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emp-ot

build CodeQL

Which version do I want?

  • Existing projects pinned to a published release: stay on 0.3.0 — tag 0.3.0 or branch v0.3.x. Bug fixes and security patches will be backported to v0.3.x.
  • New projects, or willing to migrate: track the development branch (this branch). It will become 1.0.0-alpha after a polish pass and then 1.0.0. New SoftSpoken butterfly kernel with rounds 0-2 fused into AES generation at k=8 (eight leaves' Davies-Meyer outputs folded through three halving levels in-register; cross-platform via emp-tool's AesLane abstraction over VAES-512 / VAES-256 / AES-NI / NEON), post-quantum PVWKyber base OT, reorganized base OTs and extensions, the wire-equivalence framework from emp-tool 1.0 — but the API is not yet frozen and headers may move between alphas. Requires emp-tool ≥ 1.0.0-alpha.

State-of-the-art OT implementations on top of emp-tool: four base OTs (CO, PVW, CSW, PVWKyber), IKNP and SoftSpoken OT extensions (semi-honest + malicious), and Ferret silent COT extension. All hash functions used for OT are instantiated with MITCCRH for optimal concrete security.

Heads up — AI-assisted drafts, not yet audited. PVWKyber is not yet auditted.

Requirements

  • CMake ≥ 3.21
  • A C++17 compiler (Clang ≥ 12, GCC ≥ 9, AppleClang 14+)
  • emp-tool ≥ 1.0
  • OpenSSL ≥ 3.0. PVWKyber's SHAKE shim uses EVP_DigestSqueeze on ≥ 3.3 (one-shot squeeze) and falls back to a re-init / re-absorb loop on 3.0.x — same answers, slightly slower CRS expansion. No build-time configuration needed; the version is detected from OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.
  • pthreads

emp-ot builds a small static library (emp-ot::emp-ot) that bundles the IKNP, SoftSpoken, and Ferret OT bodies; the rest of the surface (base OTs, headers consumed inline) lives in headers.

Build and install

emp-ot consumes emp-tool through its installed CMake package. Install emp-tool first, then build emp-ot the same way:

# emp-tool
git clone https://github.com/emp-toolkit/emp-tool.git
cmake -S emp-tool -B emp-tool/build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release
cmake --build emp-tool/build -j
cmake --install emp-tool/build       # respects CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX

# emp-ot
git clone https://github.com/emp-toolkit/emp-ot.git
cmake -S emp-ot -B emp-ot/build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release
cmake --build emp-ot/build -j
cmake --install emp-ot/build

If you don't want to install emp-tool, point emp-ot directly at its build tree:

cmake -S emp-ot -B emp-ot/build \
    -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
    -Demp-tool_DIR=/abs/path/to/emp-tool/build

CMake options

Option Default Effect
EMP_OT_BUILD_TESTS ON when top-level Build the test suite under test/.
EMP_OT_INSTALL ON when top-level Generate install + export rules.

Consuming from another CMake project

find_package(emp-ot CONFIG REQUIRED)
target_link_libraries(my-app PRIVATE emp-ot::emp-ot)

emp-ot::emp-ot is an INTERFACE target that pulls in emp-tool::emp-tool transitively, so consumers don't need to find emp-tool separately.

Tests

cmake -S . -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release
cmake --build build -j
ctest --test-dir build --output-on-failure

The two-party benches (bench_iknp_rcot, bench_softspoken_rcot, bench_ferret_rcot, bench_ot_extension, bench_base_ot, trace_equiv) launch ALICE/BOB on localhost via the run script. bench_lpn and bench_cggm are single-process benchmarks of internal kernels.

Wire-trace hashes

test/trace_hash.cpp runs every protocol in the repo under a fresh NetIO with Fiat-Shamir enabled and prints one SHA-256 digest per direction per protocol. Refactors that leave the wire bytes untouched leave the hashes untouched; refactors that do change the wire are visible as a single-line diff. See docs/wire-trace-hashes.md for the full workflow.

$ EMP_TEST_MODE=1 ./run ./build/trace_hash | grep '^[A-Za-z(]'

Current baseline (ALICE's view; first 16 hex of each direction's SHA-256). A change to any of these hashes means the corresponding protocol's wire format changed — fine if intentional, but flag it clearly in the commit message and update this table.

CO                     send=cb1241385e1fa266 recv=1527f501eb006b21
CSW                    send=802e9b74d81f63a8 recv=634c8c41847634f2
PVW                    send=06ff8f3498188271 recv=73bc62e4d02ea245
PVWKyber               send=1708ae2aabef619e recv=d8195b395536297d
IKNP semi              send=dd62b5bfb8bd58b3 recv=864359025637ab39
SoftSpoken<2> semi     send=0e7edf2b638a30db recv=3dafa542197102c0
SoftSpoken<8> semi     send=784c7d47a9f146a2 recv=13c3d9136aaa1698
Ferret(b11) semi       send=42e75ecf31cec7e7 recv=04549cff31949b6c
F2kVOLE semi           send=784ac978756e932c recv=5cf72d6ec0c8248c
FpVOLE semi            send=320ae55724cc85bb recv=04358d21086fbdeb
IKNP mali              send=bc4e21045185ec28 recv=400bfc6cfc0b8ce5
SoftSpoken<2> mali     send=9e9d7a0ff4815691 recv=be74fc600d3ee7b7
SoftSpoken<8> mali     send=74a54a2eb2f0fcdd recv=381ad0d603383439
Ferret(b11) mali       send=14349b47d4840654 recv=95a3fc38a39e43a7
F2kVOLE mali           send=dc93e25b4b3b0d56 recv=932f73c273156a16
FpVOLE mali            send=687cf07828fd876b recv=a3392c323c9e5871

Usage

#include <emp-tool/emp-tool.h>     // NetIO etc.
#include <emp-ot/emp-ot.h>         // OTs
using namespace emp;

NetIO io(party == ALICE ? nullptr : "127.0.0.1", port);

Interfaces

All OTs in emp-ot derive from a four-layer hierarchy in emp-ot/ot.h and emp-ot/ot_extension/ot_extension.h. Each layer adds methods on top of the previous one; you can always call a lower-level method on a higher-level object.

Interface New methods Semantics added
OT send(m0, m1, n) / recv(mc, c, n) chosen-input 1-out-of-2: sender supplies both messages, receiver picks one
COT : OT send_cot(m0, n) / recv_cot(mc, c, n); free send_rot/recv_rot chosen-correlation: sender's two messages always differ by a public Delta
RandomCOT : COT rcot(data, n) (role implicit in instance party) random correlation: no choice-bit input; receiver's choice ends up in getLSB(data[i]), and Delta's LSB is forced to 1 so the correlation survives that one bit
OTExtension : RandomCOT set_delta(const bool* delta_bool) (sender-only Δ override), chunk_size(), begin/next/end, next_n(data, n), run(data, num) streaming RCOT (one fixed-size chunk per next); base-OT bootstrap fires lazily on the first begin

Concrete classes attach as follows:

  • Base OTs (OT only): CO, PVW, CSW, PVWKyber.
  • OT extensions (OTExtension, so all of the above): IKNP, SoftSpoken<k>, Ferret.

The chosen-input / chosen-correlation / random conversions are implemented once in the base classes (one MITCCRH pass per OT for the chosen-message wrapper, one bit per OT for the random → chosen correction), so picking a backend never forces you to also pick a flavor.

Base OTs

The four base OTs (CO, PVW, CSW, PVWKyber) implement only the OT interface — chosen-input 1-out-of-2.

block m0[length], m1[length];   // sender's two messages
block mc[length];               // receiver's chosen message
bool  c [length];               // receiver's choice bits

PVW ot(&io);
if (party == ALICE) ot.send(m0, m1, length);
else                ot.recv(mc, c, length);    // mc[i] = m_{c[i]}

All four implement the same OT interface. CO is semi-honest; CSW, PVW, PVWKyber are malicious-secure.

OT extensions

IKNP, SoftSpoken<k>, and Ferret all derive from RandomCOT, take the same constructor shape, and the same object exposes all four flavors:

IKNP ote(party, &io);
// SoftSpoken<2> ote(party, &io); Ferret ote(party, &io); ... all the same below.
block buf[length];

// rcot() is single-method and role-implicit — the instance's party
// determines whether it acts as sender or receiver internally.
// Each side fills its own `buf`; sender's buf[i] ^ receiver's buf[i] = c[i] · Δ.
ote.rcot(buf, length);

// COT / ROT / OT flavors are role-explicit (different signatures by side):
if (party == ALICE) {
    ote.send_cot(m0, length);                     // COT:  fills m0; m1[i] = m0[i]^Δ
    ote.send_rot(m0, m1, length);                 // ROT:  fills m0, m1 (random)
    ote.send(m0, m1, length);                     // OT:   sends caller-chosen m0, m1
} else {
    ote.recv_cot(mc, c, length);                  // COT:  mc[i] = m0[i] ^ c[i]*Δ
    ote.recv_rot(mc, c, length);                  // ROT:  mc[i] = c[i] ? m1[i] : m0[i]
    ote.recv(mc, c, length);                      // OT:   mc[i] = c[i] ? m1[i] : m0[i]
}

The constructor allocates per-instance state and (on the sender side) samples a random Δ with LSB(Δ) = 1 pinned. No network I/O runs in the ctor. The base-OT bootstrap runs on the first begin() (or the first rcot() one-shot call, which delegates to run()begin() internally).

Δ is readable as ote.Delta immediately after construction. The receiver has no Δ. To override the ctor-sampled Δ (e.g. when an outer protocol like emp-zk or emp-sh2pc supplies its own correlation), call set_delta before the first rcot() call:

IKNP ote(party, &io);
if (party == ALICE) {
    bool delta_bool[128]; /* fill from outer protocol; delta_bool[0] = true */
    ote.set_delta(delta_bool);
}
// ote.rcot(buf, length); // bootstrap fires here, on first streaming begin

set_delta must fire before the first rcot/begin/run call (asserts otherwise).

Each extension can be parameterized to bootstrap from a non-default base OT (default is PVW); pair an extension's malicious mode with a malicious-secure base — IKNP / SoftSpoken / Ferret check this at construction time and abort otherwise.

IKNP            ote1(party, &io, /*malicious=*/true,
                     std::make_unique<CSW>(&io));
SoftSpoken<4>   ote2(party, &io, /*malicious=*/true,
                     std::make_unique<CSW>(&io));      // k=4
Ferret          ote3(party, &io, /*malicious=*/true,
                     ferret_b13,
                     std::make_unique<CSW>(&io));

Streaming RCOT

The OTExtension base also exposes a streaming API for callers that want to overlap RCOT production with downstream work (one fixed chunk_size()-sized batch per next() call, no internal buffering):

const int64_t chunk = ote.chunk_size();
BlockVec buf(chunk);

ote.begin();
for (int i = 0; i < n_chunks; ++i) {
    ote.next(buf.data());
    consume_chunk(buf.data(), chunk);  // role implicit in party
}
ote.end();

The one-shot rcot(data, num) is implemented in terms of this streaming API plus a small leftover buffer for tails that aren't a multiple of chunk_size().

For callers that consume the stream incrementally — even one COT at a time — draw from a single long-lived session with next_n(dst, n) instead of calling rcot repeatedly:

ote.begin();                       // open one session (e.g. in your ctor)
ote.next_n(&one, 1);               // draw any count; refills a chunk internally
ote.next_n(batch.data(), k);       // …amortizes the per-round end-work
ote.end();                         // close it (e.g. in your dtor)

This matters because rcot(data, num) opens and closes a session per call, so the per-round end-work (refill trees + the malicious chi-fold check) is paid every chunk_size() COTs. next_n keeps one session open, amortizing that over the whole stream — e.g. emp-zk's per-AND-gate COT draw is ~20× faster this way than calling rcot(_, 1) in a loop. next_n is mutually exclusive with run()/rcot() on the same instance (both touch the same leftover buffer).

Performance

AWS c8a.2xlarge (AMD EPYC 9R45, Zen 5, 8 vCPU), Ubuntu 22.04, GCC 11.4, OpenSSL 3.0.2, -march=native.

Base OTs

One batch of 128 base OTs.

Protocol Time Send B Recv B Security
CO 6.2 ms 4,165 8,832 semi-honest
CSW 9.3 ms 6,229 8,864 malicious-secure (CDH + RO)
PVW 40 ms 39,424 17,664 malicious-secure (DDH messy mode)
PVWKyber 7.3 ms 200,704 98,304 malicious-secure, post-quantum (ML-KEM-512)

OT extensions (RCOT throughput)

Length 2²⁵ OTs (~33M). Both MOT/s (million RCOTs per second; median of 5 runs, slower of the two parties per run) and bits/RCOT (total wire bytes, both directions) include the one-time base-OT bootstrap amortised over the bench length.

Protocol Mode bits/RCOT MOT/s
IKNP semi 127 227
IKNP malicious 127 85
SoftSpoken<2> semi 63 136
SoftSpoken<2> malicious 63 125
SoftSpoken<4> semi 31 146
SoftSpoken<4> malicious 31 135
SoftSpoken<8> semi 15 57
SoftSpoken<8> malicious 15 55
Ferret semi 0.27 83
Ferret malicious 0.27 78

IKNP and SoftSpoken<k> traffic is one-direction: 127 bits/RCOT for IKNP, 128/k − 1 bits/RCOT for SoftSpoken<k>. Ferret's 0.27 bits/RCOT at 2²⁵ is ~0.20 bits/RCOT of steady-state per-round MPCOT/LPN traffic plus ~0.07 bits/RCOT of one-time bootstrap; the bootstrap fraction shrinks linearly with bench length.

COT, ROT, OT flavors layer one MITCCRH pass (and, for chosen-input OT, one block per OT on the wire) on top of RCOT.

License

Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 — see LICENSE.

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