fix(android): disable Auto Backup of on-device health data (allowBackup=false)#253
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…up=false) Per the secure-storage investigation: the highest-value, cheapest on-device hardening is not moving the token to Keystore — it's closing the `adb backup` extraction path. With allowBackup="true" a device-access adversary could pull the app sandbox, which holds the ENTIRE plaintext Dexie health PII DB (intake, vitals, meds, dose logs, …) plus the session token. Setting allowBackup="false" removes that vector for both, on all Android versions, with zero dependencies. No user data is lost: the data syncs to Neon Postgres (the device is not the system of record), so a reinstall/new device restores via sign-in + sync. The trade-off is that Android cloud/`adb` backup of app data is disabled — which for a health PII app is the privacy-correct default. The Keystore-plugin move is deliberately deferred (medium-cost async refactor across 7 files for marginal at-rest gain on a re-obtainable token); if on-device encryption is later wanted, the target is the Dexie health DB, not the token.
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Why (from the secure-storage investigation)
I investigated moving the Bearer token to Android Keystore (as you asked). The research reframed the problem: that move is medium-cost (a 7-file async refactor) for marginal protection on the cheapest secret (a re-obtainable ~7-day opaque token) — and it misses the real exposure.
The actual currently-open hole:
android:allowBackup="true"means a device-access adversary canadb backupthe app sandbox, which holds the entire plaintext Dexie health-PII database (intake, weight, blood pressure, eating, meds, dose logs, …) plus the session token. Encrypting only the token would leave the crown jewels exposed.This one-line fix (
allowBackup="false") closes that vector for both the DB and the token, on all Android versions, zero dependencies — a strictly larger security win than the whole Keystore project.Trade-off (your call to merge)
adbbackup of app data is disabled. For a health-PII app this is the privacy-correct default (you don't want health data in Google cloud backup).Deferred (deliberately)
@aparajita/capacitor-secure-storage.error-log-servicelogs path-only;captureFailurenever includes headers/token).Validation