Create vul.py #1

coderabbitai · 2026-02-02T10:41:14Z

⚠️ Potential issue | 🟡 Minor

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

find . -name "vul.py" -type f

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 95

🏁 Script executed:

git ls-files | grep -E "(vul\.py|test|example|vulnerable)" | head -20

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 93

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cat -n vul.py | head -25

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 664

This is intentional test code—add an import guard to prevent accidental deployment.

The hardcoded API_KEY is confirmed at line 16 and is intentionally vulnerable for testing/education purposes. However, add a safeguard to prevent this file from being accidentally imported in production environments:

import sys if not (sys.modules.get("pytest") or sys.modules.get("unittest")): raise ImportError("This module is for testing only. Use only in test environments.")

Alternatively, document clearly in the module docstring and repository that this file must never be deployed to production, or use a naming convention (e.g., test_vul.py or place in a tests/ directory) to prevent accidental import.

🧰 Tools

🪛 Gitleaks (8.30.0)

[high] 16-16: Found a Stripe Access Token, posing a risk to payment processing services and sensitive financial data.

(stripe-access-token)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents

In `@vul.py` around lines 13 - 16, The file defines a hardcoded API_KEY and should be protected from accidental production import; add a module-level import guard at the top (before API_KEY and app/Flask usage) that checks for test runners (e.g., presence of "pytest" or "unittest" in sys.modules) and raises ImportError if not running under tests, so the module can only be imported in test environments and will fail fast otherwise; update references around API_KEY and app (Flask(__name__)) to ensure the guard runs first.

coderabbitai · 2026-02-02T10:41:14Z

⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

cat vul.py

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 1527

Correct filename and replace os.system with os.listdir to prevent command injection.

The file is vuln_examples.py (not vul.py). The code at lines 19-21 uses os.system("ls " + user_path), which allows arbitrary command execution when user_path is untrusted. Use os.listdir(user_path) instead, and implement path validation (e.g., ensure the path stays within an allowed directory) to prevent path traversal.

🔧 Proposed fix

def list_files(user_path): - os.system("ls " + user_path) + return os.listdir(user_path)

📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change

# 2️⃣ COMMAND INJECTION

def list_files(user_path):

os.system("ls " + user_path)

def list_files(user_path):

return os.listdir(user_path)

🧰 Tools

🪛 Ruff (0.14.14)

[error] 21-21: Starting a process with a shell, possible injection detected

(S605)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents

In `@vul.py` around lines 19 - 21, The file is misnamed—rename vul.py to vuln_examples.py and replace the unsafe os.system call inside function list_files(user_path) with a safe os.listdir(user_path) implementation; before calling os.listdir, validate and normalize user_path (e.g., use os.path.abspath and ensure it is under an allowed base directory or matches an allowlist) and raise or return an error for invalid/unauthorized paths, then return the directory listing rather than executing shell commands.

coderabbitai · 2026-02-02T10:41:14Z

⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

# Find and read the vul.py file find . -name "vul.py" -type f | head -5

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 95

🏁 Script executed:

# Check if vul.py exists and read lines 24-30 if [ -f "./vul.py" ]; then echo "=== File found. Reading lines 24-30 ===" sed -n '24,30p' ./vul.py echo "" echo "=== Full file for context ===" wc -l ./vul.py fi

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 399

🏁 Script executed:

# If not in root, search recursively rg -l "def get_user" --type py

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 93

Parameterize the SQL query and close the connection using a context manager.

The function is vulnerable to SQL injection—the f-string directly interpolates the username parameter into the query without escaping. Additionally, the database connection is never closed, causing a resource leak. Use bound parameters and wrap the connection in a context manager to fix both issues.

🔧 Proposed fix

def get_user(username): - conn = sqlite3.connect("users.db") - cursor = conn.cursor() - query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '{username}'" - cursor.execute(query) - return cursor.fetchall() + with sqlite3.connect("users.db") as conn: + cursor = conn.cursor() + cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?", (username,)) + return cursor.fetchall()

🧰 Tools

🪛 Ruff (0.14.14)

[error] 28-28: Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction

(S608)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents

In `@vul.py` around lines 24 - 30, The get_user function is vulnerable to SQL injection and leaks the DB connection; fix it by using a context manager for the connection and a parameterized query: open the DB with "with sqlite3.connect(... ) as conn", obtain a cursor from conn, execute the query using a placeholder (e.g., "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?") with (username,) as parameters, fetch and return results so the connection is closed automatically; update references to get_user accordingly.

coderabbitai · 2026-02-02T10:46:45Z

⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

find . -name "vul.py" -type f

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 95

🏁 Script executed:

cat -n vul.py

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 2066

Block unsafe deserialization in load_session.
pickle.loads on untrusted data can lead to RCE; use JSON or a signed serializer instead.

🔧 Suggested fix (JSON)

-import pickle +import json @@ -def load_session(data): - return pickle.loads(data) +def load_session(data): + return json.loads(data)

🧰 Tools

🪛 Ruff (0.14.14)

[error] 45-45: pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue

(S301)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents

In `@vul.py` around lines 44 - 45, The load_session function currently calls pickle.loads on input data which allows unsafe deserialization; replace this with a safe parser such as json.loads or a verified/signed deserializer and reject raw pickle input. Update the load_session implementation to (1) detect and refuse pickle-serialized blobs, (2) parse the session using json.loads (or a signed serializer API) and validate required session fields, and (3) raise a clear exception on malformed/untrusted data so no direct pickle.loads call remains in load_session.

coderabbitai · 2026-02-02T10:41:14Z

⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

find . -type f -name "vul.py" | head -20

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 95

🏁 Script executed:

cat -n vul.py

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 2066

Correct the line numbers and prevent path traversal by resolving against a fixed base directory.

The code is at lines 48-51 (not 38-41). Concatenating "uploads/" + filename allows ../ escapes to access files outside the uploads directory. Resolve and verify the path stays under the uploads directory.

🔧 Proposed fix

+from pathlib import Path + +# Base directory for uploads +UPLOADS_DIR = Path("uploads").resolve() + # 5️⃣ PATH TRAVERSAL def read_file(filename): - with open("uploads/" + filename, "r") as f: - return f.read() + path = (UPLOADS_DIR / filename).resolve() + if UPLOADS_DIR not in path.parents and path != UPLOADS_DIR: + raise ValueError("Invalid filename") + return path.read_text()

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents

In `@vul.py` around lines 38 - 41, The read_file function concatenates "uploads/" with the user-supplied filename and is vulnerable to path traversal; change it to resolve the filename against a fixed base uploads directory (use pathlib.Path or os.path.realpath) and then verify the resolved path is inside that base (e.g., compare resolved_path.commonpath/base or resolved_path.startswith(base_resolved)); if the check fails, raise an error and do not open the file. Ensure all references in read_file use the resolved, validated path.

coderabbitai · 2026-02-02T10:41:14Z

⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

🧩 Analysis chain

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cat -n vul.py | head -50

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 1402

🏁 Script executed:

rg "fetch_url" vul.py

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 106

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wc -l vul.py

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

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cat -n vul.py

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 2066

Add SSRF protections and timeouts for outbound HTTP (lines 55–56).

Accepting arbitrary URLs can hit internal services and the call can hang without a timeout. Restrict hosts/schemes (and block private IPs) and set a timeout.

🔧 Proposed fix

+from urllib.parse import urlparse @@ +# Example allowlist — tighten for your environment +ALLOWED_HOSTS = {"example.com"} @@ def fetch_url(url): - return requests.get(url).text + parsed = urlparse(url) + if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"}: + raise ValueError("Invalid URL scheme") + if parsed.hostname not in ALLOWED_HOSTS: + raise ValueError("Host not allowed") + return requests.get(url, timeout=5, allow_redirects=False).text

🧰 Tools

🪛 Ruff (0.14.14)

[error] 46-46: Probable use of requests call without timeout

(S113)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents

In `@vul.py` around lines 44 - 46, The fetch_url function currently accepts arbitrary URLs and calls requests.get without validation or timeout; update fetch_url to (1) parse the URL (use urllib.parse) and reject non-http/https schemes, (2) resolve the hostname to IP(s) (use socket.getaddrinfo) and refuse any private/reserved addresses (RFC1918, IPv6 unique/local, loopback, link-local), (3) optionally enforce a host allowlist or denylist, and (4) call requests.get with a sensible timeout and raise or return a controlled error on validation failures or timeouts; reference the fetch_url function when making these changes.

coderabbitai · 2026-02-02T10:41:14Z

⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

git ls-files | grep -E "(vul|debug)" | head -20

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 93

🏁 Script executed:

find . -name "vul.py" -o -name "*vul*" 2>/dev/null | head -20

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 95

🏁 Script executed:

# Search for Flask debug routes or os.popen usage rg "os\.popen|@app\.route.*debug" -A 3 -B 1

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 333

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cat -n vul.py | head -70

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 1875

🏁 Script executed:

# Check Flask app setup and any middleware/auth rg "def.*auth|@.*auth|before_request|after_request" vul.py -B 2 -A 2

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 69

Remove the /debug command‑execution endpoint.

This provides unauthenticated RCE. The debug() function at lines 61-64 in vul.py directly executes user-supplied commands from query parameters via os.popen(cmd) without any authentication checks. Drop the route entirely or replace it with authenticated admin tooling that never shells out.

🔧 Proposed fix

-@app.route("/debug") -def debug(): - cmd = request.args.get("cmd") - return os.popen(cmd).read()

📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change

# 9️⃣ FLASK DEBUG MODE + USER INPUT EXECUTION

@app.route("/debug")

def debug():

cmd = request.args.get("cmd")

return os.popen(cmd).read()

🧰 Tools

🪛 Ruff (0.14.14)

[error] 63-63: Starting a process with a shell, possible injection detected

(S605)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents

In `@vul.py` around lines 59 - 63, The /debug endpoint exposing debug() should be removed or replaced: delete the `@app.route`("/debug") handler and the debug() function that calls os.popen(cmd). If you need equivalent admin tooling, implement an authenticated admin-only endpoint (verify admin session/credentials) and avoid executing shell commands from user input—use safe, explicit server-side operations or vetted library calls instead of os.popen(cmd). Ensure no remaining references to debug() or os.popen(cmd) remain in vul.py.

coderabbitai · 2026-02-02T10:41:14Z

⚠️ Potential issue | 🟡 Minor

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

# First, let's find and examine vul.py fd vul.py -t f

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 93

🏁 Script executed:

# Read vul.py to examine the code at lines 66-71 cat -n vul.py | sed -n '60,75p'

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 498

Avoid bare except to prevent error hiding.

Catching everything masks bugs; handle specific exceptions and let others surface.

🔧 Proposed fix

try: return a / b - except: + except ZeroDivisionError: return None

🧰 Tools

🪛 Ruff (0.14.14)

[error] 70-70: Do not use bare except

(E722)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents

In `@vul.py` around lines 66 - 71, The function divide currently uses a bare except which hides all errors; update divide to catch specific exceptions (e.g., catch ZeroDivisionError and return None) and do not swallow other exceptions—either let them propagate or re-raise them so calling code can see real failures; locate the divide function and replace the bare except with an explicit except ZeroDivisionError (and optionally an except TypeError if you want to handle non-numeric inputs) while ensuring other exceptions are not caught silently.

coderabbitai · 2026-02-02T10:46:45Z

⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

cat -n vul.py | sed -n '70,80p'

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 305

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# Check if os module is imported rg "^import os|^from os" vul.py

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 96

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# Get full context of the file wc -l vul.py

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 96

🏁 Script executed:

head -30 vul.py

Repository: AbhishekPrecogsAI/Mern-stack-Authentication

Length of output: 675

Don't run Flask with debug=True and host 0.0.0.0 together.
This exposes the debugger publicly, creating a remote code execution vulnerability; gate via environment variables and default to localhost.

🔧 Safer defaults

if __name__ == "__main__": - app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=5000, debug=True) + debug = os.getenv("FLASK_DEBUG") == "1" + host = os.getenv("FLASK_HOST", "127.0.0.1") + app.run(host=host, port=5000, debug=debug)

📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change

if __name__ == "__main__":

# 11️⃣ DEBUG MODE ENABLED

app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=5000, debug=True)

if __name__ == "__main__":

debug = os.getenv("FLASK_DEBUG") == "1"

host = os.getenv("FLASK_HOST", "127.0.0.1")

app.run(host=host, port=5000, debug=debug)

🧰 Tools

🪛 ast-grep (0.40.5)

[warning] 76-76: Running flask app with host 0.0.0.0 could expose the server publicly.
Context: app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=5000, debug=True)
Note: [CWE-668]: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere [OWASP A01:2021]: Broken Access Control [REFERENCES]
https://owasp.org/Top10/A01_2021-Broken_Access_Control

(avoid_app_run_with_bad_host-python)

[warning] 76-76: Detected Flask app with debug=True. Do not deploy to production with this flag enabled as it will leak sensitive information. Instead, consider using Flask configuration variables or setting 'debug' using system environment variables.
Context: app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=5000, debug=True)
Note: [CWE-489] Active Debug Code. [REFERENCES]
- https://labs.detectify.com/2015/10/02/how-patreon-got-hacked-publicly-exposed-werkzeug-debugger/

(debug-enabled-python)

🪛 Ruff (0.14.14)

[error] 77-77: Possible binding to all interfaces

(S104)

[error] 77-77: Use of debug=True in Flask app detected

(S201)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents

In `@vul.py` around lines 75 - 77, The app currently calls app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=5000, debug=True) in the if __name__ == "__main__" block which exposes the Flask debugger publicly; change this to default to host="127.0.0.1" and set debug from an environment flag (e.g., os.environ.get("FLASK_DEBUG") == "1" or similar) so debug=True is only enabled when explicitly allowed, and ensure any allowlist for host binding is enforced before calling app.run; update the app.run invocation and gating logic around __main__ accordingly.

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