b, 0) // algoID 0 = no integrity - return b.Bytes() -} - -// writeAnoVersion emits a version sub-packet: length=4, type=5, body=uint32 BE. -func writeAnoVersion(b *TTCBuilder, version uint32) { - b.PutInt(4, 2, true, false) // length - b.PutInt(anoTypeVersion, 2, true, false) - b.PutUint(uint64(version), 4, true, false) -} - -// writeAnoStatus emits a status sub-packet: length=2, type=6, body=uint16 BE. -func writeAnoStatus(b *TTCBuilder, status uint16) { - b.PutInt(2, 2, true, false) - b.PutInt(anoTypeStatus, 2, true, false) - b.PutUint(uint64(status), 2, true, false) -} - -// writeAnoUB1 emits a UB1 sub-packet: length=1, type=2, body=byte. -func writeAnoUB1(b *TTCBuilder, v uint8) { - b.PutInt(1, 2, true, false) - b.PutInt(anoTypeUB1, 2, true, false) - b.PutBytes(v) -} - -// writeAnoUB2Array emits the supervisor service's UB2Array sub-packet, which has a -// non-standard body framed with the 0xDEADBEEF magic (see comm.go writeUB2Array). -func writeAnoUB2Array(b *TTCBuilder, input []int) { - b.PutInt(int64(10+len(input)*2), 2, true, false) // length field - b.PutInt(anoTypeBytes, 2, true, false) // type = 1 (bytes) - // Body - b.PutUint(uint64(anoMagic), 4, true, false) - b.PutInt(3, 2, true, false) // constant - b.PutInt(int64(len(input)), 4, true, false) - for _, v := range input { - b.PutInt(int64(v), 2, true, false) - } -} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 53d0defc..00000000 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,186 +0,0 @@ -package oracle - -import ( - "context" - "database/sql" - "fmt" - "io" - "net" - "os" - "testing" - "time" - - _ "github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2" -) - - -// TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra spins up just the client-facing Oracle handshake on a -// local TCP listener (no real upstream Oracle target) and checks whether a go-ora -// client connecting with ProxyPasswordPlaceholder completes the handshake cleanly. -// -// Skipped unless ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST=1 because it binds a TCP port. -func TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra(t *testing.T) { - if os.Getenv("ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST") == "" { - t.Skip("set ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST=1 to run") - } - - ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - defer ln.Close() - port := ln.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port - t.Logf("Listening on 127.0.0.1:%d", port) - - serverDone := make(chan error, 1) - go func() { - conn, err := ln.Accept() - if err != nil { - serverDone <- fmt.Errorf("accept: %w", err) - return - } - defer conn.Close() - serverDone <- runHandshakeOnly(conn, t) - }() - - dsn := fmt.Sprintf("oracle://ADMIN:%s@127.0.0.1:%d/TESTDB", ProxyPasswordPlaceholder, port) - t.Logf("go-ora DSN: %s", dsn) - - db, err := sql.Open("oracle", dsn) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal("sql.Open:", err) - } - defer db.Close() - - ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second) - defer cancel() - - pingErr := db.PingContext(ctx) - - var serverErr error - select { - case serverErr = <-serverDone: - case <-time.After(20 * time.Second): - t.Fatal("server goroutine timed out") - } - - t.Logf("SERVER handshake result: %v", serverErr) - t.Logf("CLIENT go-ora ping result: %v", pingErr) - - if serverErr != nil { - t.Fatalf("server-side handshake failed: %v", serverErr) - } - t.Log("PASS: go-ora client completed the handshake against our impersonation") -} - -// runHandshakeOnly mirrors the client-facing portion of HandleConnection (lines -// 106-220) without dialling an upstream Oracle. It returns nil if our server -// successfully writes the phase-2 auth response without the client closing the -// connection underneath us. -func runHandshakeOnly(clientConn net.Conn, t *testing.T) error { - connectRaw, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("read CONNECT: %w", err) - } - if PacketTypeOf(connectRaw) == PacketTypeResend { - connectRaw, err = ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("re-read CONNECT: %w", err) - } - } - if PacketTypeOf(connectRaw) != PacketTypeConnect { - return fmt.Errorf("expected CONNECT, got type=%d", connectRaw[4]) - } - connectPkt, err := ParseConnectPacket(connectRaw) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("parse CONNECT: %w", err) - } - t.Logf("CONNECT received: clientVersion=%d", connectPkt.Version) - - accept := AcceptFromConnect(connectPkt) - t.Logf("connect parsed: sdu=%d tdu=%d version=%d loVer=%d acfl0=0x%02X acfl1=0x%02X options=0x%04X", - connectPkt.SessionDataUnit, connectPkt.TransportDataUnit, connectPkt.Version, connectPkt.LoVersion, - connectPkt.ACFL0, connectPkt.ACFL1, connectPkt.Options) - t.Logf("accept built: sdu=%d tdu=%d version=%d histone=%d acfl0=0x%02X acfl1=0x%02X", - accept.SessionDataUnit, accept.TransportDataUnit, accept.Version, accept.Histone, accept.ACFL0, accept.ACFL1) - acceptBytes := accept.Bytes() - if _, err := clientConn.Write(acceptBytes); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("write ACCEPT: %w", err) - } - use32Bit := accept.Version >= 315 - t.Logf("ACCEPT sent: version=%d use32Bit=%v acceptHex=% X", accept.Version, use32Bit, acceptBytes) - - peekBuf := make([]byte, 512) - _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)) - n, _ := clientConn.Read(peekBuf) - _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) - t.Logf("POST-ACCEPT peek: n=%d first16=% X", n, peekBuf[:min(16, n)]) - peeked := append([]byte(nil), peekBuf[:n]...) - - if slen := detectConnectDataSupplement(peeked); slen > 0 { - t.Logf("draining connect-data supplement (16-bit framed DATA, %d bytes)", slen) - if slen > len(peeked) { - rest := make([]byte, slen-len(peeked)) - if _, err := io.ReadFull(clientConn, rest); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("read supplement tail: %w", err) - } - peeked = nil - } else { - peeked = peeked[slen:] - } - } - - wrapped := &prependedConn{Conn: clientConn, buf: peeked} - - p1Payload, err := RunPreAuthExchange(wrapped, use32Bit) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("pre-auth exchange: %w", err) - } - t.Logf("pre-auth exchange complete, received phase-1 payload (%d bytes)", len(p1Payload)) - - if _, err := ParseAuthPhaseOne(p1Payload); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("parse auth phase 1: %w", err) - } - state, err := NewO5LogonServerState() - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("init O5Logon state: %w", err) - } - if err := writeDataPayload(wrapped, BuildAuthPhaseOneResponse(state), use32Bit); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("write phase 1 response: %w", err) - } - t.Logf("phase-1 response sent") - - p2Payload, err := readDataPayload(wrapped, use32Bit) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("read phase 2: %w", err) - } - p2, err := ParseAuthPhaseTwo(p2Payload) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("parse phase 2: %w", err) - } - t.Logf("phase-2 received, verifying password...") - - _, encKey, verr := state.VerifyClientPassword(p2.EClientSessKey, p2.EPassword) - if verr != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("verify password: %w", verr) - } - t.Logf("password verified — client proved knowledge of placeholder") - - svr, err := BuildSvrResponse(encKey) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("build SVR response: %w", err) - } - if err := writeDataPayload(wrapped, BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse(svr, 0xC0DE, 0x42), use32Bit); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("write phase 2 response: %w", err) - } - t.Logf("phase-2 response sent — handshake complete from server side") - - // Try to read a follow-up from the client. If the client sends anything, - // it accepted our handshake. If it closes immediately, it rejected it. - _ = wrapped.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)) - buf := make([]byte, 32) - m, rerr := wrapped.Read(buf) - t.Logf("post-handshake client read: n=%d err=%v firstBytes=%x", m, rerr, buf[:m]) - - return nil -} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go deleted file mode 100644 index b942e782..00000000 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,425 +0,0 @@ -// Portions of this file are adapted from github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2, -// licensed under MIT. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. -// Original: tcp_protocol_nego.go (newTCPNego) and data_type_nego.go (buildTypeNego, -// DataTypeNego.read/write, TZBytes). -// Modifications for server-side use: inverted roles — the gateway reads the client's -// ProtocolNego TTC message and responds with a fixed server profile matching 19c. - -package oracle - -import ( - "bytes" - "encoding/binary" - "fmt" - "net" - "time" - - "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" -) - -// Server-side protocol negotiation. The flow after the ACCEPT packet is: -// 1. Client sends a TCPNego TTC message (opcode 1): [0x01 0x00 "client_name\x00"] -// 2. Server responds with its own TCPNego: [0x01 0x06 0x00 ...] -// 3. Client sends a DataTypeNego message (opcode 2) with client caps and type list. -// 4. Server responds with a matching DataTypeNego. -// -// We advertise a 19c-class server profile, which is the most broadly compatible choice -// across supported Oracle client drivers. - -// Hard-coded server capabilities for a 19c-class server. These match go-ora's default -// CompileTimeCaps (modified for server role) and RuntimeCap. -var serverCompileTimeCaps = []byte{ - 6, 1, 0, 0, 106, 1, 1, 11, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 41, - 144, 3, 7, 3, 0, 1, 0, 235, - 1, 0, 5, 1, 0, 0, 0, 24, - 0, 0, 7, 32, 2, 58, 0, 0, - 5, 0, 0, 0, 8, -} - -var serverRuntimeCaps = []byte{2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} - -// tzBytes returns the server's time zone — go-ora's TZBytes in reverse. -func tzBytes() []byte { - _, offset := time.Now().Zone() - hours := int8(offset / 3600) - minutes := int8((offset / 60) % 60) - seconds := int8(offset % 60) - return []byte{128, 0, 0, 0, uint8(hours + 60), uint8(minutes + 60), uint8(seconds + 60), 128, 0, 0, 0} -} - -// RunPreAuthExchange is a thin wrapper that calls RunPreAuthExchangeWithUpstream with no -// upstream overrides; responses are constructed from local templates (TCPNego) and -// dynamic echoes (DataTypeNego). -func RunPreAuthExchange(conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool) (authPhase1Payload []byte, err error) { - return RunPreAuthExchangeWithUpstream(conn, use32BitLen, nil, nil) -} - -// RunPreAuthExchangeWithUpstream reads the client's pre-authentication DATA payloads and -// dispatches each based on content (ANO magic, TCPNego opcode, DataTypeNego opcode, auth -// opcode). If upstreamTCPNego and/or upstreamDataTypeNego are non-nil, those exact bytes -// are forwarded to the client as responses — aligning client-negotiated caps with what -// upstream actually negotiated. When nil, falls back to locally-built responses. -func RunPreAuthExchangeWithUpstream(conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool, upstreamTCPNego, upstreamDataTypeNego []byte) (authPhase1Payload []byte, err error) { - seenTCPNego := false - seenDataTypeNego := false - iteration := 0 - for { - iteration++ - // Apply a generous per-step deadline so a client that stops sending surfaces - // as a diagnosable timeout rather than blocking the handler forever. - if tc, ok := conn.(interface{ SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error }); ok { - _ = tc.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(15 * time.Second)) - } - payload, rerr := readDataPayload(conn, use32BitLen) - if tc, ok := conn.(interface{ SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error }); ok { - _ = tc.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) - } - if rerr != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("read pre-auth payload (iter %d): %w", iteration, rerr) - } - if len(payload) == 0 { - // Some clients send an empty DATA packet as a flush/ack between steps. - // Skip it and read the next payload. - log.Info().Int("iter", iteration).Msg("empty pre-auth payload (ignored)") - continue - } - log.Info(). - Int("iter", iteration). - Int("payloadLen", len(payload)). - Str("firstBytes", fmt.Sprintf("% X", payload[:min(32, len(payload))])). - Msg("Pre-auth payload received") - - // ANO request: DATA payload begins with 0xDEADBEEF magic (4-byte BE uint32). - if len(payload) >= 4 && binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[:4]) == anoMagic { - if werr := handleANOPayload(payload, conn, use32BitLen); werr != nil { - return nil, werr - } - continue - } - - switch payload[0] { - case 1: // TCPNego - if err := parseClientTCPNego(payload); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse client TCPNego: %w", err) - } - var resp []byte - if upstreamTCPNego != nil { - resp = upstreamTCPNego - log.Info().Int("respLen", len(resp)).Msg("Server TCPNego response (from upstream)") - } else { - resp = buildServerTCPNego() - log.Info().Int("respLen", len(resp)).Msg("Server TCPNego response (local)") - } - if err := writeDataPayload(conn, resp, use32BitLen); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("write server TCPNego: %w", err) - } - seenTCPNego = true - case 2: // DataTypeNego - req, err := parseClientDataTypeNego(payload) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse client DataTypeNego: %w", err) - } - var resp []byte - if upstreamDataTypeNego != nil { - resp = upstreamDataTypeNego - log.Info().Int("respLen", len(resp)).Msg("Server DataTypeNego response (from upstream)") - } else { - resp = buildServerDataTypeNego(req) - log.Info(). - Int("clientTypes", len(req.Types)). - Int("respLen", len(resp)). - Msg("Server DataTypeNego response (echoed)") - } - if err := writeDataPayload(conn, resp, use32BitLen); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("write server DataTypeNego: %w", err) - } - seenDataTypeNego = true - case TTCMsgAuthRequest: // 0x03 — auth phase 1 begins - if !seenTCPNego || !seenDataTypeNego { - // Permissive: some clients may skip nego steps; we still progress to auth. - } - return payload, nil - default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected pre-auth payload opcode 0x%02X", payload[0]) - } - } -} - -func parseClientTCPNego(payload []byte) error { - r := NewTTCReader(payload) - op, err := r.GetByte() - if err != nil { - return err - } - if op != 1 { - return fmt.Errorf("expected TCPNego opcode 1, got 0x%02X", op) - } - // client version byte - if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { - return err - } - // null-terminated client name - if _, err := r.GetNullTermString(); err != nil { - return err - } - return nil -} - -// buildServerTCPNego returns the server's TCPNego response. We use RDS's exact bytes -// (captured from a real Oracle 19c listener) because JDBC thin uses the negotiated -// compile-time caps downstream for summary-object parsing — and any deviation from -// the real Oracle caps causes ORA-17401 during auth. -func buildServerTCPNego() []byte { - // Return a copy so callers can't mutate the template. - out := make([]byte, len(rdsTCPNegoResponse)) - copy(out, rdsTCPNegoResponse) - return out -} - -// DataTypeTuple is one entry in the client's offered type-representation list. -// Wire format is u16BE per field, with a trailing u16BE 0 between entries. -type DataTypeTuple struct { - DataType uint16 - ConvDataType uint16 - Representation uint16 -} - -// ClientDataTypeNegoRequest holds everything we parsed from the client's DataType Nego -// request. We keep the offered tuple list so we can echo it back in the response -// (mirror strategy — we claim to support whatever the client offered; the actual type -// handling happens upstream where go-ora already negotiated with real Oracle). -type ClientDataTypeNegoRequest struct { - InCharset uint16 - OutCharset uint16 - Flags byte - CompileCaps []byte - RuntimeCaps []byte - TZBlock []byte // 11 bytes if runtimeCaps[1]&1 else nil - ClientTZVersion uint32 // present if TZBlock present AND compileCaps[37]&2 - HasTZVersion bool - ServernCharset uint16 - Types []DataTypeTuple -} - -// parseClientDataTypeNego parses the client's DataType Nego payload into a struct the -// response builder can echo back from. -// -// Request wire format (ported from go-ora's DataTypeNego.write): -// u8 opcode 0x02 -// u16LE client_in_charset -// u16LE client_out_charset -// u8 server_flags -// u8 compile_caps_len -// [] compile_caps -// u8 runtime_caps_len -// [] runtime_caps -// [if runtime_caps[1]&1 == 1: -// [11]byte tz_block -// [if compile_caps[37]&2 == 2: -// u32BE client_tz_version]] -// u16LE server_ncharset -// (tuples loop — each entry is either full [8B] or bare [4B]: -// u16BE data_type -// u16BE conv_data_type -// [if conv_data_type != 0: -// u16BE rep -// u16BE 0 (separator)]) -// u16BE 0 // terminator -// -// Full entries carry a (dty, conv, rep) triple; bare entries are (dty, 0) used to signal -// types offered without a specific representation. Terminator is u16BE 0. -func parseClientDataTypeNego(payload []byte) (*ClientDataTypeNegoRequest, error) { - r := NewTTCReader(payload) - op, err := r.GetByte() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if op != 2 { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected DataTypeNego opcode 2, got 0x%02X", op) - } - req := &ClientDataTypeNegoRequest{} - - inBytes, err := r.GetBytes(2) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("in_charset: %w", err) - } - req.InCharset = binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(inBytes) - - outBytes, err := r.GetBytes(2) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("out_charset: %w", err) - } - req.OutCharset = binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(outBytes) - - req.Flags, err = r.GetByte() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("flags: %w", err) - } - - ccLen, err := r.GetByte() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("compile_caps_len: %w", err) - } - req.CompileCaps, err = r.GetBytes(int(ccLen)) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("compile_caps: %w", err) - } - - rcLen, err := r.GetByte() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("runtime_caps_len: %w", err) - } - req.RuntimeCaps, err = r.GetBytes(int(rcLen)) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("runtime_caps: %w", err) - } - - // Optional TZ preamble: 11 bytes if runtime_caps[1]&1 == 1, plus 4 more for - // clientTZVersion if compile_caps[37]&2 == 2. Mirrored exactly in our response. - if len(req.RuntimeCaps) >= 2 && req.RuntimeCaps[1]&1 == 1 { - req.TZBlock, err = r.GetBytes(11) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tz_block: %w", err) - } - if len(req.CompileCaps) > 37 && req.CompileCaps[37]&2 == 2 { - vBytes, err := r.GetBytes(4) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("client_tz_version: %w", err) - } - req.ClientTZVersion = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(vBytes) - req.HasTZVersion = true - } - } - - // ServernCharset (2 bytes LE) — always present. - ncBytes, err := r.GetBytes(2) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("server_ncharset: %w", err) - } - req.ServernCharset = binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(ncBytes) - - // Tuple loop. Full entry = 8 bytes (dty, conv, rep, 0). Bare = 4 bytes (dty, 0). - // 2-byte fields are u16BE. CompileCaps[27]==0 would switch to 1-byte fields - // (legacy mode); every mainstream modern client uses 2-byte. - use1ByteFields := len(req.CompileCaps) > 27 && req.CompileCaps[27] == 0 - readField := func() (uint16, error) { - if use1ByteFields { - b, err := r.GetByte() - return uint16(b), err - } - bs, err := r.GetBytes(2) - if err != nil { - return 0, err - } - return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(bs), nil - } - - for { - dt, err := readField() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tuple %d data_type: %w", len(req.Types), err) - } - if dt == 0 { - break - } - conv, err := readField() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tuple %d conv_data_type: %w", len(req.Types), err) - } - t := DataTypeTuple{DataType: dt, ConvDataType: conv} - if conv != 0 { - rep, err := readField() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tuple %d rep: %w", len(req.Types), err) - } - sep, err := readField() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tuple %d separator: %w", len(req.Types), err) - } - if sep != 0 { - log.Debug(). - Int("tuple", len(req.Types)). - Uint16("separator", sep). - Msg("DataTypeNego: unexpected non-zero tuple separator") - } - t.Representation = rep - } - req.Types = append(req.Types, t) - } - - log.Info(). - Int("types", len(req.Types)). - Int("compileCapsLen", len(req.CompileCaps)). - Int("runtimeCapsLen", len(req.RuntimeCaps)). - Bool("tzBlock", req.TZBlock != nil). - Bool("tzVersion", req.HasTZVersion). - Uint16("ncharset", req.ServernCharset). - Msg("DataTypeNego request parsed") - return req, nil -} - -// buildServerDataTypeNego returns the server's DataTypeNego response that echoes back -// the client's offered type list as "all supported". -// -// Response wire format (per go-ora's DataTypeNego.read): -// u8 opcode 0x02 -// [if client_runtime_caps[1]&1 == 1: -// [11]byte tz_block -// [if client_compile_caps[37]&2 == 2: -// u32BE server_tz_version]] -// (tuples loop echoing client's offer — full entry 8B or bare 4B): -// u16BE data_type -// u16BE conv_data_type -// [if conv != 0: u16BE rep, u16BE 0] -// u16BE 0 // terminator -// -// Strategy: "mirror everything." We don't maintain a server-side supported-type set -// because actual type handling happens upstream (go-ora → real Oracle negotiates for -// real). We just need the client to accept the handshake and move on to auth. -func buildServerDataTypeNego(req *ClientDataTypeNegoRequest) []byte { - var out bytes.Buffer - out.WriteByte(0x02) // opcode - - // Mirror the TZ preamble the client sent us. If the client included a TZ block, - // the response must include one too; mismatches cause protocol violations. - if req.TZBlock != nil { - out.Write(tzBytes()) - if req.HasTZVersion { - var vbuf [4]byte - // Use a stable 19c-era serverTZVersion. Exact value doesn't matter — client - // just validates structure and records it. - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(vbuf[:], 44) - out.Write(vbuf[:]) - } - } - - use1ByteFields := len(req.CompileCaps) > 27 && req.CompileCaps[27] == 0 - writeField := func(v uint16) { - if use1ByteFields { - out.WriteByte(byte(v)) - return - } - var b [2]byte - binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(b[:], v) - out.Write(b[:]) - } - - // Echo each client-offered tuple. If client sent a full entry, we reply with a - // full entry (supported). If client sent a bare entry (conv == 0), we reply with - // a bare entry (also conv == 0) to mirror the structure. - for _, t := range req.Types { - writeField(t.DataType) - writeField(t.ConvDataType) - if t.ConvDataType != 0 { - writeField(t.Representation) - writeField(0) // separator - } - } - // Final terminator: u16BE 0 (or u8 0 in legacy mode) - writeField(0) - return out.Bytes() -} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go deleted file mode 100644 index 08d63a1c..00000000 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,207 +0,0 @@ -package oracle - -// Hardcoded TCPNego and DataTypeNego response payloads captured from a real Oracle -// 19c RDS listener. These set the TTC caps (TTCVersion, HasEOSCapability, etc.) that -// the client uses later to parse the auth response summary object. -// -// Captured from upstream taplog during a working go-ora connection to the same user's -// RDS instance. Byte-for-byte verbatim — modifying any byte is likely to trigger -// ORA-17401 (protocol violation) because the client treats the trailing summary bytes -// based on these negotiated caps. - -// rdsTCPNegoResponse is the payload of the DATA packet RDS sends in response to a -// client TCPNego request (231 bytes, starts with opcode 0x01). -var rdsTCPNegoResponse = []byte{ - 0x01, 0x06, 0x00, 0x78, 0x38, 0x36, 0x5F, 0x36, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x75, 0x78, 0x20, - 0x32, 0x2E, 0x34, 0x2E, 0x78, 0x78, 0x00, 0x69, 0x03, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x66, 0x03, 0x40, 0x03, - 0x01, 0x40, 0x03, 0x66, 0x03, 0x01, 0x66, 0x03, 0x48, 0x03, 0x01, 0x48, 0x03, 0x66, 0x03, 0x01, - 0x66, 0x03, 0x52, 0x03, 0x01, 0x52, 0x03, 0x66, 0x03, 0x01, 0x66, 0x03, 0x61, 0x03, 0x01, 0x61, - 0x03, 0x66, 0x03, 0x01, 0x66, 0x03, 0x1F, 0x03, 0x08, 0x1F, 0x03, 0x66, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x64, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x60, 0x01, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x03, 0x0C, 0x0C, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, - 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x07, 0x08, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, - 0x0A, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x08, 0x23, 0x47, 0x23, 0x47, - 0x08, 0x11, 0x23, 0x08, 0x11, 0x41, 0xB0, 0x47, 0x00, 0x83, 0x03, 0x69, 0x07, 0xD0, 0x03, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x6F, 0x07, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x01, 0x01, - 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0x03, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xFF, 0x01, 0xFF, - 0xFF, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x01, 0x01, 0xFF, 0x01, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xE2, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x05, 0x0F, 0x0F, 0x0D, - 0x07, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x18, 0x00, 0x77, -} - -// rdsDataTypeNegoResponse is the payload of the DATA packet RDS sends in response to -// a client DataTypeNego request (2714 bytes, starts with opcode 0x02). The client -// uses the compile-time caps inside this response to determine TTCVersion and -// downstream parsing behavior. -var rdsDataTypeNegoResponse = []byte{ - 0x02, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3C, 0x3C, 0x3C, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2C, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x17, 0x00, 0x17, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x19, 0x00, 0x19, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x1B, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1C, 0x00, 0x1C, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1E, 0x00, 0x1E, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x21, 0x00, 0x21, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, - 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"errors" "fmt" - "strconv" ) // O5Logon verifier types. Only 18453 (12c+ PBKDF2+SHA512) is supported in v1. @@ -120,68 +116,6 @@ func encryptPassword(password, key []byte, padding bool) (string, error) { return encryptSessionKey(padding, key, buffer) } -// O5LogonServerState is the per-session state the gateway maintains across O5Logon's -// two message phases. All crypto runs against ProxyPasswordPlaceholder. -type O5LogonServerState struct { - // ServerSessKey is the raw (not-yet-encrypted) server session key we sent to the client. - ServerSessKey []byte - // Salt is the AUTH_VFR_DATA we sent (10 raw bytes; hex-encoded on the wire). - Salt []byte - // Pbkdf2CSKSalt is AUTH_PBKDF2_CSK_SALT — EXACTLY 32 hex characters (16 raw bytes). ORA-28041 otherwise. - Pbkdf2CSKSalt string - Pbkdf2VGenCount int - Pbkdf2SDerCount int - - // EServerSessKey is the hex-encoded encrypted server session key we sent (for round-trip checks). - EServerSessKey string - - // speedyKey derived from the placeholder + salt; cached so phase 2 doesn't recompute. - speedyKey []byte - // key is the per-session encryption key derived from placeholder password and pbkdf2 params. - key []byte -} - -// NewO5LogonServerState generates the server-side challenge material using the placeholder password. -// Sizes match a real Oracle 19c listener's output: server session key = 32 raw bytes -// (64 hex chars on the wire), salt = 16 raw bytes (32 hex chars), PBKDF2 CSK salt = 16 raw. -func NewO5LogonServerState() (*O5LogonServerState, error) { - s := &O5LogonServerState{ - Pbkdf2VGenCount: 4096, - Pbkdf2SDerCount: 3, - } - - s.ServerSessKey = make([]byte, 32) - if _, err := rand.Read(s.ServerSessKey); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - s.Salt = make([]byte, 16) - if _, err := rand.Read(s.Salt); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - // AUTH_PBKDF2_CSK_SALT must be exactly 32 hex chars on the wire (16 raw bytes). - csk := make([]byte, 16) - if _, err := rand.Read(csk); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - s.Pbkdf2CSKSalt = fmt.Sprintf("%X", csk) - - key, speedy, err := deriveServerKey(ProxyPasswordPlaceholder, s.Salt, s.Pbkdf2VGenCount) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - s.key = key - s.speedyKey = speedy - - eServerSessKey, err := encryptSessionKey(false, key, s.ServerSessKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - s.EServerSessKey = eServerSessKey - - return s, nil -} // deriveServerKey computes the 32-byte AES-256 key used to encrypt AUTH_SESSKEY for // verifier type 18453 (12c+ PBKDF2+SHA512), same as go-ora's client-side derivation. @@ -198,49 +132,6 @@ func deriveServerKey(password string, salt []byte, vGenCount int) (key []byte, s return } -// VerifyClientPassword runs the server side of the phase-2 handshake: decrypt the -// client's AUTH_SESSKEY + AUTH_PASSWORD and confirm the plaintext password matches the -// placeholder. Returns the clientSessKey (needed for the SVR response) plus the password -// encryption key. -func (s *O5LogonServerState) VerifyClientPassword(eClientSessKey, ePassword string) (clientSessKey, encKey []byte, err error) { - clientSessKey, err = decryptSessionKey(false, s.key, eClientSessKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt client session key: %w", err) - } - if len(clientSessKey) != len(s.ServerSessKey) { - // For verifier 18453, len should be 48. Mismatch → bad protocol or key mismatch. - return nil, nil, errors.New("client session key length mismatch") - } - - // Derive password encryption key: generateSpeedyKey(pbkdf2ChkSalt_raw, - // hex(clientSessKey || serverSessKey), pbkdf2SderCount)[:32] for verifier 18453. - buffer := append([]byte(nil), clientSessKey...) - buffer = append(buffer, s.ServerSessKey...) - keyBuffer := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%X", buffer)) - df2key, err := hex.DecodeString(s.Pbkdf2CSKSalt) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("decode pbkdf2 salt: %w", err) - } - encKey = generateSpeedyKey(df2key, keyBuffer, s.Pbkdf2SDerCount)[:32] - - // Client calls encryptPassword(password, key, padding=true), which PKCS5-pads the - // (random16 || password) buffer to a 16-byte boundary and returns the full padded - // ciphertext. We decrypt with padding=true so decryptSessionKey strips the PKCS5 - // pad, leaving (random16 || password). - decoded, err := decryptSessionKey(true, encKey, ePassword) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt password: %w", err) - } - // encryptPassword prepended 16 random bytes before encryption. - if len(decoded) <= 16 { - return nil, nil, errors.New("decoded password too short") - } - plain := decoded[16:] - if string(plain) != ProxyPasswordPlaceholder { - return nil, nil, errors.New("password mismatch") - } - return clientSessKey, encKey, nil -} // BuildSvrResponse produces AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE: AES-CBC(rand(16) || "SERVER_TO_CLIENT", encKey). // The client decrypts it and verifies bytes [16:32] == "SERVER_TO_CLIENT" (verified from @@ -254,37 +145,3 @@ func BuildSvrResponse(encKey []byte) (string, error) { return encryptSessionKey(true, encKey, body) } -// Legacy 11g (verifier 6949) key derivation, kept for reference — v1 does not use it. -// nolint: unused -func deriveKey11g(password, saltHex string) ([]byte, error) { - salt, err := hex.DecodeString(saltHex) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - buffer := append([]byte(password), salt...) - h := sha1.New() - if _, err := h.Write(buffer); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - key := h.Sum(nil) - key = append(key, 0, 0, 0, 0) - return key, nil -} - -// md5Hash is a small helper so callers don't have to import md5 directly. -// nolint: unused -func md5Hash(data []byte) []byte { - sum := md5.Sum(data) - out := make([]byte, 16) - copy(out, sum[:]) - return out -} - -// parseIntVal is a small utility for parsing the integer-encoded TTC values -// (VGEN_COUNT / SDER_COUNT) we read out of AUTH_* key-values. -func parseIntVal(v []byte) (int, error) { - if len(v) == 0 { - return 0, nil - } - return strconv.Atoi(string(v)) -} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go index 992bb210..36c07cf9 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go @@ -1,12 +1,8 @@ package oracle import ( - "bytes" - "encoding/binary" "fmt" - "io" "net" - "strconv" ) // Server-role O5Logon implementation. The gateway acts as an Oracle server and drives @@ -38,12 +34,6 @@ const ( LogonModeNoNewPass = 0x2000 ) -// AuthPhaseOne carries the parsed client request that begins auth. -type AuthPhaseOne struct { - Username string - LogonMode uint32 - KeyValuePairs map[string]string -} // AuthPhaseTwo carries the parsed client request that completes auth. type AuthPhaseTwo struct { @@ -83,156 +73,7 @@ func writeDataPayload(conn net.Conn, payload []byte, use32BitLen bool) error { return err } -// ParseAuthPhaseOne decodes the first auth-request TTC payload from the client. -// Layout: opcode(0x03) subop(0x76) 0x00, then username length-prefix + username, -// then mode(uint32 compressed), marker byte, KVP count, then pairs. -// The structure mirrors AuthObject.Write (inverted as reader). -func ParseAuthPhaseOne(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseOne, error) { - r := NewTTCReader(payload) - op, err := r.GetByte() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("phase1 opcode: %w", err) - } - if op != TTCMsgAuthRequest { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("phase1 unexpected opcode 0x%02X", op) - } - sub, err := r.GetByte() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if sub != AuthSubOpPhaseOne { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("phase1 unexpected sub-op 0x%02X", sub) - } - if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - out := &AuthPhaseOne{KeyValuePairs: map[string]string{}} - - // username presence byte + length - hasUser, err := r.GetByte() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - var userLen int - if hasUser == 1 { - userLen, err = r.GetInt(4, true, true) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } else { - // skip the second length byte (go-ora writes two zeros when no username) - if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } - - mode, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - out.LogonMode = uint32(mode) - - if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - index, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - // two marker bytes (1, 1) - if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - if hasUser == 1 && userLen > 0 { - // Username encoding varies per client: - // - go-ora: CLR-prefixed — one byte length (== userLen) followed by userLen bytes. - // - JDBC thin (sqlcl / SQL Developer / DBeaver): raw userLen bytes, no prefix. - // Disambiguate by peeking: if the next byte equals userLen AND is in the control - // range (< 0x20), it's a length prefix. Otherwise treat as raw string data. - peek, perr := r.PeekByte() - if perr != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("peek username: %w", perr) - } - if int(peek) == userLen && peek < 0x20 { - // Consume CLR length and use GetClr-style read. - if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("consume username length prefix: %w", err) - } - } - u, err := r.GetBytes(userLen) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("read username bytes: %w", err) - } - out.Username = string(u) - } - - for i := 0; i < index; i++ { - k, v, _, err := r.GetKeyVal() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("phase1 KVP #%d: %w", i, err) - } - out.KeyValuePairs[string(k)] = string(v) - } - return out, nil -} - -// BuildAuthPhaseOneResponse builds the server's phase-1 response payload carrying the -// challenge material the client needs to continue. Layout (mirrors a real Oracle 19c -// listener byte-for-byte): -// -// opcode(0x08) -// dictLen(compressed) = 6 -// AUTH_SESSKEY num=0 value = 64 hex chars (32 raw bytes, AES-CBC encrypted) -// AUTH_VFR_DATA num=18453 value = 32 hex chars (16 raw bytes salt) -// AUTH_PBKDF2_CSK_SALT num=0 value = 32 hex chars -// AUTH_PBKDF2_VGEN_COUNT num=0 value = "4096" -// AUTH_PBKDF2_SDER_COUNT num=0 value = "3" -// AUTH_GLOBALLY_UNIQUE_DBID num=0 value = 32 hex chars (fake DBID is fine) -// then summary: -// opcode(0x04) + retCode + zeros (ends the response — without it JDBC thin ORA-17401) -func BuildAuthPhaseOneResponse(state *O5LogonServerState) []byte { - b := NewTTCBuilder() - b.PutBytes(TTCMsgAuthResponse) - kvs := []struct { - key string - value string - flag uint32 - }{ - {"AUTH_SESSKEY", state.EServerSessKey, 0}, - // AUTH_VFR_DATA: value = hex-encoded salt; flag = VerifierType. - {"AUTH_VFR_DATA", fmt.Sprintf("%X", state.Salt), VerifierType12c}, - {"AUTH_PBKDF2_CSK_SALT", state.Pbkdf2CSKSalt, 0}, - {"AUTH_PBKDF2_VGEN_COUNT", strconv.Itoa(state.Pbkdf2VGenCount), 0}, - {"AUTH_PBKDF2_SDER_COUNT", strconv.Itoa(state.Pbkdf2SDerCount), 0}, - // AUTH_GLOBALLY_UNIQUE_DBID — a fixed 32-hex-char fake DBID. Real Oracle uses - // the instance's actual DBID; JDBC thin just validates its presence and format. - // Key ends with an embedded NULL to exactly match the 26-byte length RDS sends. - {"AUTH_GLOBALLY_UNIQUE_DBID\x00", "11A7D223DECC14322F8777F2BACBEE84", 0}, - } - b.PutUint(uint64(len(kvs)), 4, true, true) - for _, kv := range kvs { - b.PutKeyValString(kv.key, kv.value, kv.flag) - } - // Trailing summary packet (message code 0x04) — marks end of the auth response so - // JDBC thin's reader loop terminates. Format observed from RDS (34 bytes total): - // 04 01 01 02 1A 98 <28 zero bytes> - // Two compressed ints: first = 1 (call status), second = 2-byte sequence number. - b.PutBytes(TTCMsgError) // opcode 4 - b.PutInt(1, 4, true, true) // 01 01 - b.PutInt(0x1A98, 4, true, true) // 02 1A 98 - // padding — 28 zero bytes matches RDS's 34-byte summary trailer - for i := 0; i < 28; i++ { - b.PutBytes(0) - } - return b.Bytes() -} // ParseAuthPhaseTwo decodes the second auth-request TTC payload from the client. func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { @@ -330,158 +171,7 @@ func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { return out, nil } -// BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponseFromUpstream produces the phase-2 response using the actual -// KVPs upstream Oracle returned to go-ora during our upstream auth. We substitute -// AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE with our placeholder-derived value (so the client can verify the -// server proves knowledge of its placeholder password) and keep everything else intact. -// -// If upstreamKVPs is empty (e.g. TLS path where we can't tap), we fall back to the -// synthesised minimal response via BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse. -func BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponseFromUpstream(svrResponse string, upstreamKVPs map[string]string) []byte { - if len(upstreamKVPs) == 0 { - return BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse(svrResponse, 0xC0DE, 0x42) - } - - b := NewTTCBuilder() - b.PutBytes(TTCMsgAuthResponse) - - // Build KVP list preserving a canonical insertion order. We mirror the order Oracle - // 19c uses: version info first, then DB identity, then session identity, then server - // host scoping, then NLS params, then AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE, then misc limits. Clients - // don't appear to require a specific order but matching reality is safest. - order := []string{ - "AUTH_VERSION_STRING", - "AUTH_VERSION_SQL", - "AUTH_XACTION_TRAITS", - "AUTH_VERSION_NO", - "AUTH_VERSION_STATUS", - "AUTH_CAPABILITY_TABLE", - "AUTH_LAST_LOGIN", - "AUTH_DBNAME", - "AUTH_DB_MOUNT_ID", - "AUTH_DB_ID", - "AUTH_USER_ID", - "AUTH_SESSION_ID", - "AUTH_SERIAL_NUM", - "AUTH_INSTANCE_NO", - "AUTH_FAILOVER_ID", - "AUTH_SERVER_PID", - "AUTH_SC_SERVER_HOST", - "AUTH_SC_DBUNIQUE_NAME", - "AUTH_SC_INSTANCE_NAME", - "AUTH_SC_INSTANCE_ID", - "AUTH_SC_INSTANCE_START_TIME", - "AUTH_SC_DB_DOMAIN", - "AUTH_SC_SERVICE_NAME", - "AUTH_ONS_RLB_SUBSCR_PATTERN", - "AUTH_ONS_HA_SUBSCR_PATTERN", - "AUTH_INSTANCENAME", - "AUTH_NLS_LXLAN", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCTERRITORY", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCCURRENCY", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCISOCURR", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCNUMERICS", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCDATEFM", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCDATELANG", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCSORT", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCCALENDAR", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCUNIONCUR", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCTIMEFM", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCSTMPFM", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCTTZNFM", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCSTZNFM", - "AUTH_NLS_LXLENSEMANTICS", - "AUTH_NLS_LXNCHARCONVEXCP", - "AUTH_NLS_LXCOMP", - "AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE", // substituted below - "AUTH_TSTZ_ERROR_CHECK", - "AUTH_MAX_OPEN_CURSORS", - "AUTH_MAX_IDEN_LENGTH", - } - // Build the final KVP list — only include keys that appear either in the order - // list (from upstream) or are AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE (always included). - type kvEntry struct { - key string - value string - } - var kvs []kvEntry - seen := map[string]bool{} - for _, k := range order { - if k == "AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE" { - kvs = append(kvs, kvEntry{k, svrResponse}) - seen[k] = true - continue - } - if v, ok := upstreamKVPs[k]; ok { - kvs = append(kvs, kvEntry{k, v}) - seen[k] = true - } - } - // Append any upstream keys we didn't explicitly order (e.g. keys Oracle added in a - // newer version that aren't in our list). This keeps us forward-compatible. - for k, v := range upstreamKVPs { - if !seen[k] && k != "AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE" { - kvs = append(kvs, kvEntry{k, v}) - } - } - - b.PutUint(uint64(len(kvs)), 4, true, true) - for _, kv := range kvs { - b.PutKeyValString(kv.key, kv.value, 0) - } - - // Trailing summary packet — same shape as the non-upstream variant. - b.PutBytes(TTCMsgError) - b.PutInt(1, 4, true, true) - b.PutInt(0x1A98, 4, true, true) - for i := 0; i < 28; i++ { - b.PutBytes(0) - } - return b.Bytes() -} - -// BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse produces the final server response that tells the client -// auth succeeded. It includes session IDs, NLS params and AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE. -func BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse(svrResponse string, sessionID, serialNum uint32) []byte { - b := NewTTCBuilder() - b.PutBytes(TTCMsgAuthResponse) - kvs := []struct { - key string - value string - flag uint32 - }{ - {"AUTH_VERSION_NO", "352321536", 0}, - {"AUTH_SESSION_ID", strconv.FormatUint(uint64(sessionID), 10), 0}, - {"AUTH_SERIAL_NUM", strconv.FormatUint(uint64(serialNum), 10), 0}, - {"AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE", svrResponse, 0}, - {"AUTH_VERSION_STRING", "Oracle Database 19c Enterprise Edition Release 19.0.0.0.0 - Production", 0}, - {"AUTH_VERSION_SQL", "1", 0}, - {"AUTH_XACTION_TRAITS", "3", 0}, - {"AUTH_INSTANCENAME", "orcl", 0}, - {"AUTH_FLAGS", "16777344", 0}, - // NLS params - {"AUTH_SC_DBUNIQUE_NAME", "orcl", 0}, - {"AUTH_SC_SERVICE_NAME", "orcl", 0}, - {"AUTH_SC_INSTANCE_NAME", "orcl", 0}, - {"AUTH_SC_DB_DOMAIN", "", 0}, - {"AUTH_SC_INSTANCE_START_TIME", "", 0}, - } - b.PutUint(uint64(len(kvs)), 4, true, true) - for _, kv := range kvs { - b.PutKeyValString(kv.key, kv.value, kv.flag) - } - // Trailing summary packet (opcode 0x04) — terminates the auth response so the - // client's TTC reader loop exits. Same shape as the phase-1 trailer. - // Format (34 bytes total): 04 01 01 02 <2-byte seq> <28 zero bytes> - b.PutBytes(TTCMsgError) - b.PutInt(1, 4, true, true) // 01 01 - b.PutInt(0x1A98, 4, true, true) // 02 1A 98 - for i := 0; i < 28; i++ { - b.PutBytes(0) - } - return b.Bytes() -} // BuildErrorPacket constructs an Oracle error summary packet (opcode 0x04). The Oracle // client checks `Session.HasError()` after each response, which reads this summary. @@ -545,80 +235,5 @@ func WriteErrorToClient(conn net.Conn, oraCode int, message string, use32BitLen return writeDataPayload(conn, BuildErrorPacket(oraCode, message), use32BitLen) } -// RunServerO5Logon drives the two-phase O5Logon handshake with the client. On success -// returns nil; on failure it has already written an ORA-error packet to the client. -func RunServerO5Logon(conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool) error { - // Phase 1: read client's initial auth request. - p1Payload, err := readDataPayload(conn, use32BitLen) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("read phase1 DATA: %w", err) - } - if _, err := ParseAuthPhaseOne(p1Payload); err != nil { - _ = WriteErrorToClient(conn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32BitLen) - return fmt.Errorf("parse phase1: %w", err) - } - state, err := NewO5LogonServerState() - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("init O5Logon state: %w", err) - } - - // Phase 1 response: send challenge material. - if err := writeDataPayload(conn, BuildAuthPhaseOneResponse(state), use32BitLen); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("write phase1 response: %w", err) - } - - // Phase 2: read client's password response. - p2Payload, err := readDataPayload(conn, use32BitLen) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("read phase2 DATA: %w", err) - } - p2, err := ParseAuthPhaseTwo(p2Payload) - if err != nil { - _ = WriteErrorToClient(conn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32BitLen) - return fmt.Errorf("parse phase2: %w", err) - } - _, encKey, err := state.VerifyClientPassword(p2.EClientSessKey, p2.EPassword) - if err != nil { - _ = WriteErrorToClient(conn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32BitLen) - return fmt.Errorf("verify password: %w", err) - } - - svrResponse, err := BuildSvrResponse(encKey) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("build svr response: %w", err) - } - - // Phase 2 response: auth OK - if err := writeDataPayload(conn, BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponse(svrResponse, 0xC0DE, 0x42), use32BitLen); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("write phase2 response: %w", err) - } - return nil -} - -// dumpBytes is a tiny hex helper used in log messages when something goes sideways. -// nolint: unused -func dumpBytes(b []byte, max int) string { - if len(b) > max { - b = b[:max] - } - var buf bytes.Buffer - for i, v := range b { - if i > 0 { - buf.WriteByte(' ') - } - fmt.Fprintf(&buf, "%02X", v) - } - return buf.String() -} - -// readUint32 is a tiny helper used in tests. Kept here to avoid a separate utility file. -// nolint: unused -func readUint32(r io.Reader) (uint32, error) { - var v [4]byte - if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, v[:]); err != nil { - return 0, err - } - return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(v[:]), nil -} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go index 504e5e0f..69855ae8 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go @@ -4,12 +4,10 @@ import ( "context" "crypto/tls" "fmt" - "io" "net" "time" "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/session" - "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" ) // prependedConn lets us push bytes we've already read back "in front" of a net.Conn's @@ -64,221 +62,14 @@ func NewOracleProxy(config OracleProxyConfig) *OracleProxy { } // HandleConnection runs one end-to-end PAM session for a connecting Oracle client. -// Flow: -// 1. Dial+auth upstream with real credentials so we fail cleanly if the backend is down. -// 2. Read the client's CONNECT, send an ACCEPT. -// 3. Drive server-side TCPNego + DataTypeNego. -// 4. Handle (and refuse) ANO if the client sent it. -// 5. Run server-side O5Logon verifying ProxyPasswordPlaceholder. -// 6. Relay raw bytes both directions with a passive TTC tap for query logging. +// The proxied-auth flow lives in handleConnectionProxied: pre-auth bytes are forwarded +// verbatim between client and upstream (so both negotiate with each other through us +// and end up in matching capability state), and we intercept only at the O5Logon +// boundary to swap placeholder-keyed material for real-password-keyed material. func (p *OracleProxy) HandleConnection(ctx context.Context, clientConn net.Conn) error { - // New proxied-auth flow: forward client pre-auth bytes verbatim to upstream, intercept - // only at O5Logon boundary. This keeps client and upstream in matching cap state, so - // post-auth byte relay works for clients whose caps differ from go-ora's (notably JDBC - // thin — sqlcl, SQL Developer, DBeaver). return p.handleConnectionProxied(ctx, clientConn) } -// handleConnectionLegacy is the original impersonation flow (go-ora upstream dial + -// server-side handshake). Kept for reference; not currently routed. -func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionLegacy(ctx context.Context, clientConn net.Conn) error { - defer clientConn.Close() - defer func() { - if err := p.config.SessionLogger.Close(); err != nil { - log.Error().Err(err).Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Failed to close session logger") - } - }() - - log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Str("target", p.config.TargetAddr).Msg("Oracle PAM session started") - - host, port, err := splitHostPort(p.config.TargetAddr) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("invalid target addr: %w", err) - } - - upstream, err := DialUpstream(ctx, UpstreamCredentials{ - Host: host, - Port: port, - Service: p.config.InjectDatabase, - Username: p.config.InjectUsername, - Password: p.config.InjectPassword, - SSLEnabled: p.config.EnableTLS, - SSLRejectUnauthorized: p.config.SSLRejectUnauthorized, - SSLCertificate: p.config.SSLCertificate, - }) - if err != nil { - log.Error().Err(err).Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Failed to authenticate to Oracle upstream") - _ = WriteRefuseToClient(clientConn, "(DESCRIPTION=(ERR=12564)(VSNNUM=0)(ERROR_STACK=(ERROR=(CODE=12564)(EMFI=4))))") - return fmt.Errorf("upstream auth failed: %w", err) - } - defer upstream.Close() - - // Read client CONNECT (16-bit length framing until ACCEPT completes + v315 negotiation). - connectRaw, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("read client CONNECT: %w", err) - } - if PacketTypeOf(connectRaw) == PacketTypeResend { - // Rare fall-back: client may re-send; accept and read again. - connectRaw, err = ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("re-read CONNECT: %w", err) - } - } - if PacketTypeOf(connectRaw) != PacketTypeConnect { - return fmt.Errorf("expected CONNECT, got type=%d", connectRaw[4]) - } - connectPkt, err := ParseConnectPacket(connectRaw) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("parse CONNECT: %w", err) - } - - log.Info(). - Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID). - Uint16("clientVersion", connectPkt.Version). - Uint16("clientLoVersion", connectPkt.LoVersion). - Uint32("clientSDU", connectPkt.SessionDataUnit). - Uint32("clientTDU", connectPkt.TransportDataUnit). - Uint16("clientOptions", connectPkt.Options). - Uint8("clientFlag", connectPkt.Flag). - Uint8("clientACFL0", connectPkt.ACFL0). - Uint8("clientACFL1", connectPkt.ACFL1). - Int("connectDataLen", len(connectPkt.ConnectData)). - Str("connectRawHex", fmt.Sprintf("% X", connectRaw[:min(80, len(connectRaw))])). - Msg("Oracle CONNECT received") - - accept := AcceptFromConnect(connectPkt) - acceptBytes := accept.Bytes() - if _, err := clientConn.Write(acceptBytes); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("write ACCEPT: %w", err) - } - // From ACCEPT onward, use 32-bit length framing if negotiated >= 315. - use32Bit := accept.Version >= 315 - log.Info(). - Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID). - Uint16("acceptVersion", accept.Version). - Bool("use32BitLen", use32Bit). - Int("acceptLen", len(acceptBytes)). - Str("acceptHex", fmt.Sprintf("% X", acceptBytes)). - Msg("Oracle ACCEPT sent") - - // Peek what the client sends next: if it's an empty read/EOF, the client rejected - // our ACCEPT and closed the socket. Otherwise feed the bytes back into nego. - peekBuf := make([]byte, 256) - _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)) - n, peekErr := clientConn.Read(peekBuf) - _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) - log.Info(). - Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID). - Int("peekBytes", n). - Err(peekErr). - Str("peekHex", fmt.Sprintf("% X", peekBuf[:n])). - Msg("Post-ACCEPT peek") - if peekErr != nil && n == 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("client closed after ACCEPT without sending nego: %w", peekErr) - } - - peeked := append([]byte(nil), peekBuf[:n]...) - - // Connect-data supplement: some clients (notably go-ora) send the DESCRIPTION string - // as a follow-up 16-bit-framed DATA packet right after the ACCEPT, before any nego - // traffic. We recognise it by the 16-bit framing pattern (length high byte in [0], - // length low byte in [1], bytes [2:4] zero, bytes[4] == 0x06 for DATA) and drain it. - // Only after this supplement is consumed does the client switch to 32-bit framing. - if supplementLen := detectConnectDataSupplement(peeked); supplementLen > 0 { - log.Info(). - Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID). - Int("supplementLen", supplementLen). - Msg("Draining connect-data supplement (16-bit framed DATA)") - if supplementLen > len(peeked) { - // Supplement extends past what we peeked — read the rest. - remaining := make([]byte, supplementLen-len(peeked)) - if _, err := io.ReadFull(clientConn, remaining); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("read connect-data supplement tail: %w", err) - } - peeked = nil - } else { - peeked = peeked[supplementLen:] - } - } - - clientConn = &prependedConn{Conn: clientConn, buf: peeked} - - // Pre-auth: client may send ANO / TCPNego / DataTypeNego in various orders. - // RunPreAuthExchange dispatches per-payload and returns once it sees the auth-request - // opcode (0x03), returning that payload so we can feed it to O5Logon phase 1. - p1Payload, err := RunPreAuthExchange(clientConn, use32Bit) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("pre-auth exchange: %w", err) - } - log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Oracle pre-auth exchange complete") - - if _, err := ParseAuthPhaseOne(p1Payload); err != nil { - _ = WriteErrorToClient(clientConn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32Bit) - return fmt.Errorf("parse auth phase 1: %w", err) - } - state, err := NewO5LogonServerState() - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("init O5Logon state: %w", err) - } - p1Resp := BuildAuthPhaseOneResponse(state) - log.Info(). - Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID). - Int("p1RespLen", len(p1Resp)). - Str("p1RespHex", fmt.Sprintf("% X", p1Resp)). - Msg("Auth phase 1 response") - if err := writeDataPayload(clientConn, p1Resp, use32Bit); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("write auth phase 1 response: %w", err) - } - - p2Payload, err := readDataPayload(clientConn, use32Bit) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("read auth phase 2: %w", err) - } - p2, err := ParseAuthPhaseTwo(p2Payload) - if err != nil { - _ = WriteErrorToClient(clientConn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32Bit) - return fmt.Errorf("parse auth phase 2: %w", err) - } - if _, encKey, verr := state.VerifyClientPassword(p2.EClientSessKey, p2.EPassword); verr != nil { - _ = WriteErrorToClient(clientConn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32Bit) - return fmt.Errorf("verify client password: %w", verr) - } else { - svr, err := BuildSvrResponse(encKey) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("build SVR response: %w", err) - } - // Mirror upstream's phase-2 KVPs (session IDs, NLS, db info etc.) so the client's - // view of the session matches what upstream actually issued — otherwise subsequent - // RPCs reference IDs upstream will reject. - p2Resp := BuildAuthPhaseTwoResponseFromUpstream(svr, upstream.Phase2KVPs) - if err := writeDataPayload(clientConn, p2Resp, use32Bit); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("write auth phase 2 response: %w", err) - } - } - - log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Client authenticated; starting relay") - - c2u, u2c := NewQueryExtractorPair(p.config.SessionLogger, p.config.SessionID, use32Bit) - defer c2u.Stop() - defer u2c.Stop() - - errCh := make(chan error, 2) - go relayWithTap(clientConn, upstream.Conn, c2u, errCh) - go relayWithTap(upstream.Conn, clientConn, u2c, errCh) - - select { - case rerr := <-errCh: - if rerr != nil && rerr != io.EOF { - log.Debug().Err(rerr).Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Oracle relay ended") - } - case <-ctx.Done(): - log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Oracle session cancelled by context") - } - - log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Oracle PAM session ended") - return nil -} // detectConnectDataSupplement returns the length of a 16-bit-framed DATA packet at the // start of buf, or 0 if buf doesn't look like one. Pattern: bytes[0:2] = length (16-bit diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go index de7f7b9a..db92098d 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go @@ -82,151 +82,10 @@ func PacketTypeOf(packet []byte) PacketType { return PacketType(packet[4]) } -// ConnectPacket holds the parsed fields from a client CONNECT packet (or used to build a -// response). Field layout matches go-ora's ConnectPacket / newConnectPacket. -type ConnectPacket struct { - Version uint16 - LoVersion uint16 - Options uint16 - SessionDataUnit uint32 - TransportDataUnit uint32 - OurOne uint16 - Flag uint8 - ACFL0 uint8 - ACFL1 uint8 - DataOffset uint16 - ConnectData []byte // the connect-string payload ("(DESCRIPTION=...)") -} -func ParseConnectPacket(raw []byte) (*ConnectPacket, error) { - if len(raw) < 70 { - return nil, errors.New("CONNECT packet too short") - } - if PacketType(raw[4]) != PacketTypeConnect { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("not a CONNECT packet: type=%d", raw[4]) - } - p := &ConnectPacket{ - Version: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[8:]), - LoVersion: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[10:]), - Options: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[12:]), - OurOne: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[22:]), - ACFL0: raw[32], - ACFL1: raw[33], - DataOffset: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[26:]), - Flag: raw[5], - // 16-bit SDU/TDU at offset 14/16; 32-bit at 58/62 - SessionDataUnit: binary.BigEndian.Uint32(raw[58:]), - TransportDataUnit: binary.BigEndian.Uint32(raw[62:]), - } - if p.SessionDataUnit == 0 { - p.SessionDataUnit = uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[14:])) - } - if p.TransportDataUnit == 0 { - p.TransportDataUnit = uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[16:])) - } - buffLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[24:]) - if p.DataOffset > 0 && int(p.DataOffset)+int(buffLen) <= len(raw) { - p.ConnectData = make([]byte, buffLen) - copy(p.ConnectData, raw[int(p.DataOffset):int(p.DataOffset)+int(buffLen)]) - } - return p, nil -} -// AcceptPacket is the server response to CONNECT, plus the negotiated session parameters -// the gateway will use. We always respond with >= v315 framing to match modern clients. -type AcceptPacket struct { - Version uint16 - NegotiatedOptions uint16 - SessionDataUnit uint32 - TransportDataUnit uint32 - Histone uint16 - ACFL0 uint8 - ACFL1 uint8 - ConnectData []byte // usually empty on ACCEPT -} -// AcceptFromConnect returns a server-role ACCEPT that mirrors what a real Oracle 19c -// listener (RDS) sends. Captured values from a real AWS RDS Oracle listener: -// -// version = 317, options = 0x0801 (2049), Histone = 256, -// dataOffset = 45 (equals total length), ACFL0 = 0x41, ACFL1 = 0x01, -// SDU = 8192, TDU = 2_097_152, 5 trailing zero bytes after the 32-bit SDU/TDU. -// -// These are the bytes JDBC thin actually validates against; downgrading version or -// shortening the packet makes it silently drop the TCP connection. -func AcceptFromConnect(c *ConnectPacket) *AcceptPacket { - sdu := c.SessionDataUnit - tdu := c.TransportDataUnit - if sdu == 0 { - sdu = 8192 - } - if tdu == 0 { - tdu = sdu - } - if sdu < 512 { - sdu = 512 - } - if tdu < sdu { - tdu = sdu - } - if sdu > 2097152 { - sdu = 2097152 - } - if tdu > 2097152 { - tdu = 2097152 - } - return &AcceptPacket{ - Version: 317, - NegotiatedOptions: 0x0801, - SessionDataUnit: sdu, - TransportDataUnit: tdu, - Histone: 256, - ACFL0: 0x41, - ACFL1: 0x01, - } -} -// Bytes serializes the ACCEPT to wire format, mirroring a real Oracle 19c listener. -// For version < 315 we use the legacy 24-byte layout; for >= 315 the packet is 45 -// bytes (header 0-23, reserved/reconAddr 24-31, 32-bit SDU/TDU 32-39, 5 trailing -// zero bytes 40-44). dataOffset equals the total length, indicating no trailing buffer. -func (a *AcceptPacket) Bytes() []byte { - var dataOffset uint16 - if a.Version < 315 { - dataOffset = 24 - } else { - dataOffset = 45 - } - length := uint32(int(dataOffset) + len(a.ConnectData)) - out := make([]byte, length) - binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(length)) - out[4] = byte(PacketTypeAccept) - out[5] = 0 // flag - binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[8:], a.Version) - binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[10:], a.NegotiatedOptions) - if a.Version < 315 { - sdu := uint16(a.SessionDataUnit) - if a.SessionDataUnit > 0xFFFF { - sdu = 0xFFFF - } - tdu := uint16(a.TransportDataUnit) - if a.TransportDataUnit > 0xFFFF { - tdu = 0xFFFF - } - binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[12:], sdu) - binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[14:], tdu) - } else { - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[32:], a.SessionDataUnit) - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[36:], a.TransportDataUnit) - } - binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[16:], a.Histone) - binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[18:], uint16(len(a.ConnectData))) - binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[20:], dataOffset) - out[22] = a.ACFL0 - out[23] = a.ACFL1 - copy(out[dataOffset:], a.ConnectData) - return out -} // DataPacket wraps a single TNS DATA frame, without any ANO encryption/hash (the gateway // refuses ANO so we never deal with those on the client-facing leg). @@ -261,13 +120,6 @@ func (d *DataPacket) Bytes(use32BitLen bool) []byte { return out } -// MarkerPacket fixed 11-byte frame for break / reset signals. -func MarkerPacketBytes(markerType uint8, use32BitLen bool) []byte { - if use32BitLen { - return []byte{0, 0x0, 0, 0xB, byte(PacketTypeMarker), 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, markerType} - } - return []byte{0, 0xB, 0, 0, byte(PacketTypeMarker), 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, markerType} -} // RefusePacket is the server's polite "no" to an incoming CONNECT (pre-ACCEPT). Used for // upstream-failure reporting. diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/upstream.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/upstream.go deleted file mode 100644 index a921f1fa..00000000 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/upstream.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,401 +0,0 @@ -package oracle - -import ( - "bytes" - "context" - "crypto/tls" - "crypto/x509" - "database/sql" - "fmt" - "net" - "net/url" - "sync" - "time" - - go_ora "github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2" - "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" -) - -// taplogConn wraps a net.Conn and accumulates bytes read from it during the auth -// phase. We later parse the accumulated bytes to extract the upstream's AUTH_* KVPs -// (AUTH_SESSION_ID, AUTH_SERIAL_NUM, NLS params, etc.) so we can mirror them when -// building our own server's phase-2 response. Without this, sqlcl authenticates but -// subsequent queries use session IDs the upstream doesn't recognise. -type taplogConn struct { - net.Conn - remaining int - readIdx int - accum []byte // accumulated bytes up to 'remaining' limit - mu sync.Mutex -} - -func (t *taplogConn) Read(b []byte) (int, error) { - n, err := t.Conn.Read(b) - if n > 0 && t.remaining > 0 { - toCapture := n - if toCapture > t.remaining { - toCapture = t.remaining - } - t.readIdx++ - t.mu.Lock() - t.accum = append(t.accum, b[:toCapture]...) - t.mu.Unlock() - log.Info(). - Int("readIdx", t.readIdx). - Int("bytes", toCapture). - Msg("Upstream Oracle read (captured)") - t.remaining -= toCapture - } - return n, err -} - -func (t *taplogConn) Captured() []byte { - t.mu.Lock() - defer t.mu.Unlock() - out := make([]byte, len(t.accum)) - copy(out, t.accum) - return out -} - -// UpstreamCredentials holds everything the gateway needs to authenticate to the real -// Oracle target as the injected user. -type UpstreamCredentials struct { - Host string - Port int - Service string // Oracle service name (PAMCredentials.Database) - Username string - Password string - SSLEnabled bool - SSLRejectUnauthorized bool - SSLCertificate string // PEM-encoded cert for pinning (optional) -} - -// UpstreamConn wraps a captured authenticated net.Conn to the real Oracle target. -// Do NOT close the go-ora *sql.DB — that writes a logoff packet onto our captured conn -// and corrupts the relay. Close the net.Conn directly via Close(). -type UpstreamConn struct { - Conn net.Conn - sqlDB *sql.DB // Held only to prevent GC of the go-ora Connection during the session. - - // Phase2KVPs holds the AUTH_* key-value pairs we extracted from upstream Oracle's - // phase-2 response during go-ora's authentication. Contains AUTH_SESSION_ID, - // AUTH_SERIAL_NUM, AUTH_VERSION_STRING, NLS params, etc. We mirror these in our - // server-facing phase-2 response so the client sees identical session metadata to - // what upstream issued — otherwise subsequent RPCs reference IDs upstream rejects. - Phase2KVPs map[string]string - - // UpstreamTCPNegoPayload and UpstreamDataTypeNegoPayload are the raw TTC payloads - // (no TNS header) of upstream Oracle's responses during go-ora's auth. Forwarding - // these to the client instead of constructing our own makes the client negotiate - // with upstream's actual capability profile — ensuring session-state alignment - // after auth (sequence numbers, framing flags, type table all agree). - UpstreamTCPNegoPayload []byte - UpstreamDataTypeNegoPayload []byte -} - -func (u *UpstreamConn) Close() error { - if u == nil || u.Conn == nil { - return nil - } - return u.Conn.Close() -} - -// DialUpstream authenticates to the Oracle target using go-ora and returns the -// authenticated net.Conn for raw byte relay. The TLS wrap (when SSLEnabled) happens -// inside RegisterDial so session.conn is the *tls.Conn — and go-ora never calls its -// own TCPS negotiate() because we advertise Protocol=tcp in the DSN. See the plan's -// §5.2 "TLS-in-dial" note for why this is the key to capturing a usable conn. -func DialUpstream(ctx context.Context, creds UpstreamCredentials) (*UpstreamConn, error) { - dsn := fmt.Sprintf("oracle://%s:%s@%s:%d/%s", - url.QueryEscape(creds.Username), - url.QueryEscape(creds.Password), - creds.Host, - creds.Port, - creds.Service, - ) - - config, err := go_ora.ParseConfig(dsn) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("go-ora ParseConfig: %w", err) - } - - // Defensive: force "tcp" so UpdateSSL (configurations/session_info.go:48-66) leaves - // SSL=false and go-ora's own negotiate() never wraps the conn in TLS. - for i := range config.Servers { - config.Servers[i].Protocol = "tcp" - } - config.Protocol = "tcp" - - var ( - captured net.Conn - mu sync.Mutex - ) - - config.RegisterDial(func(dctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { - rawConn, derr := (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}).DialContext(dctx, network, addr) - if derr != nil { - return nil, derr - } - - if !creds.SSLEnabled { - wrapped := &taplogConn{Conn: rawConn, remaining: 8192} - mu.Lock() - captured = wrapped - mu.Unlock() - return wrapped, nil - } - - tlsCfg, terr := buildUpstreamTLSConfig(creds, addr) - if terr != nil { - rawConn.Close() - return nil, terr - } - tlsConn := tls.Client(rawConn, tlsCfg) - - // Do the handshake explicitly so failure surfaces here, not inside go-ora's - // session code on first write. - if herr := tlsConn.HandshakeContext(dctx); herr != nil { - rawConn.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("TCPS handshake failed: %w", herr) - } - - mu.Lock() - captured = tlsConn - mu.Unlock() - return tlsConn, nil - }) - - go_ora.RegisterConnConfig(config) - db, err := sql.Open("oracle", "") - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("sql.Open oracle: %w", err) - } - if perr := db.PingContext(ctx); perr != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("Oracle upstream auth failed: %w", perr) - } - - mu.Lock() - defer mu.Unlock() - if captured == nil { - _ = db.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("RegisterDial was never invoked (unexpected)") - } - - // Pull the captured auth bytes (if we wrapped with taplogConn for plaintext) and - // parse out the phase-2 AUTH_* KVPs and the TCPNego/DataTypeNego response payloads. - var ( - phase2 map[string]string - tcpNegoResp []byte - dataTypeResp []byte - ) - if tap, ok := captured.(*taplogConn); ok { - raw := tap.Captured() - phase2 = extractUpstreamPhase2KVPs(raw) - tcpNegoResp = extractUpstreamDataPayload(raw, 0x01) // TCPNego response starts with 0x01 - dataTypeResp = extractUpstreamDataPayload(raw, 0x02) // DataTypeNego starts with 0x02 - log.Info(). - Int("kvpCount", len(phase2)). - Str("sessionID", phase2["AUTH_SESSION_ID"]). - Str("serialNum", phase2["AUTH_SERIAL_NUM"]). - Int("tcpNegoLen", len(tcpNegoResp)). - Int("dataTypeLen", len(dataTypeResp)). - Msg("Upstream Oracle caps extracted") - } - - return &UpstreamConn{ - Conn: captured, - sqlDB: db, - Phase2KVPs: phase2, - UpstreamTCPNegoPayload: tcpNegoResp, - UpstreamDataTypeNegoPayload: dataTypeResp, - }, nil -} - -func buildUpstreamTLSConfig(creds UpstreamCredentials, addr string) (*tls.Config, error) { - host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr) - cfg := &tls.Config{ - ServerName: host, - InsecureSkipVerify: !creds.SSLRejectUnauthorized, - } - if creds.SSLCertificate != "" { - pool := x509.NewCertPool() - if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM([]byte(creds.SSLCertificate)) { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid SSLCertificate PEM") - } - cfg.RootCAs = pool - } - return cfg, nil -} - -// extractUpstreamPhase2KVPs walks the captured upstream bytes (post-ACCEPT, so 32-bit -// length framing), identifies DATA packets whose first payload byte is 0x08 (TTC auth -// response), parses the key-value pairs inside, and returns the LARGEST/LAST such set -// — which is the phase-2 response (the phase-1 response is smaller and comes first). -// -// The phase-2 response carries AUTH_SESSION_ID, AUTH_SERIAL_NUM, all AUTH_NLS_* params, -// AUTH_VERSION_STRING, etc. These values are what a real Oracle server returned to -// go-ora; mirroring them downstream keeps our fake-server metadata consistent with the -// real upstream session the client's RPCs will actually run against. -func extractUpstreamPhase2KVPs(raw []byte) map[string]string { - // Skip the initial CONNECT→ACCEPT handshake bytes, which use 16-bit framing and - // have different header layout. The transition to 32-bit framing happens after - // the ACCEPT response. We scan for the ACCEPT (packet type 0x02) and start - // walking 32-bit frames from just past it. - // In practice the captured stream starts with upstream's ACK (0x0B), ACCEPT (0x02), - // then all 32-bit-framed DATA packets. - pos := 0 - // Skip ACK (8 bytes 16-bit framed) if present. - if len(raw) >= 8 && raw[4] == 0x0B { - accL := int(raw[0])<<8 | int(raw[1]) - if accL >= 8 && accL <= 32 && pos+accL <= len(raw) { - pos += accL - } - } - // Skip ACCEPT (16-bit framed). - if pos+5 <= len(raw) && raw[pos+4] == 0x02 { - accL := int(raw[pos])<<8 | int(raw[pos+1]) - if accL >= 8 && pos+accL <= len(raw) { - pos += accL - } - } - - // Now walk 32-bit DATA packets. Find the largest auth-response (opcode 0x08) — - // that's the phase-2 response with all the session metadata we want to mirror. - var best map[string]string - var bestSize int - for pos+10 <= len(raw) { - pktLen := int(raw[pos])<<24 | int(raw[pos+1])<<16 | int(raw[pos+2])<<8 | int(raw[pos+3]) - if pktLen < 10 || pos+pktLen > len(raw) { - break - } - pktType := raw[pos+4] - if pktType != 0x06 { // not DATA — skip - pos += pktLen - continue - } - payload := raw[pos+10 : pos+pktLen] - if len(payload) >= 1 && payload[0] == 0x08 { - kvps := parseAuthResponseKVPs(payload) - if kvps != nil && len(kvps) > bestSize { - best = kvps - bestSize = len(kvps) - } - } - pos += pktLen - } - if best == nil { - best = map[string]string{} - } - return best -} - -// extractUpstreamDataPayload walks the captured upstream bytes and returns the body of -// the first 32-bit-framed DATA packet whose payload begins with the given opcode byte. -// Used to extract upstream's TCPNego (opcode 0x01) and DataTypeNego (opcode 0x02) -// responses so we can forward them verbatim to the client — aligning the client's -// negotiated caps with upstream's actual caps. -func extractUpstreamDataPayload(raw []byte, opcode byte) []byte { - pos := 0 - if len(raw) >= 8 && raw[4] == 0x0B { - accL := int(raw[0])<<8 | int(raw[1]) - if accL >= 8 && accL <= 32 && pos+accL <= len(raw) { - pos += accL - } - } - if pos+5 <= len(raw) && raw[pos+4] == 0x02 { - accL := int(raw[pos])<<8 | int(raw[pos+1]) - if accL >= 8 && pos+accL <= len(raw) { - pos += accL - } - } - for pos+10 <= len(raw) { - pktLen := int(raw[pos])<<24 | int(raw[pos+1])<<16 | int(raw[pos+2])<<8 | int(raw[pos+3]) - if pktLen < 10 || pos+pktLen > len(raw) { - break - } - if raw[pos+4] != 0x06 { // DATA - pos += pktLen - continue - } - payload := raw[pos+10 : pos+pktLen] - if len(payload) >= 1 && payload[0] == opcode { - out := make([]byte, len(payload)) - copy(out, payload) - return out - } - pos += pktLen - } - return nil -} - -// parseAuthResponseKVPs decodes a TTC auth-response payload (opcode 0x08) into a map. -// -// Wire format from a real Oracle server (observed by decoding a captured AWS RDS -// phase-2 response). The server side of PutKeyVal differs subtly from what go-ora -// writes as the client: when a value is empty, Oracle does NOT write the single-zero -// placeholder byte that go-ora's own CLR encoding inserts. go-ora's default GetDlc -// consumes that placeholder, so parsing a real server response corrupts alignment -// after the first empty-value KVP (e.g., AUTH_CAPABILITY_TABLE). Our own KVP reader -// here handles the Oracle-server variant correctly. -// -// Per-KVP layout (Oracle server variant): -// key_len (compressed int) -// if key_len > 0: CLR key bytes (1-byte length prefix + key_len bytes) -// val_len (compressed int) -// if val_len > 0: CLR val bytes (1-byte length prefix + val_len bytes) -// flag (compressed int) -func parseAuthResponseKVPs(payload []byte) map[string]string { - r := NewTTCReader(payload) - op, err := r.GetByte() - if err != nil || op != 0x08 { - return nil - } - dictLen, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) - if err != nil || dictLen <= 0 || dictLen > 1000 { - return nil - } - out := make(map[string]string, dictLen) - for i := 0; i < dictLen; i++ { - // key - keyLen, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) - if err != nil { - log.Debug().Int("iter", i).Err(err).Msg("Upstream KVP parse: key_len error") - break - } - var keyBytes []byte - if keyLen > 0 { - keyBytes, err = r.GetClr() - if err != nil { - break - } - if len(keyBytes) > keyLen { - keyBytes = keyBytes[:keyLen] - } - } - // value - valLen, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) - if err != nil { - break - } - var valBytes []byte - if valLen > 0 { - valBytes, err = r.GetClr() - if err != nil { - break - } - if len(valBytes) > valLen { - valBytes = valBytes[:valLen] - } - } - // flag - if _, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true); err != nil { - break - } - - if len(keyBytes) > 0 { - key := string(bytes.TrimRight(keyBytes, "\x00")) - out[key] = string(valBytes) - } - } - return out -} From decdee33343b23f03e1e75f7b4fe714a8a3a98c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 04:59:25 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 03/21] fix(pam-oracle): capture SQL in session recordings MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The TTC query extractor was logging empty strings for OALL8 payloads because tryExtractSQL's "skip 6 compressed ints then read a CLR" heuristic didn't land on the SQL text — the OALL8 wire format has variable-length headers that differ by client driver and bind pattern. As a result, session recordings contained only session headers (124 bytes) with no actual query content. Replace structured parsing with a simple scan for the longest printable ASCII run in the payload. In practice the SQL text is always the longest such run. Verified with sqlcl: .enc file grows from 124 bytes (empty) to ~880 bytes (with captured queries) for a SELECT + COMMIT session. This only affects content — the tap, packet demultiplexing, and encrypted file I/O were all working correctly. Fix is localised to tryExtractSQL. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go | 52 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go index 38ff0cd1..92b9335d 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go @@ -199,28 +199,50 @@ func (e *QueryExtractor) recordLiteral(sql string) { e.pair.mu.Unlock() } -// tryExtractSQL does a best-effort walk of an OALL8 payload to pick out the SQL string. -// The exact OALL8 layout is: options (ub4), cursor_id (ub4), SQL text length (ub4), -// then compressed ub4's for various counts, followed by the CLR of the SQL text. -// We scan forward looking for the first CLR that decodes to printable text ≥ 4 bytes — -// the SQL statement. This is intentionally lenient: we'd rather miss a query than -// crash, and structured parsing is brittle across Oracle versions and bind variants. +// tryExtractSQL scans an OALL8 payload for the SQL statement. The OALL8 wire format +// has variable-length headers that differ across client drivers and bind patterns, so +// we use a simple heuristic rather than structured parsing: find the longest run of +// printable ASCII bytes ≥ 4 chars long. In practice the SQL text is always the +// longest such run in the payload. Lenient by design — we'd rather miss a query than +// crash on a bind-param shape we didn't anticipate. func tryExtractSQL(r *TTCReader) string { - // Skip first few compressed uint4s (options, cursor_id, sql length, etc.) - for i := 0; i < 6; i++ { - if _, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true); err != nil { - return "" - } + // Pull the remaining bytes from the reader. + // r.buf is private; use a Remaining-check-plus-GetBytes dance. + remaining := r.Remaining() + if remaining <= 0 { + return "" } - data, err := r.GetClr() + buf, err := r.GetBytes(remaining) if err != nil { return "" } - s := string(data) - if len(s) < 1 { + return longestPrintableRun(buf) +} + +// longestPrintableRun returns the longest contiguous run of printable ASCII (0x20..0x7E +// plus tab/newline/CR) in data, provided it's at least 4 chars. Otherwise returns "". +func longestPrintableRun(data []byte) string { + bestStart, bestLen := 0, 0 + curStart, curLen := 0, 0 + for i, b := range data { + printable := b == '\t' || b == '\n' || b == '\r' || (b >= 0x20 && b <= 0x7E) + if printable { + if curLen == 0 { + curStart = i + } + curLen++ + if curLen > bestLen { + bestLen = curLen + bestStart = curStart + } + } else { + curLen = 0 + } + } + if bestLen < 4 { return "" } - return s + return string(data[bestStart : bestStart+bestLen]) } func (e *QueryExtractor) handleServerResponse(payload []byte) { From d6df37db6804896bdee616eb0ac35a77891258fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 06:17:29 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 04/21] fix(pam-oracle): capture queries bundled behind piggyback OCLOSE sqlcl (and other JDBC thin clients) frequently bundle a piggybacked OCLOSE for the previous cursor with the next OALL8 query in a single TTC packet. The previous parser checked byte 0 for 0x03 (function call) and bailed when it saw 0x11 (piggyback marker), missing the OALL8 underneath. Scan the payload for the function-call + OALL8 byte pair instead, so the parser finds the query regardless of any preceding piggyback prefix. Same treatment for COMMIT and ROLLBACK, which also get piggybacked. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go | 45 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go index 92b9335d..4c2d2726 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go @@ -163,34 +163,39 @@ func (e *QueryExtractor) handlePacket(raw []byte) { } func (e *QueryExtractor) handleClientRequest(payload []byte) { - r := NewTTCReader(payload) - op, err := r.GetByte() - if err != nil { + // Oracle clients (sqlcl, JDBC thin) frequently bundle multiple TTC messages + // in a single packet — typically a piggybacked OCLOSE for the previous cursor + // (0x11 0x69 ...) followed by the new function call (0x03 0x5E ... for OALL8). + // The piggyback prefix is variable-length, so rather than parse it we scan the + // payload for the function-call+opcode marker pair and start parsing there. + if idx := findBytePair(payload, ttcMsgFunction, ttcFuncOALL8); idx >= 0 { + r := NewTTCReader(payload[idx+2:]) + if sqlText := tryExtractSQL(r); sqlText != "" { + e.pair.mu.Lock() + e.pair.pending = &pendingQuery{sql: sqlText, timestamp: time.Now()} + e.pair.mu.Unlock() + } return } - if op != ttcMsgFunction { + if findBytePair(payload, ttcMsgFunction, ttcFuncOCOMMIT) >= 0 { + e.recordLiteral("COMMIT") return } - sub, err := r.GetByte() - if err != nil { + if findBytePair(payload, ttcMsgFunction, ttcFuncORLLBK) >= 0 { + e.recordLiteral("ROLLBACK") return } - switch sub { - case ttcFuncOALL8: - sqlText := tryExtractSQL(r) - if sqlText != "" { - e.pair.mu.Lock() - e.pair.pending = &pendingQuery{sql: sqlText, timestamp: time.Now()} - e.pair.mu.Unlock() + // FETCH packets are intentionally not surfaced — they correlate to a still-pending + // SELECT and we want responses to attribute back to that, not to the FETCH itself. +} + +func findBytePair(data []byte, b1, b2 byte) int { + for i := 0; i+1 < len(data); i++ { + if data[i] == b1 && data[i+1] == b2 { + return i } - case ttcFuncOFETCH: - // Fetch uses a cursor ID we don't track in v1; leave any previous pending - // query as-is so FETCH responses are attributed back to the open SELECT. - case ttcFuncOCOMMIT: - e.recordLiteral("COMMIT") - case ttcFuncORLLBK: - e.recordLiteral("ROLLBACK") } + return -1 } func (e *QueryExtractor) recordLiteral(sql string) { From fa44af8cce0386da722d3925e6d1cd071fa55e88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 03:46:57 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 05/21] feat(pam-oracle): TLS (TCPS) support for upstream MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Matches the other SQL handlers' pattern: the client speaks plain TCP to our local listener, we do TLS to the upstream database and translate in the middle. No change to the client-facing UX — the same JDBC URL that works against a plain-TCP Oracle resource now also works against a TCPS-enabled one. Implementing this correctly required discovering Oracle TCPS's two-handshake flow (by reading go-ora's network/session.go readPacket RESEND branch — credit there): 1. Dial TCP, do an initial TLS handshake. Forward the client's CONNECT through this first TLS session. 2. When the upstream RESEND packet's byte-5 flag has 0x08 set, Oracle expects the client to abandon the first TLS session and run a FRESH TLS handshake on the bare TCP socket. Server drops its first-round TLS state in lockstep. We mirror this via upgradeToTLS on the same rawConn, then continue the Oracle handshake through the new session. 3. Mask byte 5 on packets going downstream so thin clients (JDBC thin, python-oracledb thin) don't see the 0x08 signal and try to cast their local TcpNTAdapter to TcpsNTAdapter — the cast would fail because the client-to-proxy socket is plain TCP. 4. Accept TLS 1.0 as the floor for the upstream dial: Oracle 19c's second-round handshake negotiates down to 1.0 in some configurations (AWS RDS's SSL option being one of them). The outer ALPN mTLS tunnel remains TLS 1.2+. Also removes now-dead SSLRejectUnauthorized / SSLCertificate fields from OracleProxyConfig — the shared TLSConfig built in pam-proxy.go carries that information already. Verified end-to-end against AWS RDS Oracle 19c (SSL option, port 2484) with sqlcl: authentication, DDL, DML+COMMIT, PL/SQL, DBMS_OUTPUT, bind variables, and session recording all work. Plain-TCP Oracle path is unchanged. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go | 10 +- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go | 158 ++++++++++++++++++--- packages/pam/pam-proxy.go | 18 ++- 3 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go index 69855ae8..1b75c263 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go @@ -37,20 +37,18 @@ func (p *prependedConn) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error { } // OracleProxyConfig mirrors the shape used by other PAM database handlers so the -// dispatch in pam-proxy.go stays templatized. Oracle-specific extras (the upstream -// TLS pinning fields) sit on top of the common eight. +// dispatch in pam-proxy.go stays templatized. When EnableTLS is true, the +// upstream leg uses TLSConfig (built centrally in pam-proxy.go from the +// resource's sslRejectUnauthorized + sslCertificate fields). type OracleProxyConfig struct { TargetAddr string // "host:port" InjectUsername string InjectPassword string InjectDatabase string EnableTLS bool - TLSConfig *tls.Config // provided by dispatcher but not used on the upstream leg + TLSConfig *tls.Config SessionID string SessionLogger session.SessionLogger - - SSLRejectUnauthorized bool - SSLCertificate string } type OracleProxy struct { diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go index 37b2adeb..312c912e 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go @@ -35,14 +35,26 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Str("target", p.config.TargetAddr).Msg("Oracle PAM session started (proxied auth)") - // 1. Raw TCP dial to upstream. - upstreamConn, err := dialUpstreamRaw(ctx, p.config) + // 1. Dial upstream. For TCPS targets we get back both the raw TCP conn and + // the first TLS session wrapping it. Oracle's TCPS flow may ask us to do + // a SECOND TLS handshake on the raw conn partway through (see the + // RESEND+flag=0x08 branch below), so we keep both references. + rawUpstream, tlsUpstream, err := dialUpstreamRaw(ctx, p.config) if err != nil { log.Error().Err(err).Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Failed to dial Oracle upstream") _ = WriteRefuseToClient(clientConn, "(DESCRIPTION=(ERR=12564)(VSNNUM=0)(ERROR_STACK=(ERROR=(CODE=12564)(EMFI=4))))") return fmt.Errorf("upstream dial: %w", err) } - defer upstreamConn.Close() + // upstreamConn starts as the first TLS session (when TLS) or the raw conn + // (when not). It may be reassigned to a fresh *tls.Conn on a flag-0x08 + // RESEND. The deferred close acts on whatever it points to at exit time. + var upstreamConn net.Conn + if tlsUpstream != nil { + upstreamConn = tlsUpstream + } else { + upstreamConn = rawUpstream + } + defer func() { upstreamConn.Close() }() // 2. Forward client CONNECT → upstream, then upstream ACCEPT → client. connectRaw, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) @@ -74,7 +86,37 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne return fmt.Errorf("read upstream handshake packet (attempt %d): %w", attempt, err) } pktType := PacketTypeOf(pkt) - log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Uint8("pktType", uint8(pktType)).Int("pktLen", len(pkt)).Msg("Proxy: upstream handshake packet") + var origFlag byte + if len(pkt) > 5 { + origFlag = pkt[5] + } + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Uint8("pktType", uint8(pktType)).Int("pktLen", len(pkt)).Uint8("flag", origFlag).Msg("Proxy: upstream handshake packet") + + // Oracle TCPS in-band "restart TLS" signal: RESEND with byte-5 flag + // 0x08 tells the client to abandon the current TLS session and run a + // FRESH TLS handshake on the raw TCP socket (bypassing the already- + // established first-round TLS). The server does the same on its end. + // go-ora handles this in network/session.go readPacket's RESEND branch + // by calling session.negotiate() again — which creates a new + // tls.Client(session.conn, ...) wrapping the raw conn. We do the + // equivalent here. + if p.config.EnableTLS && pktType == PacketTypeResendMarker && origFlag&0x08 != 0 { + tc, terr := upgradeToTLS(ctx, rawUpstream, p.config) + if terr != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("upstream TLS upgrade after RESEND(flag=0x08): %w", terr) + } + upstreamConn = tc + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Str("tlsVersion", tlsVersionString(tc.ConnectionState().Version)).Str("cipher", tls.CipherSuiteName(tc.ConnectionState().CipherSuite)).Msg("Proxy: upstream TLS re-handshook on RESEND(flag=0x08)") + } + + // Byte-5 masking: thin clients (JDBC thin, python-oracledb thin) read + // byte 5 from the RESEND to decide whether their local socket is + // TCPS-shaped and try to cast their NT adapter to TcpsNTAdapter. Our + // client-facing socket is plain TCP, so the cast would fail. Strip + // the flag on the packet going to the client. + if p.config.EnableTLS && len(pkt) > 5 { + pkt[5] = 0x00 + } if _, werr := clientConn.Write(pkt); werr != nil { return fmt.Errorf("forward upstream handshake packet: %w", werr) } @@ -87,7 +129,8 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne return fmt.Errorf("upstream REDIRECT during handshake (not supported)") case PacketTypeResendMarker: // Read the client's follow-up packet (typically the DESCRIPTION supplement - // as a 16-bit-framed DATA packet) and forward to upstream. + // as a 16-bit-framed DATA packet) and forward to upstream. If we upgraded + // to TLS above, this write flows through the new TLS session. supplement, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("read client supplement after RESEND: %w", err) @@ -220,32 +263,107 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne return nil } -// dialUpstreamRaw opens a plain TCP (or TLS) connection to the upstream Oracle target -// without invoking go-ora. We'll drive the handshake ourselves by proxying client bytes. -func dialUpstreamRaw(ctx context.Context, cfg OracleProxyConfig) (net.Conn, error) { - host, port, err := splitHostPort(cfg.TargetAddr) +// oracleUpstreamCiphers is the set of TLS cipher suites we advertise to Oracle +// TCPS listeners. Oracle 19c (including AWS RDS's SSL option) only offers +// legacy RSA-CBC cipher suites — they are not in Go's crypto/tls defaults, so +// we list them explicitly. Modern AEAD suites are kept first so newer Oracle +// versions still use them. +var oracleUpstreamCiphers = []uint16{ + tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, +} + +// buildOracleTLSConfig clones the shared TLS config and augments it with the +// settings Oracle TCPS needs: legacy cipher suites, TLS 1.0 floor (Oracle's +// second-round handshake in some deployments negotiates down to 1.0 — openssl +// s_client with defaults picks 1.2 against RDS, but the handshake-restart +// flow doesn't always honour MinVersion=1.2 — so we accept 1.0 here for +// compatibility; the outer relay mTLS and our own code paths remain strict). +// TLS 1.3 is capped out because renegotiation / handshake restart is a 1.2- +// only feature; Oracle's signal is nonsensical in a 1.3 world. +func buildOracleTLSConfig(base *tls.Config, host string) *tls.Config { + cfg := base.Clone() + if cfg.ServerName == "" { + cfg.ServerName = host + } + cfg.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS10 + cfg.MaxVersion = tls.VersionTLS12 + cfg.CipherSuites = oracleUpstreamCiphers + return cfg +} + +// dialUpstreamRaw opens the upstream connection. Returns the raw TCP conn +// and — when TLS is enabled — the first TLS session wrapping it. +// +// Oracle TCPS on port 2484 requires a TLS handshake from byte zero (we tested +// this — plaintext CONNECT is met with an immediate connection reset). That +// first TLS session carries the initial CONNECT and the server's RESEND. If +// the RESEND's byte-5 flag has 0x08 set, Oracle's protocol requires a SECOND +// TLS handshake on the SAME underlying TCP socket (bypassing the first TLS +// session) before the next CONNECT supplement can flow. go-ora does this +// same two-handshake dance in network/session.go readPacket's RESEND branch. +// That second handshake is performed by upgradeToTLS below, reusing the raw +// conn returned here. +func dialUpstreamRaw(ctx context.Context, cfg OracleProxyConfig) (rawConn net.Conn, tlsConn *tls.Conn, err error) { + host, _, err := splitHostPort(cfg.TargetAddr) if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid target addr: %w", err) + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid target addr: %w", err) } - addr := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", host, port) d := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 15 * time.Second} - rawConn, err := d.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", addr) + rawConn, err = d.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", cfg.TargetAddr) if err != nil { - return nil, err + return nil, nil, err } if !cfg.EnableTLS { - return rawConn, nil + return rawConn, nil, nil } - tlsCfg := &tls.Config{ - ServerName: host, - InsecureSkipVerify: !cfg.SSLRejectUnauthorized, - } - if cfg.TLSConfig != nil && len(cfg.TLSConfig.RootCAs.Subjects()) > 0 { - tlsCfg.RootCAs = cfg.TLSConfig.RootCAs + if cfg.TLSConfig == nil { + rawConn.Close() + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream TLS requested but no TLSConfig provided") } + tlsCfg := buildOracleTLSConfig(cfg.TLSConfig, host) tc := tls.Client(rawConn, tlsCfg) if err := tc.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil { rawConn.Close() + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream TLS handshake: %w", err) + } + return rawConn, tc, nil +} + +func tlsVersionString(v uint16) string { + switch v { + case tls.VersionTLS10: + return "TLS1.0" + case tls.VersionTLS11: + return "TLS1.1" + case tls.VersionTLS12: + return "TLS1.2" + case tls.VersionTLS13: + return "TLS1.3" + default: + return fmt.Sprintf("0x%04x", v) + } +} + +// upgradeToTLS performs a TLS handshake on an existing upstream TCP socket. +// Called mid-flow when Oracle's RESEND packet signals the socket should switch +// to TLS. The returned *tls.Conn replaces the raw conn from that point on. +func upgradeToTLS(ctx context.Context, rawConn net.Conn, cfg OracleProxyConfig) (*tls.Conn, error) { + host, _, err := splitHostPort(cfg.TargetAddr) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid target addr: %w", err) + } + tlsCfg := buildOracleTLSConfig(cfg.TLSConfig, host) + tc := tls.Client(rawConn, tlsCfg) + if err := tc.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream TLS handshake: %w", err) } return tc, nil diff --git a/packages/pam/pam-proxy.go b/packages/pam/pam-proxy.go index d2f55f21..51e4ce10 100644 --- a/packages/pam/pam-proxy.go +++ b/packages/pam/pam-proxy.go @@ -384,16 +384,14 @@ func HandlePAMProxy(ctx context.Context, conn *tls.Conn, pamConfig *GatewayPAMCo return proxy.HandleConnection(ctx, conn) case session.ResourceTypeOracle: oracleConfig := oracle.OracleProxyConfig{ - TargetAddr: fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", credentials.Host, credentials.Port), - InjectUsername: credentials.Username, - InjectPassword: credentials.Password, - InjectDatabase: credentials.Database, - EnableTLS: credentials.SSLEnabled, - TLSConfig: tlsConfig, - SessionID: pamConfig.SessionId, - SessionLogger: sessionLogger, - SSLRejectUnauthorized: credentials.SSLRejectUnauthorized, - SSLCertificate: credentials.SSLCertificate, + TargetAddr: fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", credentials.Host, credentials.Port), + InjectUsername: credentials.Username, + InjectPassword: credentials.Password, + InjectDatabase: credentials.Database, + EnableTLS: credentials.SSLEnabled, + TLSConfig: tlsConfig, + SessionID: pamConfig.SessionId, + SessionLogger: sessionLogger, } proxy := oracle.NewOracleProxy(oracleConfig) log.Info(). From 260cf43608ca835f59697b821cc129d8d7aeece7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 04:24:16 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 06/21] chore(pam-oracle): tighten TCPS TLS config comment MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Pure comment cleanup on buildOracleTLSConfig — no behavior change. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go index 312c912e..ed9385f3 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go @@ -282,13 +282,11 @@ var oracleUpstreamCiphers = []uint16{ } // buildOracleTLSConfig clones the shared TLS config and augments it with the -// settings Oracle TCPS needs: legacy cipher suites, TLS 1.0 floor (Oracle's -// second-round handshake in some deployments negotiates down to 1.0 — openssl -// s_client with defaults picks 1.2 against RDS, but the handshake-restart -// flow doesn't always honour MinVersion=1.2 — so we accept 1.0 here for -// compatibility; the outer relay mTLS and our own code paths remain strict). -// TLS 1.3 is capped out because renegotiation / handshake restart is a 1.2- -// only feature; Oracle's signal is nonsensical in a 1.3 world. +// settings Oracle TCPS needs: legacy cipher suites (Oracle 19c only offers +// RSA-CBC), TLS 1.0 floor (the second-round handshake against RDS negotiates +// down to 1.0 in practice), and 1.2 ceiling (TLS 1.3 has no handshake-restart +// mechanism). Only the Oracle-upstream leg relaxes versions this way; the +// relay mTLS and other handlers stay on defaults. func buildOracleTLSConfig(base *tls.Config, host string) *tls.Config { cfg := base.Clone() if cfg.ServerName == "" { From 52c1fdfae012b2b43b8da803a108406d02785a4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 04:31:44 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 07/21] chore(pam-oracle): update stale comments + attribution MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - ATTRIBUTION.md: drop reference to nego.go (deleted in the impersonation-era cleanup) and add the upstream TCPS two-handshake flow adaptation from go-ora's session.readPacket RESEND branch. - o5logon_server.go: the file header still described the impersonation-era architecture where the gateway acted as an Oracle server and drove the O5Logon exchange. Rewrite it to describe the current proxied-auth role — packet-layer helpers used by the byte- level O5Logon translation in proxy_auth.go — and drop the reference to upstream.go, which was removed in 3ff9cff. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md | 2 +- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go | 13 +++++++------ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md index ae43ff47..c8d181a7 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md @@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ Ported / adapted portions: - `tns.go` adapts `go-ora/v2/network/{packets,connect_packet,accept_packet,data_packet,marker_packet,refuse_packet}.go` - `o5logon.go` adapts crypto primitives from `go-ora/v2/auth_object.go` -- `nego.go` adapts `go-ora/v2/{tcp_protocol_nego,data_type_nego}.go` - `ttc.go` adapts the TTC buffer codec from `go-ora/v2/network/session.go` +- The upstream TCPS two-handshake flow in `proxy_auth.go` mirrors the logic in `go-ora/v2/network/session.go` `readPacket` RESEND branch ## MIT License diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go index 36c07cf9..7721d45e 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go @@ -5,13 +5,14 @@ import ( "net" ) -// Server-role O5Logon implementation. The gateway acts as an Oracle server and drives -// the two-phase O5Logon challenge/response with the client, verifying that the client -// sends the placeholder password. Real upstream auth is handled separately (see -// upstream.go) with the injected real credentials. +// Packet-layer helpers for the O5Logon exchange: DATA-packet I/O, phase-2 +// request parsing, and error packet construction. Used by proxy_auth.go's +// proxied-auth flow to parse AUTH_SESSKEY / AUTH_PASSWORD at the O5Logon +// boundary (so they can be re-encrypted before forwarding) and to synthesise +// clean error responses back to the client when upstream rejects auth. // -// NOTE: This is new code (not ported from go-ora). The formats match what go-ora's -// client-side code expects; see auth_object.go newAuthObject / AuthObject.Write. +// The constants and wire formats below mirror what go-ora's client-side code +// emits; see auth_object.go newAuthObject / AuthObject.Write for reference. // TTC function-call opcodes we touch during auth. const ( From de4664a5a8e224418cb7af4dd7a771b1c3c6f166 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 04:35:16 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 08/21] chore(pam-oracle): fix go vet warnings in proxy_auth.go MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Two warnings, both from the original feat commit (4b25ec2): - Dead self-assignment state.ServerSessKey = state.ServerSessKey on the phase-2 request translation path. The inline comment "no-op; kept for clarity" already admitted it was pointless. Delete. - Unreachable _ = prefix after a return statement inside replaceKvpValueKeepingSize. The prefix variable was left over from a refactor — the new code uses oldStart / oldEnd instead — and the _ = prefix trick to silence "declared but not used" landed on the wrong side of the return. Delete both the dead prefix declaration and the unreachable suppression. Also drops valStart (only used by the dead prefix computation). No behavior change; go vet is now clean on the oracle handler. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go | 9 ++------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go index ed9385f3..c00337ff 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go @@ -641,8 +641,6 @@ func translatePhase2Request(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState, realPassword return nil, fmt.Errorf("encrypt real password: %w", err) } - // Remember encKey so phase-2 response translation can reuse it for SVR_RESPONSE regen. - state.ServerSessKey = state.ServerSessKey // (no-op; kept for clarity) // Rebuild the phase-2 payload with substituted AUTH_SESSKEY and AUTH_PASSWORD. rebuilt, err := rebuildPhase2Request(payload, newEClientSessKey, newEPassword) if err != nil { @@ -847,7 +845,6 @@ func replaceKVPValue(payload []byte, key, newValue string) ([]byte, error) { } else { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid val_len size byte %d", vSizeByte) } - valStart := pos // If vLen > 0, there's a CLR length byte + vLen value bytes. if vLen > 0 { // CLR length byte @@ -866,9 +863,8 @@ func replaceKVPValue(payload []byte, key, newValue string) ([]byte, error) { newValSection = append(newValSection, encodeCompressedInt(uint64(newVLen))...) newValSection = append(newValSection, byte(newVLen)) newValSection = append(newValSection, newVal...) - // Assemble output: prefix (unchanged up to valStart) + newValSection + rest after old val - prefix := payload[:valStart-int(vSizeByte)-1] // everything up to val_len size byte (inclusive of bytes before vSizeByte) - // Actually recompute: the old section we replace is from idx+len(keyBytes) to valBodyEnd + // Splice in the new value: keep bytes up to the end of the key, then the new + // encoded value section, then everything after the old value's body. oldStart := idx + len(keyBytes) oldEnd := valBodyEnd out := make([]byte, 0, len(payload)+len(newValSection)) @@ -876,7 +872,6 @@ func replaceKVPValue(payload []byte, key, newValue string) ([]byte, error) { out = append(out, newValSection...) out = append(out, payload[oldEnd:]...) return out, nil - _ = prefix } return payload, fmt.Errorf("unexpected empty value for %q", key) } From 3ee79518a7ce1e1fb4b4a8add2ead4d89dff9988 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 04:45:14 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 09/21] chore(pam-oracle): drop TNS_ADMIN dance, shorten placeholder password MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Two UX simplifications to the Oracle PAM access command: 1. Stop creating a per-session TNS_ADMIN directory and printing an `export TNS_ADMIN=...` line in the connect instructions. The directory only existed to hold a sqlnet.ora that set DISABLE_OOB=TRUE — a defence against sqlcl's out-of-band Ctrl-C signalling that we never actually observed breaking. If a real interrupt problem surfaces we can revisit with a proper fix instead of a per-session file dance. 2. Change ProxyPasswordPlaceholder from "infisical-pam-proxy" to "password". The string value is cryptographically arbitrary — Oracle's O5Logon needs the client and gateway to agree on SOME string; any works. Shorter is easier to copy-paste. The accompanying "not a real credential" note in the CLI output stays. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go | 2 +- packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go | 16 ---------------- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go index 729216fb..b7210e69 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go @@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ package oracle // enforced by the mTLS tunnel between CLI, backend and gateway, and by session-scoped // client certs. Oracle's O5Logon cannot be bypassed the way MySQL/Postgres auth can, // so the gateway and the client must agree on some shared string; this is it. -const ProxyPasswordPlaceholder = "infisical-pam-proxy" +const ProxyPasswordPlaceholder = "password" diff --git a/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go b/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go index f40e1553..944f6979 100644 --- a/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go +++ b/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import ( "net" "os" "os/signal" - "path/filepath" "syscall" "time" @@ -22,7 +21,6 @@ type DatabaseProxyServer struct { BaseProxyServer // Embed common functionality server net.Listener port int - oracleTNSAdmin string // per-session TNS_ADMIN dir (Oracle only; cleaned up on shutdown) } type ALPN string @@ -130,14 +128,6 @@ func StartDatabaseLocalProxy(accessToken string, accessParams PAMAccessParams, p util.PrintfStderr("mongodb://localhost:%d/%s?serverSelectionTimeoutMS=15000", proxy.port, database) case session.ResourceTypeOracle: util.PrintfStderr("oracle://%s:%s@localhost:%d/%s", username, oracle.ProxyPasswordPlaceholder, proxy.port, database) - tnsDir := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "infisical-pam-"+pamResponse.SessionId) - if err := os.MkdirAll(tnsDir, 0700); err == nil { - sqlnetPath := filepath.Join(tnsDir, "sqlnet.ora") - if werr := os.WriteFile(sqlnetPath, []byte("DISABLE_OOB=TRUE\n"), 0600); werr == nil { - proxy.oracleTNSAdmin = tnsDir - util.PrintfStderr("\n\nBefore connecting, set:\n export TNS_ADMIN=%s", tnsDir) - } - } util.PrintfStderr("\n\nNote: the password shown is a protocol placeholder required by Oracle, not a secret.") util.PrintfStderr("\nReal authentication is handled by the local proxy.") default: @@ -197,12 +187,6 @@ func (p *DatabaseProxyServer) gracefulShutdown() { // Wait for connections to close p.WaitForConnectionsWithTimeout(10 * time.Second) - if p.oracleTNSAdmin != "" { - if err := os.RemoveAll(p.oracleTNSAdmin); err != nil { - log.Warn().Err(err).Str("path", p.oracleTNSAdmin).Msg("Failed to remove Oracle TNS_ADMIN temp dir") - } - } - log.Info().Msg("Database proxy shutdown complete") os.Exit(0) }) From b83a36781dc7a9f520e7e3b3bd2b21b58aa9f2c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 04:59:13 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 10/21] chore(pam-oracle): drop unrelated changes from branch MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Three items that snuck in but aren't part of Oracle PAM: 1. Untrack ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md. It's a development notes/research log that belongs with scratch work, not in the branch. The file stays on disk (uncommitted) for local reference. Its content is also stale since the placeholder password changed from "infisical-pam-proxy" to "password" in 3ee7951 without matching updates to the notes. 2. Revert the github.com/emirpasic/gods indirect bump from v1.12.0 to v1.18.1 in go.mod/go.sum. This was residue from when go-ora/v2 was temporarily added as a direct dep in the initial feat commit — go-ora needed the newer gods, and Go module MVS held the bumped version even after go-ora was removed in 3ff9cff. Running `go mod tidy` against current HEAD (with main's go.mod/go.sum as the baseline) produces no further changes, confirming nothing we ship actually needs v1.18.1. .gitignore additions (.vscode, .idea) stay — reasonable hygiene that doesn't hurt the PR and will prevent future editor-file noise. --- ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md | 531 -------------------------------------------- go.mod | 2 +- go.sum | 4 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 534 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md diff --git a/ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md b/ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md deleted file mode 100644 index 714dc248..00000000 --- a/ORACLE_PAM_NOTES.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,531 +0,0 @@ -# Oracle PAM — Research & Implementation Notes - -## Current state (2026-04-22) - -**Oracle PAM works end-to-end for JDBC thin clients.** Verified with sqlcl against AWS RDS Oracle 19c: SELECT, INSERT, DDL, PL/SQL, DBMS_OUTPUT, bind variables, session-metadata queries, clean disconnect. Credential injection works: user types `infisical-pam-proxy`, real Oracle password never leaves the gateway. - -**Architecture shipped (see `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go`):** the gateway opens a raw TCP connection to upstream, forwards client's `CONNECT` / ANO / TCPNego / DataTypeNego bytes verbatim in both directions, and intercepts only at the O5Logon boundary to swap placeholder-keyed material for real-password-keyed material in four specific TTC fields. After auth, byte relay is transparent. This bypasses the state-mismatch problem that blocks the simpler "impersonate Oracle entirely" approach. - -**File map (current, post-cleanup):** - -- `proxy.go` — entry, relay loop, connection glue -- `proxy_auth.go` — the proxied-auth flow (pre-auth byte proxy + O5Logon translation) -- `o5logon.go` — O5Logon crypto primitives + `BuildSvrResponse` -- `o5logon_server.go` — phase-2 request parser, error packet helpers -- `tns.go` — DATA packet codec + REFUSE helper -- `ttc.go` — TTC codec (compressed ints, CLR strings, KVP encoding) -- `query_logger.go` — TTC tap for session recording -- `constants.go` — `ProxyPasswordPlaceholder` -- `ATTRIBUTION.md` — MIT notice for code ported from sijms/go-ora - -**What still needs verification:** -- Session recording file actually contains the captured queries (tap is wired but not end-to-end tested on this path) -- Other clients: sqlplus (OCI), python-oracledb (thin), SQL Developer, DBeaver, Toad -- Oracle NNE (Native Network Encryption) customers -- Oracle RAC via SCAN listeners - -**Historical sections below** document the impersonation approach we tried first (now removed from the codebase) and the research we did along the way. Kept for context — the "what we tried" and "how vendors solve this" analysis is still accurate. - ---- - -## 1. Context - -Oracle is the 8th database type being added to Infisical PAM. For the seven existing databases (Postgres, MySQL, MSSQL, MongoDB, Redis, plus SSH/Kubernetes), the gateway acts as a credential-injecting middleman: the user types a placeholder password, the gateway rewrites authentication on the fly with real credentials stored in Infisical, and forwards traffic. The user never sees real credentials, every query is session-recorded. - -Oracle breaks this pattern because: - -- The **TNS/TTC wire protocol is proprietary and poorly documented**. No published spec. Different reference behaviors per Oracle client (sqlplus/OCI vs. JDBC thin vs. python-oracledb vs. go-ora). -- **O5Logon authentication is cryptographic** — the server must generate a challenge derived from the password; client derives response from the same password; simple password substitution like Postgres/MySQL doesn't work. -- **Pre-authentication handshake has 4–5 negotiation phases** where each response must be byte-correct for the specific client profile. - -## 2. Constraints (product-level) - -Decided by product: - -1. **No credential exposure to user** — not even ephemeral credentials. User must never see, store, or be able to exfiltrate an Oracle password. -2. **Must work with the mainstream Oracle clients** actual DBAs use: sqlplus, SQL Developer, DBeaver, Toad, JDBC applications. -3. **Complete support** — not a partial ship that only covers a subset of clients. -4. **Time/effort not a constraint.** -5. **Ongoing maintenance acceptable.** - -## 3. All approaches evaluated - -| Approach | Used by | Ruled in/out | Why | -|----------|---------|-------------|-----| -| Full protocol impersonation | StrongDM, our attempt | **IN (THE MASK)** | Meets all constraints | -| Cert-based auth (mTLS + `IDENTIFIED EXTERNALLY` users) | Teleport | **IN (THE PASS)** | Meets all constraints | -| Ephemeral Oracle users (`CREATE USER temp_x; DROP USER` per session) | CyberArk SIA | OUT | User sees ephemeral password | -| Jump-host with RDP video recording | CyberArk PSM | OUT | Wrong shape for a network gateway; heavy Windows infra | -| Vaulted credential checkout | Delinea, BeyondTrust, HashiCorp Boundary | OUT | User sees real password | - -## 4. The two viable paths - -### THE MASK — full protocol impersonation - -Gateway pretends to be an Oracle server to the client, holds real credentials, authenticates upstream to the real Oracle, relays bytes. Zero Oracle-side configuration required by the customer. - -**What StrongDM ships in production.** Confirmed by release-note analysis (see §9). - -### THE PASS — cert-based auth - -Infisical issues per-session client certificates. Oracle is configured with TCPS + users created as `IDENTIFIED EXTERNALLY AS 'CN=user'`. Gateway terminates client TLS, re-establishes TLS upstream with a signed cert. No passwords anywhere. - -**What Teleport ships in production.** Specified in their [RFD 0115](https://github.com/gravitational/teleport/blob/master/rfd/0115-oracle-db-access-integration.md). - -### Trade-off - -One-axis choice: - -- **MASK** = zero customer-side setup, permanent protocol maintenance -- **PASS** = one-time customer DBA setup per Oracle DB, minimal ongoing maintenance - -## 5. Current state of THE MASK implementation - -Branch: `oracle-db`. Handler: `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/`. - -### File map (~2,750 LOC) - -| File | Purpose | -|------|---------| -| `proxy.go` | `OracleProxy` struct, `HandleConnection` orchestration | -| `upstream.go` | Upstream dial via go-ora with TLS-in-dial trick; captures authenticated `net.Conn` | -| `tns.go` | TNS packet codec (CONNECT/ACCEPT/DATA/MARKER/REFUSE); ported from go-ora | -| `o5logon.go` + `o5logon_server.go` | Server-side O5Logon crypto + auth phase 1/2 builders | -| `nego.go` | `RunPreAuthExchange` pre-auth dispatcher; handles ANO/TCPNego/DataTypeNego | -| `nego_templates.go` | Captured RDS responses (currently used as static replies) | -| `ano.go` | ANO request parser + refusal response | -| `ttc.go` | TTC codec helpers (`TTCBuilder`, `TTCReader`) | -| `query_logger.go` | Passive TTC tap for session recording | -| `handshake_test.go` | Standalone test: runs server-side handshake, points go-ora at it | -| `constants.go` | `ProxyPasswordPlaceholder = "infisical-pam-proxy"` | -| `ATTRIBUTION.md` | MIT notice for ported go-ora code | - -### Protocol flow and status - -``` -Client Gateway Upstream Oracle - │ │ │ - │── CONNECT ──────────────────────▶ │ │ - │ │── CONNECT ───────────────────────▶ │ [go-ora] - │ │◀── ACCEPT + nego + O5Logon ────── │ [go-ora] - │ │ (upstream authenticated) │ - │◀─ ACCEPT ──────────────────────── │ │ - │ │ │ - │── connect-data supplement ──────▶ │ ← NEW 16-bit framed DATA │ - │ (go-ora only — sqlplus skips) │ │ - │ │ │ - │── ANO request ──────────────────▶ │ │ - │◀─ ANO refusal ──────────────────── │ │ - │ │ │ - │── TCPNego request ──────────────▶ │ │ - │◀─ TCPNego response ────────────── │ │ - │ │ │ - │── DataTypeNego request ─────────▶ │ │ - │◀─ DataTypeNego response ───────── │ │ - │ │ │ - │── O5Logon phase 1 ──────────────▶ │ │ - │◀─ phase 1 response ───────────── │ │ - │── O5Logon phase 2 ──────────────▶ │ │ - │◀─ phase 2 response ────────────── │ │ - │ │ │ - │── post-auth byte relay ◀────────────┼──────────── byte relay ────────── │ -``` - -### Per-stage status against each client - -| Stage | go-ora | sqlcl (JDBC thin) | sqlplus (OCI) | -|-------|--------|-------------------|---------------| -| CONNECT / ACCEPT | ✅ | ✅ | untested | -| Connect-data supplement drain | ✅ | N/A | N/A | -| ANO refusal | ✅ | ✅ | untested | -| TCPNego | ✅ | ✅ | untested | -| DataTypeNego | ✅ (dynamic echo generator) | ✅ | untested | -| O5Logon phase 1 | ✅ | ✅ (fixed JDBC thin username encoding) | untested | -| O5Logon phase 2 + password verify | ✅ | ✅ | untested | -| Phase 2 response with trailing summary | ✅ | ✅ | untested | -| Post-auth byte relay | not tested E2E | ⚠ stalls — state mismatch between upstream (go-ora caps) and client (sqlcl caps) | untested | - -**As of 2026-04-21 session, both go-ora and sqlcl (JDBC thin) complete the full handshake + O5Logon auth successfully.** sqlcl sends an OALL8 query through the relay, but upstream Oracle responds with a MARKER (protocol reset signal) + ORA-error instead of query results — because the upstream session was negotiated with go-ora's TTC caps at startup, and sqlcl's post-auth bytes don't match the state the upstream is in. - -## 6. What broke (and what's fixable) - -### Failure 1: sqlcl / JDBC thin — DataTypeNego - -- **Symptom:** `ORA-17401: Protocol violation` -- **Root cause:** we replay a DataTypeNego response captured from `go-ora ↔ RDS` back to JDBC thin. JDBC's offered type list differs from go-ora's, so JDBC sees types it never advertised and aborts. -- **Fix shape:** build a dynamic generator (see §8 for the reference material found). - -### Failure 2: go-ora — TCPNego response rejected - -- **Symptom:** `server compile time caps length less than 8` -- **Likely cause:** either a content issue in our captured `rdsTCPNegoResponse` template or state-dependent parsing in go-ora tied to prior ANO/nego steps. -- **Fix shape:** debug the specific byte that go-ora trips on. Probably ~hours of work with packet-level diffing. - -### Failure 3 (FIXED TODAY): go-ora — post-ACCEPT framing - -- **Symptom:** `TNS packet too large: 16056320` -- **Root cause:** after ACCEPT, go-ora sends a **16-bit-framed DATA packet** containing `(DESCRIPTION=...)` as a connect-data supplement, BEFORE switching to 32-bit framing. Our code assumed 32-bit framing immediately after ACCEPT. -- **Fix shipped:** added `detectConnectDataSupplement` in `proxy.go` and drain logic in both `proxy.go` and `handshake_test.go`. When we detect a 16-bit-framed DATA packet with the signature pattern (length in `[0:2]`, zero checksum in `[2:4]`, DATA opcode `0x06` in `[4]`), we consume it and continue. -- **This unblocks 2 of 4 pre-auth stages for go-ora.** - -## 7. Research: how the major PAM vendors solve Oracle - -### StrongDM — confirmed via release-note analysis - -Their Oracle integration is a protocol-level proxy written in Go (same as us). Release-note evidence proves they wrote their own TNS/TTC parser: - -- 2025-10-16: "shorter username would cause ORA-03146: invalid buffer length for TTC field" — only happens if you wrote the TTC encoder yourself -- 2025-10-09: "JDBC-based Oracle clients (DBeaver, SQL Developer) could fail with a decoding error during authentication" — separate JDBC-specific decode path -- 2025-09-26: "warning messages are now correctly decoded if present during the Oracle authentication handshake" -- 2025-11-20: "corrects an issue with connecting to Oracle resources using server or client character sets other than AL32UTF8" - -They ship separate "Oracle" and "Oracle (NNE)" resource types. NNE is the Native Network Encryption variant — they support both, with selectable AES/DES/RC4 + SHA algorithms. That means they implement full NNE termination (decrypt + re-encrypt), not refusal. - -8+ Oracle-specific bug fixes in Sep–Nov 2025 alone. Confirms the maintenance burden is real and permanent — this is a team of 2–4 engineers actively hardening the protocol. - -No public source code. We have to implement from scratch using go-ora and python-oracledb as references. - -### Teleport — confirmed via public RFD and docs - -Oracle Access Proxy. Terminates incoming TLS, re-establishes TLS to Oracle with a Teleport-signed client cert. Cert-based auth end-to-end. - -Hard requirements on Oracle side: -- TCPS listener on port 2484 -- `SSL_CLIENT_AUTHENTICATION = TRUE` -- `SQLNET.AUTHENTICATION_SERVICES = (TCPS)` in `sqlnet.ora` -- Teleport wallet installed on Oracle server -- Users created as `IDENTIFIED EXTERNALLY AS 'CN=user'` - -Oracle 18c/19c/21c supported. 12c explicitly incompatible (dropped due to incompatibilities). - -`tctl auth sign --format=oracle` generates the Oracle wallet for the server to trust. Turnkey DBA setup. - -### CyberArk SIA — ruled out (would expose ephemeral creds) - -Ephemeral Oracle users created per-session via bootstrap admin (`ALTER USER`, `CREATE USER`, `DROP USER`, `GRANT ANY ROLE`). Customer must also enable TCPS and disable NNE. - -### CyberArk PSM — ruled out (wrong arch for gateway) - -SQL Developer installed on PSM host itself. User RDPs to PSM, PSM launches SQL Developer with injected credentials via templated `ConnectionsTemplate.json`. Session recorded as RDP video. - -### HashiCorp Boundary — **no native Oracle support** - -Generic TCP tunneling + Vault credential brokering. Users still see Oracle passwords. No Oracle wire protocol handling. Confirmed via docs + source tree (no `oracle.go` in `internal/cmd/commands/connect`). Not a fourth architectural pattern. - -### Delinea / BeyondTrust — ruled out (vaulted creds) - -Secret Server templates / Password Safe. User checks out credential, sees the password. - -## 8. Dynamic DataType Negotiation — the key technical finding - -**The single most important finding for THE MASK path.** - -### It's filter-and-echo, not set-intersection - -Previous assumption: "server must compute intersection of client's offered types and server's supported types." That framing made the problem look like multi-week reverse engineering. - -Correct behavior (from python-oracledb source): - -> For each type the client offered, the server echoes back the same `(data_type, conv_data_type, representation)` entry **if the server supports it**; otherwise returns the type with `conv_data_type=0` (a "bare" marker meaning unsupported). - -The server maintains its own fixed supported set (Oracle 19c's type catalog). For each offered type T, emit either echo-with-rep or `(T, 0)`. Representation echoed back may be the server's preferred rep, not the client's. - -### Wire format (synthesized from go-ora + python-oracledb) - -**Request (client → server), opcode 0x02:** -``` -byte 0x02 # TNS_MSG_TYPE_DATA_TYPES -u16LE client_in_charset -u16LE client_out_charset -byte flags # TNS_ENCODING_MULTI_BYTE | TNS_ENCODING_CONV_LENGTH -byte len + compile_time_caps[] # ~45 bytes for 19c -byte len + runtime_caps[] # ~7 bytes - -u16LE client_ncharset # go-ora sends this; JDBC may not -loop: # type-rep tuples (repeated) - u16BE data_type - u16BE conv_data_type - u16BE representation - u16BE 0 # per-entry terminator -u16BE 0 # final terminator -``` - -When `compile_time_caps[27] == 0`, each field is a single byte instead of u16BE — legacy mode. - -**Response (server → client), opcode 0x02:** -``` -byte 0x02 - -loop: - u16BE data_type # 0 terminates - u16BE conv_data_type # 0 = bare entry, stop reading this entry - -``` - -### Reference materials - -| Reference | URL | What's in it | -|-----------|-----|--------------| -| `oracle/python-oracledb` | https://github.com/oracle/python-oracledb/blob/main/src/oracledb/impl/thin/messages/data_types.pyx | **Oracle-authored.** 320-entry `DATA_TYPES` array as `(data_type, conv_data_type, representation)` tuples. `_write_message` (request builder) and `_process_message` (response parser). This is the Rosetta Stone — port this table. | -| `sijms/go-ora` | https://github.com/sijms/go-ora/blob/master/v2/data_type_nego.go | Full `buildTypeNego()` with ~270 `addTypeRep()` calls. Type range 1–640. Three reps: `NATIVE=0`, `UNIVERSAL=1`, `ORACLE=10`. Go-native cross-check. | -| `SpiderLabs/net-tns` | https://github.com/SpiderLabs/net-tns/blob/master/lib/net/tti/messages/data_type_negotiation_request.rb | Ruby request builder. Confirms `compile_time_caps[27]` 1-byte vs 2-byte encoding toggle. | -| Wireshark `packet-tns.c` | https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/blob/master/epan/dissectors/packet-tns.c | Falls through to generic data dissector for DTY. **Not useful** for content parsing but confirms the TNS framing. | -| `T4CTTIdty.java` (Oracle JDBC) | not public | We couldn't find a decompilation. Would be the third reference. Using python-oracledb + go-ora is sufficient since the Oracle-blessed reference covers 320 types. | - -### Open questions (for the implementer) - -- **Do go-ora's offered types differ from JDBC thin's?** Unknown without a JDBC capture. Likely JDBC offers a superset (XDB/XML, AQ, streams). The server's supported set should be derived from 19c, NOT from any specific client. -- **How to handle `compile_time_caps[27] == 0` legacy clients?** Match `go-ora`'s write/read logic — it already handles both modes. -- **Time zone block representation** — `runtime_caps[1] & 1` flag. Mirror what client advertises. - -Research agent's confidence: tractable, 1–2 weeks of focused work. - -## 9. StrongDM research — detailed findings - -Full transcript of the research (what we could verify, what we couldn't): - -**Verified facts:** -- Gateway is Go (job postings, HN threads, careers page) -- Hand-rolled TNS/TTC parser (release-note bugs prove it — `ORA-03146` invalid buffer length, character set conversion bugs, warning decode bugs) -- Separate decode paths per client (JDBC decode bugs distinct from OCI bugs in release notes) -- Oracle handling lives in main gateway binary (release notes ship as CLI version bumps, not sidecar) -- Full NNE termination (not refusal) — separate resource type with selectable algorithms, stacks with TLS -- Character-set conversion done themselves (AL32UTF8-specific bugs) -- Active team of 2–4 engineers hardening the protocol (8+ bug fixes Sep–Nov 2025) - -**Not found (confirmed absent):** -- No public StrongDM source code for Oracle -- No fork of sijms/go-ora or godror on their GitHub org -- No patent, blog post, conference talk, or ex-employee writeup describing the Oracle internals -- No description of their DataType Negotiation strategy specifically - -**Bottom line:** what we're building is what StrongDM ships. Their release-note patterns confirm the maintenance burden is ongoing but bounded — not an infinite commitment. - -## 10. Code changes made in this session - -### `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go` - -Added `detectConnectDataSupplement` (new function, ~20 LOC) that identifies a 16-bit-framed DATA packet post-ACCEPT by signature: `bytes[0:2]` = plausible length (8..64K), `bytes[2:4]` = 0 (checksum zero), `bytes[4]` = 0x06 (DATA opcode). - -Added supplement-drain logic to `HandleConnection`: after ACCEPT peek, if a supplement is detected, consume it (either from the peek buffer alone or by reading additional bytes from the conn) before creating the `prependedConn` for `RunPreAuthExchange`. - -### `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/handshake_test.go` (new file) - -Standalone test that runs the client-facing handshake on a local TCP listener (skipping upstream Oracle dial) and points go-ora at it with `ProxyPasswordPlaceholder` as the password. Mirrors the proxy.go handshake logic in a test harness. - -Gated by env var: `ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST=1 go test -run TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra ./packages/pam/handlers/oracle/...` - -Skipped by default. Useful for iterating on protocol fixes without needing a live Oracle or the full PAM/gateway stack. - -### `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego_templates.go` - -Removed a stray `0x00` byte at offset 180 of `rdsTCPNegoResponse` that was causing go-ora to read `compile_caps_length = 0` ("server compile time caps length less than 8"). The original capture had a one-byte surplus. Template now parses cleanly through go-ora's client-side `newTCPNego`. - -### `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/nego.go` - -**Full rewrite of DataType Nego parser and response builder.** Previously we parsed a minimal header and replayed a static captured RDS response. Now: - -- `ClientDataTypeNegoRequest` struct holds the parsed request including TZ preamble, `ClientTZVersion`, `ServernCharset`, and a list of `DataTypeTuple` entries (full or bare). -- `parseClientDataTypeNego` parses the full wire format, including the optional TZ/version preamble (conditional on `runtime_caps[1]&1` and `compile_caps[37]&2`), the mandatory `ServernCharset`, and tuple-by-tuple type entries. Supports both 2-byte and 1-byte field modes (legacy `compile_caps[27]==0`). -- `buildServerDataTypeNego` now echoes the client's offered type list dynamically. For each tuple the client sent, we reply with an identical tuple ("supported"). The TZ preamble is mirrored from the client's request. Terminator is `u16BE 0` (or `u8 0` in legacy mode). - -**Strategy note:** we mirror everything the client offered rather than maintaining a server-side supported-type set. This works because our gateway byte-relays data from upstream Oracle (which did its own type negotiation with go-ora); we just need the client to accept the handshake. - -### `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go` - -Fixed `VerifyClientPassword` to decrypt with `padding=true` instead of `padding=false`. Client calls `encryptPassword(pw, key, padding=true)` which returns the full PKCS5-padded ciphertext; decrypting with `padding=false` left the trailing pad bytes in place, causing `decoded[16:] != ProxyPasswordPlaceholder`. - -### Handshake test now PASSES end-to-end - -``` -$ ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST=1 go test -count=1 -run TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra \ - ./packages/pam/handlers/oracle/... -v -... - handshake_test.go:173: password verified — client proved knowledge of placeholder - handshake_test.go:182: phase-2 response sent — handshake complete from server side - handshake_test.go:79: PASS: go-ora client completed the handshake against our impersonation ---- PASS: TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra (3.01s) -``` - -The go-ora client connects, authenticates with `ProxyPasswordPlaceholder`, and our server-side O5Logon successfully verifies its password. This proves the protocol impersonation approach works end-to-end for at least one major client profile. - -## 11. What we exhausted and what's definitively needed for THE MASK - -### Completed in this session -- ✅ Dynamic DataType Nego parser + echo generator -- ✅ TCPNego captured-template off-by-one fix -- ✅ Connect-data supplement drain -- ✅ O5Logon password verification padding fix -- ✅ JDBC thin username encoding (raw bytes, no CLR prefix) in phase 1 + phase 2 parsers -- ✅ Phase 2 response trailing summary packet -- ✅ End-to-end handshake against sqlcl (JDBC thin): full auth completes successfully -- ✅ Extracted upstream's real phase-2 KVPs (47 entries including `AUTH_SESSION_ID`, `AUTH_SERIAL_NUM`, all NLS params) via a custom byte-level parser; mirrored them in our downstream phase-2 response - -### The architectural blocker (verified, not speculation) - -**Post-auth byte relay fails even with full session-metadata mirroring.** When sqlcl sends its first query post-auth (an OALL8 execute, 469 bytes), upstream Oracle responds with MARKER packets (0x0C, Oracle's protocol-reset signal) followed by an ORA-error summary. Same behavior regardless of whether we mirror session IDs, serial numbers, NLS params, DB info, or any combination thereof. - -Root cause: the upstream Oracle session was negotiated by **go-ora**, not by us. go-ora's session holds state we cannot access or influence from outside the library: -- **Sequence numbers** (per-session monotonic, incremented by every round-trip) -- **`UseBigClrChunks` / `ClrChunkSize`** framing flags -- **Compile-time capability bits** that influence downstream packet parsing (`ServerCompileTimeCaps[4]`, `[15]`, `[16]`, `[27]`, `[37]` all gate behaviors) -- **Runtime capability bits** (`RuntimeCap[1]` gates TZ handling) -- **Character-set conversion state** -- **Negotiated ANO service levels** (even though we refused ANO to the client, go-ora may have negotiated supervisor-level ANO with upstream) - -The client (sqlcl) sends its post-auth RPCs per **its** negotiated state with us. When we relay those bytes to upstream, upstream interprets them per **go-ora's** state. Any mismatch in any of the above fields produces a protocol violation — which is exactly what we see. - -### What would actually fix this - -**Replace go-ora's upstream dial with our own client-side TNS/TTC/O5Logon implementation**, so we control every bit of the upstream session state and can match it to the client's negotiated state. - -Scope (realistic): -- Port go-ora's client-side handshake logic into our own `upstream.go` -- Interleave client and upstream negotiation: read client's CONNECT → forward to upstream → forward ACCEPT back → etc. -- Intercept O5Logon specifically: decrypt client's AUTH_SESSKEY (with placeholder key), re-encrypt with real-password-derived key, forward to upstream; same for phase 2 AUTH_PASSWORD -- After auth, both sides are in matching state because we forwarded the same negotiation bytes to both -- Relay post-auth bytes transparently - -This is substantial work. Estimate: **1–2 weeks of focused engineering**, plus ongoing maintenance for every new Oracle version and client-driver release (see StrongDM's release-note cadence as reference). - -### Exhaustion checklist - -Things we tried or thoroughly considered: -- ✅ Fix every pre-auth protocol bug we could find (done — auth succeeds for both go-ora and sqlcl) -- ✅ Mirror upstream's session metadata (all 47 phase-2 KVPs: AUTH_SESSION_ID, AUTH_SERIAL_NUM, NLS params, DB identity) to the client's phase-2 response (done — no effect on relay) -- ✅ Tested whether session ID/serial mismatch alone was the issue (no — fixing them didn't help) -- ✅ Tested whether ANO negotiation was wrapping packets asymmetrically (no — disabling ANO levels changed nothing) -- ✅ Researched all major PAM vendors' Oracle approaches (CyberArk SIA/PSM, StrongDM, Teleport, Delinea, BeyondTrust, HashiCorp Boundary — no fourth architecture exists) -- ✅ Searched for open-source Oracle proxies, honeypots, protocol analyzers we could reference (found ODAT, SpiderLabs net-tns, redwood spec, britus Wireshark dissector — none implement upstream re-auth with downstream impersonation; Teleport is the closest peer and it sidesteps the problem via cert auth) -- ✅ Checked go-ora's public API for ways to manipulate session state externally (only `Connection.SessionProperties` is exposed; sequence numbers, compile-time caps, UseBigClrChunks, ClrChunkSize are all private) - -No cheap win remains. The state-mismatch is a fundamental consequence of using an existing client library for upstream. Every piece of go-ora's internal session state we'd need to match is either private or set during negotiation and not adjustable after the fact. - -### Why this is a reasonable stopping point for THE MASK (if we stop) - -- The handshake-plus-auth surface is proven viable (our `handshake_test.go` passes end-to-end for go-ora; sqlcl reaches and completes auth against the real gateway). -- The architectural blocker is understood and reproducible. -- The fix is well-defined but expensive (1–2+ weeks). -- The research confirms no external shortcut exists — even StrongDM had to build this themselves and maintain it with a dedicated team. -- **PASS (cert-based auth, Teleport's approach) is the pragmatic alternative** — it sidesteps this entire class of problems by avoiding upstream re-auth. It requires one-time customer DBA setup per Oracle DB but has vastly lower ongoing complexity. - -### Medium priority -1. **Per-client profile detection** — different clients send slightly different request shapes (sqlcl sends 23-byte TCPNego with protocol list `05 04 03 02 01 00` before banner; go-ora sends 18-byte TCPNego without). Current static TCPNego response works for both so far, but may need splitting if we see future divergences. -2. **OCI (sqlplus/Toad) support** — untested. OCI uses a different client library than JDBC thin. The dynamic DataType Nego should adapt automatically but there may be other protocol-shape differences. -3. **Auth phase 1 response hardening** — currently sends a byte-for-byte RDS-captured trailing summary with a fixed sequence number `0x1A98`. Works for both go-ora and sqlcl so far but may need dynamic derivation for some clients. - -### Medium priority -4. **OCI (sqlplus/Toad) support** — untested. OCI uses a different client library than JDBC thin. The dynamic DataType Nego should adapt automatically but there may be other protocol-shape differences. -5. **Auth phase 1 response hardening** — the captured trailing summary bytes are byte-for-byte correct for go-ora. JDBC and OCI may parse it differently; verify against each. -6. **Character set conversion** — we pass `AL32UTF8` only. Non-UTF-8 targets will break (StrongDM hit this in Nov 2025). - -### Lower priority (but eventually needed) -7. **NNE termination** — StrongDM ships this as a separate resource type. When a customer requires `SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_CLIENT=REQUIRED`, the gateway must decrypt/re-encrypt rather than refuse. ~1000 LOC of crypto + state machine. -8. **Oracle RAC via SCAN** — single-host only in v1. RAC customers must use a specific VIP. -9. **Query logging hardening** — current `query_logger.go` handles OALL8/OFETCH/OCOMMIT; add OROLLBACK, OLOBOPS, bundled RPC calls. - -## 12. Remaining work for THE PASS - -Different shape of work — less protocol engineering, more infrastructure. - -### High priority -1. **Oracle CA infrastructure** — new CA per org, scoped to Oracle targets. May be able to reuse existing Infisical cert-signing infrastructure if there is one. -2. **Per-session cert issuance** — on `pam db access`, CLI receives a short-lived cert signed by the Oracle CA with CN set to the Infisical user. -3. **CLI wallet generator** — CLI writes `cwallet.sso` + `tnsnames.ora` into a session-scoped temp dir. Prints `export TNS_ADMIN=` for the user. -4. **TCPS proxy** — gateway terminates incoming TLS from CLI, re-establishes TLS upstream with the session cert. Byte-relays post-TLS-auth. - -### Medium priority -5. **DBA setup script / docs** — one-time per Oracle DB. Teleport's pattern: `tctl auth sign --format=oracle` generates the server wallet. We'd ship equivalent: an Infisical command that emits an Oracle wallet containing our CA + setup instructions for `listener.ora`, `sqlnet.ora`, and creating users as `IDENTIFIED EXTERNALLY AS 'CN='`. -6. **Autonomous DB / RDS support** — these have their own wallet-config paths. Document the specifics. - -### What we'd delete -- All protocol impersonation code (TNS codec, O5Logon, nego handlers, DataType Nego) — ~2,000 LOC of current work. -- `nego_templates.go` -- The `handshake_test.go` test harness - -### What we'd keep -- Backend resource/account schema (~70% reusable, need to swap password fields for cert config) -- Frontend resource form (~70% reusable) -- CLI subcommand structure -- Upstream dial via go-ora (used for initial connection validation; may or may not be retained post-redesign) -- Session recording tap (can parse TTC read-only, same as Teleport does, for audit logging) - -## 13. How to run the current tests - -### Handshake test (current state, demonstrates 2/4 stages working for go-ora) - -```bash -cd /path/to/cli.oracle-db -ORACLE_HANDSHAKE_TEST=1 go test -count=1 -run TestHandshakeAgainstGoOra \ - ./packages/pam/handlers/oracle/... -v -timeout 30s -``` - -Expected output: test reaches TCPNego response, go-ora rejects with `server compile time caps length less than 8`. This confirms: -- CONNECT/ACCEPT works -- Connect-data supplement drain works -- ANO refusal works -- TCPNego request parsing works -- (Blocked on TCPNego response content bug) - -### Full gateway + CLI end-to-end (against real Oracle) - -Requires existing PAM resource `aws-oracledb` with account `admin` in backend. From prior work — may have been cleaned up. - -```bash -# Terminal 1 — gateway -go run main.go gateway start local-pat-g2-1 \ - --enroll-method=token --token=gwe_... \ - --target-relay-name=local-pat-1 \ - --domain=https://oracle-db.test \ - --pam-session-recording-path=./sessionrecordings - -# Terminal 2 — CLI proxy -go run main.go pam db access --resource aws-oracledb --account admin \ - --project-id --duration 4h --domain https://oracle-db.test - -# Terminal 3 — client -sql admin/infisical-pam-proxy@localhost:/DATABASE -``` - -## 14. Recommended path for the fork - -If committing to **THE MASK**: - -1. Start with dynamic DataType Nego. Port python-oracledb's `DATA_TYPES` table. This is the concrete, well-scoped piece of work that gets us past the current blocker for JDBC. -2. Debug the go-ora TCPNego template issue. Should be hours, not days. -3. Verify end-to-end against go-ora (easiest because we captured templates from go-ora). -4. Extend to JDBC thin (sqlcl / SQL Developer / DBeaver). Expect per-client response shaping. -5. Extend to OCI (sqlplus / Toad). Separate test profile. -6. Hardening: char sets, NNE, more query logger coverage. - -If committing to **THE PASS**: - -1. Delete `packages/pam/handlers/oracle/{tns.go, ttc.go, nego.go, nego_templates.go, o5logon*.go, ano.go, handshake_test.go}`. -2. Keep `proxy.go` skeleton, `upstream.go`, `query_logger.go`, `constants.go`. -3. Build Oracle CA infrastructure in `backend/`. -4. Add per-session cert issuance on `/api/v1/pam/accounts/access`. -5. Add CLI wallet generator to `packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go`. -6. Replace upstream dial path with TCPS-with-cert instead of password auth. -7. Draft DBA setup script. - -## 15. References - -### Primary -- [python-oracledb data_types.pyx](https://github.com/oracle/python-oracledb/blob/main/src/oracledb/impl/thin/messages/data_types.pyx) — Oracle-authored type table -- [sijms/go-ora](https://github.com/sijms/go-ora) — pure-Go Oracle driver, client-side reference for TNS/TTC/O5Logon -- [Teleport RFD 0115](https://github.com/gravitational/teleport/blob/master/rfd/0115-oracle-db-access-integration.md) — cert-based Oracle proxy architecture - -### Secondary -- [StrongDM Oracle docs](https://docs.strongdm.com/admin/resources/datasources/oracle) — what production protocol-injection Oracle looks like (surface only) -- [StrongDM release notes](https://docs.strongdm.com/changelog/release-notes) — indirect evidence of implementation decisions via bug fixes -- [CyberArk SIA Oracle ZSP](https://docs.cyberark.com/ispss-access/latest/en/content/db/dpa-database-manage-zsp.htm) — ephemeral-user approach details -- [SpiderLabs/net-tns](https://github.com/SpiderLabs/net-tns) — Ruby Oracle client library, DTY request builder -- [Wireshark packet-tns.c](https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/blob/master/epan/dissectors/packet-tns.c) — TNS framing dissector - -### Background -- [Passive Capture and Analysis of Oracle Network Traffic (NYOUG 2008)](https://www.nyoug.org/Presentations/2008/Sep/Harris_Listening%20In.pdf) — general TNS protocol overview -- [Oracle error index](https://docs.oracle.com/error-help/) — for decoding ORA-* errors seen during debugging - ---- - -*Document generated 2026-04-21 after ~2 weeks of implementation attempts and research. Forks should update as findings evolve.* diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index 9d278b3e..795ea4a9 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ require ( github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.0 // indirect github.com/dvsekhvalnov/jose2go v1.7.0 // indirect github.com/emicklei/go-restful/v3 v3.11.0 // indirect - github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.18.1 // indirect + github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.12.0 // indirect github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.0.4 // indirect github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.4.9 // indirect github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2 v2.7.0 // indirect diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index 14c03ec0..a76256b5 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -165,8 +165,8 @@ github.com/dvsekhvalnov/jose2go v1.7.0 h1:bnQc8+GMnidJZA8zc6lLEAb4xNrIqHwO+9Tzqv github.com/dvsekhvalnov/jose2go v1.7.0/go.mod h1:QsHjhyTlD/lAVqn/NSbVZmSCGeDehTB/mPZadG+mhXU= github.com/emicklei/go-restful/v3 v3.11.0 h1:rAQeMHw1c7zTmncogyy8VvRZwtkmkZ4FxERmMY4rD+g= github.com/emicklei/go-restful/v3 v3.11.0/go.mod h1:6n3XBCmQQb25CM2LCACGz8ukIrRry+4bhvbpWn3mrbc= -github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.18.1 h1:FXtiHYKDGKCW2KzwZKx0iC0PQmdlorYgdFG9jPXJ1Bc= -github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.18.1/go.mod h1:8tpGGwCnJ5H4r6BWwaV6OrWmMoPhUl5jm/FMNAnJvWQ= +github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.12.0 h1:QAUIPSaCu4G+POclxeqb3F+WPpdKqFGlw36+yOzGlrg= +github.com/emirpasic/gods v1.12.0/go.mod h1:YfzfFFoVP/catgzJb4IKIqXjX78Ha8FMSDh3ymbK86o= github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane v0.9.0/go.mod h1:YTl/9mNaCwkRvm6d1a2C3ymFceY/DCBVvsKhRF0iEA4= github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane v0.9.1-0.20191026205805-5f8ba28d4473/go.mod h1:YTl/9mNaCwkRvm6d1a2C3ymFceY/DCBVvsKhRF0iEA4= github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane v0.9.4/go.mod h1:6rpuAdCZL397s3pYoYcLgu1mIlRU8Am5FuJP05cCM98= From cf41f62b313c45d3255164515b09ed89fce56746 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 22:17:46 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 11/21] fix(pam-oracle): AI-review findings + username parity with other handlers MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Password plaintext no longer embedded in "password mismatch" error (was bubbling to gateway logs via zerolog's .Err chain). - Long Oracle passwords (≥ 96 chars) now encode correctly: replaceKVPValue routes AUTH_PASSWORD through TTCBuilder.PutClr so values above the short-form threshold emit the 0xFE chunked form instead of a truncated single-byte length. - Client-supplied username rewritten to InjectUsername in phase-1 and phase-2 auth requests. Matches the effect of how the postgres/mysql/mssql handlers overwrite the startup-packet user — the client's choice becomes inert; upstream always looks up the configured account's verifier. - Dead / misleading code removed: local PacketTypeResendMarker constant that duplicated tns.go's PacketTypeResend, package-level min() shadowing the Go 1.21+ builtin, the if !use32Bit branch in extractDataPayload where both arms assigned the same value, and the now-unused encodeCompressedInt helper. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go | 7 - packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go | 205 +++++++++++++++++---- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go | 4 + 3 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go index 1b75c263..a6fb620b 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go @@ -112,13 +112,6 @@ func relayWithTap(src, dst net.Conn, tap *QueryExtractor, errCh chan<- error) { } } -func min(a, b int) int { - if a < b { - return a - } - return b -} - func splitHostPort(addr string) (string, int, error) { host, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if err != nil { diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go index c00337ff..5c0deb54 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go @@ -76,9 +76,6 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne // forward it back to upstream — otherwise upstream stalls waiting for it. // // A REFUSE / REDIRECT ends the flow with an error. - const ( - PacketTypeResendMarker PacketType = 0x0B // NSPTRS - ) var acceptRaw []byte for attempt := 0; acceptRaw == nil; attempt++ { pkt, err := ReadFullPacket(upstreamConn, false) @@ -100,7 +97,7 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne // by calling session.negotiate() again — which creates a new // tls.Client(session.conn, ...) wrapping the raw conn. We do the // equivalent here. - if p.config.EnableTLS && pktType == PacketTypeResendMarker && origFlag&0x08 != 0 { + if p.config.EnableTLS && pktType == PacketTypeResend && origFlag&0x08 != 0 { tc, terr := upgradeToTLS(ctx, rawUpstream, p.config) if terr != nil { return fmt.Errorf("upstream TLS upgrade after RESEND(flag=0x08): %w", terr) @@ -127,7 +124,7 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne return fmt.Errorf("upstream REFUSE during handshake") case PacketTypeRedirect: return fmt.Errorf("upstream REDIRECT during handshake (not supported)") - case PacketTypeResendMarker: + case PacketTypeResend: // Read the client's follow-up packet (typically the DESCRIPTION supplement // as a 16-bit-framed DATA packet) and forward to upstream. If we upgraded // to TLS above, this write flows through the new TLS session. @@ -191,8 +188,19 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne } log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Int("p1Len", len(p1Payload)).Msg("Proxy: auth-request boundary reached") - // 5. Forward client's phase-1 auth request to upstream verbatim. - if err := writeDataPayload(upstreamConn, p1Payload, use32Bit); err != nil { + // 5. Rewrite the phase-1 auth-request username to match the configured account, + // then forward to upstream. Same net effect as how the postgres/mysql/mssql + // handlers overwrite the client's startup-packet user: whatever the client + // types is inert; upstream always looks up the configured account's verifier. + p1Forward := p1Payload + if p.config.InjectUsername != "" { + rewritten, rerr := rewritePhase1User(p1Payload, p.config.InjectUsername) + if rerr != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("rewrite phase 1 username: %w", rerr) + } + p1Forward = rewritten + } + if err := writeDataPayload(upstreamConn, p1Forward, use32Bit); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("forward phase 1 request: %w", err) } @@ -222,6 +230,15 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne _ = WriteErrorToClient(clientConn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32Bit) return fmt.Errorf("translate phase 2 request: %w", err) } + // Upstream Oracle cross-checks the phase-2 username against phase-1; we rewrote + // phase-1 above, so phase-2 has to agree or auth fails. + if p.config.InjectUsername != "" { + rewritten, rerr := rewritePhase2User(p2ReqTranslated, p.config.InjectUsername) + if rerr != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("rewrite phase 2 username: %w", rerr) + } + p2ReqTranslated = rewritten + } if err := writeDataPayload(upstreamConn, p2ReqTranslated, use32Bit); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("forward phase 2 request: %w", err) } @@ -429,7 +446,7 @@ func proxyUntilAuthRequest(client, upstream net.Conn, use32Bit bool, sessionID s pktType := PacketTypeOf(pkt) // Check for auth-request on DATA packets. if pktType == PacketTypeData { - payload, perr := extractDataPayload(pkt, use32Bit) + payload, perr := extractDataPayload(pkt) if perr == nil && len(payload) >= 2 && payload[0] == TTCMsgAuthRequest && payload[1] == AuthSubOpPhaseOne { // Don't forward — caller takes over. @@ -471,23 +488,141 @@ func proxyUntilAuthRequest(client, upstream net.Conn, use32Bit bool, sessionID s } // extractDataPayload returns the TTC payload body of a DATA packet. Assumes caller has -// verified the packet is indeed DATA. Framing: 4-byte length + 1-byte type + 1-byte flag -// + 2-byte checksum + 2-byte data flags = 10-byte header; body starts at offset 10. -// For 16-bit framing, header is 8 bytes (2-byte length + 2-byte checksum + 1-byte type -// + 1-byte flag + 2-byte data flags). -func extractDataPayload(pkt []byte, use32Bit bool) ([]byte, error) { - headerLen := 10 - if !use32Bit { - headerLen = 10 // 2 len + 2 ch + 1 type + 1 flag + 2 data = 8 actually. But go-ora and we add dflags. - // Actually both use 10 because of the 2-byte data_flags after the 8-byte packet - // header. See readDataPayload in o5logon_server.go. - } +// verified the packet is indeed DATA. The 2-byte data_flags follow the 8-byte TNS header +// in both 16-bit and 32-bit framing modes, so body always starts at offset 10. +func extractDataPayload(pkt []byte) ([]byte, error) { + const headerLen = 10 if len(pkt) < headerLen { return nil, fmt.Errorf("packet too short: %d", len(pkt)) } return pkt[headerLen:], nil } +// rewriteAuthRequestUser replaces the username field in a client-sent auth request +// (phase-1 or phase-2 — same layout, different sub-op) with `newUser`, leaving every +// other field verbatim. Upstream Oracle uses the username we forward here to look up +// the account's verifier in phase 1 and to validate the same user in phase 2 — so +// rewriting both drives the whole crypto path to operate on `newUser`'s credentials, +// regardless of what the client originally typed. +// +// Layout (identical for phase-1 sub-op 0x76 and phase-2 sub-op 0x73): +// +// u8 0x03, u8 subOp, u8 0, u8 hasUser, [u32 compressed userLen OR single 0 byte], +// u32 compressed mode, u8 1, u32 compressed count, u8 1, u8 1, +// [optional u8 CLR-length prefix (go-ora) | no prefix (JDBC thin)] + user bytes, +// +// +// Username encoding varies by client: go-ora emits a CLR-length byte before the raw +// bytes; JDBC thin omits it. We detect which form the client used with the same peek +// heuristic as ParseAuthPhaseTwo (if the next byte equals userLen and is below 0x20, +// it's a length prefix) and mirror that form when emitting `newUser`. +func rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload []byte, expectedSubOp byte, newUser string) ([]byte, error) { + r := NewTTCReader(payload) + op, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("opcode: %w", err) + } + if op != TTCMsgAuthRequest { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected opcode 0x%02X", op) + } + sub, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if sub != expectedSubOp { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected sub-op 0x%02X (want 0x%02X)", sub, expectedSubOp) + } + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { // the 0x00 separator + return nil, err + } + + hasUser, err := r.GetByte() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Client sent no username — nothing to rewrite; forward verbatim. + if hasUser != 1 { + return payload, nil + } + origUserLen, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("userLen: %w", err) + } + if origUserLen <= 0 { + return payload, nil + } + + // Capture the offset just after the userLen compressed-int. Everything from here + // up to the start of the user bytes (mode / markers / count) is copied verbatim. + middleStart := r.Pos() + + // Walk mode + markers + count + 1 + 1 (identical to ParseAuthPhaseTwo). + if _, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("mode: %w", err) + } + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("marker after mode: %w", err) + } + if _, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("count: %w", err) + } + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("marker 1: %w", err) + } + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("marker 2: %w", err) + } + middleEnd := r.Pos() + + // The next bytes are either (go-ora) or just + // (JDBC thin). Peek to distinguish. + peek, perr := r.PeekByte() + if perr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("peek user: %w", perr) + } + usedCLRPrefix := int(peek) == origUserLen && peek < 0x20 + if usedCLRPrefix { + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("consume user CLR length: %w", err) + } + } + if _, err := r.GetBytes(origUserLen); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("user bytes: %w", err) + } + userEnd := r.Pos() + + // Rebuild: header [0..3) + hasUser(1) + new userLen compressed + original middle + // (mode/marker/count/1/1) + [optional CLR-len byte] + new user bytes + tail. + newUserBytes := []byte(newUser) + newUserLen := len(newUserBytes) + + out := make([]byte, 0, len(payload)+16) + out = append(out, payload[:3]...) // opcode + sub + 0x00 + out = append(out, 0x01) // hasUser = 1 + // Emit newUserLen as a compressed int. Reuse TTCBuilder to avoid reimplementing + // the 0xFE/size-byte prefix rules. + lb := NewTTCBuilder() + lb.PutInt(int64(newUserLen), 4, true, true) + out = append(out, lb.Bytes()...) + out = append(out, payload[middleStart:middleEnd]...) + if usedCLRPrefix { + out = append(out, byte(newUserLen)) + } + out = append(out, newUserBytes...) + out = append(out, payload[userEnd:]...) + return out, nil +} + +// rewritePhase1User rewrites AUTH_USER on a phase-1 auth request. +func rewritePhase1User(payload []byte, newUser string) ([]byte, error) { + return rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload, AuthSubOpPhaseOne, newUser) +} + +// rewritePhase2User rewrites AUTH_USER on a phase-2 auth request. +func rewritePhase2User(payload []byte, newUser string) ([]byte, error) { + return rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload, AuthSubOpPhaseTwo, newUser) +} + // ProxyAuthState carries session material extracted during phase-1 so phase-2 translation // and SVR_RESPONSE regeneration have access to what they need. type ProxyAuthState struct { @@ -632,7 +767,9 @@ func translatePhase2Request(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState, realPassword return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoded password too short") } if string(decoded[16:]) != ProxyPasswordPlaceholder { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("password mismatch: got %q", string(decoded[16:])) + // Do not embed the decrypted plaintext — it could be a real password the + // client typed by mistake, and the error chain bubbles to gateway logs. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("password mismatch") } // Encrypt REAL password with the real encKey (which equals placeholderEncKey here // because the computation uses session keys + CSK salt only, not the password). @@ -856,13 +993,15 @@ func replaceKVPValue(payload []byte, key, newValue string) ([]byte, error) { pos++ valBodyStart := pos valBodyEnd := valBodyStart + vLen - // Build new encoded value: + // Build the new encoded value section: . + // TTCBuilder.PutClr emits the chunked 0xFE form when the value exceeds + // 0xFC bytes; a single-byte length would wrap and corrupt AUTH_PASSWORD + // for long (≥ 96-char) Oracle passwords. newVal := []byte(newValue) - newVLen := len(newVal) - var newValSection []byte - newValSection = append(newValSection, encodeCompressedInt(uint64(newVLen))...) - newValSection = append(newValSection, byte(newVLen)) - newValSection = append(newValSection, newVal...) + vb := NewTTCBuilder() + vb.PutUint(uint64(len(newVal)), 4, true, true) + vb.PutClr(newVal) + newValSection := vb.Bytes() // Splice in the new value: keep bytes up to the end of the key, then the new // encoded value section, then everything after the old value's body. oldStart := idx + len(keyBytes) @@ -875,17 +1014,3 @@ func replaceKVPValue(payload []byte, key, newValue string) ([]byte, error) { } return payload, fmt.Errorf("unexpected empty value for %q", key) } - -// encodeCompressedInt emits a compressed int the same way PutInt(n, 4, true, true) does. -func encodeCompressedInt(n uint64) []byte { - if n == 0 { - return []byte{0} - } - var buf [8]byte - binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], n) - trimmed := bytes.TrimLeft(buf[:], "\x00") - out := make([]byte, 1+len(trimmed)) - out[0] = byte(len(trimmed)) - copy(out[1:], trimmed) - return out -} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go index 5cc0cc8a..fe43a62f 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go @@ -166,6 +166,10 @@ func (r *TTCReader) SetUseBigClrChunks(v bool) { r.useBigClrChunks = v } func (r *TTCReader) Remaining() int { return len(r.buf) - r.pos } +// Pos returns the current byte offset into the payload. Useful when a caller needs +// to slice the original payload at a field boundary discovered during parsing. +func (r *TTCReader) Pos() int { return r.pos } + func (r *TTCReader) read(n int) ([]byte, error) { if r.pos+n > len(r.buf) { return nil, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF From 04402ba8ca04fad9ac7962b27f0e790e76687633 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 22:40:53 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 12/21] chore(pam-oracle): remove dead code + tighten attribution MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Static-analysis sweep (staticcheck + manual cross-file grep) across the oracle handler package. All removals are symbols that were defined but never referenced anywhere: - tns.go: markerTypeReset, markerTypeInterrupt constants. - o5logon_server.go: TTCMsgAuthResponse, TTCMsgBreak, LogonModeUserAndPass, LogonModeNoNewPass constants; AuthPhaseTwo fields ESpeedyKey / AlterSession / ClientInfo / LogonMode (parser wrote them, no reader downstream); ParseAuthPhaseTwo's KVP switch trimmed to the two keys actually consumed (AUTH_SESSKEY, AUTH_PASSWORD). - ttc.go: TTCReader.GetNullTermString(), TTCReader.SetUseBigClrChunks() — both uncalled. Also added a proper attribution header to o5logon_server.go (it was adapting go-ora's phase-2 layout + summary-object format but lacked the same kind of header the other ported files have), and expanded ATTRIBUTION.md to cover it plus the specific primitives borrowed by o5logon.go. No behavior change. go build / go vet / staticcheck clean on the package. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md | 3 +- .../pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go | 64 +++++++------------ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go | 11 ---- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go | 16 ----- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md index c8d181a7..50329c85 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md @@ -6,8 +6,9 @@ licensed under the MIT License. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. Ported / adapted portions: - `tns.go` adapts `go-ora/v2/network/{packets,connect_packet,accept_packet,data_packet,marker_packet,refuse_packet}.go` -- `o5logon.go` adapts crypto primitives from `go-ora/v2/auth_object.go` - `ttc.go` adapts the TTC buffer codec from `go-ora/v2/network/session.go` +- `o5logon.go` adapts the O5Logon crypto primitives (`generateSpeedyKey`, `getKeyFromUserNameAndPassword`, `decryptSessionKey`, `encryptSessionKey`, `encryptPassword`, `generatePasswordEncKey`) from `go-ora/v2/auth_object.go` and `PKCS5Padding` from `go-ora/v2/network/security/general.go` +- `o5logon_server.go` mirrors the phase-2 auth-request layout emitted by `go-ora/v2/auth_object.go`'s `AuthObject.Write` (used in reverse for parsing) and the Oracle error-summary packet layout from `go-ora/v2/network/summary_object.go` - The upstream TCPS two-handshake flow in `proxy_auth.go` mirrors the logic in `go-ora/v2/network/session.go` `readPacket` RESEND branch ## MIT License diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go index 7721d45e..0672d3ff 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go @@ -1,3 +1,13 @@ +// Portions of this file are adapted from github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2, +// licensed under MIT. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. +// Original sources: +// auth_object.go (AuthObject.Write — phase-2 request layout mirrored by +// ParseAuthPhaseTwo in reverse) and summary_object.go (Oracle error summary +// packet layout mirrored by BuildErrorPacket). +// Modifications for server-side use by Infisical: the parser operates from the +// server's perspective (reading what go-ora's client would write), and the +// error packet is constructed standalone rather than via a Session. + package oracle import ( @@ -10,16 +20,11 @@ import ( // proxied-auth flow to parse AUTH_SESSKEY / AUTH_PASSWORD at the O5Logon // boundary (so they can be re-encrypted before forwarding) and to synthesise // clean error responses back to the client when upstream rejects auth. -// -// The constants and wire formats below mirror what go-ora's client-side code -// emits; see auth_object.go newAuthObject / AuthObject.Write for reference. // TTC function-call opcodes we touch during auth. const ( - TTCMsgAuthRequest = 0x03 // generic "pre-auth" message - TTCMsgAuthResponse = 0x08 // server's response carrying KVP dict - TTCMsgError = 0x04 // server's error summary packet - TTCMsgBreak = 0x0B // reserved + TTCMsgAuthRequest = 0x03 // generic "pre-auth" message + TTCMsgError = 0x04 // server's error summary packet ) // AuthSubOp values — bundled inside a TTCMsgAuthRequest. @@ -28,22 +33,10 @@ const ( AuthSubOpPhaseTwo = 0x73 ) -// LogonMode flags (subset). Sent by the client inside phase-2 so we know what kind of -// auth is requested. -const ( - LogonModeUserAndPass = 0x100 - LogonModeNoNewPass = 0x2000 -) - - // AuthPhaseTwo carries the parsed client request that completes auth. type AuthPhaseTwo struct { EClientSessKey string EPassword string - ESpeedyKey string - ClientInfo map[string]string - AlterSession string - LogonMode uint32 } // readDataPayload reads a single DATA packet from the client and returns its TTC payload @@ -74,8 +67,6 @@ func writeDataPayload(conn net.Conn, payload []byte, use32BitLen bool) error { return err } - - // ParseAuthPhaseTwo decodes the second auth-request TTC payload from the client. func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { r := NewTTCReader(payload) @@ -97,7 +88,7 @@ func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { return nil, err } - out := &AuthPhaseTwo{ClientInfo: map[string]string{}} + out := &AuthPhaseTwo{} hasUser, err := r.GetByte() if err != nil { @@ -115,12 +106,11 @@ func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { } } - mode, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) - if err != nil { + // Advance past mode + marker + count + 1 + 1. We don't keep any of these today, + // but we have to consume them to reach the KVP list. + if _, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true); err != nil { return nil, err } - out.LogonMode = uint32(mode) - if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -135,8 +125,8 @@ func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { return nil, err } if hasUser == 1 && userLen > 0 { - // Same client-specific branch as ParseAuthPhaseOne: go-ora prefixes with a - // CLR length byte; JDBC thin sends raw. Peek to disambiguate. + // go-ora prefixes the username with a CLR length byte; JDBC thin sends it raw. + // Peek to disambiguate. peek, perr := r.PeekByte() if perr != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("peek phase2 username: %w", perr) @@ -151,6 +141,7 @@ func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { } } + // Only AUTH_SESSKEY and AUTH_PASSWORD are consumed downstream; skip the rest. for i := 0; i < count; i++ { k, v, _, err := r.GetKeyVal() if err != nil { @@ -161,19 +152,11 @@ func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { out.EClientSessKey = string(v) case "AUTH_PASSWORD": out.EPassword = string(v) - case "AUTH_PBKDF2_SPEEDY_KEY": - out.ESpeedyKey = string(v) - case "AUTH_ALTER_SESSION": - out.AlterSession = string(v) - default: - out.ClientInfo[string(k)] = string(v) } } return out, nil } - - // BuildErrorPacket constructs an Oracle error summary packet (opcode 0x04). The Oracle // client checks `Session.HasError()` after each response, which reads this summary. // Minimal fields: opcode, retCode (the ORA error number), retCol, errorPos, SQL state, @@ -204,9 +187,9 @@ func BuildErrorPacket(oraCode int, message string) []byte { // rba byte (4) // some flags, then CLR of the message // Most fields can be zero; the code is what matters. - b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) // endOfCallStatus - b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) // endToEndECID - b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) // currentRow + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) // endOfCallStatus + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) // endToEndECID + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) // currentRow b.PutInt(int64(oraCode), 4, true, true) b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) @@ -235,6 +218,3 @@ func BuildErrorPacket(oraCode int, message string) []byte { func WriteErrorToClient(conn net.Conn, oraCode int, message string, use32BitLen bool) error { return writeDataPayload(conn, BuildErrorPacket(oraCode, message), use32BitLen) } - - - diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go index db92098d..e3846bb2 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go @@ -33,11 +33,6 @@ const ( PacketTypeCtrl PacketType = 14 ) -const ( - markerTypeReset uint8 = 2 - markerTypeInterrupt uint8 = 3 -) - // TNS header is always 8 bytes. Length field is uint16 before handshakeComplete+v315, // uint32 afterwards. For server-side use the simple rule is: CONNECT / ACCEPT / REFUSE / // early MARKER use 16-bit length; post-ACCEPT (nego onwards) use 32-bit length when the @@ -82,11 +77,6 @@ func PacketTypeOf(packet []byte) PacketType { return PacketType(packet[4]) } - - - - - // DataPacket wraps a single TNS DATA frame, without any ANO encryption/hash (the gateway // refuses ANO so we never deal with those on the client-facing leg). type DataPacket struct { @@ -120,7 +110,6 @@ func (d *DataPacket) Bytes(use32BitLen bool) []byte { return out } - // RefusePacket is the server's polite "no" to an incoming CONNECT (pre-ACCEPT). Used for // upstream-failure reporting. type RefusePacket struct { diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go index fe43a62f..a29ebc69 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go @@ -161,9 +161,6 @@ func NewTTCReader(payload []byte) *TTCReader { return &TTCReader{buf: payload, useBigClrChunks: true} } -// SetUseBigClrChunks lets callers match negotiated capabilities. Default is true. -func (r *TTCReader) SetUseBigClrChunks(v bool) { r.useBigClrChunks = v } - func (r *TTCReader) Remaining() int { return len(r.buf) - r.pos } // Pos returns the current byte offset into the payload. Useful when a caller needs @@ -328,16 +325,3 @@ func (r *TTCReader) GetKeyVal() (key, val []byte, num int, err error) { num, err = r.GetInt(4, true, true) return } - -func (r *TTCReader) GetNullTermString() (string, error) { - start := r.pos - for r.pos < len(r.buf) { - if r.buf[r.pos] == 0 { - s := string(r.buf[start:r.pos]) - r.pos++ - return s, nil - } - r.pos++ - } - return "", io.ErrUnexpectedEOF -} From 68cda895184aed2dab647fcb7976968df128d729 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 22:45:13 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 13/21] chore(pam-oracle): remove dead verifier-type and error-code constants MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Exhaustive dead-export sweep via `go doc -all` (a more reliable check than my earlier regex-based grep, which missed untyped constants). Removed: - VerifierType10g / VerifierType11g / VerifierType12c — defined but no callers; the only verifier type our code implements (18453, 12c+ PBKDF2+SHA512) is hardcoded, the three named constants were never referenced. The 18453-specific comments in the code retain the documentation. - ORA12660EncryptionRequired — defined but no callers. Only ORA1017InvalidCredentials is actually emitted. Post-sweep: every exported symbol in the oracle handler package has a call site. `go build` / `go vet` / `staticcheck` clean. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go | 11 ----------- 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go index 70dcbb2b..d98d5e15 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go @@ -19,17 +19,9 @@ import ( "fmt" ) -// O5Logon verifier types. Only 18453 (12c+ PBKDF2+SHA512) is supported in v1. -const ( - VerifierType10g = 2361 - VerifierType11g = 6949 - VerifierType12c = 18453 -) - // Oracle error codes we return on the client-facing leg. const ( ORA1017InvalidCredentials = 1017 - ORA12660EncryptionRequired = 12660 ) // PKCS5Padding appends PKCS#5 padding. @@ -116,7 +108,6 @@ func encryptPassword(password, key []byte, padding bool) (string, error) { return encryptSessionKey(padding, key, buffer) } - // deriveServerKey computes the 32-byte AES-256 key used to encrypt AUTH_SESSKEY for // verifier type 18453 (12c+ PBKDF2+SHA512), same as go-ora's client-side derivation. func deriveServerKey(password string, salt []byte, vGenCount int) (key []byte, speedy []byte, err error) { @@ -132,7 +123,6 @@ func deriveServerKey(password string, salt []byte, vGenCount int) (key []byte, s return } - // BuildSvrResponse produces AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE: AES-CBC(rand(16) || "SERVER_TO_CLIENT", encKey). // The client decrypts it and verifies bytes [16:32] == "SERVER_TO_CLIENT" (verified from // auth_object.go:526-537 — the commented-out VerifyResponse in go-ora). @@ -144,4 +134,3 @@ func BuildSvrResponse(encKey []byte) (string, error) { body := append(head, []byte("SERVER_TO_CLIENT")...) return encryptSessionKey(true, encKey, body) } - From 3be05ed973df7ef1ead4ba7d8febe395ee236fe1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 23:08:40 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 14/21] chore(pam-oracle): remove dead enum-block const members staticcheck's U1000 has an exemption for const blocks: if any member is used, sibling members aren't flagged as unused even when they are. An exhaustive sweep that enumerates every top-level identifier via manual grep (so const-block membership is irrelevant) caught the ones staticcheck skipped. Removed: - tns.go: PacketTypeAbort, PacketTypeAck, PacketTypeAttn, PacketTypeCtrl, PacketTypeNull. Only the 7 PacketType values we actually dispatch on remain. - query_logger.go: ttcFuncOFETCH, ttcFuncOCLOSE, ttcFuncOSTMT, ttcFuncOLOGOFF, ttcMsgPiggyback. Only the 4 TTC opcodes the query tap actually looks for remain (OALL8, OCOMMIT, ORLLBK, the outer msgFunction). Post-sweep: exhaustive enumeration finds zero unused symbols across the package (189 candidates checked). go build / go vet / staticcheck clean. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go | 29 ++++++++------------ packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go | 5 ---- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go index 4c2d2726..ed1d3331 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go @@ -14,15 +14,10 @@ import ( // Oracle server receives during a client's query lifecycle — see Oracle Net TTC // documentation and go-ora's parameter/command.go for reference. const ( - ttcFuncOALL8 = 0x5E // all-in-one statement execution (SQL + binds in a single call) - ttcFuncOFETCH = 0x05 // fetch more rows - ttcFuncOCOMMIT = 0x0E // commit - ttcFuncORLLBK = 0x0F // rollback - ttcFuncOCLOSE = 0x69 // close cursor - ttcFuncOSTMT = 0x04 // parse / describe - ttcFuncOLOGOFF = 0x09 // logoff - ttcMsgFunction = 0x03 // outer opcode for function calls - ttcMsgPiggyback = 0x11 // piggyback TTC + ttcFuncOALL8 = 0x5E // all-in-one statement execution (SQL + binds in a single call) + ttcFuncOCOMMIT = 0x0E // commit + ttcFuncORLLBK = 0x0F // rollback + ttcMsgFunction = 0x03 // outer opcode for function calls ) // pendingQuery tracks the SQL-string that was sent client→upstream; we correlate it @@ -38,14 +33,14 @@ type pendingQuery struct { // internal channel fills, packets are dropped and a warning is logged. Logging is // best-effort, same as MSSQL. type QueryExtractor struct { - logger session.SessionLogger - sessionID string - direction string // "client->upstream" or "upstream->client" - ch chan []byte - stopCh chan struct{} - wg sync.WaitGroup - use32Bit bool - pair *pairState // shared across both directions via Pair + logger session.SessionLogger + sessionID string + direction string // "client->upstream" or "upstream->client" + ch chan []byte + stopCh chan struct{} + wg sync.WaitGroup + use32Bit bool + pair *pairState // shared across both directions via Pair } // pairState couples the client-side and upstream-side extractors so we can match diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go index e3846bb2..24afdc7b 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go @@ -21,16 +21,11 @@ type PacketType uint8 const ( PacketTypeConnect PacketType = 1 PacketTypeAccept PacketType = 2 - PacketTypeAck PacketType = 3 PacketTypeRefuse PacketType = 4 PacketTypeRedirect PacketType = 5 PacketTypeData PacketType = 6 - PacketTypeNull PacketType = 7 - PacketTypeAbort PacketType = 9 PacketTypeResend PacketType = 11 PacketTypeMarker PacketType = 12 - PacketTypeAttn PacketType = 13 - PacketTypeCtrl PacketType = 14 ) // TNS header is always 8 bytes. Length field is uint16 before handshakeComplete+v315, From 5ac39d6171e3c35e0ef7f90325931ed50b43498c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 23:15:38 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 15/21] fix(pam-oracle): show Infisical account name (not real DB user) in the banner MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The banner was printing the real upstream DB username (pamResponse.Metadata["username"]) in the connection URL, even though the preceding "Account:" label already shows the Infisical account name. Since the gateway now rewrites the client-supplied username in the O5Logon exchange to the configured real user, the client can (and should) connect using the account name — and the banner makes that explicit. Before: Resource: aws-oracledb Account: admin2 oracle://admin:password@localhost:53521/DATABASE ← confusing After: Resource: aws-oracledb Account: admin2 oracle://admin2:password@localhost:53521/DATABASE ← matches the label Scope: Oracle only for now. The postgres/mysql/mssql handlers also overwrite the client username on the wire, so the same banner change would work there, but that needs a separate verification pass per dialect before we extend it. --- packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go b/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go index 944f6979..53f8aeb4 100644 --- a/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go +++ b/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go @@ -127,7 +127,10 @@ func StartDatabaseLocalProxy(accessToken string, accessParams PAMAccessParams, p case session.ResourceTypeMongodb: util.PrintfStderr("mongodb://localhost:%d/%s?serverSelectionTimeoutMS=15000", proxy.port, database) case session.ResourceTypeOracle: - util.PrintfStderr("oracle://%s:%s@localhost:%d/%s", username, oracle.ProxyPasswordPlaceholder, proxy.port, database) + // The gateway rewrites the username in the O5Logon exchange to the real DB + // user, so the client can (and should) connect using the Infisical account + // name. Keeps the UX consistent with the "Account:" label above. + util.PrintfStderr("oracle://%s:%s@localhost:%d/%s", accessParams.AccountName, oracle.ProxyPasswordPlaceholder, proxy.port, database) util.PrintfStderr("\n\nNote: the password shown is a protocol placeholder required by Oracle, not a secret.") util.PrintfStderr("\nReal authentication is handled by the local proxy.") default: From 8988b0cd2e89bf1c88f8f37a721bb15d43582e29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 08:27:53 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 16/21] fix(pam-oracle): inject SERVICE_NAME from config into CONNECT packet The client's CONNECT description string was forwarded unchanged, requiring users to know the real Oracle service name. Now we rewrite SERVICE_NAME to match InjectDatabase from the vault config, consistent with how username and password are already injected. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go index 5c0deb54..046b63cd 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go @@ -64,6 +64,9 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne if PacketTypeOf(connectRaw) != PacketTypeConnect { return fmt.Errorf("expected CONNECT, got type=%d", connectRaw[4]) } + if p.config.InjectDatabase != "" { + connectRaw = rewriteConnectServiceName(connectRaw, p.config.InjectDatabase) + } if _, err := upstreamConn.Write(connectRaw); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("forward CONNECT: %w", err) } @@ -613,6 +616,40 @@ func rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload []byte, expectedSubOp byte, newUser string) return out, nil } +// rewriteConnectServiceName replaces the SERVICE_NAME value in a CONNECT packet's +// description string with newName, updating the packet and connect-data length fields. +func rewriteConnectServiceName(pkt []byte, newName string) []byte { + marker := []byte("SERVICE_NAME=") + idx := bytes.Index(pkt, marker) + if idx < 0 { + return pkt + } + valStart := idx + len(marker) + valEnd := bytes.IndexByte(pkt[valStart:], ')') + if valEnd < 0 { + return pkt + } + valEnd += valStart + + oldVal := pkt[valStart:valEnd] + newVal := []byte(newName) + if bytes.Equal(oldVal, newVal) { + return pkt + } + + out := make([]byte, 0, len(pkt)+len(newVal)-len(oldVal)) + out = append(out, pkt[:valStart]...) + out = append(out, newVal...) + out = append(out, pkt[valEnd:]...) + + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[0:2], uint16(len(out))) + if len(out) >= 26 { + oldCDLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[24:26]) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[24:26], uint16(int(oldCDLen)+len(newVal)-len(oldVal))) + } + return out +} + // rewritePhase1User rewrites AUTH_USER on a phase-1 auth request. func rewritePhase1User(payload []byte, newUser string) ([]byte, error) { return rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload, AuthSubOpPhaseOne, newUser) From b336e369260a2c435cd10ebc3f3914975bb5d40f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 08:28:35 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 17/21] fix(pam-oracle): remove placeholder password verification in phase-2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The gateway no longer checks whether the client sent the placeholder password "password". It unconditionally encrypts the real password from the vault, regardless of what the client typed. Auth will succeed either way since we inject the real credentials. The placeholder password is still shown to the user in the CLI banner and still used for key derivation in phase-1 — only the verification check is removed. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go | 29 ++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go index 046b63cd..33b51912 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go @@ -789,28 +789,14 @@ func translatePhase2Request(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState, realPassword return nil, fmt.Errorf("re-encrypt client session key: %w", err) } - // Compute password-encryption keys: one using placeholder password, one using real. - placeholderEncKey, err := deriveProxyPasswordEncKey(clientSessKey, state.ServerSessKey, state.Pbkdf2CSKSalt, state.Pbkdf2SDerCount) + // Compute the password-encryption key. This key is derived from session keys + + // CSK salt, NOT from the password — so it's the same regardless of what the + // client typed. We encrypt the real password unconditionally. + encKey, err := deriveProxyPasswordEncKey(clientSessKey, state.ServerSessKey, state.Pbkdf2CSKSalt, state.Pbkdf2SDerCount) if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("derive placeholder enc key: %w", err) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("derive enc key: %w", err) } - realEncKey := placeholderEncKey // same computation: encKey is derived from session keys + pbkdf2 salt, NOT password - // Verify client's password equals placeholder. - decoded, err := decryptSessionKey(true, placeholderEncKey, p2.EPassword) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt client password: %w", err) - } - if len(decoded) <= 16 { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoded password too short") - } - if string(decoded[16:]) != ProxyPasswordPlaceholder { - // Do not embed the decrypted plaintext — it could be a real password the - // client typed by mistake, and the error chain bubbles to gateway logs. - return nil, fmt.Errorf("password mismatch") - } - // Encrypt REAL password with the real encKey (which equals placeholderEncKey here - // because the computation uses session keys + CSK salt only, not the password). - newEPassword, err := encryptPassword([]byte(realPassword), realEncKey, true) + newEPassword, err := encryptPassword([]byte(realPassword), encKey, true) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("encrypt real password: %w", err) } @@ -820,8 +806,7 @@ func translatePhase2Request(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState, realPassword if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("rebuild phase 2: %w", err) } - // Also stash encKey for SVR_RESPONSE regen. - state.placeholderEncKey = placeholderEncKey + state.placeholderEncKey = encKey return rebuilt, nil } From 478e34fd747ae8b2a391f93a5b5bd7e06345cd97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 08:29:48 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 18/21] fix(pam-oracle): forward phase-2 response directly, remove SVR_RESPONSE regen MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE is encrypted with encKey, which is derived from session keys + CSK salt — not the password. The client and Oracle derive the same encKey, so Oracle's original proof is already valid for the client. No need to regenerate it. Removes translatePhase2Response, BuildSvrResponse, and the placeholderEncKey field from ProxyAuthState. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go | 11 ----- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go | 52 +++++----------------- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go index d98d5e15..9ee73af5 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go @@ -123,14 +123,3 @@ func deriveServerKey(password string, salt []byte, vGenCount int) (key []byte, s return } -// BuildSvrResponse produces AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE: AES-CBC(rand(16) || "SERVER_TO_CLIENT", encKey). -// The client decrypts it and verifies bytes [16:32] == "SERVER_TO_CLIENT" (verified from -// auth_object.go:526-537 — the commented-out VerifyResponse in go-ora). -func BuildSvrResponse(encKey []byte) (string, error) { - head := make([]byte, 16) - if _, err := rand.Read(head); err != nil { - return "", err - } - body := append(head, []byte("SERVER_TO_CLIENT")...) - return encryptSessionKey(true, encKey, body) -} diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go index 33b51912..6ee776f7 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go @@ -247,20 +247,17 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne } log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Proxy: phase-2 request translated and forwarded") - // 8. Read upstream's phase-2 response. Substitute AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE with a - // placeholder-derived one so the client verifies successfully. - p2RespUpstream, err := readDataPayload(upstreamConn, use32Bit) + // 8. Forward upstream's phase-2 response to the client unchanged. + // AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE is encrypted with encKey, which is derived from session + // keys + CSK salt (not the password), so the client can verify it as-is. + p2RespRaw, err := ReadFullPacket(upstreamConn, use32Bit) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("read upstream phase 2 response: %w", err) } - p2RespTranslated, err := translatePhase2Response(p2RespUpstream, state) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("translate phase 2 response: %w", err) - } - if err := writeDataPayload(clientConn, p2RespTranslated, use32Bit); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("write translated phase 2 response: %w", err) + if _, err := clientConn.Write(p2RespRaw); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("forward phase 2 response: %w", err) } - log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Proxy: phase-2 response translated; client authenticated") + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Proxy: phase-2 response forwarded; client authenticated") // 9. Byte relay. c2u, u2c := NewQueryExtractorPair(p.config.SessionLogger, p.config.SessionID, use32Bit) @@ -667,10 +664,9 @@ type ProxyAuthState struct { Pbkdf2CSKSalt string // hex string Pbkdf2VGenCount int Pbkdf2SDerCount int - RealKey []byte // AUTH_SESSKEY key derived from real password + salt - PlaceholderKey []byte // AUTH_SESSKEY key derived from placeholder password + salt - ServerSessKey []byte // raw server session key (decrypted from upstream) - placeholderEncKey []byte // password-encryption key (session-keyed; independent of password itself) + RealKey []byte // AUTH_SESSKEY key derived from real password + salt + PlaceholderKey []byte // AUTH_SESSKEY key derived from placeholder password + salt + ServerSessKey []byte // raw server session key (decrypted from upstream) } // translatePhase1Response decodes upstream's phase-1 response, substitutes AUTH_SESSKEY @@ -806,37 +802,9 @@ func translatePhase2Request(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState, realPassword if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("rebuild phase 2: %w", err) } - state.placeholderEncKey = encKey return rebuilt, nil } -// translatePhase2Response substitutes AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE in upstream's phase-2 response -// with one the client can verify (derived from the placeholder-keyed encKey instead of -// the real-password-keyed one). All other fields are forwarded verbatim. -func translatePhase2Response(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState) ([]byte, error) { - kvs, trailer, err := parseAuthRespKVPList(payload) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse upstream phase 2: %w", err) - } - // Regenerate SVR_RESPONSE so the client's placeholder-derived verification passes. - newSvr, err := BuildSvrResponse(state.placeholderEncKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("build placeholder SVR_RESPONSE: %w", err) - } - foundSvr := false - for i := range kvs { - if kvs[i].Key == "AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE" { - kvs[i].Value = newSvr - foundSvr = true - break - } - } - if !foundSvr { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream phase 2 missing AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE") - } - return rebuildAuthRespPayload(kvs, trailer), nil -} - // deriveProxyPasswordEncKey computes the key used for AUTH_PASSWORD encryption in // phase 2, for verifier type 18453. Formula (from go-ora's generatePasswordEncKey): // From d8188043778b29de4c73398520d6e8dd6d43b983 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 08:54:14 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 19/21] fix(pam-oracle): replace 3s timeout peek with deterministic supplement drain The post-ACCEPT supplement peek used a 3-second read deadline to detect whether a go-ora client sent connect-data as a separate packet. This added a fixed 3s delay for every non-go-ora client (sqlcl, JDBC thin). Instead, check the CONNECT packet structure: if connect-data-length + connect-data-offset exceeds the packet size, the data wasn't inline and a supplement will follow. Track whether the RESEND handler already consumed it; if not, do a blocking read (the supplement is guaranteed to be in the TCP buffer since the client sent it before waiting for a response). Removes prependedConn, detectConnectDataSupplement, and the timeout. --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go | 50 ------------------- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go | 57 ++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go index a6fb620b..4caf3696 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go @@ -5,37 +5,10 @@ import ( "crypto/tls" "fmt" "net" - "time" "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/session" ) -// prependedConn lets us push bytes we've already read back "in front" of a net.Conn's -// read stream, so downstream code can read them normally. -type prependedConn struct { - net.Conn - buf []byte -} - -func (p *prependedConn) Read(b []byte) (int, error) { - if len(p.buf) > 0 { - n := copy(b, p.buf) - p.buf = p.buf[n:] - return n, nil - } - return p.Conn.Read(b) -} - -// SetReadDeadline forwards to the wrapped conn; our prepended buf reads are synchronous -// so no deadline is needed for them. -func (p *prependedConn) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error { - type withDeadline interface{ SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error } - if d, ok := p.Conn.(withDeadline); ok { - return d.SetReadDeadline(t) - } - return nil -} - // OracleProxyConfig mirrors the shape used by other PAM database handlers so the // dispatch in pam-proxy.go stays templatized. When EnableTLS is true, the // upstream leg uses TLSConfig (built centrally in pam-proxy.go from the @@ -69,29 +42,6 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) HandleConnection(ctx context.Context, clientConn net.Conn) } -// detectConnectDataSupplement returns the length of a 16-bit-framed DATA packet at the -// start of buf, or 0 if buf doesn't look like one. Pattern: bytes[0:2] = length (16-bit -// BE, plausible 8..64K), bytes[2:4] = 0 (packet checksum), bytes[4] = 0x06 (DATA type). -func detectConnectDataSupplement(buf []byte) int { - if len(buf) < 8 { - return 0 - } - length := int(buf[0])<<8 | int(buf[1]) - if length < 8 || length > 64*1024 { - return 0 - } - // Reject if the length field LOOKS like the high bytes of a 32-bit length - // (i.e. bytes[2:4] are non-zero would imply a 32-bit length). A 16-bit framed - // packet MUST have bytes[2:4] zero because that's the checksum field. - if buf[2] != 0 || buf[3] != 0 { - return 0 - } - if buf[4] != 0x06 { - return 0 - } - return length -} - // relayWithTap copies src → dst byte-for-byte, Feed()'ing a copy of each read into the // tap extractor. This is the hot path — it must not parse or log per-packet. func relayWithTap(src, dst net.Conn, tap *QueryExtractor, errCh chan<- error) { diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go index 6ee776f7..0bf786b5 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go @@ -79,7 +79,20 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne // forward it back to upstream — otherwise upstream stalls waiting for it. // // A REFUSE / REDIRECT ends the flow with an error. + // Check if the client included connect-data inline. If not (go-ora with + // descriptions > 230 bytes), the client sends it as a separate packet and + // we may need to drain it after ACCEPT. + connectDataInline := true + if len(connectRaw) >= 28 { + cdLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(connectRaw[24:26])) + cdOff := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(connectRaw[26:28])) + if cdLen > 0 && cdOff+cdLen > len(connectRaw) { + connectDataInline = false + } + } + var acceptRaw []byte + resendConsumedSupplement := false for attempt := 0; acceptRaw == nil; attempt++ { pkt, err := ReadFullPacket(upstreamConn, false) if err != nil { @@ -128,9 +141,7 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne case PacketTypeRedirect: return fmt.Errorf("upstream REDIRECT during handshake (not supported)") case PacketTypeResend: - // Read the client's follow-up packet (typically the DESCRIPTION supplement - // as a 16-bit-framed DATA packet) and forward to upstream. If we upgraded - // to TLS above, this write flows through the new TLS session. + resendConsumedSupplement = true supplement, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("read client supplement after RESEND: %w", err) @@ -151,36 +162,18 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne use32Bit := acceptVersion >= 315 log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Uint16("acceptVersion", acceptVersion).Bool("use32Bit", use32Bit).Msg("Proxy: ACCEPT forwarded") - // 3. Post-ACCEPT: peek for go-ora's 16-bit-framed connect-data supplement. - peekBuf := make([]byte, 256) - _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)) - n, _ := clientConn.Read(peekBuf) - _ = clientConn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) - peeked := append([]byte(nil), peekBuf[:n]...) - if slen := detectConnectDataSupplement(peeked); slen > 0 { - log.Info().Int("supplementLen", slen).Msg("Proxy: draining connect-data supplement, forwarding to upstream") - if slen > len(peeked) { - rest := make([]byte, slen-len(peeked)) - if _, err := io.ReadFull(clientConn, rest); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("read supplement tail: %w", err) - } - // Forward full supplement to upstream. - if _, err := upstreamConn.Write(peeked); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("forward supplement head: %w", err) - } - if _, err := upstreamConn.Write(rest); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("forward supplement tail: %w", err) - } - peeked = nil - } else { - if _, err := upstreamConn.Write(peeked[:slen]); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("forward supplement: %w", err) - } - peeked = peeked[slen:] + // 3. If connect-data was not inline (go-ora, long descriptions) and the RESEND + // handler didn't already consume it, the client's supplement is sitting in + // the TCP buffer. Drain and forward it before switching to 32-bit framing. + if !connectDataInline && !resendConsumedSupplement { + supplement, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read connect-data supplement: %w", err) + } + log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Int("supplementLen", len(supplement)).Msg("Proxy: forwarding connect-data supplement") + if _, err := upstreamConn.Write(supplement); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("forward connect-data supplement: %w", err) } - } - if len(peeked) > 0 { - clientConn = &prependedConn{Conn: clientConn, buf: peeked} } // 4. Pre-auth turn-taking loop: each client packet → forward to upstream → read From ff584b21ef604814a0fb1288e1d15553e3013e35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 09:45:41 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 20/21] chore(pam-oracle): strip comments, enforce InjectDatabase, fix ora() formatting MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Remove verbose comments across all files (~20% → ~2% comment rate) - Remove per-file go-ora attribution (ATTRIBUTION.md carries the license) - Trim ATTRIBUTION.md to just the copyright notice + MIT text - Make InjectDatabase mandatory (error if empty, always overwrite client's SERVICE_NAME) - Format unknown Oracle error codes as ORA-XXXXX instead of bare "ERROR" - Clarify ProxyPasswordPlaceholder as a decoy --- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md | 15 +- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go | 7 +- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go | 17 -- .../pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go | 71 +---- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go | 14 +- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go | 249 ++---------------- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go | 64 +---- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go | 31 +-- packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go | 27 +- 9 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 441 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md index 50329c85..8a3a8c60 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ATTRIBUTION.md @@ -1,17 +1,6 @@ -# Third-party code attribution +This package contains code adapted from [sijms/go-ora](https://github.com/sijms/go-ora). -This package contains code adapted from [sijms/go-ora](https://github.com/sijms/go-ora), -licensed under the MIT License. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. - -Ported / adapted portions: - -- `tns.go` adapts `go-ora/v2/network/{packets,connect_packet,accept_packet,data_packet,marker_packet,refuse_packet}.go` -- `ttc.go` adapts the TTC buffer codec from `go-ora/v2/network/session.go` -- `o5logon.go` adapts the O5Logon crypto primitives (`generateSpeedyKey`, `getKeyFromUserNameAndPassword`, `decryptSessionKey`, `encryptSessionKey`, `encryptPassword`, `generatePasswordEncKey`) from `go-ora/v2/auth_object.go` and `PKCS5Padding` from `go-ora/v2/network/security/general.go` -- `o5logon_server.go` mirrors the phase-2 auth-request layout emitted by `go-ora/v2/auth_object.go`'s `AuthObject.Write` (used in reverse for parsing) and the Oracle error-summary packet layout from `go-ora/v2/network/summary_object.go` -- The upstream TCPS two-handshake flow in `proxy_auth.go` mirrors the logic in `go-ora/v2/network/session.go` `readPacket` RESEND branch - -## MIT License +MIT License Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go index b7210e69..deeb4c41 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/constants.go @@ -1,9 +1,4 @@ package oracle -// ProxyPasswordPlaceholder is the fixed password string clients must present to the -// gateway's client-facing O5Logon. Real authentication happens upstream with the real -// credentials injected by the gateway. The placeholder is not a secret — security is -// enforced by the mTLS tunnel between CLI, backend and gateway, and by session-scoped -// client certs. Oracle's O5Logon cannot be bypassed the way MySQL/Postgres auth can, -// so the gateway and the client must agree on some shared string; this is it. +// Decoy — can be any string. The gateway replaces it with the real credential before Oracle sees it. const ProxyPasswordPlaceholder = "password" diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go index 9ee73af5..ca66ea51 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon.go @@ -1,11 +1,3 @@ -// Portions of this file are adapted from github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2, -// licensed under MIT. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. -// Original: auth_object.go (generateSpeedyKey, getKeyFromUserNameAndPassword, -// decryptSessionKey, encryptSessionKey, encryptPassword, generatePasswordEncKey) and -// network/security/general.go (PKCS5Padding). -// Modifications for server-side use by Infisical: the roles are inverted — the gateway -// acts as the Oracle server verifying the client's O5Logon using the placeholder password. - package oracle import ( @@ -19,19 +11,16 @@ import ( "fmt" ) -// Oracle error codes we return on the client-facing leg. const ( ORA1017InvalidCredentials = 1017 ) -// PKCS5Padding appends PKCS#5 padding. func PKCS5Padding(cipherText []byte, blockSize int) []byte { padding := blockSize - len(cipherText)%blockSize padtext := bytes.Repeat([]byte{byte(padding)}, padding) return append(cipherText, padtext...) } -// generateSpeedyKey is HMAC-SHA512 iterative XOR, used for PBKDF2-like derivation. func generateSpeedyKey(buffer, key []byte, turns int) []byte { mac := hmac.New(sha512.New, key) mac.Write(append(buffer, 0, 0, 0, 1)) @@ -49,7 +38,6 @@ func generateSpeedyKey(buffer, key []byte, turns int) []byte { return firstHash } -// decryptSessionKey AES-CBC-decrypts a hex-encoded session key using a null IV. func decryptSessionKey(padding bool, encKey []byte, sessionKeyHex string) ([]byte, error) { result, err := hex.DecodeString(sessionKeyHex) if err != nil { @@ -81,7 +69,6 @@ func decryptSessionKey(padding bool, encKey []byte, sessionKeyHex string) ([]byt return output[:len(output)-cutLen], nil } -// encryptSessionKey AES-CBC-encrypts a byte slice and returns hex. Mirrors go-ora. func encryptSessionKey(padding bool, encKey []byte, sessionKey []byte) (string, error) { blk, err := aes.NewCipher(encKey) if err != nil { @@ -98,7 +85,6 @@ func encryptSessionKey(padding bool, encKey []byte, sessionKey []byte) (string, return fmt.Sprintf("%X", output), nil } -// encryptPassword prepends 16 random bytes to `password`, then encrypts. func encryptPassword(password, key []byte, padding bool) (string, error) { buff1 := make([]byte, 0x10) if _, err := rand.Read(buff1); err != nil { @@ -108,8 +94,6 @@ func encryptPassword(password, key []byte, padding bool) (string, error) { return encryptSessionKey(padding, key, buffer) } -// deriveServerKey computes the 32-byte AES-256 key used to encrypt AUTH_SESSKEY for -// verifier type 18453 (12c+ PBKDF2+SHA512), same as go-ora's client-side derivation. func deriveServerKey(password string, salt []byte, vGenCount int) (key []byte, speedy []byte, err error) { message := append([]byte(nil), salt...) message = append(message, []byte("AUTH_PBKDF2_SPEEDY_KEY")...) @@ -122,4 +106,3 @@ func deriveServerKey(password string, salt []byte, vGenCount int) (key []byte, s key = h.Sum(nil)[:32] return } - diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go index 0672d3ff..7df71436 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/o5logon_server.go @@ -1,13 +1,3 @@ -// Portions of this file are adapted from github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2, -// licensed under MIT. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. -// Original sources: -// auth_object.go (AuthObject.Write — phase-2 request layout mirrored by -// ParseAuthPhaseTwo in reverse) and summary_object.go (Oracle error summary -// packet layout mirrored by BuildErrorPacket). -// Modifications for server-side use by Infisical: the parser operates from the -// server's perspective (reading what go-ora's client would write), and the -// error packet is constructed standalone rather than via a Session. - package oracle import ( @@ -15,39 +5,27 @@ import ( "net" ) -// Packet-layer helpers for the O5Logon exchange: DATA-packet I/O, phase-2 -// request parsing, and error packet construction. Used by proxy_auth.go's -// proxied-auth flow to parse AUTH_SESSKEY / AUTH_PASSWORD at the O5Logon -// boundary (so they can be re-encrypted before forwarding) and to synthesise -// clean error responses back to the client when upstream rejects auth. - -// TTC function-call opcodes we touch during auth. const ( - TTCMsgAuthRequest = 0x03 // generic "pre-auth" message - TTCMsgError = 0x04 // server's error summary packet + TTCMsgAuthRequest = 0x03 + TTCMsgError = 0x04 ) -// AuthSubOp values — bundled inside a TTCMsgAuthRequest. const ( AuthSubOpPhaseOne = 0x76 AuthSubOpPhaseTwo = 0x73 ) -// AuthPhaseTwo carries the parsed client request that completes auth. type AuthPhaseTwo struct { EClientSessKey string EPassword string } -// readDataPayload reads a single DATA packet from the client and returns its TTC payload -// (the bytes after the 2-byte dataFlag). func readDataPayload(conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool) ([]byte, error) { raw, err := ReadFullPacket(conn, use32BitLen) if err != nil { return nil, err } if PacketTypeOf(raw) == PacketTypeMarker { - // Discard break/marker and try again return readDataPayload(conn, use32BitLen) } if PacketTypeOf(raw) != PacketTypeData { @@ -60,14 +38,12 @@ func readDataPayload(conn net.Conn, use32BitLen bool) ([]byte, error) { return pkt.Payload, nil } -// writeDataPayload wraps a TTC payload in a single DATA packet and writes it. func writeDataPayload(conn net.Conn, payload []byte, use32BitLen bool) error { d := &DataPacket{Payload: payload} _, err := conn.Write(d.Bytes(use32BitLen)) return err } -// ParseAuthPhaseTwo decodes the second auth-request TTC payload from the client. func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { r := NewTTCReader(payload) op, err := r.GetByte() @@ -106,8 +82,6 @@ func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { } } - // Advance past mode + marker + count + 1 + 1. We don't keep any of these today, - // but we have to consume them to reach the KVP list. if _, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true); err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -125,8 +99,7 @@ func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { return nil, err } if hasUser == 1 && userLen > 0 { - // go-ora prefixes the username with a CLR length byte; JDBC thin sends it raw. - // Peek to disambiguate. + // go-ora prefixes username with CLR length byte; JDBC thin sends it raw. peek, perr := r.PeekByte() if perr != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("peek phase2 username: %w", perr) @@ -141,7 +114,6 @@ func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { } } - // Only AUTH_SESSKEY and AUTH_PASSWORD are consumed downstream; skip the rest. for i := 0; i < count; i++ { k, v, _, err := r.GetKeyVal() if err != nil { @@ -157,39 +129,12 @@ func ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload []byte) (*AuthPhaseTwo, error) { return out, nil } -// BuildErrorPacket constructs an Oracle error summary packet (opcode 0x04). The Oracle -// client checks `Session.HasError()` after each response, which reads this summary. -// Minimal fields: opcode, retCode (the ORA error number), retCol, errorPos, SQL state, -// flags, rpc message (empty), and finally the error message. func BuildErrorPacket(oraCode int, message string) []byte { b := NewTTCBuilder() b.PutBytes(TTCMsgError) - - // length: sum of number-compressed fields. go-ora summary_object.go shows: - // endOfCallStatus (4 bytes compressed) - // endToEndECIDSequence (2 bytes) - // currentRowNumber (4) - // returnCode (4) ← our oraCode goes here - // arrayElemErrorsCount (2) - // arrayElemError count again - // current cursor id (2) - // error position (2) - // sql type (1) - // oer_fatal (1) - // flags (1) - // user cursor opts (1) - // uol (1) - // sid (4) - // serial num (4) - // rba ts (2) - // rba sqn (4) - // rba blk (4) - // rba byte (4) - // some flags, then CLR of the message - // Most fields can be zero; the code is what matters. - b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) // endOfCallStatus - b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) // endToEndECID - b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) // currentRow + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) + b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) b.PutInt(int64(oraCode), 4, true, true) b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) @@ -206,15 +151,13 @@ func BuildErrorPacket(oraCode int, message string) []byte { b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) b.PutInt(0, 4, true, true) - b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) // flags + b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) b.PutString(message) - // trailing warning count b.PutInt(0, 2, true, true) return b.Bytes() } -// WriteErrorToClient writes an Oracle-format error summary packet to the client. func WriteErrorToClient(conn net.Conn, oraCode int, message string, use32BitLen bool) error { return writeDataPayload(conn, BuildErrorPacket(oraCode, message), use32BitLen) } diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go index 4caf3696..71916b6a 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy.go @@ -9,12 +9,8 @@ import ( "github.com/Infisical/infisical-merge/packages/pam/session" ) -// OracleProxyConfig mirrors the shape used by other PAM database handlers so the -// dispatch in pam-proxy.go stays templatized. When EnableTLS is true, the -// upstream leg uses TLSConfig (built centrally in pam-proxy.go from the -// resource's sslRejectUnauthorized + sslCertificate fields). type OracleProxyConfig struct { - TargetAddr string // "host:port" + TargetAddr string InjectUsername string InjectPassword string InjectDatabase string @@ -32,18 +28,10 @@ func NewOracleProxy(config OracleProxyConfig) *OracleProxy { return &OracleProxy{config: config} } -// HandleConnection runs one end-to-end PAM session for a connecting Oracle client. -// The proxied-auth flow lives in handleConnectionProxied: pre-auth bytes are forwarded -// verbatim between client and upstream (so both negotiate with each other through us -// and end up in matching capability state), and we intercept only at the O5Logon -// boundary to swap placeholder-keyed material for real-password-keyed material. func (p *OracleProxy) HandleConnection(ctx context.Context, clientConn net.Conn) error { return p.handleConnectionProxied(ctx, clientConn) } - -// relayWithTap copies src → dst byte-for-byte, Feed()'ing a copy of each read into the -// tap extractor. This is the hot path — it must not parse or log per-packet. func relayWithTap(src, dst net.Conn, tap *QueryExtractor, errCh chan<- error) { buf := make([]byte, 32*1024) for { diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go index 0bf786b5..325f32b1 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/proxy_auth.go @@ -15,16 +15,6 @@ import ( "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" ) -// handleConnectionProxied is the cap-aligned implementation of the Oracle PAM handler. -// Instead of dialling upstream via go-ora (which negotiates upstream state with go-ora's -// own caps), we open a raw TCP connection to upstream and forward the client's CONNECT / -// ANO / TCPNego / DataTypeNego bytes verbatim. Upstream therefore negotiates with the -// CLIENT's caps — making post-auth byte relay possible. -// -// The only interception happens at the O5Logon boundary: we decrypt the client's key -// material with the placeholder password, re-encrypt with the real password before -// forwarding to upstream; and we substitute upstream's password-derived fields with -// placeholder-derived equivalents when forwarding to the client. func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn net.Conn) error { defer clientConn.Close() defer func() { @@ -35,19 +25,13 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Str("target", p.config.TargetAddr).Msg("Oracle PAM session started (proxied auth)") - // 1. Dial upstream. For TCPS targets we get back both the raw TCP conn and - // the first TLS session wrapping it. Oracle's TCPS flow may ask us to do - // a SECOND TLS handshake on the raw conn partway through (see the - // RESEND+flag=0x08 branch below), so we keep both references. + // Keep raw TCP ref — Oracle TCPS may require a second TLS handshake mid-flow. rawUpstream, tlsUpstream, err := dialUpstreamRaw(ctx, p.config) if err != nil { log.Error().Err(err).Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Failed to dial Oracle upstream") _ = WriteRefuseToClient(clientConn, "(DESCRIPTION=(ERR=12564)(VSNNUM=0)(ERROR_STACK=(ERROR=(CODE=12564)(EMFI=4))))") return fmt.Errorf("upstream dial: %w", err) } - // upstreamConn starts as the first TLS session (when TLS) or the raw conn - // (when not). It may be reassigned to a fresh *tls.Conn on a flag-0x08 - // RESEND. The deferred close acts on whatever it points to at exit time. var upstreamConn net.Conn if tlsUpstream != nil { upstreamConn = tlsUpstream @@ -56,7 +40,6 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne } defer func() { upstreamConn.Close() }() - // 2. Forward client CONNECT → upstream, then upstream ACCEPT → client. connectRaw, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("read client CONNECT: %w", err) @@ -64,24 +47,15 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne if PacketTypeOf(connectRaw) != PacketTypeConnect { return fmt.Errorf("expected CONNECT, got type=%d", connectRaw[4]) } - if p.config.InjectDatabase != "" { - connectRaw = rewriteConnectServiceName(connectRaw, p.config.InjectDatabase) + if p.config.InjectDatabase == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("InjectDatabase (service name) is required but empty") } + connectRaw = rewriteConnectServiceName(connectRaw, p.config.InjectDatabase) if _, err := upstreamConn.Write(connectRaw); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("forward CONNECT: %w", err) } - // Read upstream packets until we see ACCEPT. The listener may send intermediate - // packets first — notably NSPTRS (type 0x0B, "RESEND") which tells the client to - // re-transmit its DESCRIPTION as a follow-up packet because it didn't fit inline - // in the CONNECT. We forward these intermediates to the client transparently, and - // if we see NSPTRS specifically we also read the client's follow-up packet and - // forward it back to upstream — otherwise upstream stalls waiting for it. - // - // A REFUSE / REDIRECT ends the flow with an error. - // Check if the client included connect-data inline. If not (go-ora with - // descriptions > 230 bytes), the client sends it as a separate packet and - // we may need to drain it after ACCEPT. + // go-ora sends connect-data as a separate 16-bit-framed packet when > 230 bytes. connectDataInline := true if len(connectRaw) >= 28 { cdLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(connectRaw[24:26])) @@ -105,14 +79,7 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne } log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Uint8("pktType", uint8(pktType)).Int("pktLen", len(pkt)).Uint8("flag", origFlag).Msg("Proxy: upstream handshake packet") - // Oracle TCPS in-band "restart TLS" signal: RESEND with byte-5 flag - // 0x08 tells the client to abandon the current TLS session and run a - // FRESH TLS handshake on the raw TCP socket (bypassing the already- - // established first-round TLS). The server does the same on its end. - // go-ora handles this in network/session.go readPacket's RESEND branch - // by calling session.negotiate() again — which creates a new - // tls.Client(session.conn, ...) wrapping the raw conn. We do the - // equivalent here. + // RESEND flag 0x08: tear down current TLS, do a fresh handshake on the raw socket. if p.config.EnableTLS && pktType == PacketTypeResend && origFlag&0x08 != 0 { tc, terr := upgradeToTLS(ctx, rawUpstream, p.config) if terr != nil { @@ -122,11 +89,7 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Str("tlsVersion", tlsVersionString(tc.ConnectionState().Version)).Str("cipher", tls.CipherSuiteName(tc.ConnectionState().CipherSuite)).Msg("Proxy: upstream TLS re-handshook on RESEND(flag=0x08)") } - // Byte-5 masking: thin clients (JDBC thin, python-oracledb thin) read - // byte 5 from the RESEND to decide whether their local socket is - // TCPS-shaped and try to cast their NT adapter to TcpsNTAdapter. Our - // client-facing socket is plain TCP, so the cast would fail. Strip - // the flag on the packet going to the client. + // Mask byte 5 so thin clients don't try TLS upgrade on plain TCP. if p.config.EnableTLS && len(pkt) > 5 { pkt[5] = 0x00 } @@ -153,8 +116,6 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne } } - // Parse ACCEPT to learn negotiated version → framing mode. - // Layout: bytes[8:10] = version (u16BE). var acceptVersion uint16 if len(acceptRaw) >= 10 { acceptVersion = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(acceptRaw[8:10]) @@ -162,9 +123,6 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne use32Bit := acceptVersion >= 315 log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Uint16("acceptVersion", acceptVersion).Bool("use32Bit", use32Bit).Msg("Proxy: ACCEPT forwarded") - // 3. If connect-data was not inline (go-ora, long descriptions) and the RESEND - // handler didn't already consume it, the client's supplement is sitting in - // the TCP buffer. Drain and forward it before switching to 32-bit framing. if !connectDataInline && !resendConsumedSupplement { supplement, err := ReadFullPacket(clientConn, false) if err != nil { @@ -176,18 +134,12 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne } } - // 4. Pre-auth turn-taking loop: each client packet → forward to upstream → read - // upstream response → forward to client. Break when we see the auth request. p1Payload, err := proxyUntilAuthRequest(clientConn, upstreamConn, use32Bit, p.config.SessionID) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("pre-auth proxy: %w", err) } log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Int("p1Len", len(p1Payload)).Msg("Proxy: auth-request boundary reached") - // 5. Rewrite the phase-1 auth-request username to match the configured account, - // then forward to upstream. Same net effect as how the postgres/mysql/mssql - // handlers overwrite the client's startup-packet user: whatever the client - // types is inert; upstream always looks up the configured account's verifier. p1Forward := p1Payload if p.config.InjectUsername != "" { rewritten, rerr := rewritePhase1User(p1Payload, p.config.InjectUsername) @@ -200,7 +152,6 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne return fmt.Errorf("forward phase 1 request: %w", err) } - // 6. Read upstream's phase-1 response. Extract fields, translate, forward to client. p1RespUpstream, err := readDataPayload(upstreamConn, use32Bit) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("read upstream phase 1 response: %w", err) @@ -215,8 +166,6 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne } log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Proxy: phase-1 response translated and forwarded") - // 7. Read client's phase-2 request. Decrypt with placeholder keys, re-encrypt with - // real-password keys, forward to upstream. p2ReqClient, err := readDataPayload(clientConn, use32Bit) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("read client phase 2 request: %w", err) @@ -226,8 +175,7 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne _ = WriteErrorToClient(clientConn, ORA1017InvalidCredentials, "ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied", use32Bit) return fmt.Errorf("translate phase 2 request: %w", err) } - // Upstream Oracle cross-checks the phase-2 username against phase-1; we rewrote - // phase-1 above, so phase-2 has to agree or auth fails. + // Oracle cross-checks phase-2 username against phase-1. if p.config.InjectUsername != "" { rewritten, rerr := rewritePhase2User(p2ReqTranslated, p.config.InjectUsername) if rerr != nil { @@ -240,9 +188,7 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne } log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Proxy: phase-2 request translated and forwarded") - // 8. Forward upstream's phase-2 response to the client unchanged. - // AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE is encrypted with encKey, which is derived from session - // keys + CSK salt (not the password), so the client can verify it as-is. + // AUTH_SVR_RESPONSE is keyed on session material (not password) — forward unchanged. p2RespRaw, err := ReadFullPacket(upstreamConn, use32Bit) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("read upstream phase 2 response: %w", err) @@ -252,7 +198,6 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne } log.Info().Str("sessionID", p.config.SessionID).Msg("Proxy: phase-2 response forwarded; client authenticated") - // 9. Byte relay. c2u, u2c := NewQueryExtractorPair(p.config.SessionLogger, p.config.SessionID, use32Bit) defer c2u.Stop() defer u2c.Stop() @@ -273,11 +218,7 @@ func (p *OracleProxy) handleConnectionProxied(ctx context.Context, clientConn ne return nil } -// oracleUpstreamCiphers is the set of TLS cipher suites we advertise to Oracle -// TCPS listeners. Oracle 19c (including AWS RDS's SSL option) only offers -// legacy RSA-CBC cipher suites — they are not in Go's crypto/tls defaults, so -// we list them explicitly. Modern AEAD suites are kept first so newer Oracle -// versions still use them. +// Includes legacy RSA-CBC suites needed by Oracle 19c / AWS RDS. var oracleUpstreamCiphers = []uint16{ tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, @@ -291,12 +232,7 @@ var oracleUpstreamCiphers = []uint16{ tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, } -// buildOracleTLSConfig clones the shared TLS config and augments it with the -// settings Oracle TCPS needs: legacy cipher suites (Oracle 19c only offers -// RSA-CBC), TLS 1.0 floor (the second-round handshake against RDS negotiates -// down to 1.0 in practice), and 1.2 ceiling (TLS 1.3 has no handshake-restart -// mechanism). Only the Oracle-upstream leg relaxes versions this way; the -// relay mTLS and other handlers stay on defaults. +// TLS 1.0–1.2 only: Oracle TCPS has no TLS-1.3 restart mechanism; RDS negotiates down to 1.0. func buildOracleTLSConfig(base *tls.Config, host string) *tls.Config { cfg := base.Clone() if cfg.ServerName == "" { @@ -308,18 +244,6 @@ func buildOracleTLSConfig(base *tls.Config, host string) *tls.Config { return cfg } -// dialUpstreamRaw opens the upstream connection. Returns the raw TCP conn -// and — when TLS is enabled — the first TLS session wrapping it. -// -// Oracle TCPS on port 2484 requires a TLS handshake from byte zero (we tested -// this — plaintext CONNECT is met with an immediate connection reset). That -// first TLS session carries the initial CONNECT and the server's RESEND. If -// the RESEND's byte-5 flag has 0x08 set, Oracle's protocol requires a SECOND -// TLS handshake on the SAME underlying TCP socket (bypassing the first TLS -// session) before the next CONNECT supplement can flow. go-ora does this -// same two-handshake dance in network/session.go readPacket's RESEND branch. -// That second handshake is performed by upgradeToTLS below, reusing the raw -// conn returned here. func dialUpstreamRaw(ctx context.Context, cfg OracleProxyConfig) (rawConn net.Conn, tlsConn *tls.Conn, err error) { host, _, err := splitHostPort(cfg.TargetAddr) if err != nil { @@ -361,9 +285,6 @@ func tlsVersionString(v uint16) string { } } -// upgradeToTLS performs a TLS handshake on an existing upstream TCP socket. -// Called mid-flow when Oracle's RESEND packet signals the socket should switch -// to TLS. The returned *tls.Conn replaces the raw conn from that point on. func upgradeToTLS(ctx context.Context, rawConn net.Conn, cfg OracleProxyConfig) (*tls.Conn, error) { host, _, err := splitHostPort(cfg.TargetAddr) if err != nil { @@ -377,14 +298,6 @@ func upgradeToTLS(ctx context.Context, rawConn net.Conn, cfg OracleProxyConfig) return tc, nil } -// proxyUntilAuthRequest runs a bidirectional packet-level proxy between client and -// upstream during pre-auth. Two goroutines read from each side and forward to the other, -// synchronously with no turn-taking assumption. The client-side reader inspects DATA -// packets for the phase-1 auth request (opcode 0x03 0x76); when seen, it signals the -// main routine to stop and returns the auth-request payload WITHOUT forwarding it. -// All other packets (control, marker, data) flow through transparently. -// -// The caller takes over O5Logon translation from here. func proxyUntilAuthRequest(client, upstream net.Conn, use32Bit bool, sessionID string) ([]byte, error) { type result struct { payload []byte @@ -393,7 +306,6 @@ func proxyUntilAuthRequest(client, upstream net.Conn, use32Bit bool, sessionID s done := make(chan result, 2) stop := make(chan struct{}) - // Upstream → client: forward every packet unchanged. Exit when stop is signalled. go func() { for { select { @@ -420,7 +332,6 @@ func proxyUntilAuthRequest(client, upstream net.Conn, use32Bit bool, sessionID s } }() - // Client → upstream: forward packets, but watch DATA packets for auth-request. go func() { for { select { @@ -437,12 +348,10 @@ func proxyUntilAuthRequest(client, upstream net.Conn, use32Bit bool, sessionID s return } pktType := PacketTypeOf(pkt) - // Check for auth-request on DATA packets. if pktType == PacketTypeData { payload, perr := extractDataPayload(pkt) if perr == nil && len(payload) >= 2 && payload[0] == TTCMsgAuthRequest && payload[1] == AuthSubOpPhaseOne { - // Don't forward — caller takes over. select { case done <- result{payload: payload}: default: @@ -463,13 +372,10 @@ func proxyUntilAuthRequest(client, upstream net.Conn, use32Bit bool, sessionID s res := <-done close(stop) - // Force the other goroutine out of its blocked ReadFullPacket by setting a past - // deadline on the upstream connection. If we don't, that goroutine would steal - // the upstream's phase-1 response when we try to read it directly. + // Unblock the other goroutine so it doesn't steal the phase-1 response. if uc, ok := upstream.(interface{ SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error }); ok { _ = uc.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Second)) } - // Give it a beat to exit, then reset the deadline. time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) if uc, ok := upstream.(interface{ SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error }); ok { _ = uc.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) @@ -480,9 +386,6 @@ func proxyUntilAuthRequest(client, upstream net.Conn, use32Bit bool, sessionID s return res.payload, nil } -// extractDataPayload returns the TTC payload body of a DATA packet. Assumes caller has -// verified the packet is indeed DATA. The 2-byte data_flags follow the 8-byte TNS header -// in both 16-bit and 32-bit framing modes, so body always starts at offset 10. func extractDataPayload(pkt []byte) ([]byte, error) { const headerLen = 10 if len(pkt) < headerLen { @@ -491,24 +394,6 @@ func extractDataPayload(pkt []byte) ([]byte, error) { return pkt[headerLen:], nil } -// rewriteAuthRequestUser replaces the username field in a client-sent auth request -// (phase-1 or phase-2 — same layout, different sub-op) with `newUser`, leaving every -// other field verbatim. Upstream Oracle uses the username we forward here to look up -// the account's verifier in phase 1 and to validate the same user in phase 2 — so -// rewriting both drives the whole crypto path to operate on `newUser`'s credentials, -// regardless of what the client originally typed. -// -// Layout (identical for phase-1 sub-op 0x76 and phase-2 sub-op 0x73): -// -// u8 0x03, u8 subOp, u8 0, u8 hasUser, [u32 compressed userLen OR single 0 byte], -// u32 compressed mode, u8 1, u32 compressed count, u8 1, u8 1, -// [optional u8 CLR-length prefix (go-ora) | no prefix (JDBC thin)] + user bytes, -// -// -// Username encoding varies by client: go-ora emits a CLR-length byte before the raw -// bytes; JDBC thin omits it. We detect which form the client used with the same peek -// heuristic as ParseAuthPhaseTwo (if the next byte equals userLen and is below 0x20, -// it's a length prefix) and mirror that form when emitting `newUser`. func rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload []byte, expectedSubOp byte, newUser string) ([]byte, error) { r := NewTTCReader(payload) op, err := r.GetByte() @@ -525,7 +410,7 @@ func rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload []byte, expectedSubOp byte, newUser string) if sub != expectedSubOp { return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected sub-op 0x%02X (want 0x%02X)", sub, expectedSubOp) } - if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { // the 0x00 separator + if _, err := r.GetByte(); err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -533,7 +418,6 @@ func rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload []byte, expectedSubOp byte, newUser string) if err != nil { return nil, err } - // Client sent no username — nothing to rewrite; forward verbatim. if hasUser != 1 { return payload, nil } @@ -545,11 +429,8 @@ func rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload []byte, expectedSubOp byte, newUser string) return payload, nil } - // Capture the offset just after the userLen compressed-int. Everything from here - // up to the start of the user bytes (mode / markers / count) is copied verbatim. middleStart := r.Pos() - // Walk mode + markers + count + 1 + 1 (identical to ParseAuthPhaseTwo). if _, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("mode: %w", err) } @@ -567,8 +448,7 @@ func rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload []byte, expectedSubOp byte, newUser string) } middleEnd := r.Pos() - // The next bytes are either (go-ora) or just - // (JDBC thin). Peek to distinguish. + // go-ora prefixes user bytes with a CLR-length byte; JDBC thin omits it. peek, perr := r.PeekByte() if perr != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("peek user: %w", perr) @@ -584,16 +464,12 @@ func rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload []byte, expectedSubOp byte, newUser string) } userEnd := r.Pos() - // Rebuild: header [0..3) + hasUser(1) + new userLen compressed + original middle - // (mode/marker/count/1/1) + [optional CLR-len byte] + new user bytes + tail. newUserBytes := []byte(newUser) newUserLen := len(newUserBytes) out := make([]byte, 0, len(payload)+16) - out = append(out, payload[:3]...) // opcode + sub + 0x00 - out = append(out, 0x01) // hasUser = 1 - // Emit newUserLen as a compressed int. Reuse TTCBuilder to avoid reimplementing - // the 0xFE/size-byte prefix rules. + out = append(out, payload[:3]...) + out = append(out, 0x01) lb := NewTTCBuilder() lb.PutInt(int64(newUserLen), 4, true, true) out = append(out, lb.Bytes()...) @@ -606,8 +482,6 @@ func rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload []byte, expectedSubOp byte, newUser string) return out, nil } -// rewriteConnectServiceName replaces the SERVICE_NAME value in a CONNECT packet's -// description string with newName, updating the packet and connect-data length fields. func rewriteConnectServiceName(pkt []byte, newName string) []byte { marker := []byte("SERVICE_NAME=") idx := bytes.Index(pkt, marker) @@ -640,39 +514,30 @@ func rewriteConnectServiceName(pkt []byte, newName string) []byte { return out } -// rewritePhase1User rewrites AUTH_USER on a phase-1 auth request. func rewritePhase1User(payload []byte, newUser string) ([]byte, error) { return rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload, AuthSubOpPhaseOne, newUser) } -// rewritePhase2User rewrites AUTH_USER on a phase-2 auth request. func rewritePhase2User(payload []byte, newUser string) ([]byte, error) { return rewriteAuthRequestUser(payload, AuthSubOpPhaseTwo, newUser) } -// ProxyAuthState carries session material extracted during phase-1 so phase-2 translation -// and SVR_RESPONSE regeneration have access to what they need. type ProxyAuthState struct { - Salt []byte // raw salt (decoded from AUTH_VFR_DATA hex) - Pbkdf2CSKSalt string // hex string - Pbkdf2VGenCount int - Pbkdf2SDerCount int - RealKey []byte // AUTH_SESSKEY key derived from real password + salt - PlaceholderKey []byte // AUTH_SESSKEY key derived from placeholder password + salt - ServerSessKey []byte // raw server session key (decrypted from upstream) + Salt []byte + Pbkdf2CSKSalt string + Pbkdf2VGenCount int + Pbkdf2SDerCount int + RealKey []byte + PlaceholderKey []byte + ServerSessKey []byte } -// translatePhase1Response decodes upstream's phase-1 response, substitutes AUTH_SESSKEY -// so the client can decrypt it with the placeholder password (instead of the real one), -// and returns the modified payload plus state for phase-2. func translatePhase1Response(payload []byte, realPassword string) (*ProxyAuthState, []byte, error) { - // Parse payload into an ordered list of KVPs so we can rebuild with modifications. kvs, trailer, err := parseAuthRespKVPList(payload) if err != nil { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("parse upstream phase 1: %w", err) } - // Extract fields we need. var eSessKey, vfrData, cskSalt, vGenStr, sDerStr string for _, kv := range kvs { switch kv.Key { @@ -704,7 +569,6 @@ func translatePhase1Response(payload []byte, realPassword string) (*ProxyAuthSta sDer = 3 } - // Derive both keys (real password → decrypt upstream's SESSKEY; placeholder → re-encrypt). realKey, _, err := deriveServerKey(realPassword, salt, vGen) if err != nil { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("derive real key: %w", err) @@ -714,18 +578,15 @@ func translatePhase1Response(payload []byte, realPassword string) (*ProxyAuthSta return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("derive placeholder key: %w", err) } - // Decrypt upstream's server session key with real key. serverSessKey, err := decryptSessionKey(false, realKey, eSessKey) if err != nil { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt upstream server session key: %w", err) } - // Re-encrypt with placeholder key so client can decrypt. newESessKey, err := encryptSessionKey(false, placeholderKey, serverSessKey) if err != nil { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("re-encrypt server session key: %w", err) } - // Substitute AUTH_SESSKEY in the KVP list. for i := range kvs { if kvs[i].Key == "AUTH_SESSKEY" { kvs[i].Value = newESessKey @@ -733,7 +594,6 @@ func translatePhase1Response(payload []byte, realPassword string) (*ProxyAuthSta } } - // Rebuild payload. rebuilt := rebuildAuthRespPayload(kvs, trailer) state := &ProxyAuthState{ @@ -748,13 +608,7 @@ func translatePhase1Response(payload []byte, realPassword string) (*ProxyAuthSta return state, rebuilt, nil } -// translatePhase2Request takes the client's phase-2 payload (where AUTH_SESSKEY and -// AUTH_PASSWORD were encrypted with the placeholder-derived keys) and substitutes them -// with values keyed for the real password, so upstream Oracle can verify. func translatePhase2Request(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState, realPassword string) ([]byte, error) { - // Phase-2 request uses the same "PutKeyVal" layout as phase-1 response but with a - // different leading opcode frame (0x03 0x73 0 plus header fields). We parse the - // header prefix up to the KVP dictionary, modify the KVP dictionary, and rebuild. p2, err := ParseAuthPhaseTwo(payload) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse client phase 2: %w", err) @@ -764,7 +618,6 @@ func translatePhase2Request(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState, realPassword return nil, fmt.Errorf("client phase 2 missing AUTH_SESSKEY or AUTH_PASSWORD") } - // Decrypt client's sess key with placeholder key. clientSessKey, err := decryptSessionKey(false, state.PlaceholderKey, p2.EClientSessKey) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypt client session key: %w", err) @@ -772,15 +625,12 @@ func translatePhase2Request(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState, realPassword if len(clientSessKey) != len(state.ServerSessKey) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("client session key length mismatch: got %d want %d", len(clientSessKey), len(state.ServerSessKey)) } - // Re-encrypt with real key for upstream. newEClientSessKey, err := encryptSessionKey(false, state.RealKey, clientSessKey) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("re-encrypt client session key: %w", err) } - // Compute the password-encryption key. This key is derived from session keys + - // CSK salt, NOT from the password — so it's the same regardless of what the - // client typed. We encrypt the real password unconditionally. + // encKey derives from session keys + CSK salt, not the password. encKey, err := deriveProxyPasswordEncKey(clientSessKey, state.ServerSessKey, state.Pbkdf2CSKSalt, state.Pbkdf2SDerCount) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("derive enc key: %w", err) @@ -790,7 +640,6 @@ func translatePhase2Request(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState, realPassword return nil, fmt.Errorf("encrypt real password: %w", err) } - // Rebuild the phase-2 payload with substituted AUTH_SESSKEY and AUTH_PASSWORD. rebuilt, err := rebuildPhase2Request(payload, newEClientSessKey, newEPassword) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("rebuild phase 2: %w", err) @@ -798,11 +647,6 @@ func translatePhase2Request(payload []byte, state *ProxyAuthState, realPassword return rebuilt, nil } -// deriveProxyPasswordEncKey computes the key used for AUTH_PASSWORD encryption in -// phase 2, for verifier type 18453. Formula (from go-ora's generatePasswordEncKey): -// -// keyBuffer = hex(clientSessKey || serverSessKey) -// encKey = generateSpeedyKey(pbkdf2CSKSaltRaw, keyBuffer, sderCount)[:32] func deriveProxyPasswordEncKey(clientSessKey, serverSessKey []byte, pbkdf2CSKSaltHex string, sderCount int) ([]byte, error) { buffer := append([]byte(nil), clientSessKey...) buffer = append(buffer, serverSessKey...) @@ -818,17 +662,12 @@ func deriveProxyPasswordEncKey(clientSessKey, serverSessKey []byte, pbkdf2CSKSal return full[:32], nil } -// parsedKVP holds a decoded key/value/flag from a TTC auth response. We keep the key -// verbatim (including any trailing NULLs) so rebuilt packets match the wire format. type parsedKVP struct { Key string Value string Flag int } -// parseAuthRespKVPList decodes a TTC auth response payload (opcode 0x08) into an ordered -// KVP list plus the trailing summary bytes (opcode 0x04 onwards). Preserves the order -// and any non-standard fields so we can rebuild with minimal changes. func parseAuthRespKVPList(payload []byte) (kvs []parsedKVP, trailer []byte, err error) { r := NewTTCReader(payload) op, err := r.GetByte() @@ -881,15 +720,12 @@ func parseAuthRespKVPList(payload []byte) (kvs []parsedKVP, trailer []byte, err Flag: flag, }) } - // Trailer: everything remaining (usually the opcode 0x04 summary). trailer = make([]byte, r.Remaining()) rem, _ := r.GetBytes(r.Remaining()) copy(trailer, rem) return kvs, trailer, nil } -// rebuildAuthRespPayload reconstructs a phase-1 or phase-2 auth response payload from -// the parsed KVP list plus the trailing summary bytes. func rebuildAuthRespPayload(kvs []parsedKVP, trailer []byte) []byte { b := NewTTCBuilder() b.PutBytes(0x08) @@ -901,17 +737,6 @@ func rebuildAuthRespPayload(kvs []parsedKVP, trailer []byte) []byte { return b.Bytes() } -// rebuildPhase2Request replaces AUTH_SESSKEY and AUTH_PASSWORD values in a phase-2 -// request payload while preserving the opcode/header prefix and all other KVPs. -// -// Phase-2 request layout: -// -// u8 0x03, u8 0x73, u8 0,
, u8 hasUser, [user_len compressed], u32 mode -// compressed, u8 1, u32 count compressed, u8 1, u8 1, [user bytes], -// -// Rather than parse and rebuild byte-for-byte (risky — subtle header differences across -// clients), we scan for AUTH_SESSKEY and AUTH_PASSWORD keys in the payload and rewrite -// the associated CLR-encoded values in-place. func rebuildPhase2Request(payload []byte, newESessKey, newEPassword string) ([]byte, error) { out := make([]byte, 0, len(payload)+128) out = append(out, payload...) @@ -927,31 +752,16 @@ func rebuildPhase2Request(payload []byte, newESessKey, newEPassword string) ([]b return out, nil } -// replaceKVPValue finds a PutKeyValString-encoded KVP for `key` within `payload` and -// replaces its value with `newValue`. Assumes the key appears exactly once. -// -// Encoded KVP layout (from go-ora's PutKeyVal): -// -// key_len (compressed int) -// key_len_again (1 byte, same value, before CLR bytes) <-- this IS the CLR length -// key bytes -// val_len (compressed int) -// val_len_again (1 byte, same as CLR length) -// val bytes -// flag (compressed int) func replaceKVPValue(payload []byte, key, newValue string) ([]byte, error) { keyBytes := []byte(key) - // Search for the key substring; confirm the preceding bytes look like a length prefix. idx := bytes.Index(payload, keyBytes) if idx < 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("key %q not found", key) } - // Find the value start: skip over key, then parse (val_len compressed, val_len byte). pos := idx + len(keyBytes) if pos >= len(payload) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("truncated after key") } - // val_len is compressed int. vSizeByte := payload[pos] pos++ var vLen int @@ -965,28 +775,19 @@ func replaceKVPValue(payload []byte, key, newValue string) ([]byte, error) { } else { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid val_len size byte %d", vSizeByte) } - // If vLen > 0, there's a CLR length byte + vLen value bytes. if vLen > 0 { - // CLR length byte if pos >= len(payload) || int(payload[pos]) != vLen { - // Some encodings don't re-emit the length; handle gracefully by assuming 0 pad. - // Still, expect the CLR-length prefix to match vLen. return nil, fmt.Errorf("CLR length byte mismatch for %q: got %d want %d", key, payload[pos], vLen) } pos++ valBodyStart := pos valBodyEnd := valBodyStart + vLen - // Build the new encoded value section: . - // TTCBuilder.PutClr emits the chunked 0xFE form when the value exceeds - // 0xFC bytes; a single-byte length would wrap and corrupt AUTH_PASSWORD - // for long (≥ 96-char) Oracle passwords. + // PutClr handles chunked 0xFE form for values > 0xFC bytes. newVal := []byte(newValue) vb := NewTTCBuilder() vb.PutUint(uint64(len(newVal)), 4, true, true) vb.PutClr(newVal) newValSection := vb.Bytes() - // Splice in the new value: keep bytes up to the end of the key, then the new - // encoded value section, then everything after the old value's body. oldStart := idx + len(keyBytes) oldEnd := valBodyEnd out := make([]byte, 0, len(payload)+len(newValSection)) diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go index ed1d3331..2860b452 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/query_logger.go @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package oracle import ( "bytes" "encoding/binary" + "fmt" "sync" "time" @@ -10,48 +11,35 @@ import ( "github.com/rs/zerolog/log" ) -// TTC function-call opcodes of interest for query logging. These match what a real -// Oracle server receives during a client's query lifecycle — see Oracle Net TTC -// documentation and go-ora's parameter/command.go for reference. const ( - ttcFuncOALL8 = 0x5E // all-in-one statement execution (SQL + binds in a single call) - ttcFuncOCOMMIT = 0x0E // commit - ttcFuncORLLBK = 0x0F // rollback - ttcMsgFunction = 0x03 // outer opcode for function calls + ttcFuncOALL8 = 0x5E + ttcFuncOCOMMIT = 0x0E + ttcFuncORLLBK = 0x0F + ttcMsgFunction = 0x03 ) -// pendingQuery tracks the SQL-string that was sent client→upstream; we correlate it -// with the subsequent upstream→client response so the session log has both. type pendingQuery struct { sql string timestamp time.Time } -// QueryExtractor runs in its own goroutine, consuming DATA packet payloads from -// either direction via Feed() and emitting SessionLogEntry records when a complete -// client call + server response pair is recognized. Feed is non-blocking; if the -// internal channel fills, packets are dropped and a warning is logged. Logging is -// best-effort, same as MSSQL. +// Best-effort SQL extraction from the byte stream. type QueryExtractor struct { logger session.SessionLogger sessionID string - direction string // "client->upstream" or "upstream->client" + direction string ch chan []byte stopCh chan struct{} wg sync.WaitGroup use32Bit bool - pair *pairState // shared across both directions via Pair + pair *pairState } -// pairState couples the client-side and upstream-side extractors so we can match -// requests with responses. type pairState struct { mu sync.Mutex pending *pendingQuery } -// NewQueryExtractorPair returns two extractors, one per direction, sharing a pair state. -// They must both be started and stopped together. func NewQueryExtractorPair(logger session.SessionLogger, sessionID string, use32Bit bool) (clientToUpstream, upstreamToClient *QueryExtractor) { p := &pairState{} clientToUpstream = newExtractor(logger, sessionID, "client->upstream", use32Bit, p) @@ -74,8 +62,6 @@ func newExtractor(logger session.SessionLogger, sessionID, direction string, use return e } -// Feed pushes a chunk of bytes into the extractor. Returns without blocking if the -// queue is full; drops on overflow. This keeps the relay hot path off the TTC parser. func (e *QueryExtractor) Feed(data []byte) { if len(data) == 0 { return @@ -85,7 +71,6 @@ func (e *QueryExtractor) Feed(data []byte) { select { case e.ch <- cp: default: - // drop — logging is best-effort } } @@ -109,7 +94,6 @@ func (e *QueryExtractor) loop() { } } -// drain consumes as many complete TNS packets as the buffer contains. func (e *QueryExtractor) drain(buf *bytes.Buffer) { for { if buf.Len() < 8 { @@ -123,7 +107,6 @@ func (e *QueryExtractor) drain(buf *bytes.Buffer) { length = uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(head)) } if length < 8 || length > 16*1024*1024 { - // Framing is broken — reset. Shouldn't happen in normal flow. buf.Reset() return } @@ -158,11 +141,8 @@ func (e *QueryExtractor) handlePacket(raw []byte) { } func (e *QueryExtractor) handleClientRequest(payload []byte) { - // Oracle clients (sqlcl, JDBC thin) frequently bundle multiple TTC messages - // in a single packet — typically a piggybacked OCLOSE for the previous cursor - // (0x11 0x69 ...) followed by the new function call (0x03 0x5E ... for OALL8). - // The piggyback prefix is variable-length, so rather than parse it we scan the - // payload for the function-call+opcode marker pair and start parsing there. + // Clients often piggyback an OCLOSE before the new function call; scan for + // the function-call+opcode marker pair instead of parsing from offset 0. if idx := findBytePair(payload, ttcMsgFunction, ttcFuncOALL8); idx >= 0 { r := NewTTCReader(payload[idx+2:]) if sqlText := tryExtractSQL(r); sqlText != "" { @@ -180,8 +160,6 @@ func (e *QueryExtractor) handleClientRequest(payload []byte) { e.recordLiteral("ROLLBACK") return } - // FETCH packets are intentionally not surfaced — they correlate to a still-pending - // SELECT and we want responses to attribute back to that, not to the FETCH itself. } func findBytePair(data []byte, b1, b2 byte) int { @@ -199,15 +177,9 @@ func (e *QueryExtractor) recordLiteral(sql string) { e.pair.mu.Unlock() } -// tryExtractSQL scans an OALL8 payload for the SQL statement. The OALL8 wire format -// has variable-length headers that differ across client drivers and bind patterns, so -// we use a simple heuristic rather than structured parsing: find the longest run of -// printable ASCII bytes ≥ 4 chars long. In practice the SQL text is always the -// longest such run in the payload. Lenient by design — we'd rather miss a query than -// crash on a bind-param shape we didn't anticipate. +// tryExtractSQL uses a longest-printable-run heuristic because OALL8 headers +// vary across client drivers and bind patterns. func tryExtractSQL(r *TTCReader) string { - // Pull the remaining bytes from the reader. - // r.buf is private; use a Remaining-check-plus-GetBytes dance. remaining := r.Remaining() if remaining <= 0 { return "" @@ -219,8 +191,6 @@ func tryExtractSQL(r *TTCReader) string { return longestPrintableRun(buf) } -// longestPrintableRun returns the longest contiguous run of printable ASCII (0x20..0x7E -// plus tab/newline/CR) in data, provided it's at least 4 chars. Otherwise returns "". func longestPrintableRun(data []byte) string { bestStart, bestLen := 0, 0 curStart, curLen := 0, 0 @@ -246,9 +216,6 @@ func longestPrintableRun(data []byte) string { } func (e *QueryExtractor) handleServerResponse(payload []byte) { - // If we have a pending client query, emit one log entry with a best-effort outcome - // derived from the response. Successful responses often contain an "OK" at opcode - // 0x04 with returnCode == 0; error responses contain non-zero returnCode. e.pair.mu.Lock() pending := e.pair.pending e.pair.pending = nil @@ -267,8 +234,6 @@ func (e *QueryExtractor) handleServerResponse(payload []byte) { } } -// extractResponseOutcome scans the server response for either an OError packet (opcode -// 0x04) or a row-count in a status KV. Returns "OK", "ERROR: ORA-XXXX: ..." or "". func extractResponseOutcome(payload []byte) string { r := NewTTCReader(payload) for r.Remaining() > 0 { @@ -276,8 +241,7 @@ func extractResponseOutcome(payload []byte) string { if err != nil { break } - if op == 0x04 { // summary / error - // Skip a few fields; return code is the 4th compressed int. + if op == 0x04 { for i := 0; i < 3; i++ { if _, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true); err != nil { return "OK" @@ -308,5 +272,5 @@ func ora(code int) string { case 28000: return "ERROR: ORA-28000: the account is locked" } - return "ERROR" + return fmt.Sprintf("ERROR: ORA-%05d", code) } diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go index 24afdc7b..93d01f54 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/tns.go @@ -1,12 +1,3 @@ -// Portions of this file are adapted from github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2, -// licensed under MIT. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. -// Original sources: -// network/packets.go, network/connect_packet.go, network/accept_packet.go, -// network/data_packet.go, network/marker_packet.go, network/refuse_packet.go -// Modifications for server-side use by Infisical: field accessors exported, -// added reader/writer helpers operating directly on io.Reader / io.Writer, -// removed Session/trace/encryption coupling (handled separately by the gateway). - package oracle import ( @@ -28,16 +19,7 @@ const ( PacketTypeMarker PacketType = 12 ) -// TNS header is always 8 bytes. Length field is uint16 before handshakeComplete+v315, -// uint32 afterwards. For server-side use the simple rule is: CONNECT / ACCEPT / REFUSE / -// early MARKER use 16-bit length; post-ACCEPT (nego onwards) use 32-bit length when the -// negotiated version is >= 315. Callers pass use32BitLen explicitly so we don't carry -// hidden state. - -// ReadPacketHeader reads the 8-byte TNS header and returns the parsed fields plus the -// full raw header bytes (so the caller can dispatch on PacketType and pass the full packet -// bytes to the type-specific parser). It reads the remaining payload into the returned -// buffer whose first 8 bytes are the header. +// use32BitLen: 32-bit length framing after ACCEPT (version >= 315), 16-bit before. func ReadFullPacket(r io.Reader, use32BitLen bool) ([]byte, error) { head := make([]byte, 8) if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, head); err != nil { @@ -52,7 +34,7 @@ func ReadFullPacket(r io.Reader, use32BitLen bool) ([]byte, error) { if length < 8 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid TNS packet length: %d", length) } - if length > 1<<22 { // 4MB ceiling — Oracle SDU is 16-bit, but 32-bit length can go larger post-handshake + if length > 1<<22 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("TNS packet too large: %d", length) } buf := make([]byte, length) @@ -72,8 +54,6 @@ func PacketTypeOf(packet []byte) PacketType { return PacketType(packet[4]) } -// DataPacket wraps a single TNS DATA frame, without any ANO encryption/hash (the gateway -// refuses ANO so we never deal with those on the client-facing leg). type DataPacket struct { DataFlag uint16 Payload []byte @@ -89,7 +69,6 @@ func ParseDataPacket(raw []byte, use32BitLen bool) (*DataPacket, error) { }, nil } -// Bytes serializes a DATA packet. use32BitLen must match the negotiated version (>= 315). func (d *DataPacket) Bytes(use32BitLen bool) []byte { length := uint32(10 + len(d.Payload)) out := make([]byte, length) @@ -99,14 +78,12 @@ func (d *DataPacket) Bytes(use32BitLen bool) []byte { binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(length)) } out[4] = byte(PacketTypeData) - out[5] = 0 // flag + out[5] = 0 binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[8:], d.DataFlag) copy(out[10:], d.Payload) return out } -// RefusePacket is the server's polite "no" to an incoming CONNECT (pre-ACCEPT). Used for -// upstream-failure reporting. type RefusePacket struct { UserReason uint8 SystemReason uint8 @@ -127,8 +104,6 @@ func (r *RefusePacket) Bytes() []byte { return out } -// WriteRefuseToClient is a convenience: build and write a REFUSE packet. The message -// should look like "(ERR=...)(ERROR_STACK=...)" so clients surface it as an Oracle error. func WriteRefuseToClient(w io.Writer, message string) error { pkt := &RefusePacket{ UserReason: 0, diff --git a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go index a29ebc69..30461e59 100644 --- a/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go +++ b/packages/pam/handlers/oracle/ttc.go @@ -1,9 +1,3 @@ -// Portions of this file are adapted from github.com/sijms/go-ora/v2, -// licensed under MIT. Copyright (c) 2020 Samy Sultan. -// Original: network/session.go codec helpers (PutUint/PutInt/PutClr/PutKeyVal/Get*). -// Modifications: lifted out as stateless helpers over bytes.Buffer / []byte cursor so -// the gateway can build and parse TTC payloads without owning a full go-ora Session. - package oracle import ( @@ -13,13 +7,8 @@ import ( "io" ) -// TTCBuilder accumulates a TTC payload to be placed inside a DATA packet body. -// The resulting bytes go through Bytes() and are then embedded in a DataPacket. type TTCBuilder struct { - buf bytes.Buffer - // useBigClrChunks mirrors go-ora's Session.UseBigClrChunks flag. Enabled when - // ServerCompileTimeCaps[37]&32 != 0 (true for 12c+). Since we always negotiate a 19c - // profile as the server, we can leave this true. + buf bytes.Buffer useBigClrChunks bool clrChunkSize int } @@ -94,8 +83,6 @@ func (b *TTCBuilder) PutInt(num int64, size uint8, bigEndian, compress bool) { b.PutUint(uint64(num), size, bigEndian, false) } -// PutClr writes a chunked variable-length byte array. 1-byte length for short, 0xFE -// prefix + multi-chunk for long, matching go-ora's Session.PutClr. func (b *TTCBuilder) PutClr(data []byte) { dataLen := len(data) if dataLen == 0 { @@ -128,7 +115,6 @@ func (b *TTCBuilder) PutClr(data []byte) { func (b *TTCBuilder) PutString(s string) { b.PutClr([]byte(s)) } -// PutKeyVal writes key + val + flag. This is the core TTC KVP format used for auth info. func (b *TTCBuilder) PutKeyVal(key, val []byte, num uint32) { if len(key) == 0 { b.buf.WriteByte(0) @@ -149,8 +135,6 @@ func (b *TTCBuilder) PutKeyValString(key, val string, num uint32) { b.PutKeyVal([]byte(key), []byte(val), num) } -// TTCReader walks a TTC payload (the body of a DATA packet) and exposes the same codec -// as go-ora's Session, sans the network plumbing. type TTCReader struct { buf []byte pos int @@ -163,8 +147,6 @@ func NewTTCReader(payload []byte) *TTCReader { func (r *TTCReader) Remaining() int { return len(r.buf) - r.pos } -// Pos returns the current byte offset into the payload. Useful when a caller needs -// to slice the original payload at a field boundary discovered during parsing. func (r *TTCReader) Pos() int { return r.pos } func (r *TTCReader) read(n int) ([]byte, error) { @@ -184,10 +166,6 @@ func (r *TTCReader) GetByte() (uint8, error) { return b[0], nil } -// PeekByte returns the next byte without advancing the position. Returns 0 and -// io.ErrUnexpectedEOF if the reader is exhausted. Callers should only rely on -// this for format-sniffing decisions (e.g., distinguishing a length-prefixed -// string from a raw string when clients differ in encoding). func (r *TTCReader) PeekByte() (uint8, error) { if r.pos >= len(r.buf) { return 0, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF @@ -249,7 +227,6 @@ func (r *TTCReader) GetInt(size int, compress, bigEndian bool) (int, error) { return int(v), err } -// GetClr reads variable-length byte data. func (r *TTCReader) GetClr() ([]byte, error) { nb, err := r.GetByte() if err != nil { @@ -292,14 +269,12 @@ func (r *TTCReader) GetClr() ([]byte, error) { return buf.Bytes(), nil } -// GetDlc reads a length-prefixed variable-length byte array. func (r *TTCReader) GetDlc() ([]byte, error) { length, err := r.GetInt(4, true, true) if err != nil { return nil, err } if length <= 0 { - // length prefix = 0, but we still need to consume the CLR body (single zero byte). _, _ = r.GetClr() return nil, nil } From a8a0e2f54cc8cdcf4b6399a75af7717b24e7c558 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saif <11242541+saifsmailbox98@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 00:18:23 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 21/21] chore(pam-oracle): remove redundant banner comment and auth note --- packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go b/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go index 7ab325b0..f7e607db 100644 --- a/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go +++ b/packages/pam/local/database-proxy.go @@ -127,12 +127,8 @@ func StartDatabaseLocalProxy(accessToken string, accessParams PAMAccessParams, p case session.ResourceTypeMongodb: util.PrintfStderr("mongodb://localhost:%d/%s?serverSelectionTimeoutMS=15000", proxy.port, database) case session.ResourceTypeOracle: - // The gateway rewrites the username in the O5Logon exchange to the real DB - // user, so the client can (and should) connect using the Infisical account - // name. Keeps the UX consistent with the "Account:" label above. util.PrintfStderr("oracle://%s:%s@localhost:%d/%s", accessParams.AccountName, oracle.ProxyPasswordPlaceholder, proxy.port, database) util.PrintfStderr("\n\nNote: the password shown is a protocol placeholder required by Oracle, not a secret.") - util.PrintfStderr("\nReal authentication is handled by the local proxy.") default: util.PrintfStderr("localhost:%d", proxy.port) }