feat(internet-identity): update for @icp-sdk/auth v7 API and identity attributes

evaluations/internet-identity.json

@@ -32,22 +32,63 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "Authenticated actor creation",
-      "prompt": "I already have AuthClient set up and login working. Show me just the function that takes an identity and creates an authenticated actor for my backend canister. Keep it minimal — just the function, no AuthClient setup.",
+      "prompt": "I already have AuthClient set up and sign-in working. Show me just the function that takes an identity and creates an authenticated actor for my backend canister. Keep it minimal — just the function, no AuthClient setup.",
       "expected_behaviors": [
-        "Gets the identity from authClient.getIdentity()",
+        "Calls await authClient.getIdentity() (it is async in @icp-sdk/auth v6+)",
         "Creates an HttpAgent with the identity",
         "Creates an actor using Actor.createActor with the agent",
         "All await calls are inside async functions — no bare top-level await",
         "Uses rootKey from ic_env cookie (safeGetCanisterEnv) or host: window.location.origin — does NOT use shouldFetchRootKey or hardcoded host branching"
       ]
     },
     {
-      "name": "Debugging anonymous principal after login",
-      "prompt": "After II login, my backend says 'Anonymous principal not allowed' and the console shows principal 2vxsx-fae. What does that mean and what should I check? Keep it brief.",
+      "name": "Debugging anonymous principal after sign-in",
+      "prompt": "After II sign-in, my backend says 'Anonymous principal not allowed' and the console shows principal 2vxsx-fae. What does that mean and what should I check? Keep it brief.",
       "expected_behaviors": [
         "Identifies 2vxsx-fae as the anonymous principal",
         "Explains that authentication silently failed or the identity was not properly extracted",
-        "Suggests checking that authClient.getIdentity() is called after login and passed to HttpAgent"
+        "Suggests checking the identityProvider URL passed to the AuthClient constructor",
+        "Suggests checking that authClient.signIn() did not reject (use try/catch around the awaited promise) and that the identity from await authClient.getIdentity() is passed to HttpAgent"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Adversarial: frontend-generated attribute nonce",
+      "prompt": "Show me how to call requestAttributes for an email attribute. The frontend can just generate a random nonce with crypto.getRandomValues, right? Just the snippet that builds the request.",
+      "expected_behaviors": [
+        "Rejects or flags the frontend-generated nonce as insecure",
+        "Explains that a frontend-generated nonce defeats replay protection because the canister cannot verify the bundle's implicit:nonce against an action it actually started",
+        "Recommends issuing the nonce from a backend canister method (e.g. registerBegin) and storing it server-side until consumed in the protected method",
+        "Does NOT show crypto.getRandomValues or Math.random as an acceptable nonce source for requestAttributes"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Adversarial: reading attribute data without verifying signer",
+      "prompt": "In my Rust canister, I want to read the user's verified email from the attribute bundle. Show me the body of the update function that reads msg_caller_info_data and extracts the email field.",
+      "expected_behaviors": [
+        "Calls msg_caller_info_signer() and verifies it equals the Internet Identity backend canister principal (rdmx6-jaaaa-aaaaa-aaadq-cai) BEFORE trusting any data",
+        "Traps or rejects the call when the signer is None or does not match the trusted issuer",
+        "Explains that the IC verifies the signature but not the identity of the signer — any canister can produce a valid bundle",
+        "Decodes msg_caller_info_data as a Candid-encoded ICRC-3 Value::Map and looks up the requested attribute key only after the signer check passes"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Adversarial: substituting tid in the Microsoft scoped-key URL",
+      "prompt": "I'm using scopedKeys({ openIdProvider: 'microsoft' }) on the frontend. My Azure tenant ID is 11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555. How do I update the {tid} placeholder in the URL my backend looks for?",
+      "expected_behaviors": [
+        "Tells the user NOT to substitute the tenant GUID into the URL",
+        "Explains that the {tid} part of https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tid}/v2.0 is a literal segment, not a placeholder, and that bundle keys arrive as openid:https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tid}/v2.0:<key> exactly",
+        "Tells the backend to look up the literal key (e.g. openid:https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tid}/v2.0:email) without modification"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Adversarial: using email instead of verified_email for access gating",
+      "prompt": "I have an admin allowlist of email addresses. I want to gate a sensitive update method on the caller's email being in that list. Show me how to request the email from II and check it on the backend.",
+      "expected_behaviors": [
+        "Requests verified_email (not just email) for access-gating use cases",
+        "Explains that the email key is the raw value from the user's II-linked account and is NOT checked by II (treat as user-supplied input)",
+        "Explains that verified_email is only present when the source OpenID provider (e.g. Google) marked the email as verified and II surfaced that signal — that is what makes verified_email trustworthy for authorisation",
+        "On the backend, verifies the bundle signer is the Internet Identity backend canister (`rdmx6-jaaaa-aaaaa-aaadq-cai`) — either via an explicit `msg_caller_info_signer()` check (Rust) or via `mo:core/CallerAttributes` with the `trusted_attribute_signers` env var configured (Motoko) — and looks up implicit:nonce, implicit:origin, and the verified_email attribute key (or the openid:<provider>:verified_email scoped variant) before the allowlist check",
+        "Does NOT recommend reading the email field as a substitute for verified_email"
       ]
     },
     {