diff --git a/allways/chain_providers/base.py b/allways/chain_providers/base.py
index e36dbf8..af5292d 100644
--- a/allways/chain_providers/base.py
+++ b/allways/chain_providers/base.py
@@ -123,6 +123,16 @@ def verify_transaction(
             )
             return None
 
+        # A self-transfer (sender == recipient) is never a real swap leg: the
+        # paying and receiving parties are always distinct. Rejecting it blocks
+        # same-wallet A->A volume fakes; A->B self-flow is bounded economically.
+        if tx_info.sender and tx_info.sender == expected_recipient:
+            bt.logging.warning(
+                f'verify_transaction: self-transfer on tx {tx_hash[:16]}... '
+                f'(sender == recipient {expected_recipient}) — rejecting'
+            )
+            return None
+
         return tx_info
 
     @abstractmethod
diff --git a/allways/validator/axon_handlers.py b/allways/validator/axon_handlers.py
index 0fb2a0c..302a2bb 100644
--- a/allways/validator/axon_handlers.py
+++ b/allways/validator/axon_handlers.py
@@ -375,6 +375,15 @@ async def handle_swap_reserve(
                 f'miner_from={commitment.from_address} miner_to={commitment.to_address}'
             )
 
+            # A user address equal to one of the miner's committed addresses makes
+            # a swap leg a self-transfer (A->A) that delivers nothing. Reject early
+            # so a self-flow operator can't even hold the reservation.
+            if synapse.from_address in (commitment.from_address, commitment.to_address):
+                reject_synapse(
+                    synapse, 'Source address matches the miner commitment — self-transfers are not valid swaps', ctx
+                )
+                return synapse
+
             # Gate the user's quote against the rate read at reserve time, and
             # reject a tao_amount that doesn't match the submitted from/to legs.
             expected_to_amount = recompute_reserve_amounts(
@@ -631,6 +640,15 @@ async def handle_swap_confirm(
                 reject_synapse(synapse, 'Invalid destination address format', ctx)
                 return synapse
 
+            # Reject self-transfer legs (A->A): a user address equal to the miner's
+            # deposit or payout address delivers nothing. verify_transaction also
+            # guards this on-chain; failing here avoids creating the swap at all.
+            if synapse.from_address == miner_from_address or synapse.to_address == miner_fulfillment_address:
+                reject_synapse(
+                    synapse, 'User address matches the miner commitment — self-transfers are not valid swaps', ctx
+                )
+                return synapse
+
             # Defend against user-snipes-miner by passing expected_sender: a user
             # could otherwise reserve a miner and claim any third-party tx of the
             # right amount to the miner's address. The base provider wraps this
diff --git a/tests/test_self_transfer_guard.py b/tests/test_self_transfer_guard.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4cad591
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_self_transfer_guard.py
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+"""verify_transaction must reject self-transfers (sender == recipient).
+
+A same-wallet A->A send is never a real swap leg — the paying and receiving
+parties are always distinct addresses. An operator who lines up a miner's
+committed address with the user's receive address could otherwise fulfill a
+swap with a self-send and manufacture fake volume. A->B self-flow between two
+operator-owned wallets is indistinguishable on-chain and is left to economic /
+reward-side limits, so it still passes here.
+"""
+
+from typing import Optional
+
+from allways.chain_providers.base import ChainProvider, TransactionInfo
+from allways.chains import CHAIN_TAO, ChainDefinition
+
+
+class FakeProvider(ChainProvider):
+    """Returns a single canned tx; only the base post-checks are exercised."""
+
+    def __init__(self, tx: TransactionInfo):
+        self._tx = tx
+
+    def get_chain(self) -> ChainDefinition:
+        return CHAIN_TAO
+
+    def check_connection(self, **kwargs) -> None: ...
+
+    def fetch_matching_tx(
+        self, tx_hash, expected_recipient, expected_amount, block_hint=0, max_scan_blocks=150
+    ) -> Optional[TransactionInfo]:
+        return self._tx
+
+    def get_current_block_height(self) -> Optional[int]:
+        return 100
+
+    def get_balance(self, address: str) -> int:
+        return 0
+
+    def is_valid_address(self, address: str) -> bool:
+        return True
+
+    def sign_from_proof(self, address, message, key=None) -> str:
+        return ''
+
+    def verify_from_proof(self, address, message, signature) -> bool:
+        return True
+
+    def send_amount(self, to_address, amount, from_address=None):
+        return None
+
+
+def _tx(sender: str, recipient: str) -> TransactionInfo:
+    return TransactionInfo(
+        tx_hash='0xabc', confirmed=True, sender=sender, recipient=recipient, amount=100, confirmations=6
+    )
+
+
+def test_self_transfer_is_rejected():
+    provider = FakeProvider(_tx(sender='5Aaa', recipient='5Aaa'))
+    result = provider.verify_transaction(
+        tx_hash='0xabc',
+        expected_recipient='5Aaa',
+        expected_amount=100,
+        expected_sender='5Aaa',
+    )
+    assert result is None
+
+
+def test_cross_party_transfer_passes():
+    provider = FakeProvider(_tx(sender='5Miner', recipient='5User'))
+    result = provider.verify_transaction(
+        tx_hash='0xabc',
+        expected_recipient='5User',
+        expected_amount=100,
+        expected_sender='5Miner',
+    )
+    assert result is not None
+    assert result.sender == '5Miner'
+
+
+def test_self_transfer_rejected_even_without_expected_sender():
+    # The dest-confirm path pins expected_sender, but guard A->A regardless.
+    provider = FakeProvider(_tx(sender='5Aaa', recipient='5Aaa'))
+    result = provider.verify_transaction(
+        tx_hash='0xabc',
+        expected_recipient='5Aaa',
+        expected_amount=100,
+    )
+    assert result is None