fix: block Windows CMD injection vectors in auto-approved commands #4406
+4
−1
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Add Windows CMD specific escape character detection.
Context
This PR improves command validation stability on Windows platforms. The current command parser does not explicitly handle the Windows CMD caret escape character (
^).This inconsistency can lead to unexpected parsing behavior when processing commands on Windows.Implementation
Updated
src/core/auto-approval/commands.tsto explicitly detect and flag commands containing the caret character (^) when running on the Windows platform (win32).These commands will now be treated as "dangerous substitutions" and will strictly require explicit user approval, preventing automated execution of the exploit payload.
Screenshots
Before fix: The command is auto-approved and "Vulnerability Reproduced" is printed.
After fix: The agent detects the dangerous pattern and prompts the user for approval.
How to Test
gitcommands.