fix: shell injection in scene outbox file handling#242
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JasonOA888 wants to merge 2 commits intobenchflow-ai:mainfrom
Open
fix: shell injection in scene outbox file handling#242JasonOA888 wants to merge 2 commits intobenchflow-ai:mainfrom
JasonOA888 wants to merge 2 commits intobenchflow-ai:mainfrom
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restore() parsed user-controlled ref strings and interpolated the path segment directly into shell commands (test -f, tar xzf) without quoting or validation. A crafted ref like 'fs:x:/tmp/ok; rm -rf /' would inject arbitrary commands. Fix: - Validate snap_path must be under _SNAP_DIR and end with .tar.gz - Reject path traversal (..) components - Quote all shell arguments with shlex.quote() - Also harden snapshot() with shlex.quote for consistency
Agent-controlled filenames from /app/.outbox/ were interpolated into shell commands (cat/rm) without quoting. A malicious agent could create a file like 'x.json' to inject arbitrary commands running as root inside the container. Use shlex.quote() on the file path before interpolation.
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Agent-controlled filenames from /app/.outbox/ were interpolated into
shell commands (cat/rm) without quoting. A sandboxed agent could create
a file like
x$(evil).jsonto inject arbitrary commands running as rootinside the container.
The _read_outbox method lists .json files in the outbox, then runs
cat {fpath}andrm -f {fpath}where fpath comes from ls output.Since the agent writes these files, it controls the filenames.
Fix: use shlex.quote() on the file path before interpolation.
Impact: privilege escalation from sandbox_user to root inside the
container during multi-agent scene execution.