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Exclude attacker-planted-cookie attacks from the threat model#1314

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lovasoa merged 1 commit into
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ophir.lojkine/security-exclude-cookie-planting
Jun 10, 2026
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Exclude attacker-planted-cookie attacks from the threat model#1314
lovasoa merged 1 commit into
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ophir.lojkine/security-exclude-cookie-planting

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@lovasoa lovasoa commented Jun 10, 2026

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Documents that attacks requiring the attacker to write cookies into the victim's browser are out of scope.

This is the precondition behind the OIDC login-CSRF / session-fixation class (forged sqlpage_oidc_state_* cookie). Signing the cookie does not close it (an attacker can copy a validly server-signed cookie from their own flow), and a server-side one-time state store does not either (the attacker's state is validly issued and consumed once by the victim). The realistic defense is cookie-injection hardening, but defending against an attacker who can already write cookies to the exact origin is not something SQLPage can guarantee.

Adds one bullet to the Out of Scope list in SECURITY.md. Docs only.

Attacks that require injecting attacker-chosen cookies into the victim's
browser (e.g. OIDC login CSRF / session fixation via a forged login-flow
-state cookie) are out of scope: SQLPage assumes its origin cookie jar is
writable only by the user agent.
@lovasoa lovasoa merged commit fe13e4a into main Jun 10, 2026
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@lovasoa lovasoa deleted the ophir.lojkine/security-exclude-cookie-planting branch June 10, 2026 14:54
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