Reach out for smart contract security audits on Telegram @audits33
I am a Security Researcher and Smart Contract Developer with five years of experience in web3.
I'm available for Smart Contract Auditing and Development, please reach out below:
| Overall | High risk | Medium risk | Audited contests | Private Audits |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 85 High/Medium | 37 High | 67 Medium | 4 | 24 |
JuiceBox
|
Dein
|
StakeHouse
|
|
V4 Router
|
Uniswap Split Fee Hook
|
BackGeoOracle
|
|
| Gaia Rewards |
Seraph Token
|
Bistro Staking
|
| Project | High | Medium | Report |
|---|---|---|---|
| JuiceBox | 5 | 13 | |
| Dein | 5 | 13 | |
| MCR369 Staking | 2 | 4 | |
| StakeHouse | 4 | 3 | |
| Bistro Staking | 3 | 2 | |
| Libree V3 | 4 | 1 | |
| Libree Proxies | 1 | 2 | |
| Libree ERC6909 | 0 | 1 | |
| Libree V2 | 4 | 0 | |
| Seraph Token | 0 | 2 | |
| Seraph Token v2 | 0 | 2 | |
| 2Phux Finance | 1 | 0 | |
| Gaia Rewards | – | – |
| Project | High | Medium | Report |
|---|---|---|---|
| V4 Router | 1 | 0 | |
| Uniswap Split Fee Hook | 3 | 0 | |
| BackGeoOracle | 2 | 0 | |
| FM Oracle Redeeming | 2 | 0 |
| Project | High | Medium | Report |
|---|---|---|---|
| FortuneFi | 6 | 7 | |
| SwitchX | 3 | 0 | |
| VII Finance | 0 | 0 | |
| Coinwell | 1 | 3 | |
| Plazm EasyMode | 2 | 1 | |
| Poply | 0 | 1 | |
| DLF | 2 | 1 |
| 12 High/Medium | 3 High | 8 Medium | 4 Contests |
| Contest | High | Medium | Report |
|---|---|---|---|
| CodeHawks Escrow | – | 1 | Source |
| DSC Stable Coin | – | 4 | Source |
| BeedleFi | 3 | 2 | Report |
| Sparkn | – | 1 | Source |
| 4 High/Medium | 2 High | 0 Medium | 2 Low |
| Contest | High | Medium | Report |
|---|---|---|---|
| DAAO | 2 | – | Source |
| Sorella | – | 2 | Source |
| 4 High/Medium | 1 High | 3 Medium | 4 Contests |
| Contest | High | Medium | Report |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lambo.win | 1 | 3 | Source |
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Solidity & Smart Contract Development
- UniswapV4 Point Hook - https://github.com/leeftk/uniswapV4-points-hook
- UniswapV4 TWAMM Hook for FWB DAO - https://github.com/leeftk/hooks-fwb/
- Ekubo TWAMM Bridge built in Cairo - https://github.com/leeftk/twamm-ekubo/tree/main
- omniLiquidVaults - cross-chain liquidity vaults powered by LayerZero - https://github.com/leeftk/index-vaultv2
- ENS "Clone" - Full stack dapp displaying frontend skills - click here for demo
- ERC4626 Index Vault for AITokens - https://github.com/leeftk/index-vault
- Account Abstractions Lite - A lite implementation of the Simple Account 4337 wallet by the EF - https://github.com/leeftk/account-abstraction
- AMM router for ProphetBots - https://github.com/leeftk/prophetrouter
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Truffle Boxes - Consensys
- Truffle NFT Box for deploying NFT collections - https://github.com/truffle-box/nft-box
- Truffle DAO Box for deploying a DAO on chain - https://github.com/truffle-box/dao-box
- Truffle Unleashed - Build a Rentable NFT Using ERC-4907 - https://github.com/trufflesuite/unleashed/tree/erc-4907
- Rentable Pets NFT tutorial - https://trufflesuite.com/guides/rentable-nft/
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Truffle Core - Consensys
- Maintained and performed weekly releases for Truffle Core, ensuring its stability and continuous improvement.
- https://github.com/trufflesuite
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Truffle L2 Network Integrations - Consensys
- Integrated L2 functionality into Truffle by incorporating Arbiscan and Optimism scan in fetch-compile.
- https://github.com/trufflesuite/truffle/tree/develop/packages/fetch-and-compile
Uniform-Price Auction: Bake Sale Example (Uniswap CCA)
Bake sale with four people:
Let's assume that you have 115 cookies that you want to sell however you don't set the price for them, you want to see what the market will offer and get the best price via an auction. You ask how much each person would pay per cookie and how much they have to spend:
Anna: "I have $50. I'd pay up to $3 per cookie."
Ben: "I have $40. I'd pay up to $2 per cookie."
Dana: "I have $140. I'd pay up to $2.50 per cookie."
Cal: "I have $25. I'd pay up to $1 per cookie."
You look for one price per cookie where: 115 cookies × price = total money from everyone willing to pay at least that price.
You know total demand is $255 — that's what everyone is willing to spend. But you want the highest price that still sells all 115 cookies, so you go home with zero cookies and the most money possible.
At $2 per cookie you get that: you sell all your cookies and don't have to drop to the lowest price ($1). Anna, Ben, and Dana are willing to pay at least $2, so they fill all the supply. Cal won't get his order filled — his max is $1, which is below $2, and all the cookies are already sold to the others.
Total money from qualifying bidders = $50 + $40 + $140 = $230. 115 × $2 = $230 → supply value = demand.
So clearing price = $2 per cookie. Everyone who qualifies pays $2. Cal stays unfilled and keeps his $25.
How to Find the Clearing Price
Sort bidders by max price (low to high) and walk up. Start with total demand, then subtract each bidder's budget as you move to the next higher price level. Stop when demand from bidders at or above the current price can no longer buy all supply. The last price that cleared is the clearing price.
At $1: cumulative budget $255, demand 255 cookies, clears. At $2: cumulative budget $230, demand 115 cookies, clears. At $2.50: cumulative budget $190, demand 76 cookies, doesn't clear.
We want the highest price that clears, so we keep moving up until we can't clear anymore. That's $2.
Why Low-Balling Doesn't Work
What stops someone from bidding low to bring the price down?
If you bid low, you might get nothing. If the clearing price ends up above your max, you're excluded entirely. You can't control demand above your price — if Anna, Ben, and Dana have enough to clear at $2, the price stays at $2 and you get zero allocation.
If the clearing price ends up above your max, you get nothing. If the clearing price ends up at or below your max, you participate and pay the clearing price.
The only way a low bid "brings the price down" is if you have so much demand at that price that the market can't clear at a higher price without you. In that case you're not manipulating — you're just a large bidder, and you still pay the clearing price. Low-balling is risky: you might miss out entirely.