Mitigate security risk: content script access to chrome.storage.sync #62
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This PR mitigates a security risk where
chrome.storage.syncwas accessible to website content scripts, potentially allowing malicious sites to modify extension settings.Changes:
background.js:restore()to prioritize loading settings fromchrome.storage.session(trusted runtime storage).chrome.storage.onChangedlistener foroptionsandexcludekeys, effectively ignoring direct storage writes from untrusted sources (content scripts).updateOptionsmessage handler that verifies the sender is a trusted extension page before updating state and storage.toggleOptionto sync internal changes tochrome.storage.session.options.js:chrome.storage.sync.setcalls with a newsendUpdatefunction that sendsupdateOptionsmessages to the background script.This architecture ensures that while
chrome.storage.syncis still used for persistence and syncing, the authoritative runtime state is protected, and updates are validated.PR created automatically by Jules for task 1381566129880040394 started by @NDevTK