A Python-based file encryption tool with modern ciphers, post-quantum algorithms, and defense-in-depth key derivation.
Built to encrypt anything from grandma's pie recipe to the nuclear launch codes — with parameters to satisfy every paranoia level in between. Sensible, secure defaults out of the box; fully tunable KDF chains and cipher choices when you want to crank the cost to match the threat.
Looking for the stable release? The latest stable version is v1.4.5 on the releases/1.4.x branch.
The project is historically named openssl-encrypt because it once was a Python script wrapper around OpenSSL. That approach stopped working with recent Python versions, so I did a complete rewrite in pure Python using modern ciphers and hashes. The project name is a “homage” to its roots
To install follow the guide
This project is committed to the protection of human rights and the prevention of mass surveillance. To reflect these values, it is licensed under the Hippocratic License 2.1.
While the source code is public, usage is subject to strict ethical conditions. We prioritize human rights over traditional "neutral" open-source definitions.
By using this software, you agree that it shall not be used for:
- Violations of Human Rights: Usage by any entity that undermines the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is strictly prohibited (See License Section 2.1).
- Mass Surveillance: The software may not be used for bulk, warrantless monitoring or data collection (See License Section 2.2.a).
- Government Intelligence Agencies: Usage by agencies (such as NSA, GCHQ, etc.) or their contractors for offensive cyber operations or domestic spying is not permitted under this license.
- Military & Weapons: Usage by or for the defense industry, specifically for the development of lethal weaponry, targeting systems, or military-grade surveillance equipment (See License Section 2.2).
Technological tools are not neutral. We believe that encryption should empower individuals, not oppressive systems. The Hippocratic License creates a legal barrier that prevents the integration of this code into software stacks used for surveillance and harm.
Note: Because of these ethical protections, this project is considered Ethical Source, not "Open Source" according to the OSI definition, as we intentionally restrict usage for harmful purposes.
"The Software shall be used for Good, not Evil." — Inspired by the JSON License & HL 2.1
For deep-dives into the cryptographic design and security policies of this project, please refer to the specialized documentation in the docs/ folder:
- Technical Architecture: Detailed explanation of the Hybrid PQC-flow, the Hardened KDF Chain (Argon2id + RandomX), and the AEAD Metadata Binding.
- Security Policy: Information on our "Defense in Depth" strategy, anti-oracle policies, and how to responsibly disclose vulnerabilities.
- Post-Quantum Ready: Hybrid encryption using NIST-standardized KEMs (HQC, CROSS, MAYO).
- Deterministic AEAD: AES-SIV support for maximum protection against nonce-misuse.
- Metadata Integrity: Cryptographic binding of headers to prevent tampering (on AEAD-supported ciphers).
- Hardware-Resistant KDF: Sequential Argon2id and RandomX hashing to neutralize ASIC/GPU brute-force clusters.
- Hardware Token Binding (HSM): YubiKey/OnlyKey HMAC-SHA1 challenge-response, FIDO2, and PIV/PKCS#11 smart-card support — the hardware-derived pepper is never stored, so decryption requires the physical token. YubiKey and OnlyKey are interchangeable within a same-secret fleet.
- Cascade Multi-Layer Encryption: Independent AES-256-GCM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 layers (default in the STANDARD template) for defense-in-depth.
- Threefish-512/1024: Native AEAD ciphers with 256/512-bit post-quantum security margins.
- Streaming Chunked Encryption: Constant-memory authenticated encryption for multi-gigabyte files (format v12).
Current Release: v1.4.5 | Status: Stable | Tests: 2315+ passing
Everything that landed since v1.4.1:
- Security dependency update (1.4.5): urllib3 2.7.0, cryptography 46.0.7, pillow 12.2.0, idna 3.15 — fixes for CVE-2026-44431/44432, CVE-2026-39892, a PSD decoder out-of-bounds write, and an idna DoS. A new CI check keeps flatpak dependency pins aligned with the package requirements.
- Security hardening batch (1.4.4): Authenticated v2 keystore format (HMAC-SHA256, fails closed on tampering), D-Bus per-caller authorization with polkit, fail-closed PQC algorithm resolution, plugin sandbox enforcement (file/network/process restrictions), unique per-drive salts for portable USB drives, TOFU key-change detection in the identity layer
- OnlyKey HSM plugin & cross-device fleet decryption (1.4.4): Hardware-bound key derivation via OnlyKey challenge-response; YubiKey and OnlyKey provisioned with the same HMAC-SHA1 secret decrypt each other's files (
--hsm onlykey/--hsm yubikey,--hsm-slotoverrides the stored slot) - CLI tooling (1.4.4):
inforeconstructs the fullencryptcommand from file metadata;derive-passwordgains HSM-aware deterministic derivation and--confirm; Diceware passphrase generation (generate-password --dice, bundled EFF wordlist) - Modernized defaults (1.4.2): STANDARD template upgraded to cascade encryption (AES-256-GCM + ChaCha20-Poly1305), RandomX + Argon2 KDFs, and Independent XOR (v11) key derivation by default
- Simple/Pro GUI modes (1.4.2): Default Simple mode shows only Encrypt/Decrypt/Settings; Pro mode restores the full crypto UI
- Platform support: Python 3.11+ required; Python 3.14 fully supported including the Threefish native extension (PyO3 0.26)
Release History:
- v1.4.5 (Current) - Security dependency update (CVE fixes) and flatpak pin CI guard
- v1.4.4 - Security hardening batch, OnlyKey HSM plugin with cross-device fleet decryption,
infoCLI reconstruction, Diceware passphrases, Python 3.14 support - v1.4.3 - Flatpak GUI launcher fix
- v1.4.2 - Simple/Pro GUI modes, modernized STANDARD template (cascade by default, Independent XOR v11)
- v1.4.1 - Stable release
- v1.4.0 - Stable release with in-memory encryption and security-hardened rekey
- v1.4.0rc2 - Relax SAST rules for built-in plugins
- v1.4.0rc1 - First release candidate: security hardening and dependency updates
- v1.4.0b10 - Format Version 11: Independent XOR & Parallel Processing
- v1.4.0b9 - Test infrastructure improvements, Threefish cipher support, cross-version compatibility fixes
- v1.4.0b8 - Critical security fix: Format Version 9 with secure chained salt derivation
- See version.py.template for complete release history
Sequential encryption using multiple cipher algorithms with chained HKDF key derivation.
- Attacker must break all ciphers to decrypt data
- Minimum 2 ciphers required, supports unlimited cascade depth
- Each layer adds entropy to the next layer's key derivation
- CLI support:
--cascade "aes-256-gcm,chacha20-poly1305,xcha-poly1305" - Automatic cipher diversity validation
- New metadata format V8
Example:
python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt encrypt -i file.txt \
--cascade "aes-256-gcm,chacha20-poly1305,xcha-poly1305"Rust-based implementation of Threefish AEAD ciphers with memory-hard construction resistant to quantum attacks.
- Threefish-512: 256-bit post-quantum security level
- Threefish-1024: 512-bit post-quantum security level
- Native AEAD mode with embedded nonce
- Maturin-based Rust/Python integration
FastAPI-based keyserver for public key distribution with PostgreSQL backend.
- ML-DSA signature verification for uploaded keys
- Public key upload, search, and revocation endpoints
- Bearer token authentication, rate limiting, CORS protection
- Docker deployment with liboqs 0.12.0
- Available at: https://keyserver.rm-rf.ch
Opt-in anonymous telemetry infrastructure with user consent and data minimization.
- Anonymous client identifiers
- Configurable data collection scopes
- PostgreSQL backend with FastAPI REST API
- Docker deployment with automated migrations
- Available at: https://telemetry.rm-rf.ch
Client plugin for secure pepper storage with password hardening and mTLS authentication.
- Client-side encrypted pepper storage (server never sees plaintext)
- TOTP 2FA with QR code generation for destructive operations
- Deadman switch with configurable check-in intervals and grace periods
- Panic wipe for emergency pepper deletion (all or single pepper)
- mTLS authentication with self-signed CA (client certificates required)
- Profile management with access tracking
- OPT-IN by default (disabled until explicitly enabled)
- Configuration:
~/.openssl_encrypt/plugins/pepper.json
Client plugin for encrypted file metadata hash verification with mTLS authentication.
- Store SHA-256 hashes of encrypted file metadata on remote server
- Verify file integrity before decryption (detect tampering)
- Batch verification support (up to 100 files per request)
- Tamper detection with comprehensive audit logging
- mTLS authentication with self-signed CA (client certificates required)
- Profile management and verification statistics
- OPT-IN by default (disabled until explicitly enabled)
- Configuration:
~/.openssl_encrypt/plugins/integrity.json
Enhanced asymmetric key handling with improved format and HSM integration.
- Updated asymmetric encryption format (Format V7)
- KEM-based password wrapping using ML-KEM for post-quantum security
- Identity management system for recipient-based encryption
- Seamless integration with HSM-protected identities
- Skip interactive prompts in non-TTY environments
Centralized cryptographic algorithm registration and validation framework.
- Cipher Registry: 12+ symmetric encryption algorithms
- Hash Registry: 15+ cryptographic hash functions
- KDF Registry: 8 key derivation functions
- KEM Registry: 9 Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (Kyber, ML-KEM, HQC)
- Signature Registry: 15 post-quantum signature algorithms
- CLI command:
crypt list-algorithms - Security level indicators and validation
- CLI arguments for HSM-protected identity creation:
--hsm,--hsm-slot,--hsm-pin - HSM_ONLY identities skip password prompts during encryption/decryption
- Automatic HSM identity detection with
--with-key - Save/load HSM identities without password requirements
- PIV / PKCS#11 HSM backend (
--hsm piv): hardware-bound key derivation backed by a PIV private key on a PKCS#11 token (YubiKey Bio MPE, Token2 PIN+ R3.3+, or any compliant PIV smart card). The key signs a deterministic challenge derived from the salt; the signature is normalized into a pepper via HKDF-SHA256, so the same key on multiple devices always yields identical peppers. Algorithm-agnostic across Ed25519 and RSA-2048/3072/4096; non-deterministic schemes (ECDSA, RSA-PSS) are rejected. New flags:--hsm-pkcs11-lib PATH(required),--hsm-piv-slot {9a,9c,9d,9e},--hsm-biometric. Requirespython-pkcs11(pip install -r requirements-hsm.txt). See docs/PIV_BACKEND.md for setup. - OnlyKey support (
--hsm onlykey/--hsm onlykey-only, slots 1..12) alongside YubiKey. Same HMAC-SHA1 wire protocol — fleets mixing YubiKey and OnlyKey devices loaded with the same 20-byte secret are deterministic across either backend. See docs/hardware-tokens.md for setup and docs/migration-from-yubikey-only.md for adding OnlyKey to an existing YubiKey fleet.
openssl_encrypt info <file> reads the metadata of an encrypted file
without decrypting it. In addition to the human-readable summary, the
output now ends with a "Reconstructed CLI" section showing the
openssl_encrypt encrypt command that would produce equivalent
encryption settings on a fresh file. Salt and per-file random values
are deliberately NOT reconstructed (only the deterministic
configuration: cipher / cascade chain, KDFs, hash rounds, HSM binding,
pepper).
$ openssl_encrypt info myfile.enc
File Information:
Format Version: 9
...
Reconstructed CLI:
openssl_encrypt encrypt \
--algorithm aes-gcm \
--enable-argon2 \
--argon2-rounds 10 \
--argon2-time 3 \
--argon2-memory 65536 \
...JSON mode (--json) is unchanged — the JSON payload remains the raw
metadata dict so scripts piping into jq continue working.
The derive-password action runs a user-supplied password through the
full KDF cascade (Argon2id, scrypt, Balloon, RandomX, HKDF, hashes)
and prints the derived bytes. Useful for generating a strong,
reproducible password for third-party tools (password managers, disk
encryption, encrypted archives) from a memorable input.
# Basic: derive a 32-byte key from a password (auto-generated salt
# echoed to stderr so you can reproduce)
openssl_encrypt derive-password --enable-argon2 --argon2-rounds 10
# Reproducible (specify the salt)
openssl_encrypt derive-password --salt 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef \
--enable-argon2 --argon2-rounds 10
# Confirm the password twice — guards against typos that would
# silently produce a wrong-but-valid-looking output
openssl_encrypt derive-password --confirm --enable-argon2 --argon2-rounds 10
# Mix in a hardware token: same password + same salt + same hardware
# secret = same output. Re-provisioning the token changes the output
# (a stderr reminder fires when --hsm is used without --salt).
openssl_encrypt derive-password --hsm yubikey --salt 0123...abcdef \
--enable-argon2 --argon2-rounds 10
openssl_encrypt derive-password --hsm onlykey --hsm-slot 3 --salt 0123...abcdef \
--enable-argon2 --argon2-rounds 10generate-password --dice produces Diceware-style passphrases as an
alternative to character-based generation:
# Default: 10 words from the bundled EFF Large Wordlist (~129 bits of entropy)
openssl_encrypt generate-password --dice
# Customize word count and separator
openssl_encrypt generate-password --dice --dice-count 7 --dice-sep -
# Bring your own wordlist (EFF format or plain text)
openssl_encrypt generate-password --dice --dice-list ~/my-wordlist.txtThe bundled wordlist is the EFF Large Wordlist for Passphrases
(7,776 words), redistributed under
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 US
with attribution in
openssl_encrypt/data/EFF_WORDLIST_LICENSE.txt.
- SecureBytes implementation across all cryptographic registries (KDF, Cipher, Signature, KEM)
- Automatic zeroing of sensitive data after use
- Thread-safe secure memory operations
- SECURITY.md policy added to all 20 branches with vulnerability reporting guidelines
- PGP key: C8E4 C58E 83AB B314 74C0 E108 0271 3C63 792B 8986
- 48-hour initial response commitment for security issues
- Modularized test suite with domain-specific organization
- Parallel test execution with high-CPU runner tags
- Optimized KDF parameters for faster CI/CD
- Test duration diagnostics
- Rust extension integration via Maturin build system
- Docker multi-stage builds with liboqs 0.12.0
- Enhanced Flatpak build with Threefish wheel handling
- CI/CD pipeline improvements
Modular FastAPI server with dual authentication system supporting both public and private modules.
Public Modules (JWT Authentication):
- Keyserver: Post-quantum public key distribution
- Telemetry: Privacy-preserving usage statistics
Private Modules (mTLS Authentication with Self-Signed CA):
-
Pepper Module: Secure pepper storage for password hardening
- Client-side encrypted pepper storage (20 endpoints)
- TOTP 2FA with QR code generation
- Deadman switch with configurable check-in intervals
- Panic wipe for emergency pepper deletion
- Auto-registration on first mTLS connection
- Database: 5 tables (clients, peppers, deadman, panic log, TOTP backup codes)
-
Integrity Module: Encrypted file metadata hash verification
- SHA-256 hash storage for encrypted file metadata (12 endpoints)
- Integrity violation detection with audit logging
- Batch verification support (up to 100 files)
- Statistics tracking (success rate, verification counts)
- Auto-registration on first mTLS connection
- Database: 3 tables (clients, hashes, verification log)
Security Features:
- Self-signed CA requirement (public CAs rejected)
- Certificate fingerprint authentication (SHA-256)
- Trusted proxy IP validation
- Comprehensive audit logging
- Automated certificate management scripts
Deployment:
- Docker Compose with PostgreSQL backend
- Nginx reverse proxy support (recommended)
- Direct mTLS mode available
- Helper scripts:
setup_ca.sh,create_client_cert.sh - Full documentation:
openssl_encrypt_server/docs/MTLS_SETUP.md
Complete overhaul of the desktop GUI with advanced cryptographic features and improved user experience.
Cascade Encryption UI:
- Multi-cipher selection interface with diversity validation
- Sub-group organization for algorithm categories
- Visual chain preview showing encryption layers
- Integrated into File Crypto, Text Crypto, and Batch Operations tabs
Asymmetric Encryption UI:
- Identity Management screen with create/import/export functionality
- Recipient selection for multi-recipient encryption
- HSM integration (YubiKey Challenge-Response, FIDO2/WebAuthn)
- Real-time YubiKey touch prompt display
- ML-KEM/ML-DSA key pair generation and management
Network Plugin Configuration:
- Remote Pepper Plugin settings with mTLS certificate management
- Integrity Plugin configuration with verification options
- Keyserver Plugin setup with bearer token authentication
- Visual feedback for plugin status and connectivity
Algorithm Enhancements:
- Enhanced algorithm picker with grouped display (Classical Symmetric, Post-Quantum, AEAD)
- PQC algorithms displayed in Information Tab
- Support for Threefish-512 and Threefish-1024 ciphers
- Format version 7 and 8 support in metadata viewer
User Experience:
- Steganography configuration panel in encryption tab
- Force password option for workflow automation
- Default input type set to file mode
- Improved status messages and error handling
- Progress indicators for long-running operations
Flatpak Distribution:
- Complete CI/CD pipeline with automated builds
- Incremental caching for faster compilation
- OSTree repository integration
- Available on Flathub (pending approval)
- Compatible with v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, and v8 encrypted files
- Automatic format detection and migration
- V3-V8 metadata formats deprecated due to security vulnerability (read-only support maintained)
- V9 metadata format (current) with secure chained salt derivation
- Re-encryption strongly recommended for ALL files with format version < v9 or encrypted with code version < 1.4.0
Note: HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic) post-quantum cryptography is not functional in v1.2.x releases due to fork-safety issues in liboqs on certain AMD64 systems. Files encrypted with HQC algorithms (hqc-128, hqc-192, hqc-256) cannot be decrypted reliably in these versions.
- ✅ Other PQC algorithms work correctly: Kyber/ML-KEM, Dilithium, Falcon, SPHINCS+, and all other supported post-quantum algorithms function as expected in v1.2.x
- ✅ HQC fully supported in v1.3.0+: The issue has been resolved in version 1.3.0 and later through improved multiprocessing handling
Recommendation: If you need to encrypt or decrypt files using HQC algorithms, please upgrade to version 1.3.0 or later.
For v1.2.x users: If you have files encrypted with HQC, you can:
- Upgrade to v1.3.0+ to decrypt them
- Use a different system where the fork-safety issue doesn't occur
- Re-encrypt important files using Kyber/ML-KEM instead (recommended for long-term compatibility)
Issue: In versions prior to 1.3.0, AEAD algorithms (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, AES-GCM-SIV, AES-SIV, AES-OCB3, XChaCha20-Poly1305, and all PQC hybrid variants) pass None for the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) parameter, despite documentation indicating metadata is cryptographically bound to the ciphertext.
Security Impact: Low - The encryption itself remains secure. Metadata is already cryptographically bound through the key derivation chain, meaning any tampering causes decryption failure. However, without AAD, tampering detection is delayed until after both KDF operations and decryption attempts complete.
Attack Scenarios:
- An attacker with write access to encrypted files can tamper with metadata
- Modified metadata will cause decryption to fail, but only after processing
- No data confidentiality breach is possible
- Potential DoS vector: modifying the
roundsparameter forces expensive KDF operations before failure is detected
Recommendation: Upgrade to version 1.3.0 or later, which implements proper AAD binding for earlier tampering detection. Note that AAD does not eliminate the DoS risk, as metadata parsing and KDF execution occur before AAD validation.
Workaround: No workaround needed for data security. To mitigate DoS risks, ensure file permissions prevent unauthorized write access to encrypted files.
This tool uses a chained hash/KDF architecture where each round’s output determines the next round’s salt:
Password + Salt₀ → KDF₁ → Result₁ → Salt₁ = f(Result₁) → KDF₂ → Result₂ → ... → Final Key
Design Properties:
- Sequential Dependency: Each round requires the previous round’s result
- Dynamic Salting: Salts are derived from previous outputs, not predictable in advance
- Memory-Hard Functions: Argon2 and Balloon hashing require significant memory per attempt
The chained architecture provides several security properties:
| Attack Vector | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| GPU/ASIC parallelization | Sequential dependency forces single-threaded computation |
| Rainbow tables | Dynamic per-round salts prevent precomputation |
| Time-memory trade-offs | Cannot cache intermediate results across attempts |
| Quantum key recovery | Hybrid PQC modes (ML-KEM, HQC) for key encapsulation |
| Password Entropy | KDF Configuration | Time/Attempt | Brute-Force Estimate* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 50 bits (8 random chars) | Balloon ×5 | ~40s | ~10²² years |
| 60 bits (10 random chars) | Balloon ×5 | ~40s | ~10²⁵ years |
| 80 bits (13 random chars) | Balloon ×5 | ~40s | ~10³¹ years |
*Estimates assume: 95-character set, uniformly random password, single-threaded attack, no implementation flaws. Actual security depends on password quality and operational security.
- Strong passwords (12+ random characters) make brute-force computationally infeasible
- Sequential chaining prevents parallelization of key derivation
- Post-quantum algorithms provide resistance against quantum key-recovery attacks
- Limitations: Implementation bugs, side-channel attacks, weak passwords, or compromised systems remain potential risks. No cryptographic system provides absolute guarantees.
The v1.3.0 codebase received an independent security review:
- Score: 8.8/10
- Critical/High findings: 0
- Medium findings: 3 (defense-in-depth improvements, not blocking)
- Dependencies: pip-audit clean, zero known vulnerabilities
See <SECURITY_REVIEW_v1.3.0.md> for the full report.
Core cryptographic/security source files are covered by a PGP-signed integrity
manifest. Verify with openssl-encrypt verify-integrity (a convenience tripwire) or,
authoritatively, with gpg against the out-of-band fingerprint published in
SECURITY.md. Full runbook: docs/SOURCE_INTEGRITY.md.
Modern AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) ciphers:
| Algorithm | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| AES-GCM | ✅ Recommended | NIST standard, hardware-accelerated |
| AES-GCM-SIV | ✅ Recommended | Nonce-misuse resistant |
| ChaCha20-Poly1305 | ✅ Recommended | Software-optimized, constant-time |
| XChaCha20-Poly1305 | ✅ Recommended | Extended nonce (192-bit) |
| AES-SIV | ✅ Supported | Deterministic encryption |
| Fernet | ✅ Default | AES-128-CBC + HMAC, simple API |
| AES-OCB3 | ⚠ Decrypt only | Deprecated in v1.2.0 |
| Camellia | ⚠ Decrypt only | Deprecated in v1.2.0 |
Hybrid encryption combining classical symmetric ciphers with post-quantum KEMs:
NIST Standardized:
- ML-KEM (FIPS 203): ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024
- Kyber: Kyber-512, Kyber-768, Kyber-1024 (original implementation)
NIST Selected (2025):
- HQC: HQC-128, HQC-192, HQC-256
Signature Schemes (for authenticated encryption):
- MAYO: MAYO-1, MAYO-2, MAYO-3, MAYO-5
- CROSS: CROSS-R-SDPG-1, CROSS-R-SDPG-3, CROSS-R-SDPG-5
| KDF | Type | Status | Use Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argon2id | Memory-hard | ✅ Recommended | Default for password hashing |
| Balloon | Memory-hard | ✅ Recommended | Alternative to Argon2 |
| Scrypt | Memory-hard | ✅ Supported | GPU-resistant |
| HKDF | Extract-and-expand | ✅ Supported | Key expansion |
| RandomX | CPU-hard | ✅ Supported | Anti-ASIC (from Monero) |
| PBKDF2 | Iterative | ⚠ Decrypt only | Deprecated in v1.2.0 |
For key derivation chaining:
- SHA-2 Family (FIPS 180-4): SHA-512, SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-224
- SHA-3 Family (FIPS 202): SHA3-512, SHA3-384, SHA3-256, SHA3-224
- BLAKE Family: BLAKE2b, BLAKE3
- SHAKE (XOF): SHAKE-256, SHAKE-128
- Legacy: Whirlpool (decrypt only in v1.2.0+)
Memory Protection:
- Secure memory allocation with mlock/VirtualLock
- Multi-pass memory wiping (random, 0xFF, 0xAA, 0x55, 0x00)
- Constant-time operations for timing attack resistance
File Operations:
- Multi-pass secure deletion (configurable passes)
- Atomic file operations
- Symlink attack protection (O_NOFOLLOW in D-Bus service)
Key Management:
- Encrypted keystore for PQC keys
- Key rotation support
- Dual encryption (password + keystore)
Operational:
- Password policy enforcement
- Common password dictionary check
- Audit logging
The easiest way to install with all dependencies included (Python, liboqs, liboqs-python, Flutter GUI):
# Add the repository
flatpak remote-add --if-not-exists openssl-encrypt https://flatpak.rm-rf.ch/openssl-encrypt.flatpakrepo
# Install latest stable version
flatpak install openssl-encrypt com.opensslencrypt.OpenSSLEncrypt
# Run the application
flatpak run com.opensslencrypt.OpenSSLEncrypt --helpBenefits:
- All dependencies pre-installed (including liboqs and Python bindings)
- Flutter Desktop GUI included
- Sandboxed environment
- Automatic updates
- Works on any Linux distribution
Build Flatpak locally (alternative to using the repository):
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt.git
cd openssl_encrypt/flatpak
# Build and install locally (includes Flutter GUI)
./build-flatpak.sh --build-flutter --local-install
# Or install as development branch (recommended for testing, runs parallel to stable)
./build-flatpak.sh --build-flutter --dev-install
# Run the locally installed flatpak
flatpak run com.opensslencrypt.OpenSSLEncryptBuild options:
--build-flutter- Build Flutter Desktop GUI before packaging--local-install- Install as stable branch (overwrites production)--dev-install- Install as development branch (parallel to production, recommended)-f, --force- Force clean build cache
See flatpak/README.md for detailed build instructions.
Requirements:
- Python 3.11+ (3.12 or 3.13 recommended)
Core Dependencies:
cryptography>=44.0.1
argon2-cffi>=23.1.0
PyYAML>=6.0.2
blake3>=1.0.0
Optional Dependencies:
liboqs-python # Extended PQC support (HQC, ML-DSA, etc.)
# Requires liboqs (https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/liboqs)
tkinter # GUI (usually included with Python)
Install:
# From PyPI (when available)
pip install openssl-encrypt
# From source
git clone https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt.git
cd openssl_encrypt
pip install -e .Note: For full post-quantum support (HQC, ML-DSA), you need to manually install liboqs and liboqs-python. The Flatpak version includes these by default.
# Basic encryption (Fernet, default settings)
python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt encrypt -i file.txt -o file.txt.enc
# AES-GCM with Argon2
python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt encrypt -i file.txt -o file.txt.enc \
--algorithm aes-gcm \
--enable-argon2 --argon2-rounds 3
# Post-quantum hybrid encryption
python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt encrypt -i file.txt -o file.txt.enc \
--algorithm ml-kem-768-hybrid
# Using security templates
python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt encrypt -i file.txt --quick # Fast, good security
python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt encrypt -i file.txt --standard # Balanced (default)
python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt encrypt -i file.txt --paranoid # Maximum security
# Decryption (algorithm auto-detected from metadata)
python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt decrypt -i file.txt.enc -o file.txt
# Secure file deletion
python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt shred -i sensitive.txt --passes 3
# Generate random password
python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt generate --length 20python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt_gui
# or
python -m openssl_encrypt.cli --guiCross-platform GUI available for Linux, macOS, and Windows. See the User Guide for installation.
# Create keystore
python -m openssl_encrypt.keystore_cli_main create --keystore-path keys.pqc
# Generate PQC keypair
python -m openssl_encrypt.keystore_cli_main generate --keystore-path keys.pqc \
--algorithm ml-kem-768
# Encrypt with keystore
python -m openssl_encrypt.crypt encrypt -i file.txt \
--keystore keys.pqc --key-id my-keyPre-configured security profiles in templates/:
| Template | Use Case | KDF | Rounds | Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|
quick.json |
Fast encryption, good security | Argon2 | 1 | ~1s |
standard.json |
Balanced (default) | Argon2 + SHA3 | 3 | ~5s |
paranoid.json |
Maximum security | Argon2 + Balloon + SHA3 | 10+ | ~60s+ |
openssl_encrypt/
├── crypt.py # CLI entry point
├── crypt_gui.py # Tkinter GUI
├── modules/
│ ├── crypt_core.py # Core encryption/decryption
│ ├── crypt_cli.py # CLI implementation
│ ├── crypt_utils.py # Utilities (shred, password gen)
│ ├── crypt_errors.py # Exception classes
│ ├── secure_memory.py # Memory protection
│ ├── secure_ops.py # Constant-time operations
│ ├── balloon.py # Balloon hashing
│ ├── randomx.py # RandomX KDF
│ ├── pqc.py # Post-quantum crypto
│ ├── pqc_adapter.py # PQC algorithm adapter
│ ├── keystore_cli.py # Keystore management
│ ├── password_policy.py # Password validation
│ ├── dbus_service.py # D-Bus integration (Linux)
│ └── plugin_system/ # Plugin sandbox
├── unittests/
│ ├── unittests.py # Main test suite (950+ tests)
│ └── testfiles/ # Test vectors (password: 1234)
├── templates/ # Security profiles
└── docs/ # Documentation
| Document | Description |
|---|---|
| User Guide | Installation, usage, examples, troubleshooting |
| Keystore Guide | PQC key management, dual encryption |
| Security Documentation | Architecture, threat model, best practices |
| Algorithm Reference | Cipher and KDF specifications |
| Metadata Formats | File format specs (v3, v4, v5) |
| Development Setup | Contributing, CI/CD, testing |
# Run all tests
pytest openssl_encrypt/unittests/
# Run with coverage
pytest --cov=openssl_encrypt openssl_encrypt/unittests/
# Run specific test class
pytest openssl_encrypt/unittests/unittests.py::TestCryptCore- Issues: GitHub Issues
- Email: issue+world-openssl-encrypt-2-issue-@gitlab.rm-rf.ch
- Security vulnerabilities: Email only (not public issues)
See file.
OpenSSL Encrypt – File encryption with modern ciphers, post-quantum algorithms, and defense-in-depth key derivation.