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Create test5.html#27
maekuss wants to merge 1 commit into
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maekuss-patch-15

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@maekuss maekuss commented Dec 4, 2025

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🔒 Hacktron Security Scan Results

🔐 Hacktron Security Analysis

Overview

This PR introduces a postMessage demonstration that contains critical security vulnerabilities. The implementation lacks proper origin validation and uses unsafe DOM manipulation techniques.

🚨 Attack Flow Diagram

sequenceDiagram
    participant Attacker
    participant VictimPage as Victim Page (test5.html)
    participant DOM
    
    Attacker->>VictimPage: postMessage(malicious_payload, "*")
    Note over Attacker,VictimPage: No origin restriction!
    
    VictimPage->>VictimPage: addEventListener("message")
    Note over VictimPage: No origin validation ❌
    
    VictimPage->>DOM: innerHTML = event.data
    Note over VictimPage,DOM: Unsafe assignment ❌
    
    DOM->>DOM: Execute malicious script
    Note over DOM: XSS triggered! 🚨
    
    DOM-->>Attacker: Steal cookies/tokens
Loading

📋 What This PR Does

  • Demonstrates cross-origin communication using postMessage API
  • Shows message passing between parent and child windows
  • ⚠️ Contains intentional security flaws for educational purposes

🔍 Security Issues Found

  1. Critical: DOM-based XSS vulnerability via innerHTML
  2. High: Unrestricted targetOrigin in postMessage sender
  3. Medium: Missing origin validation in message receiver

🛠️ Technical Details

File: test5.html

Vulnerable Code Patterns:

  • Line 30: innerHTML = event.data (XSS vector)
  • Line 28: No event.origin validation
  • Line 45: postMessage(message, "*") (wildcard origin)

⚡ Impact Assessment

  • Confidentiality: HIGH - Attacker can steal sensitive data
  • Integrity: HIGH - Attacker can modify page content
  • Availability: MEDIUM - Potential for DoS via malicious messages

🔒 Recommended Actions

  1. Add origin validation in message handler
  2. Replace innerHTML with textContent or use DOMPurify
  3. Specify exact targetOrigin instead of wildcard
  4. Implement Content Security Policy (CSP)

This security analysis was automatically generated by Hacktron


📊 Summary

  • Total Findings: 3
  • Critical: 1 🚨
  • High: 1 🔴
  • Medium: 1 🟡

🔍 Findings

🚨 Critical

  1. DOM-Based XSS via Unsafe innerHTML Assignment
    • File: test5.html
    • Description: The code directly assigns user-controlled data from event.data to innerHTML without sanitization. This creates a DOM-based XSS vulnerability where an attacker can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript code that will be executed in the context of the page.
    • Category: vulnerability

🔴 High

  1. Unrestricted postMessage targetOrigin Allows Cross-Origin Data Leakage
    • File: test5.html
    • Description: The postMessage call uses a wildcard (*) as the targetOrigin parameter, which means any website can receive the message. This creates a security vulnerability where sensitive data could be intercepted by malicious sites.
    • Category: vulnerability

🟡 Medium

  1. Missing Origin Validation in postMessage Event Handler
    • File: test5.html
    • Description: The message event listener does not validate the origin of incoming messages using event.origin. This allows any website to send messages to this page, potentially triggering unintended actions or injecting malicious content.
    • Category: vulnerability

📋 View Full Scan Report

Powered by Hacktron

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🚨 DOM-Based XSS via Unsafe innerHTML Assignment

Severity: critical
File: test5.html

Description: The code directly assigns user-controlled data from event.data to innerHTML without sanitization. This creates a DOM-based XSS vulnerability where an attacker can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript code that will be executed in the context of the page.

Proof of Concept:

An attacker can send a message containing malicious HTML/JavaScript: postMessage("<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>", "*") which will execute arbitrary code.

Finding ID: 2E85E3F2-BB6A-4BBD-B01C-46B17ADFFEC4

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🟡 Missing Origin Validation in postMessage Event Handler

Severity: medium
File: test5.html

Description: The message event listener does not validate the origin of incoming messages using event.origin. This allows any website to send messages to this page, potentially triggering unintended actions or injecting malicious content.

Proof of Concept:

A malicious website can send crafted messages to this page without any origin checks, potentially leading to XSS or other attacks.

Finding ID: C8515179-C849-4DE3-A2A8-3E8D9B1A01B2

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🔴 Unrestricted postMessage targetOrigin Allows Cross-Origin Data Leakage

Severity: high
File: test5.html

Description: The postMessage call uses a wildcard (*) as the targetOrigin parameter, which means any website can receive the message. This creates a security vulnerability where sensitive data could be intercepted by malicious sites.

Proof of Concept:

An attacker can create a malicious iframe that listens for postMessage events and captures sensitive data being transmitted.

Finding ID: F3C406DA-052C-43AD-A25F-153CBBD0E38E

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