🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection in toolExists

[acebytes]

🚨 Severity: HIGH

💡 Vulnerability: The toolExists(_:) method in Sources/Cacheout/Models/CacheCategory.swift passed unsanitized user input (tool) to a shell wrapper via string interpolation (shell("/usr/bin/which \(tool)")). This is a classic command injection vulnerability.

🎯 Impact: An attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the application by supplying a crafted string (e.g., git; cat /etc/passwd) as the tool argument.

🔧 Fix: Replaced the insecure shell wrapper invocation with a direct invocation of /usr/bin/which using Foundation.Process. The tool name is now safely passed as an isolated element in the process.arguments array, which prevents the shell from interpreting metacharacters. Also securely redirected standard streams to FileHandle.nullDevice.

✅ Verification:

• Verified the direct Process execution logic locally.
• Ran ./scripts/test.sh.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 14739727403125208993 started by @acebytes

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