fix(deps): update dependency @angular/core to v21.2.17 [security] - autoclosed

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
@angular/core (source)	21.2.14 → 21.2.17

---

Angular Client Hydration DOM Clobbering & Response-Cache Poisoning

CVE-2026-54267 / GHSA-rgjc-h3x7-9mwg

More information

Details

To optimize client-side bootstrap in Server-Side Rendered (SSR) environments, Angular supports Hydration via provideClientHydration(). During SSR, Angular serializes the application's runtime state (such as cached HttpClient responses) and outputs it into the HTML stream as a <script> tag with a predictable identifier:

<script type="application/json" id="ng-state">
    {"some-api-url": {"body": ...}}
</script>

During client bootstrap, Angular recovers this state by looking up the element via document.getElementById('ng-state') and parsing its text content.

Because the DOM element lookup for the state container is predictable and relies solely on the ID selector (ng-state), it is susceptible to DOM Clobbering.

If the application binds untrusted user input or CMS content to element properties such as id (e.g., <div [id]="userInput"> or <a id="ng-state">) before the genuine <script> tag is parsed by the browser, the attacker-controlled element takes precedence in the DOM lookup.

During hydration, when Angular calls document.getElementById('ng-state'), the browser returns the attacker's clobbered element. Angular then attempts to parse the text content or attributes of this clobbered element as JSON.

Impact

By clobbering the state element, the attacker can inject a custom JSON payload into Angular's TransferState cache. The most critical exploitation vector is poisoning the HTTP Transfer Cache.

1. The attacker injects a clobbered ng-state element containing custom JSON.
2. The JSON maps a key (representing a target API endpoint URL) to a malicious payload of the attacker's choice.
3. During client-side initialization, Angular's HttpClient checks TransferState before making requests. Finding the poisoned key, HttpClient returns the forged response instantly instead of requesting the genuine backend API.

Depending on how the application processes and renders the affected API response, this can lead to:

• DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if poisoned fields are rendered using unsafe bindings.
• Privilege Escalation by spoofing user info or session details retrieved from poisoned API payloads.
• UI Hijacking and redirection by spoofing configuration endpoints.

Patched Versions

• 22.0.1
• 21.2.17
• 20.3.25

Workarounds

If you cannot immediately update to a patched Angular version, apply the following workarounds:

A. Avoid Dynamic/User-Controlled IDs

Avoid binding raw user-supplied values or dynamic CMS IDs directly to element attributes. If dynamic IDs are required, sanitize them or prepend a static safe prefix:

<!-- Vulnerable Pattern -->
<div [id]="userControlledInput">...</div>

<!-- Mitigated Pattern -->
<div [id]="'safe-prefix-' + userControlledInput">...</div>

B. Configure a Custom Application ID

Declaring a unique, non-predictable APP_ID changes the ID suffix of the state element, making it harder for attackers to predict and target:

// app.config.ts

import { APP_ID } from '@​angular/core';
import { provideClientHydration } from '@​angular/platform-browser';

export const appConfig = {
  providers: [
    { provide: APP_ID, useValue: 'unique-obfuscated-app-id' },
    provideClientHydration()
  ]
};

This changes the state element lookup ID from ng-state to unique-obfuscated-app-id-state.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.6 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-rgjc-h3x7-9mwg
• https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69064
• https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/6bde84fa8e6a5770b54040fbbc9bf10d5d0386fa
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rgjc-h3x7-9mwg

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

@​angular/core: Angular Template and Dynamic Component Namespace Bypass leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

CVE-2026-52725 / GHSA-692r-grfm-v8x7

More information

Details

An issue in the @angular/core package allows bypassing script-execution restrictions during dynamic component creation.

Specifically, the dynamic component instantiation mechanism (createComponent) failed to reject mounting components directly onto a <script> or namespaced script element (such as <svg:script>). This enabled the initialization of custom components on a tag that executes scripts, allowing attackers to hijack or inject script-executing hosts.

This flaw enables an attacker who can control the host element or selector parameter passed to createComponent to initialize or mount an Angular component directly onto a <script> tag, leading to execution of untrusted code or client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).

Impact

Any Angular application that registers dynamic components based on user-supplied parameters (like selectors or host elements) is vulnerable to this security bypass.

Once exploited, this allows a malicious actor to mount a dynamic component on a script tag, bypassing core dynamic component creation safeguards to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the target user's browser context. This could lead to session hijacking, sensitive data exposure, or unauthorized actions on behalf of the user.

Attack Preconditions

To successfully exploit these vulnerabilities, the following environment parameters and application states must all concurrently exist:

1. User-Controlled Host Selection: The application must accept user-controlled inputs that are passed as a selector/host element to createComponent.
2. Absence of Additional Context Sanitization: The application does not perform separate input sanitization before feeding values to the dynamic creation APIs.

Patches

• 22.0.0-rc.2
• 21.2.15
• 20.3.22
• 19.2.23

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-692r-grfm-v8x7
• https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/68686
• https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/68713
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-692r-grfm-v8x7

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Angular: Template and Attribute Namespace Sanitization Bypass (XSS)

CVE-2026-50557 / GHSA-f3m7-gqxr-g87x

More information

Details

An issue in the @angular/compiler and @angular/core packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.

Specifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., <svg:script> or <:svg:script>) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.

Furthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.

Combined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).

Impact

Any Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.

Once exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribute bindings, bypassing core sanitization constraints to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the target user's browser context. This could lead to session hijacking, sensitive data exposure, or unauthorized actions on behalf of the user.

Attack Preconditions

To successfully exploit these vulnerabilities, the following environment parameters and application states must all concurrently exist:

1. User-Controlled Template Input: The application must accept user-controlled inputs that are directly processed by the Angular template compiler at runtime.
2. Namespace Parsing Support: The input structure must employ custom namespace prefixes (such as <svg:script>) to evade standard tag-name blocklists/checks.
3. Absence of Additional Context Sanitization: The application does not perform separate input sanitization before feeding values to the Angular compiler.

Patches

• 22.0.0-rc.2
• 21.2.15
• 20.3.22
• 19.2.23

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-f3m7-gqxr-g87x
• https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/68689
• https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/68868
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f3m7-gqxr-g87x

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

angular/angular (@​angular/core)

v21.2.17

Compare Source

Deprecations

platform-server

• XHR support in @angular/platform-server is deprecated. Use standard fetch APIs instead.

common

Commit	Type	Description
86a56dc279	fix	Limits date format string length
d846326b07	fix	skip transfer cache for uncacheable HTTP traffic
bc55749698	fix	use cryptographically secure SHA-256 for transfer cache key generation

compiler

Commit	Type	Description
dc9c99636d	fix	sanitize two-way properties

core

Commit	Type	Description
1523061137	fix	harden TransferState restoration against DOM clobbering
88832c84f8	fix	validate lowercase SVG animation attribute names (#​69269)

http

Commit	Type	Description
bcb1b7ea25	fix	preserve empty referrer option in HttpRequest
a810a319d1	fix	Rejects non-HTTP(S) URLs in JSONP requests
e245d40c4d	fix	skip transfer cache for fetch credentialed requests

platform-server

Commit	Type	Description
35510746b7	fix	harden platform location origin validation during SSR
13fb0afe93	refactor	deprecate ServerXhr (#​69255)

service-worker

Commit	Type	Description
b9d29381bb	fix	Strips sensitive headers on cross-origin redirects

v21.2.16

Compare Source

common

Commit	Type	Description
f6d8e642b0	fix	only strip a literal /index.html suffix from URLs

compiler

Commit	Type	Description
ae1c8a1f7a	fix	move projection attributes into constants

core

Commit	Type	Description
3fd6897a67	fix	harden inherit definition feature against polluted prototypes
7e38336dc7	fix	use Object.create(null) for LOCALE_DATA as a hardening measure

platform-server

Commit	Type	Description
66821c4ed5	fix	throw on suspicious URLs and restrict protocol-relative URLs
d3170031b6	fix	update domino to latest version

v21.2.15

Compare Source

common

Commit	Type	Description
7f4ac78994	fix	add upper bounds for digitsInfo
300f61feb3	fix	sanitize placeholder

compiler

Commit	Type	Description
0b07f47bd6	fix	normalize tag names with custom namespaces in DomElementSchemaRegistry (#​68925)
eb1cbbf2eb	fix	prevent namespaced SVG <style> elements from being stripped
cc1378d54b	fix	sanitize dynamic href and xlink:href bindings on SVG a elements (#​68925)
782e01594e	fix	strip namespaced SVG script elements during template compilation (#​68925)

core

Commit	Type	Description
ff12fe55ac	fix	normalize tag names in runtime i18n attribute security context lookup (#​68925)
e6fe77cc97	fix	sanitize meta selectors
daaf32937f	fix	support prefix-insensitive DOM schema lookups and compile-time i18n attribute validation (#​68925)
dada86e43d	fix	synchronize core sanitization schema with compiler (#​68925)

http

Commit	Type	Description
582a417bd2	fix	exclude withCredentials requests from transfer cache
5c6d6df34b	fix	skip TransferCache for cookie-bearing requests by default

platform-server

Commit	Type	Description
37e8aadf87	fix	prevent SSRF bypasses via backslash URLs in HttpClient
72696e244e	fix	secure location and document initialization against SSRF and path hijack

service-worker

Commit	Type	Description
b8bd49341d	fix	Preserves explicit 'credentials: omit' in asset requests
ca32fc1000	fix	Preserves HTTP cache mode in asset group requests

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[codacy-production]

Up to standards ✅

🟢 Issues 0 issues

Results:
0 new issues

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🟢 Metrics 0 complexity

Metric	Results
Complexity	✅ 0 (≤ 20 complexity)

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🟢 Coverage ∅ diff coverage · +0.00% coverage variation

Metric	Results
Coverage variation	✅ +0.00% coverage variation (-1.00%)
Diff coverage	✅ ∅ diff coverage

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Coverage variation details

	Coverable lines	Covered lines	Coverage
Common ancestor commit (2f9f86e)	15036	7250	48.22%
Head commit (ccee3d1)	15036 (+0)	7250 (+0)	48.22% (+0.00%)

Coverage variation is the difference between the coverage for the head and common ancestor commits of the pull request branch: <coverage of head commit> - <coverage of common ancestor commit>

Diff coverage details

	Coverable lines	Covered lines	Diff coverage
Pull request (#1111)	0	0	∅ (not applicable)

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[github-actions]

🚨 Client Code Validation Failed 🚨

The client code in /client/src/app/core/modules/openapi is not up-to-date.
Please regenerate the client code by running:

cd ./client
pnpm generate:openapi

Commit and push the updated files.