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22 changes: 15 additions & 7 deletions SECURITY.md
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- Network and firewall settings
- Container orchestration

**Important**: Texera's security model defines distinct roles with different privilege levels. However, REGULAR and ADMIN users can execute arbitrary code within computing units through User-Defined Functions (UDFs), which is a known limitation that can break the intended role boundaries. UDF code may access resources available in the execution environment, including environment variables, configuration values, and application state. Deployment managers are responsible for mitigating this by applying techniques such as sandboxing UDF execution and disallowing in-process (coordinator JVM) UDFs. See [Deployments and Computing Units](#deployments-and-computing-units) and [What is NOT a Security Issue](#what-is-not-a-security-issue) for more details.
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replace in-process UDFs with Java UDFs. Remove the (coordinator JVM)

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Fix the what-is-not-a-security-issue link


**Roles**: UI users are assigned one of four roles (INACTIVE, RESTRICTED, REGULAR, ADMIN) that control their permissions
within the Texera application.

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### Computing Unit Types

Texera executes workflows on **computing units**. UI users (REGULAR and ADMIN) can execute arbitrary code (e.g., through
UDFs written in Python, R, Scala) within computing units as part of their workflows. This code is currently not
sandboxed or restricted by Texera. Deployment managers configure which types of computing units are available:
UDFs written in Python, R, Java, Scala) within computing units as part of their workflows. UDF execution is a known limitation that can break the intended privilege boundaries between roles — UDF code may access resources available in the execution environment, such as environment variables, configuration values, and other application state. Deployment managers are responsible for mitigating this risk by applying techniques such as sandboxing UDF execution, disallowing in-process (coordinator JVM) UDFs, and ensuring that only trusted users are granted roles that permit code execution.
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replace in-process UDFs with Java UDFs. Remove the (coordinator JVM)


Deployment managers configure which types of computing units are available:

#### Local Computing Units

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**Security considerations**:

- Users' workflow code executes on the host machine with limited isolation
- UDF code is a known limitation that can break role boundaries — it may access application configuration and state in the execution environment
- Deployment managers should mitigate this by sandboxing UDF execution or disallowing in-process (coordinator JVM) UDFs
- Deployment managers must trust all REGULAR and ADMIN users
- Resource exhaustion by one user can affect all users

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- Better isolation between users compared to local computing units
- Kubernetes provides namespace and pod-level isolation
- Resource limits prevent individual users from consuming excessive resources
- UDF code within a pod can still access resources available inside that pod's environment (e.g., environment variables, mounted secrets)
- Container security and image scanning should be implemented
- Deployment managers must secure the Kubernetes cluster infrastructure

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Texera's security model does NOT guarantee:

- Protection against malicious code in user workflows (users can execute arbitrary code)
- Isolation of application secrets from UDF code executing within the same process or pod
- Strong isolation between workflows in local computing units
- Complete isolation between workflows in Kubernetes computing units within the same namespace
- Protection against infrastructure-level compromises
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### User Code Execution

REGULAR and ADMIN users can execute arbitrary code (Python, R, Scala) within computing units. This is by design - Texera
is a data analytics platform where custom code execution is a core feature. The system currently does not sandbox user
code beyond the isolation provided by the deployment environment (local processes or Kubernetes pods). Deployment
managers should use resource limits, monitor usage, and restrict user roles appropriately.
Texera's security model defines distinct user roles with different privilege levels. However, REGULAR and ADMIN users can execute arbitrary code (Python, R, Java, Scala) within computing units through UDFs. This is by design — Texera is a data analytics platform where custom code execution is a core feature.

UDF execution is a known limitation that can break the intended privilege boundaries between roles. UDF code may access resources available in the execution environment, including application configuration, environment variables, and other process state. This is not considered a vulnerability, given that Texera's security model expects deployment managers to actively mitigate this risk.

Deployment managers are responsible for making UDF execution more secure by applying techniques such as sandboxing UDF execution, disallowing in-process (coordinator JVM) UDFs, restricting user roles appropriately, and monitoring resource usage.

### Resource Consumption

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---

**Last Updated**: November 2025
**Last Updated**: March 2026

**Disclaimer**: This project is currently undergoing incubation at The Apache Software Foundation (ASF). Incubation is
required of all newly accepted projects until a further review indicates that the infrastructure, communications, and
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