diff --git a/architecture/security-policy.md b/architecture/security-policy.md
index efbcee76..ccf9d411 100644
--- a/architecture/security-policy.md
+++ b/architecture/security-policy.md
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ If any condition fails, the proxy returns `403 Forbidden`.
 7. Rewrites the request: absolute-form → origin-form (`GET /path HTTP/1.1`), strips hop-by-hop headers, adds `Via: 1.1 openshell-sandbox` and `Connection: close`
 8. Forwards the rewritten request, then relays bidirectionally using `tokio::io::copy_bidirectional` (supports chunked transfer, SSE streams, and other long-lived responses with no idle timeout)
 
-**V1 simplifications**: Forward proxy v1 injects `Connection: close` (no keep-alive) and does not perform L7 inspection on the forwarded traffic. Every forward proxy connection handles exactly one request-response exchange.
+**V1 simplifications**: Forward proxy v1 injects `Connection: close` (no keep-alive) and does not perform L7 inspection on the forwarded traffic. To avoid bypassing endpoint L7 rules, forward proxy requests are rejected when the matched endpoint has L7 configuration; use CONNECT for those endpoints. Every forward proxy connection handles exactly one request-response exchange.
 
 **Implementation**: See `crates/openshell-sandbox/src/proxy.rs` -- `handle_forward_proxy()`, `parse_proxy_uri()`, `rewrite_forward_request()`.
 
diff --git a/crates/openshell-sandbox/src/proxy.rs b/crates/openshell-sandbox/src/proxy.rs
index 6fe26b37..dfb9e7da 100644
--- a/crates/openshell-sandbox/src/proxy.rs
+++ b/crates/openshell-sandbox/src/proxy.rs
@@ -1647,6 +1647,43 @@ async fn handle_forward_proxy(
     };
     let policy_str = matched_policy.as_deref().unwrap_or("-");
 
+    // Forward proxy requests are parsed and rewritten before relay, so they
+    // cannot safely enter the CONNECT-style per-request L7 inspection loop.
+    // Deny here when endpoint-level L7 rules are configured to avoid bypassing
+    // method/path policy enforcement.
+    if query_l7_config(&opa_engine, &decision, &host_lc, port).is_some() {
+        let reason = "forward proxy is not allowed for endpoints with L7 policy; use CONNECT";
+        info!(
+            src_addr = %peer_addr.ip(),
+            src_port = peer_addr.port(),
+            proxy_addr = %local_addr,
+            dst_host = %host_lc,
+            dst_port = port,
+            method = %method,
+            path = %path,
+            binary = %binary_str,
+            binary_pid = %pid_str,
+            ancestors = %ancestors_str,
+            cmdline = %cmdline_str,
+            action = "deny",
+            engine = "opa",
+            policy = %policy_str,
+            reason = %reason,
+            "FORWARD",
+        );
+        emit_denial_simple(
+            denial_tx,
+            &host_lc,
+            port,
+            &binary_str,
+            &decision,
+            reason,
+            "forward_l7",
+        );
+        respond(client, b"HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\r\n\r\n").await?;
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
     // 5. DNS resolution + SSRF defence (mirrors the CONNECT path logic).
     //    - If allowed_ips is set: validate resolved IPs against the allowlist
     //      (this is the SSRF override for private IP destinations).