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    <title>OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference</title>
    <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/</link>
    <description>Recent content on OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Internet Censorship in Pakistan: Findings from 2014-2017</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/</guid>
      <description>Islamabad: Political dissent in Pakistan under threat, government censors online content - PC: Haroon Baloch
A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Bytes for All Pakistan.
Table of contents
 Key Findings
 Introduction
 Background
 Network landscape and internet penetration
 Legal environment
 Freedom of expression
 Press freedom
 Access to information
 Privacy and digital surveillance
 Censorship
  Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Evidence of Internet Censorship during Catalonia&#39;s Independence Referendum</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/internet-censorship-catalonia-independence-referendum/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/internet-censorship-catalonia-independence-referendum/</guid>
      <description>Image: Catalan Independence Referendum site seized
Two days ago, Catalonia held a referendum seeking independence from Spain. As the world awaits to see what happens next, we publish this post to share evidence of recent censorship events that occurred during and leading up to the referendum.
We confirm the blocking of at least 25 sites related to the Catalan referendum by means of DNS tampering and HTTP blocking, based on OONI Probe network measurements collected from three local networks.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Internet Censorship in Iran: Network Measurement Findings from 2014-2017</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 Sep 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/</guid>
      <description>Image: Blockpage in Iran
A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), ASL19, ARTICLE 19, and Small Media.
Table of contents
 Key Findings
 Introduction
 Background
 Network landscape
 Internet use
 Legal environment
 Reported cases of internet censorship
  Methodology: Measuring internet censorship in Iran
 Review of the Citizen Lab&amp;rsquo;s test list for Iran
 OONI network measurement testing</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OONI Run: Let&#39;s fight internet censorship together!</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-run/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 27 Sep 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-run/</guid>
      <description>Today we released OONI Run, a website linked to an exciting new OONI Probe mobile app feature that enables you to:
 Engage your friends (and the world) to run censorship measurement tests
 Monitor the blocking of your website around the world
  OONI Run includes a variety of OONI Probe software testsdesigned to:
 Test the blocking of websites
 Find middleboxes
 Measure the speed and performance of networks</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Measuring Internet Censorship in Cuba&#39;s ParkNets</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Aug 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/</guid>
      <description>Image by Arturo Filastò (CC-BY-SA-3.0)  A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
View the pdf version of the report here.
Table of contents
 Key Findings
 Introduction
 Background
 Network landscape and internet penetration
 ETECSA
 ParkNets
 Joven Club
 StreetNets
 El Paquete
 Summary
  Measuring Internet Censorship in Cuba
 Methodology
 Collection and analysis of ooniprobe network measurements</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>DASH Streaming Test</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/dash/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Jul 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/dash/</guid>
      <description>DASH Streaming Test DASH is designed to measure the quality of tested networks by emulating a video streaming. This test is called DASH because it uses the DASH (Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP) streaming technique.
Running this test can be useful to understand the baseline streaming performance of a specific network connection. It measures video-related metrics as well as network metrics that are key to understand the reason of performance issues.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OONI Partner Gathering 2017</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Jul 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/</guid>
      <description>Two weeks ago we hosted the first OONI Partner Gathering in Toronto, Canada. This report provides an overview of the event, partner needs and challenges, and future goals to address them.
View the pdf version of the report here.
 About
 Objectives
 Sessions
 Day 1 - 10th July 2017
 Day 2 - 11th July 2017
  Inclusiveness
 Challenges and needs
 Future goals and priorities</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>#EgyptCensors: Evidence of recent censorship events in Egypt</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/egypt-censors/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Jun 2017 15:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/egypt-censors/</guid>
      <description>Country: Egypt
OONI tests: Web Connectivity, HTTP Header Field Manipulation, HTTP Invalid Request Line, HTTP Host, Vanilla Tor.
Probed ISPs: Link Egypt (AS24863), Vodafone Egypt (AS36935), Telecom Egypt (AS8452).
Analysis period: 23rd May 2017 to 17th June 2017.
Censorship method: Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) used to RESET connections.
Starting on May 24th, the Egyptian government ordered ISPs to block at least 21 news websites on the grounds of “supporting terrorism and spreading lies”.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>The State of Internet Censorship in Indonesia</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 May 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/</guid>
      <description>Image: Block page in Indonesia
A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Sinar Project.
Table of contents
 Key Findings
 Introduction
 Background
 Network landscape and internet penetration
 Legal environment
 Freedom of expression
 Press freedom
 Access to information
 Privacy
 Censorship and surveillance
  Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance
 Examining internet censorship in Indonesia</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OONI at the CryptoRave 2017</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-cryptorave-2017/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 May 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-cryptorave-2017/</guid>
      <description>CryptoRave is a free, non-commercial and collectively funded 48 hour event featuring talks, workshops and activities related to security, privacy, anonymity, hacking and freedom of expression that attracts more that 2,500 people mainly from South America. The event took place in São Paulo, Brazil on 5th and 6th May 2017.
A number of people attended the OONI presentation and workshop (&amp;ldquo;Listatona&amp;rdquo;) that was co-organized with Coding Rights. During the workshop participants were able to better understand OONI&amp;rsquo;s testing methodology, and how ooniprobe performs network measurements.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OONI at the Internet Freedom Festival &amp; RightsCon 2017</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-iff-rightscon/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Apr 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-iff-rightscon/</guid>
      <description>Over the last month the OONI team joined the internet freedom community at the following events:
 Vietnam Cyber Dialogue (VCD)
 Internet Freedom Festival (IFF)
 Iran Cyber Dialogue (ICD)
 RightsCon 2017
 International Journalism Festival (IJF)
  These events provided us with the opportunity to engage with community members, create new friendships, learn about new projects, and to share skills and knowledge. We also had the opportunity to facilitate sessions that allowed us to collect feedback for the improvement of our software and research methodologies.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>The State of Internet Censorship in Myanmar</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/myanmar-report/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Mar 2017 13:31:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/myanmar-report/</guid>
      <description>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), Sinar Project, and the Myanmar ICT for Development Organization (MIDO).
Table of contents
 Key Findings
 Introduction
 Background
 Network landscape and internet penetration
 Legal environment
 Freedom of expression
 Press freedom
 Access to information
 Privacy
 Censorship and surveillance
  Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance
 Examining internet censorship in Myanmar</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Examining internet blackouts through public data sources</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/examining-internet-blackouts/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Mar 2017 16:39:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/examining-internet-blackouts/</guid>
      <description>Pulling the plug on the internet is one of the ways that governments around the world attempt to exert control over the flow of information.
While the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) project has developed numerous software tests for examining different forms of internet censorship (such as the blocking of websites, instant messaging apps, and censorship circumvention tools), we currently do not have tests that are designed to examine internet blackouts, when the internet as a whole is rendered inaccessible within a location.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>The State of Internet Censorship in Thailand</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 20 Mar 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/</guid>
      <description>Image: Block page in Thailand
A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), Sinar Project, and the Thai Netizen Network.
Table of contents
 Key Findings
 Introduction
 Background
 Network landscape and internet penetration
 Legal environment
 Freedom of expression
 Press freedom
 Access to information
 Privacy
 Censorship and surveillance
  Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance
 Examining internet censorship in Thailand</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>New ooniprobe Mobile App: Measure Internet Censorship &amp; Performance</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-mobile-app/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-mobile-app/</guid>
      <description>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) project is thrilled to announce the release of a new mobile app (“ooniprobe - Measure Internet Censorship &amp;amp; Performance”) that can now be installed on Android and iOS for testing Internet censorship and network performance.
     By running the tests included in OONI’s mobile app, you can monitor:
 Blocking of websites; Presence of systems that could be responsible for censorship or surveillance; Speed and performance of your network.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Kenya: Censorship-free internet?</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/kenya-study/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/kenya-study/</guid>
      <description>Over the last five months we ran OONI tests in Kenya almost every day to examine whether internet censorship events were occurring in the country. Hundreds of thousands of network measurements were collected and analyzed. 1,357 URLs were tested for censorship, including both international websites and sites that are more relevant to Kenya (e.g. local news outlets). Yet, after five months of intensive testing from four local vantage points in Kenya, we found almost no signs of internet censorship in the country.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>The State of Internet Censorship in Malaysia</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/malaysia-report/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/malaysia-report/</guid>
      <description>Block page in Malaysia
A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Sinar Project.
Table of contents
 Key Findings
 Introduction
 Background
 Network landscape and internet penetration
 Legal environment
 Freedom of expression
 Press freedom
 Access to information
 Privacy
 Censorship and surveillance
  Previous cases of internet censorship and surveillance
 Examining internet censorship in Malaysia</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>New OONI tests examine the blocking of WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/whatsapp-and-facebook-tests/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/whatsapp-and-facebook-tests/</guid>
      <description>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) project is excited to announce the release of two new software tests which are designed to examine the blocking of WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger. You can now run these tests to monitor the accessibility of these apps across time, and to collect data that can serve as evidence when/if they are blocked.
WhatsApp test Many of our users have asked us to develop a test to examine the accessibility of WhatsApp, especially in light of it being blocked by various governments around the world during elections, protests, and other political events.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Ethiopia: Evidence of social media blocking and internet censorship</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ethiopia-report/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 14 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ethiopia-report/</guid>
      <description>Youth in Addis trying to get Wi-Fi Connection. Credit Addis Fortune Newspaper
Recently we published a post about what appeared to be a possible internet shutdown in Ethiopia during a wave of ongoing protests by ethnic groups. Today, in collaboration with Amnesty International we are releasing a report that includes evidence of recent censorship events during Ethiopia’s political upheaval.
View the pdf version of the report here.
Country: Ethiopia</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OONI releases new web UI: Run censorship tests from your web browser!</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/web-ui-post/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/web-ui-post/</guid>
      <description>Today we are excited to announce the beta release of our new web-based user interface (WUI) that enables ooniprobe users to run censorship tests from a web browser!
Whether you’re running ooniprobe from your desktop or a Raspberry Pi, you can now easily choose which tests you want to run through OONI’s web UI and run them with the click of a button. These tests are designed to examine the following:</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>The Gambia: Internet Shutdown during 2016 Presidential Election</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/gambia-internet-shutdown/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 09 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/gambia-internet-shutdown/</guid>
      <description>Last week we attempted to perform OONI network measurement tests in the Gambia to examine whether websites were blocked during its 2016 presidential election. But merely a few hours after we connected our probe to perform tests, it stopped working completely.
We suspected that this was due to an internet shutdown. To confirm this, we referred to third-party data to examine whether a country-wide internet blackout was taking place.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>urandom.pcap: Belarus (finally) bans Tor</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/belarus-fries-onion/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 08 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/belarus-fries-onion/</guid>
      <description>Country: Belarus
Probed ISPs: Beltelecom (AS 6697)
Censorship method: TCP injections
We have recently heard of network anomalies in Belarus. Tor has been finally blocked in December 2016, although it had been explicitly declared that Tor should be blocked since February 2015.
An anonymous cypherpunk has helped to gather some evidence regarding Tor being blocked in Belarus. It&amp;rsquo;s neither a complete study nor an in-depth research and it&amp;rsquo;s unclear if any other further evidence will be gathered, so we decided to share current knowledge as-is:</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OONI releases Lepidopter Raspberry Pi distribution</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/lepidopter/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 07 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/lepidopter/</guid>
      <description>The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) team is happy to announce the beta release of ooniprobe&amp;rsquo;s distribution for Raspberry Pis, caĺled Lepidopter.
What is Lepidopter Lepidopter is a Raspberry Pi distribution image with all the required dependencies and software packages in place, configured to run network measurement tests via the ooniprobe software. It is developed and designed to require no physical attendance upon first bootstrap but also allows experienced users to further configure it as they wish.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OONI-dev meeting and hackathon 2016</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-dev-and-hackathon-2016/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Nov 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-dev-and-hackathon-2016/</guid>
      <description>Oonitarians are spread out across the globe, and OONI’s core team is no exception. We recently met in Berlin to hack on OONI’s software, work on our roadmap, and to have all those discussions that are more fruitful to have in person than on IRC. We also held a hackathon to engage new individuals with our project!
Below we document some of the things that we worked on as part of our OONI-dev meeting and hackathon.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Egypt: Media censorship, Tor interference, HTTPS throttling and ads injections?</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/egypt-network-interference/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/egypt-network-interference/</guid>
      <description>Country: Egypt
Probed ISPs: Noor (AS 20928), TE Data (AS 8452), Vodafone (AS 24835)
Censorship method: DPI, network throttling, TCP injections
OONI tests: HTTP Requests, Web Connectivity, Vanilla Tor
Measurement period: 2016-08-27 - 2016-10-26
We recently noticed network anomalies in Egypt and performed a study in an attempt to understand the situation.
Our findings indicate that the Tor anonymity network appeared to be interfered with in Egypt, while HTTPS connections to DigitalOcean&amp;rsquo;s Frankfurt data centre were throttled.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OONI Hackathon: Join us to explore internet censorship!</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/berlin-hackathon-2016/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/berlin-hackathon-2016/</guid>
      <description>Interested in exploring (and exposing) internet censorship? Join the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) hackathon in Berlin!
 When? Friday, 11th November &amp;amp; Saturday, 12th November 2016
 Where? The OnionSpace (Gottschedstraße 4, 13357 Berlin, Germany)
 What time? 10am onwards
 Who? Software developers, data analysts, academics, journalists, bloggers, lawyers, activists, and all those who don’t go by any particular label, but are curious enough to join! We only have one rule: Be excellent to each other.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Zambia: Internet censorship during the 2016 general elections?</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2016 10:52:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/</guid>
      <description>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Strathmore University’s Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT).
Table of contents
 Key Findings
 Introduction
 Background
 Network landscape and internet penetration
 Legal environment
 Freedom of expression
 Press freedom
 Access to information
 Privacy
 Censorship and surveillance
  Previous cases of internet censorship and surveillance
 Zambia’s 2016 general elections and constitutional referendum</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Ethiopia: Internet Shutdown Amidst Recent Protests?</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ethiopia-internet-shutdown-amidst-recent-protests/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Aug 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ethiopia-internet-shutdown-amidst-recent-protests/</guid>
      <description>Nearly 100 deaths and thousands of arrests have been reported in Ethiopia over the last days, as part of protests against the marginalization and persecution of the Oromos and Amharas, Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups. But the attacks and arrests may not have been the only forms of retribution carried out by the Ethiopian government in its crackdown against protesters.
Last weekend, the internet was reportedly shut down in the country.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Internet Access Disruption in Turkey - July 2016</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/turkey-internet-access-disruption/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Jul 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/turkey-internet-access-disruption/</guid>
      <description>With the attempted coup in Turkey, reports went out about social media being throttled and/or blocked. We analysed data about this that we collected with RIPE Atlas and the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI).
On 15 July, a coup was attempted in Turkey. We heard about social media being throttled and/or blocked, but much was unclear about what was actually going on. Here we present measurement data from various platforms that shared their data publicly.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Lepidopter Installation: Help Guides and Resources</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/install/lepidopter/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jun 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/install/lepidopter/</guid>
      <description>Lepidopter guide This guide explains step-by-step how to run OONI tests from a Raspberry Pi.
The code of the image as well as the build script can be found in the git repository.
Some compact documentation on how to install, build, copy to an SD card and run Lepidopter in QEMU is described here.
About Lepidopter Lepidopter is an ooniprobe distribution for Raspberry Pis.
This enables users to contribute to the collection of network measurements consistently across time, without having to manually run ooniprobe from their computers and regardless of their technical skills.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OONI releases new Web Connectivity test for detecting online censorship</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/web-connectivity/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jun 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/web-connectivity/</guid>
      <description>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) is excited to be releasing a brand new test, called Web Connectivity, which is designed to detect three different types of censorship: DNS tampering, TCP/IP blocking and HTTP blocking.
Advantages of running Web Connectivity This test allows us to see which websites are blocked and how, more accurately than ever before!
Previously we relied on running separate (http_request, dns_consistency and tcp_connect) tests with the aim of identifying various forms of censorship.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>How Uganda blocked social media, again</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/uganda-social-media-blocked/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/uganda-social-media-blocked/</guid>
      <description>Country: Uganda
Probed ISPs: Orange (AS36991), SMILE (AS37122)
Censorship method: IP blocking
OONI tests: HTTP Requests
Measurement period: 2016-05-12
Last Wednesday, the Ugandan Communications Commission (UCC) ordered ISPs to block access to social media leading up to the (fifth) inauguration of President Yoweri Museveni, who has governed the country since 1986. Authorities argued that the blocking was ordered for “security purposes”, but the move directly harms political opposition, which has relied on social media to organize a “defiance campaign” of protests.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OONI Data Reveals How WhatsApp Was Blocked (Again) in Brazil</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/brazil-whatsapp-block/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 May 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/brazil-whatsapp-block/</guid>
      <description>Country: Brazil
Probed ISPs: Tim mobile (AS 26615), Oi landline (AS 7738)
Censorship method: DNS Hijacking
OONI tests: HTTP Requests, DNS Consistency
Measurement period: 2016-05-02 - 2016-05-03
19:10 UTC Saturday, 7 May 2016 Update: Add OONI Explorer measurements links
Ever since WhatsApp implemented end-to-end encryption to protect the privacy and security of its 1 billion users worldwide, several cases of censorship have been ordered by governments who are frustrated with the fact that they can no longer access users&amp;rsquo; private communications.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>EEEP and Greek Internet censorship</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/eeep-greek-censorship/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/eeep-greek-censorship/</guid>
      <description>Country: Greece
Probed ISPs: Forthnet, Ote, Cyta, Wind, Vodafone, Cosmote, Wind mobile
Blocking methods: DPI, DNS Hijacking, HTTP proxy
Measurement period: June - July 2014
19:40 UTC Saturday, 17 June 2016 Update: Add AS numbers of the ISPs, update raw measurement data URLs.
The newly formed Independent Administrative Authority&amp;rsquo;s Hellenic Gaming Commission acts as the public body responsible for the control and supervision of gambling services in Greece and published a blacklist of websites that are offering unlicensed gambling and betting services to Greek internet users.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Zambia, a country under Deep Packet Inspection</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/zambia/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jul 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/zambia/</guid>
      <description>&amp;ldquo;I do not have the details of the blocking of Zambianwatchdog.com, but I would celebrate.&amp;rdquo; Guy Scott Zambian Vicepresident, Friday 28th June 2013
The following article is a guest blog post by Mr T. an independent researcher and provider of hosting to various grass roots organizations.
This article summarizes how we discovered that the grass roots online newspaper Zambianwatchdog.com was being blocked inside Zambia. This report provides technical evidence of the unlawful presence of Deep Packet Inspection in the country to monitor the Internet communications and stop users from browsing the website.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Tab-Tab, Come in! Bypassing Internet blocking to categorize DPI devices</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/tab-tab-come-in/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/tab-tab-come-in/</guid>
      <description>Motivation During the past two years, we have been following the technical developments in Internet filtering in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Internet users were reporting that some websites were blocked, connections were reseted and in some cases users were redirected to another website.
Apart from our technical curiosity of how Internet filtering is implemented at large scale and how it can be circumvented, we are interested in providing technical facts of how blocking is taking place.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Hadara Palestine</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/hadara-palestine/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/hadara-palestine/</guid>
      <description>ooni_test: HTTP Host
country: Palestine
provider: Hadara, Paltel
product: Squid
product_website: http://www.squid-cache.org/
censorship method: Transparent HTTP proxy
downloads:
 Full scan result List of censored sites  This is the technical report on the politically motivated censorship going on in Bethlehem, West Bank.
These are the networks in question:
inetnum: 82.205.96.0 - 82.205.103.255 netname: GZ-HOME-BR1 descr: GAZA BSA HOME country: PS admin-c: WK4085-RIPE tech-c: HT1472-RIPE status: ASSIGNED PA mnt-by: Palnet-mnt source: RIPE # Filtered inetnum: 212.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>T-Mobile USA Web Guard</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/t-mobile-usa-web-guard/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Mar 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/post/t-mobile-usa-web-guard/</guid>
      <description>ooni_test: HTTP Host
country: United States
provider: T-Mobile USA
product: Web Guard
product_website: http://support.t-mobile.com/docs/DOC-2144
censorship_method: Transparent HTTP proxy
downloads:
 Full scan result List of censored sites Categories of censored sites  T-Mobile USA offers a &amp;ldquo;feature&amp;rdquo; to restrict access to certain kinds of content. This is called Web Guard. Supposedly Web Guard is supposed to inhibit access to content that falls under the following categories: Alcohol, Mature Content, Violence, Drugs, Pornography, Weapons, Gambling, Suicide, Guns, Hate, Tobacco, Ammunition.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>HTTP Requests</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/http-requests/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 0003 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/http-requests/</guid>
      <description>HTTP Requests This test tries to detect online censorship based on a comparison of HTTP requests over Tor and over the network of the user.
HTTP is a protocol which allows communication between a client and a server. It does so by handling a client&amp;rsquo;s request to connect to a server, and a server&amp;rsquo;s response to a client&amp;rsquo;s request. Every time you connect to a website, your browser (the client) sends a request through the HTTP protocol to the server which is hosting that website.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>HTTP Host</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/http-host/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 0002 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/http-host/</guid>
      <description>HTTP Host This test attempts to:
 examine whether the domain names of websites are blocked
 detect the presence of “middle boxes” (software which could be used for censorship and/or traffic manipulation) in tested networks
 assess which censorship circumvention techniques are capable of bypassing the censorship implemented by the “middle box”
  HTTP is a protocol which transfers or exchanges data across the internet. It does so by handling a client&amp;rsquo;s request to connect to a server, and a server&amp;rsquo;s response to a client&amp;rsquo;s request.</description>
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    <item>
      <title></title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/about/data-policy/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/about/data-policy/</guid>
      <description>OONI Data Policy Last modified: July 17, 2017
Version: 1.1.0
This Data Policy discloses and explains what data the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) project (&amp;ldquo;we&amp;rdquo;, &amp;ldquo;us&amp;rdquo;, or &amp;ldquo;our&amp;rdquo;) collects, processes, stores and publishes relating to users of its website and its ooniprobe software (&amp;ldquo;you&amp;rdquo; or &amp;ldquo;your&amp;rdquo;).
WARNING:
Our ooniprobe software is not designed to protect your privacy. You may face various risks such as fines, imprisonment, or other penalties for running ooniprobe.</description>
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    <item>
      <title></title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/about/inform-users-long/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/about/inform-users-long/</guid>
      <description>GOAL OONI is a project aimed at mapping network anomalies by performing measurements from the vantage point of a users. You may find details on what exactly it is that we measure by reading through our test specifications. The data we collect is then made available to the public for further analysis.
The goal of this study is to have a better understanding on how the internet works around the world and what is stopping it from working as it should.</description>
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    <item>
      <title></title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/about/inform-users-short/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/about/inform-users-short/</guid>
      <description>WARNING: Running OONI may be against the terms of service of your ISP or legally questionable in your country. By running OONI you will connect to web services which may be banned, and use web censorship circumvention methods such as Tor. The OONI project will publish data submitted by probes, possibly including your IP address or other identifying information. In addition, your use of OONI will be clear to anybody who has access to your computer, and to anybody who can monitor your internet connection (such as your employer, ISP or government).</description>
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    <item>
      <title></title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/about/risks/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/about/risks/</guid>
      <description>Risks: Things you should know before using ooniprobe To our knowledge, no ooniprobe user has ever faced consequences as a result of using our software. Therefore, the potential risks described below are theoretical and quite speculative. If you are running ooniprobe from a &amp;ldquo;high-risk environment&amp;rdquo;, we strongly encourage you to read all of the documentation below.
Summary of potential risks  Anyone monitoring your internet activity (e.g. ISP, government, employer) will be able to see that you are running ooniprobe;</description>
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    <item>
      <title></title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/data/content/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/data/content/</guid>
      <description>This URL is old Raw ooniprobe measurements now live at: https://measurements.ooni.torproject.org.
You can also explore the collected measurements via the OONI Explorer.
You should update your bookmarks and links accordingly.</description>
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    <item>
      <title></title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/faq/faq/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/faq/faq/</guid>
      <description>Frequently Asked Questions Below we include some questions that we are quite frequently asked. Hope this helps!
 OONI
 1. What does OONI&amp;rsquo;s software do?
 2. Who can run ooniprobe?
 3. How can I run ooniprobe?
 4. What does the default set of ooniprobe tests include?
 5. How can I choose which ooniprobe tests to run from the terminal?
 6. What are the risks of running ooniprobe?</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title></title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/</guid>
      <description>Contributing to Test Lists Censorship findings are only as interesting as the sites and services that you test.
We encourage you to suggest sites and services to test for censorship.
Please read the documentation below to contribute to community resources for censorship measurement research.
 What are test lists?
 Why contribute to test lists?
 Contributing to test lists
 Reviewing test lists
 Creating new test lists</description>
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    <item>
      <title>DNS consistency</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/dns-consistency/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/dns-consistency/</guid>
      <description>DNS consistency This test compares the DNS query results from a DNS resolver which is considered to be reliable with one that is tested for tampering.
The domain name system (DNS) is what is responsible for transforming a host name (e.g. torproject.org) into an IP address (e.g. 38.229.72.16). ISPs, amongst others, run DNS resolvers which map IP addresses to host names. In certain circumstances though, ISPs map the wrong IP addresses to the wrong host names.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Facebook Messenger test</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/facebook-messenger/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/facebook-messenger/</guid>
      <description>Facebook Messenger test This test is designed to examine the reachability of Facebook Messenger within a tested network.
OONI&amp;rsquo;s Facebook Messenger test attempts to perform a TCP connection and DNS lookup to Facebook&amp;rsquo;s endpoints over the vantage point of the user. Based on this methodology, Facebook Messenger is likely blocked if one or both of the following apply:
 TCP connections to Facebook&amp;rsquo;s endpoints fail
 DNS lookups to domains associated to Facebook do not resolve to IP addresses allocated to Facebook</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>HTTP Header Field Manipulation</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/http-header-field-manipulation/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/http-header-field-manipulation/</guid>
      <description>HTTP Header Field Manipulation This test tries to detect the presence of network components (“middle box”) which could be responsible for censorship and/or traffic manipulation.
HTTP is a protocol which transfers or exchanges data across the internet. It does so by handling a client&amp;rsquo;s request to connect to a server, and a server&amp;rsquo;s response to a client&amp;rsquo;s request. Every time you connect to a server, you (the client) send a request through the HTTP protocol to that server.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>HTTP invalid request line</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/http-invalid-request-line/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/http-invalid-request-line/</guid>
      <description>HTTP invalid request line This test tries to detect the presence of network components (“middle box”) which could be responsible for censorship and/or traffic manipulation.
Instead of sending a normal HTTP request, this test sends an invalid HTTP request line - containing an invalid HTTP version number, an invalid field count and a huge request method – to an echo service listening on the standard HTTP port. An echo service is a very useful debugging and measurement tool, which simply sends back to the originating source any data it receives.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Lantern</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/lantern/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/lantern/</guid>
      <description>Lantern This test provides an automated way of examining whether Lantern works in a tested network.
Lantern is a centralized and peer-to-peer proxy, which is used as a circumvention tool. It detects whether websites are blocked and, if so, it allows you to access them via Lantern servers or via the network of Lantern users.
This test runs Lantern and checks to see if it is working. If it&amp;rsquo;s able to connect to a Lantern server and reach a control website over it, then we consider that Lantern can be used for censorship circumvention within the tested network.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Meek Fronted Requests</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/meek-fronted-requests/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/meek-fronted-requests/</guid>
      <description>Meek Fronted Requests This test examines whether the domains used by Meek (a type of Tor bridge) work in tested networks.
Meek is a pluggable transport which uses non-blocked domains, such as google.com, awsstatic.com (Amazon cloud infrastructure) and ajax.aspnetcdn.com (Microsoft azure cloud infrastructure), to proxy its users over Tor to blocked websites, while hiding both the fact that they are connecting to such websites and how they are connecting to them.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>NDT Speed Test</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/ndt/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/ndt/</guid>
      <description>NDT Speed Test NDT (Network Diagnostic Test) is designed to measure the speed and performance of tested networks.
This network performance test was originally developed by The Internet2 Project and is currently maintained by Measurement Lab (M-Lab). NDT is designed to measure the speed and performance of networks by connecting to M-Lab servers close to the user, and by subsequently uploading and downloading random data. In doing so, NDT collects TCP/IP low level information that is useful to examining and characterizing the quality of the network path between the user and the mLab server.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OONI Partnership Program</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/get-involved/partnership-program/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/get-involved/partnership-program/</guid>
      <description>What is the OONI Partnership Program?
 What is the aim of the OONI Partnership Program?
 What does the OONI Partnership Program entail?
 Collecting ooniprobe network measurements
 Reviewing community resources for censorship measurement research
 Communicating internet censorship findings to the public
  Who can join the OONI Partnership Program?
 How can OONI support its partners?
  What is the OONI Partnership Program?</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Psiphon</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/psiphon/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/psiphon/</guid>
      <description>Psiphon This test provides an automated way of examining whether Psiphon works in a tested network.
Psiphon is a free and open source tool that utilises SSH, VPN and HTTP proxy technology for censorship circumvention.
This test runs Psiphon and checks to see if it is working. If it&amp;rsquo;s able to connect to a Psiphon server and reach a website over it, then we consider that Psiphon can be used for censorship circumvention within the tested network.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Telegram test</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/telegram/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/telegram/</guid>
      <description>Telegram test This test is designed to examine the reachability of Telegram&amp;rsquo;s app and web version within a tested network.
More specifically, this test attempts to perform an HTTP POST request, and establish a TCP connection to Telegram’s access points (DCs), as well as an HTTP GET request to Telegram&amp;rsquo;s web version (web.telegram.org) over the vantage point of the user. The test is triggered as blocking when connections to all access points defined in the test fail.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Tor Bridge Reachability</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/tor-bridge-reachability/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/tor-bridge-reachability/</guid>
      <description>Tor Bridge Reachability This test examines whether Tor bridges work in tested networks.
Tor is free and open source software which enables online anonymity and censorship circumvention. It was designed to bounce communications around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers around the world, thus hiding users&amp;rsquo; IP address and circumventing online tracking and censorship. However, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in various countries around the world are often ordered by their governments to block users&amp;rsquo; access to Tor.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Vanilla Tor</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/vanilla-tor/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/vanilla-tor/</guid>
      <description>Vanilla Tor This test examines the reachability of the Tor network (which is designed for online anonymity and censorship circumvention).
The Vanilla Tor test attempts to start a connection to the Tor network. If the test successfully bootstraps a connection within a predefined amount of seconds (300 by default), then Tor is considered to be reachable from the vantage point of the user. But if the test does not manage to establish a connection, then the Tor network is likely blocked within the tested network.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>WhatsApp test</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/whatsapp/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/whatsapp/</guid>
      <description>WhatsApp test This test is designed to examine the reachability of both WhatsApp&amp;rsquo;s app and the WhatsApp web version within a tested network.
OONI&amp;rsquo;s WhatsApp test attempts to perform an HTTP GET request, TCP connection and DNS lookup to WhatsApp’s endpoints, registration service and web version over the vantage point of the user. Based on this methodology, WhatsApp’s app is likely blocked if any of the following apply:
 TCP connections to WhatsApp&amp;rsquo;s endpoints fail;</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>ooniprobe: Installation guide</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/install/ooniprobe/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/install/ooniprobe/</guid>
      <description>The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) is a free software project under the Tor Project which aims to detect internet censorship, traffic manipulation and signs of surveillance around the world through the collection and processing of network measurements. Since late 2012, OONI has collected millions of network measurements across more than 100 countries around the world, shedding light on multiple cases of network interference.
ooniprobe is a program that users can run to probe their network and to collect data for the OONI project.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Web connectivity</title>
      <link>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/web-connectivity/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 0000 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/web-connectivity/</guid>
      <description>Web connectivity This test examines whether websites are reachable and if they are not, it attempts to determine whether access to them is blocked through DNS tampering, TCP connection RST/IP blocking or by a transparent HTTP proxy.
Specifically, this test is designed to perform the following:
 Resolver identification
 DNS lookup
 TCP connect
 HTTP GET request
  By default, this test performs the above (excluding the first step, which is performed only over the network of the user) both over a control server and over the network of the user.</description>
    </item>
    
  </channel>
</rss>