Pocket Agent is a single-user local-first application. Most of its threat surface concerns:
- The Anthropic API key that lives in your local
.env - The local SQLite database, which is unencrypted at rest
- The local HTTP server bound to
127.0.0.1(not exposed to the internet by design) - HTML embeds rendered by the agent (sandboxed in iframes)
If you find a security issue — please do not file a public issue. Instead, open a private security advisory on GitHub: https://github.com/dogum/pocket-agent/security/advisories/new
If GitHub advisories aren't an option, contact the maintainer directly through the repository's profile contact info.
- A path that leaks the user's
.env,data/app.db, ordata/uploads/*to anywhere outside the local machine - A way for agent-generated HTML to escape its sandboxed iframe
- A way to bypass the typed-confirmation gate on
DELETE /api/data/all - Any RCE / arbitrary file write via the API server
- Prompt-injection escalations that cause the agent to exfiltrate local data through tools it has access to
Pocket Agent has no auth because the API binds only to localhost. If you expose the port to the internet (e.g. via tunneling), you're on your own — there are no security guarantees outside of local-only operation.
This is a small project run by a small number of people. We'll acknowledge within a few days and aim for a fix or disclosure timeline within 30 days for confirmed issues. Coordinated disclosure preferred.
There isn't one. Sorry. We'll credit you in the changelog if you'd like.