ci: pin github actions to pull commit SHAs#57
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dzeveloper wants to merge 1 commit intoinsightsengineering:mainfrom
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ci: pin github actions to pull commit SHAs#57dzeveloper wants to merge 1 commit intoinsightsengineering:mainfrom
dzeveloper wants to merge 1 commit intoinsightsengineering:mainfrom
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✅ All contributors have signed the CLA |
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I have read the CLA Document and I hereby sign the CLA |
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This PR updates the GitHub Action workflows to use full length commit SHAs instead of mutable tags (e.g., @v2).
By pinning to a specific hash, we ensure that the code running in our CI/CD pipeline is exactly what we audited, protecting us from "tag shifting" where a version tag is moved to a different (potentially malicious) commit.
Using version tags like @V3 relies on trust that the maintainer’s account won't be compromised. If an attacker gains access to a dependency we use, they can push a malicious update to that tag, and our pipeline would automatically pull the compromised code.
Reference Incident: aquasecurity/trivy-action#541