fix(security): force attachment disposition for SVG uploads#3023
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tomqiaozc wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix(security): force attachment disposition for SVG uploads#3023tomqiaozc wants to merge 1 commit into
tomqiaozc wants to merge 1 commit into
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SVG files are XML and can carry <script>, <foreignObject>, or onload= attributes that execute in the document's origin when rendered inline. The upload handler maps .svg to image/svg+xml, and storage backends (local + S3) previously set Content-Disposition: inline based on the image/ prefix in isInlineContentType. A workspace member could upload a crafted SVG, share its attachment URL in an issue or comment, and any teammate who clicks the link would execute attacker-controlled JS in the application's first-party origin (reading auth cookies, posting to authenticated endpoints). Exclude image/svg+xml from isInlineContentType so both storage paths serve SVG with Content-Disposition: attachment. Test coverage: - New util_test.go covers the inline/attachment matrix including SVG. - Existing local_test.go ContentDisposition table gains an SVG case.
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Summary
Fixes #3022.
Uploaded SVG files were served with
Content-Disposition: inlinebecauseisInlineContentTypereturnedtruefor anyimage/*MIME type. SVG is XML —<script>,<foreignObject>, andonload=execute when rendered inline — so a workspace member could upload a crafted.svg, share its attachment URL, and any clicker would execute attacker-controlled JS in the application's first-party origin (cookie theft, authenticated API calls).This PR excludes
image/svg+xmlfromisInlineContentType, so the local and S3 storage backends both serve SVG withContent-Disposition: attachment. Browsers do not run scripts in downloaded files.Why this approach
Test plan
server/internal/storage/util_test.gocoversisInlineContentTypewithimage/svg+xml→falseand the existing inline types →true.TestLocalStorage_ServeFile_ContentDispositionFromSidecarwith an SVG case assertingContent-Disposition: attachment; filename="logo.svg".make test(reviewer-side; my local environment lacks Go).